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Introduction
Why Study International Family Law?
Why Study ‘International’ Family Law?
This question contains three related but distinct questions,  all of which pivot on the 
multiple meanings of  ‘international’ in this context.  First, why study international
family law as opposed to domestic family law?  Second, why study international
family law as opposed to comparative family law?  Third, why study international (i.e. 
private and public) family law rather than private family law?  The answers to these 
questions explain the purpose, scope, and approach of this book. 
‘International’ vs. ‘Domestic’ Family Law: The Importance of International   
Family Law 
The answer here is pragmatic. International Family Law (IFL) is an essential part of 
any Family Law curriculum, or any family lawyer’s library, because the practice of 
family law has in fact become globalized.  Lawyers inevitably encounter clients whose 
family law problems extend beyond national boundaries, including problems in which 
the laws of more than one state must be taken into account. Lawyers everywhere are 
increasingly confronted with issues regarding international adoption, child abduction, 
divorce, custody and domestic violence, where the parties reside in, or are citizens of, 
different states.   
This is not surprising.  As the United Nations notes, families are the primary unit of 
social organization, and families are changing, trying to adapt to new demands and 
taking advantage of new mobility.  Globalization is transforming family law.  Women 
are seeking asylum as refugees, fleeing domestic violence. Workers are following jobs, 
leaving their families behind and sometimes starting new families in their new 
countries.  Child abduction has become an increasing threat as parents of different 
nationalities divorce, and both want their children to be raised in their own national 
traditions. 
Even as ties to such traditions become increasingly attenuated, their appeal may 
become stronger for some.  Local religious leaders, similarly, may insist on even 
stricter adherence to local customs, especially those related to marriage, divorce, and 
the care and custody of children, as their authority is challenged by competing customs 
and international norms. In many  States, such as Saudi Arabia, family law is basically 
left to religious authorities.  This reflects both its relatively low importance to national 
governments (compared to matters of trade and finance, for example) and its 
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paradoxically high importance to those who seek to shape the national identity.  As 
Article 9 of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia states, ‘the family is the kernel of Saudi 
society, and its members shall be brought up on the basis of Islamic faith.’ There are 
powerful trends and countertrends everywhere, and  competing norms of family law 
are at the core of each. 
These play out in a range of contexts, such as the recognition of marriage, child 
custody jurisdiction, enforcement of foreign support awards, and adoptions, which 
already claim a significant amount of class time in family law courses and account for 
a similarly significant number of hours in family law practice.  The extraterritorial 
expansion of family law poses new challenges, but the basic analytic framework 
remains the same.  First, we identify procedures that do not mesh, distinguishing those 
that are better characterized as procedural from those that reflect more substantive 
differences in underlying policy. Second, we find or create mechanisms for 
reconciliation, where possible, or for the orderly resolution of disputes where 
reconciliation is not possible.  
While major issues in international family law, such as those addressed in the 
Hague Convention on Child Abduction, can be at least touched upon in a general 
course, growing numbers of students go on to specialize in family law.  For these 
future lawyers, IFL is increasingly a necessity.  In fact, the failure to anticipate 
international family law issues, such as the removal of children to another country 
during visitation, may well expose a lawyer to a malpractice claim. 
‘International’ Family Law vs. ‘Comparative’ Family Law 
Second, why study  ‘international family’ as opposed to ‘comparative’ family law?  
‘International’ here refers to shared or agreed upon rules and norms among a group of 
States, while ‘comparative’ refers to the respective rules and norms applicable in two 
or more particular States.  Comparative family law is an essential component of IFL.   
The ways in which different domestic legal systems address custody disputes or 
invalidate marriages must be understood in the practice of IFL. The study of 
comparative law is also invaluable for gaining insight into other cultures and 
expanding horizons. Lawmakers increasingly look abroad for new approaches to 
intractable domestic problems. 
They must keep in mind, however, that legal norms do not operate in the 
abstract, but in specific cultural contexts. A particular reform, such as retroactive 
laws opening adoption records, might be functional because it is compatible with 
the underlying social norms in one context but not in another.   Comparative 
family law requires lawyers to focus on the ways in which culture supports or 
undermines law. The comparative perspective not only provides a window into 
another culture, but exposes the often unquestioned assumptions of one’s own.  
Studying custodial presumptions in Islamic states, for example, exposes  ways in 
which culture shapes such presumptions, which may not be as visible when 
dealing with the culture in which we are immersed.  
Thus, the comparative element of international family law enables law 
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students to gain a perspective on their own law. While comparative analysis is an 
integral part of IFL, the analytic and procedural processes which govern the 
interaction between national laws is the focus of this book.   That is, the emphasis 
here is on the legal mechanisms devised by the international community to resolve 
or reconcile the different perspectives that a study of comparative family law 
reveals.  
‘International’ Family Law vs. ‘Private’ International Family Law
‘Private’ international law historically referred to the rules regarding conflicts of law in 
disputes between private legal persons, including individuals or corporations.  Public 
international law, in contrast, historically referred to the rules and norms governing 
disputes among nation States.  As many commentators have observed, the distinction 
between public and private international law has steadily eroded.    States increasingly 
engage in the same kinds of commercial activities as private entities.  In addition, 
because of the growing influence of international human rights, the individual has 
increasingly become the subject of public international law.   
Historically, IFL has been regarded primarily as the province of private 
international law, requiring familiarity with conflicts of law principles in general 
and the conventions promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private Law in 
particular.  Public international law plays an increasingly important role, 
however.  Even as the Hague Conference studies the problem of transnational 
child support, for example, States enter into growing numbers of bilateral treaties 
addressing the issue.  (See Chapter 10, section 7.)  Such treaties are governed by 
public international law. 
International human rights law, moreover, has become an increasingly 
pervasive factor in international family law, from the refusal to recognize 
institutions such as polygamy (as a violation of human rights) to the recognition 
of reproductive rights. International human rights law also recognizes affirmative 
economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to maternal protection 
before and after the birth of a child, which are explicitly identified as rights owed 
to the family as such.  Finally, rights of individuals within the family, such as the 
child’s rights to freedom of religion, raise issues of State interference with family 
privacy.  The State has an obligation to protect the child’s rights without violating 
the rights of the family unit. 
In sum, the erosion between public and private international law has been so 
thorough in the context of international family law that the subject can no longer be 
understood merely as a part of private international law.  Rather, it requires a grasp of 
the applicable public international laws, especially human rights law, as well.  Thus, 
this book addresses international family law, encompassing the principles of public as 
well as private international law. 
4 International Family Law 
The Approach
Each topic in IFL is addressed in a separate chapter.  Each chapter takes  the same 
basic approach, although different aspects of this basic approach are emphasized for 
different topics.  In general, each chapter tracks the following outline: 
1. The Problem  
2. Overview 
3. Cultural Variations 
4. Private International Law 
5. Public International Law 
6. Regional Conventions 
7. National Implementation 
8.  International Organizations (IOs) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) 
The substantive content and objectives of each section are described below. 
The Problem
Each chapter begins with  one or two problems.  There are concrete fact situations, 
often based on actual cases.  The problem provides law students with a focus for the 
chapter and practitioners with analyses for some of the most common kinds of 
problems encountered in practice. The materials that follow explain the general 
principles to be applied and provide a few examples of local variations. 
After reading the entire chapter the student should be able to answer the question 
posed or solve the problem presented in broad terms.  It must be stressed, however, 
that local counsel should be consulted in actual practice. As a practical matter, foreign 
counsel is likely to be barred from actually representing a client under local or national 
rules governing the practice of law.  As the problems indicate, however, legal 
representation is not always required in many cases where advice is sought.  (At least 
no legal representation is required at that point.) The problem in Chapter 6, for 
example, presents a hypothetical in which the client wants to know which of three 
States is most likely to grant her asylum.  Actually preparing an application for asylum 
would be the responsibility of the lawyer in the asylum State.  Even where local 
counsel is necessary, moreover, a basic understanding of the substantive law and 
procedural posture will enable the lawyer to be more helpful to both the client and to 
local counsel. 
Often, as in actual practice, there is not one correct answer but a range of 
possibilities.  The question then becomes one of strategy, that is, how to present the 
case in a manner that is likely to lead to the client’s desired outcome.  Sometimes, of 
course, the client’s desired outcome is not a realistic possibility.  Then the question 
becomes: what is the best possible result for the client in this situation?  How can other 
options be generated?  
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Overview 
The purpose of this section is both to introduce the particular topic to those for whom 
family law is a new subject and to broaden the understanding of the topic for those 
who have studied or practiced in a single national context.  It begins by describing the 
scope and function of the law, the circumstances in which it becomes important and 
the parties likely to be involved.  Each section includes a range of perspectives to 
remind the reader that there is no ‘neutral’ overview; any orientation necessarily 
reflects some perspectives and omits others. 
Cultural Variations
The third section discusses both specific national approaches and ethnic or religious 
approaches that cross national boundaries.  In each chapter, this section focuses on one 
particular aspect of the law, such as the requirement of ‘consent’ in Chapter 1,  to 
suggest the range of approaches to a single issue.   
The point is to problematize what might otherwise be perceived as straightforward 
doctrine.  The simple requirement of ‘consent,’ for example, may refer to the consent 
of the parties to the marriage, or it may refer to the consent of their fathers. Cultural 
variations are often expressed in the form of legal presumptions, that which a 
particular culture accepts as ‘natural.’ Under the Hanafi school of Islamic family law, 
for example, the assent of a virgin to a marriage may be presumed from her silence, 
her laughter, or her tears, which are interpreted as regret about leaving her parents (El 
Alami and Hinchcliff, 1996). The range of presumptions in a particular context 
illustrates the range of custom that has been naturalized.  Indeed, in some cases, such 
as custody presumptions in favor of fathers or mothers, ‘cultural variations’ may 
include polar opposites.  
Private International Law Conventions
Each chapter sets out the pertinent provisions of the private international law 
conventions, if any, that govern that particular issue in family law.  Family law in 
many States is a matter of national or sub-national, i.e., state or provincial, law.  A 
major exception is those States in which family law is basically delegated to religious 
authorities.  IFL focuses on  the ways in which these various systems are  harmonized 
on the international level. 
This has been accomplished through private international law conventions, such as 
the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, the Hague Convention on Intercountry 
Adoption, and the Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations 
Toward Children.  A list of the Hague Conventions on Private International Law can 
be found at www.hcch.net/e/conventions/index.html. (Lists of States Parties are also 
available at this site.)  These treaties are binding on States parties.  In many States, 
such treaties become enforceable in national courts through implementing legislation.  
Under international law, a State is legally obligated under a convention it has ratified 
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even if it has not yet enacted domestic law to implement that treaty. 
An excellent introduction to the Hague Conference is available on its website.  An 
excerpt is printed below. 
Hague Conference InfoSheet1
Intro The Hague Conference on private international law is an intergovernmental 
organization the purpose of which is ‘to work for the progressive unification of the rules of 
private international law’ (Statute, Article 1). 
Background, Establishment and Status  The First Session of the Hague Conference on 
private international law was convened in 1893 by the Netherlands Government on the 
initiative of T.M.C. Asser.  The Seventh Session in 1951 marked the beginning of a new era 
with the Plenary Sessions meet in principle every four years in ordinary diplomatic session. 
In case of need, as occurred in 1966 and 1985, an Extraordinary Session may be held.  The 
Plenary Sessions discuss and adopt the draft Conventions (and sometimes 
Recommendations) prepared by the Special Commissions and take decisions on the 
subjects to be included in the agenda for the Conference’s work.  All of the texts adopted 
are brought together in a Final Act which is signed by the delegations.  Under the rules of 
procedure of the Plenary Sessions each Member State has one vote.  Decisions are taken by 
a majority of the votes cast by the delegations of Member States which are present at the 
vote.  Non-Member States invited to participate on an equal footing with Member States 
also have the right to vote. 
* * * 
Secretariat  The activities of the Conference are organized by a secretariat – the Permanent 
Bureau – which has its seat at The Hague and whose officials must be of different 
nationalities.  The Secretary General is currently assisted by four lawyers: a Deputy 
Secretary General and three First Secretaries.  The Permanent Bureau’s main task is the 
preparation and organization of the Plenary Sessions and the Special Commissions.  Its 
members carry out the basic research required for any subject that the Conference takes up. 
* * * 
Methods of operation  The principal method used to achieve the purpose of the Conference 
consists in the negotiation and drafting of multilateral treaties or Conventions in the 
different fields of private international law (international judicial and administrative co-
operation;  
* * * 
maintenance obligations, status and protection of children, relations between spouses.  After 
preparatory research has been done by the secretariat, preliminary drafts of the Conventions 
are drawn up by the Special Commissions made up of governmental experts.  The drafts are 
then discussed and adopted at a Plenary Session of the Hague Conference, which is a 
diplomatic conference. 
 The secretariat of the Hague Conference maintains close contacts with the Governments 
of its Member States through National Organs designated by each Government.  For the 
purpose of monitoring the operation of certain treaties involving judicial or administrative 
co-operation, the Permanent Bureau enters into direct contact from time to time with the 
Central Authorities designated by the States Parties to such treaties.  In order to promote 
international co-operation and to ensure co-ordination of work undertaken by different 
bodies, the Hague Conference also maintains continuing contacts with a number of 
international organizations, including the United Nations – particularly its Commission of 
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International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNICEF, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – the Council of Europe, the 
European Union, the Organization of American States, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, the International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law (Unidroit) and others.  Certain non-governmental organizations, such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the International Bar Association, International Social 
Service, the International Society of Family Law and the International Union of Latin 
Notaries also send observers to follow the meetings of the Hague Conference. 
Achievements, monitoring of results and work in progress  From 1951 to 2002 the 
Conference adopted 35 international Conventions.  Until 1960 the Conventions were 
drafted only in French; since then they have been drawn up in French and English.  Among 
those that have been the most widely ratified, the following Conventions should be 
mentioned: maintenance obligations, recognition of divorces, protection of minors, 
international child abduction and intercountry adoption.  Some of the Hague Conventions 
deal with the determination of the applicable law, some with the conflict of jurisdictions, 
some with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and some with 
administrative and judicial co-operation between authorities.  Some of the Hague 
Conventions combine one or more of these aspects of private international law. 
From time to time, Special Commissions are held at The Hague to monitor the practical 
operation of Hague Conventions.  In the past, such Commissions have been convoked for   
the Child Abduction Convention, the Intercountry Adoption Convention and the 
Conventions on maintenance (support) obligations. 
Public International Law 
State family law is also subject to public international law, including international 
human rights law.  As set out in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, there 
are three sources of international law.  First, international law may be made by treaty; 
that is, a binding agreement entered into by two or more States.  Examples include the 
U.N. Charter and the human rights conventions discussed below, all of which are 
multilateral treaties, and the bilateral treaties regarding child support (discussed in 
Chapter 10) and spousal maintenance (discussed in Chapter 5). 
 Second, international law may be found in customary international law, which has 
two elements: (1) State practice, and (2) opinio juris; that is, the belief that such State 
practice is legally mandated.  Torture, for example, is a violation of customary 
international law.  No State claims that it may legally engage in torture.  On the 
contrary, all States have official policies against torture, reflecting their common 
understanding that it is prohibited in the international community.  This does not mean, 
of course, that no State actually engages in torture.  It simply means that it does so 
secretly, or contends that a particular practice is not in fact ‘torture.’  As discussed in 
Chapter 11, for example, domestic violence may amount to torture although this is not 
recognized by most States. 
Customary international law may be shown through State practice over time, in the 
form of State adherence to international treaties, declarations, or General Assembly 
resolutions, through the enactment of domestic legislation, through executive action, 
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and through a State’s own judicial decisions. The accretion of such practice, 
accompanied by evidence that the State believed that such practice was legally 
mandated, constitutes customary international law.  Where consensus among States is 
clear and no State objects, less practice may be needed.  
Third, and finally, international law may be found in the ‘general principles’ of law 
recognized by States.  These include principles such as res judicata or the commonly 
accepted understanding that statements made to one’s lawyer are privileged.  In the 
context of ILF, however, general principles may not be applicable.  Res judicata, for 
example, may not apply to the custody determination of one State because another 
considers that determination subject to its modification, or contrary to the best interest 
of the child. 
The major international human rights treaties affecting family law are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’ or the ‘Civil 
Covenant,’) the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(‘ICESCR’ or the ‘Economic Covenant’), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’ or the ‘Women’s Convention’), 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’ or the ‘Child’s Convention’).  
The pertinent sections of each of these instruments are set forth in the chapters in 
which they apply most directly.  There is some cross-referencing in order to avoid 
repetition, but there is also some repetition for the reader’s convenience.  Complete 
texts of the instruments can be found in the treaty series cited in the chapters or at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree. (Lists of States Parties are also available at 
this site.)   
Some States ratify human rights conventions subject to reservations regarding 
specific provisions.  This means that the State accepts its obligations under the treaty 
with the exception of the particular article to which it has taken a reservation.  Many 
Islamic States, for example, have taken reservations to Article 16 of the Women’s 
Convention, addressing family rights. The usual reservation provides that the State 
accepts the cited article to the extent that it is consistent with Shari’ah, Islamic 
personal law. 
Regional Conventions
This section sets forth the pertinent regional conventions, private and public, 
governing and harmonizing national family law.  Most of the regional private law 
conventions involve European States. 
The relevant provisions, if any, of the various regional public law conventions, 
establish another layer of human rights protection.  The most important regional 
conventions for purposes of IFL include the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of Children.  The European Convention has been useful in 
protecting the rights of sexual minorities, particularly gays, lesbians and transgendered 
persons. The Inter-American Convention has been used to establish State 
responsibility in connection with domestic violence.  The African Charter restricts 
Introduction 9
intercountry adoption in Africa, explicitly preferring institutionalization in the child’s 
country of origin to intercountry adoption. Where there are no feasible alternatives, 
intercountry adoption may be considered, but even then, it is limited to those countries 
which are also parties to the Charter or to the CRC. This has recently been challenged 
under the South African Constitution, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
National Implementation
This section considers the national implementation of international norms.  
Implementing legislation may be required in those States, like the United Kingdom and 
the United States, which do not incorporate international treaties as part of domestic 
law. Implementing legislation may be useful even in those States which do incorporate 
treaties, since it enables the State to tailor the treaty to national circumstances. 
In addition, national laws often function on both a national (or federal)  and a local 
level.  While cooperation with a local lawyer will probably be necessary, an overview 
of the national family law system may facilitate such cooperation.  The U.S. State 
Department maintains some useful sites, e.g., http://travel.state.gove/abduct.html 
(International Parental Child Abduction, with links to Application for Assistance; 
Booklet, Islamic Family Law, Judicial Education), and country-specific flyers. 
Conflicts questions are apt to be decided under the national conflicts law of the 
State asserting jurisdiction.  As in the domestic sphere, forum non conveniens
arguments may sometimes prevail.  In general, however, the foreign State is likely to 
retain jurisdiction where it believes that the issue raises important public policy 
concerns.  Deference to foreign law, reasonably expected in a commercial context, is 
more elusive when matters involving highly-charged family issues are at stake. 
IOs and NGOs
The last section describes some of the roles played by non-State actors in IFL. 
International organizations (IOs), that is, organizations comprised of States such as the 
United Nations or UNIFEM, often exert a strong influence in this area.  As discussed 
in Chapter 6, for example, UNIFEM has established an internet working group to end 
violence against women.  This represents a broad-based effort, which coordinates  
strategies involving education, training, mobilization, and changing male behavior.  
The World Health Organization (‘WHO’), similarly, has supported efforts throughout 
the world to educate teenagers and young adults about reproduction and different 
forms of birth control.  These are described in Chapter 7. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also increasingly important in 
lobbying for and raising consciousness about family law issues.  The European 
Women’s Lobby, for example, has taken strong positions on a number of issues from 
domestic violence to family leave.  Non-State actors  play  important roles in 
establishing, maintaining,  enforcing and challenging  family law norms.  In addition to 
NGOs, these may include religious and local communities which shape and support 
cultural norms.  As noted above, for example, in some States family law is explicitly 
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left to religious authorities. Cultural norms, such as the son’s responsibility for aged 
parents in China and parts of India, may undermine or even negate more formal law. 
An Approach to the Problem
Each chapter offers a possible approach to the Problem set out in the first section.  
Legal problem-solving is more of an art than a science and there are usually a range of 
possible approaches to any particular problem.  Indeed, if there were only one, obvious 
solution, there would be no ‘problem’ to be solved, since there would be no basis for 
contesting that solution.  The proposed approach, accordingly, is neither the only 
solution nor necessarily the optimal solution.  It is, however, a solution that 
constructively deals with the material at hand, that is, the material set out in the 
preceding sections for that chapter.   
For Further Research
Finally, each chapter concludes with suggestions for further research.  These include 
the bibliographic material relied upon for that chapter.  Sources relied upon for this 
chapter, for example, along with other helpful sources on international family law in 
general, are set out below.   In addition, bibliographies have been compiled for several 
of the Hague Conventions.  These can be accessed through the Hague Conference 
website.   
For Further Research
1. For a comprehensive text on IFL, see Blair, D. Marianne and Weiner, Merle 
(2003), Family Law in the World Community, Carolina Academic Press, Durham.  The 
International Society of Family Law publishes an annual survey, The International 
Survey of Family Law, providing information on current developments in family law 
throughout the world.  Other noteworthy global surveys include Eeklaar, J. and Katz, 
S. (eds 1978), Family Violence,  Butterworths, Canada;  Eeklaar, J. and Katz, S. (eds. 
1980), Marriage and Cohabitation, Butterworths, Canada; Eeklaar, J. and Katz, S. 
(eds 1984), The Resolution of Family Conflict, Butterworths, Canada; Meulders-Klein, 
M.T. and Eeklaar, J. (eds 1988), Family, State, and Individual Economic Security,
Story Scientia and Kluwer, London; Lowe, N. and Douglas, G. (eds 1996), Families 
Across Frontiers, Martinus Nijhoff, London; Stark, B. (ed 1992), Family Law and 
Gender Bias: Comparative Perspectives, JAI, Greenwich. 
2. For a current survey of family law in twenty-two Islamic States, in  
Africa and Asia as well as the Middle East, see Islamic Family Law 
http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/legal/html.  For an overview of Islamic laws, codified as 
well as uncodified, in the Arab world, see El Alimi, Dawoud and Hinchcliff, Doreen 
(1996), Islamic Marriage and Divorce Laws of the Arab World, Kluwer, London. 
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3. For an introduction to the harmonization and unification of family law in Europe, 
see The European Family Law Series, including Boele-woelki, K., Breat, B. and 
Summer, I. (eds 2003), European Family Law in Action: Grounds for Divorce,
Interscientia, Antwerp.  For an analysis of the European Community’s changing 
approach to family law, see McEleavy, P. (2002),‘The Brussels II Regulation: How the 
European Community has moved into Family Law’, International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 51, pp. 883-908. 
Note 
1 http://www.hcch.net/e/infosheet.html. 
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Chapter 1
Marriage
1. The Problem
Julia and Amitabh met when both were students at the London School of Economics.  
Julia is a citizen of the U.K. and an agnostic; Ami is a citizen of India and a Hindu.  
They fell in love and decided to marry.  Julia wanted to marry in the Savoy Hotel in 
London.  Ami wanted to marry in his village in India.  They agreed to do both. 
After a joyful wedding at the Savoy, they wrote to Ami’s Uncle in India and asked 
him to arrange a wedding for them there.  Ami’s parents had died in an earthquake 
when he was 8 and he had been raised by his Uncle, who had quickly sent him off to 
boarding school in the U.K.  Ami and Julia have just received the following letter 
from his Uncle: 
My Dear Nephew, 
I am very sorry to be the one to have to tell you this, but you should probably reconsider 
your desire to return to Rajasthan for your wedding.  You were in fact married here 18 
years ago, when you were just four years old.  Your wife, Ratna, was sent to your father’s 
house when she was 11, but you had already left for boarding school when you were 9.  
The dowry was paid in full and I never heard of any action for divorce or annulment.  I do 
not know where she went when your parents died. 
I look forward to seeing you soon, but it would probably be unwise to attempt to marry 
here. Your Fond Uncle
 Ami and Julia come to you.  Assuming that his Uncle’s statements are true, how 
does this affect their marriage in London?  How does it affect their planned marriage 
in India?  Does Ami have any obligation to Ratna?  What are his options? 
2. Overview
Anthropologists agree that the institution of  marriage began as a way to connect the  
families of the bride and groom.  It was usually arranged between the families and 
often accompanied by an exchange of property (usually from the wife’s family to that 
of the husband, in the form of a ‘bride price’ or ‘dowry’) and the formation of 
alliances.  In patriarchal societies, a young woman or girl would leave her family and 
join that of her husband. 
The modern notion of companionate marriage is very different. It also involves a 
long-term commitment between a man and a woman, but it is a relationship which they 
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enter into voluntarily. Unlike traditional marriage, modern marriage resembles a 
partnership, a relationship of equals.  Many women in such marriages, for example, 
work outside the home.  They are more likely to have some degree of economic 
independence, accordingly, although they usually earn less than their husbands. 
Both kinds of marriages may be found throughout the world.  Traditional marriages 
endure in traditional societies, such as Pakistan.  They may also be found throughout 
Africa, parts of Asia, and the Middle East alongside modern marriages.  In rural areas 
in Kenya, for example, traditional marriages persist while modern marriages are more 
common in the more cosmopolitan cities.  Modern marriages are most common in the 
industrialized North, although more traditional groups within those societies may opt 
for some form of traditional marriage.  Among fundamentalist religious groups, such 
as Christian Mormons in the United States or Orthodox Jews in Israel, for example, 
traditional marriage is often favored. 
A crucial function of both traditional and modern marriage is to establish a stable 
framework in which children will be cared for and supported, emotionally as well as 
financially.  Marriage rates are falling in some regions, however, especially in northern 
Europe. This reflects, in part, a growing number of couples who choose to live 
together without marrying. As discussed in Chapters 8-10, increasing numbers of 
children are born out of wedlock.  In addition,  a growing, but still small, number of 
couples opt for  ‘child free’ marriages in the industrialized North.  In the developing 
South, in contrast, barrenness is often a ground for annulment or divorce. 
Many States recognize multiple forms of marriage, including religious and civil 
marriages.  Traditional marriages usually involve a religious ceremony, while modern 
marriage is often entered into through a secular, civil ceremony.  Czechoslovakia, for 
example, recognizes civil as well as religious forms of marriage, but both require a 
procedure before a civil registrar.  India recognizes several different forms of 
marriage.  Under Hindu law, marriage is viewed as a sacrament, in contrast to Muslim 
law, under which marriage is regarded as a contract.  The Special Marriage Act 
authorizes some interreligious civil marriages.  The 1937 Arya Marriage Validation 
Act recognizes the legality of intercaste marriages.  The 1955 Hindu Marriages Act, 
which applies to any person in India who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew, 
establishes the legal parameters of Hindu marriage, and prohibits bigamy as well as 
certain degrees of consanguinity. 
Prerequisites 
The prerequisites to marriage fall into three categories:  eligibility, consent, and 
formalities.  In general, States determine who is eligible to enter into marriage, and 
require freely given consent (although the ‘consent’ required may be that of the heads 
of the families rather than that of the parties).  In addition, States often require some 
ceremony, registration or similar formality to distinguish marriage from other 
relationships and to impress this distinction upon the parties as well as their families 
and their communities.  
‘Eligibility’ refers to a wide range of factors.  Most States impose limits based on 
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their laws on consanguinity; that is, laws which incorporate incest taboos and prohibit 
close relatives from marrying,  although ‘close’  has different meanings in different 
cultures.  In Asia, for example, marriages between cousins are common while in most 
parts of the United States such marriages are void. Virtually all States  require that the 
spouses be different genders.  While most States impose some age limit, this ranges 
from ‘puberty’ (which may be deemed to begin as early as nine years for girls) to 18 or 
21 years.  Some countries allow different ages for men and women.   Others, such as 
the U.S. and Germany, require both parties to be at least 18, unless they have the 
consent of their parents. 
Reforms in traditional societies often involve raising the marriage age.  Under 
traditional Islamic law, for example, no minimum age is established.  In codifying their 
marriage laws, however, several Islamic States have set a minimum age at which 
consent is valid.  In Jordan, for example, the man must be 16 and the woman 15.   
Other traditional societies have similarly reformed their marriage laws.  In Botswana, 
for example, the Marriage Bill 2000 establishes 18 as the minimum age for women as 
well as men to marry in order to conform to contemporary human rights instruments.  
Former colonial powers, such as the U.K., also set minimum ages for marriage. In 
India and Pakistan, for example, the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 set a 
minimum of 18 years for girls and 21 years for boys for contracting marriage.  The Act 
also sought to deter arranged child marriages by punishing the parents or guardians 
who arranged them.  The Act does not, however, invalidate the resulting marriage.  
Most non-Muslim States require that a person be unmarried in order to be eligible 
for marriage.  That is, most prohibit bigamy, and a prior existing marriage is a bar to a 
new one.  Several Muslim States, however, permit  polygamy, the practice of allowing 
a husband to marry more than one wife.  Under some interpretations of Islamic law, a 
husband may marry  up to four  wives.  Polyandry, in which a woman has more than 
one husband, is rare.  It is said to persist in certain remote regions of Tibet, where an 
elder brother may share his wife with his younger brothers. 
Additional eligibility requirements may be imposed by religious laws or other 
customs.  Some religious laws, for example, require that the spouses be of the same 
religion. Customs that remain entrenched in certain societies, in some cases 
notwithstanding a legal bar, include:  the requirement that a woman not marry below 
her own caste (certain Hindu castes in India), that the woman be a virgin (Iran and 
Saudi Arabia), and that a bride-price, or dowry be paid (Botswana).  In general, as part 
of the marriage contract under Islamic law, the husband pays a dower, or mahr, to the 
wife.  This is paid in cash or in kind and is the wife’s sole property (El Alami and 
Hinchcliff, 1996). 
Consent requirements refer to the consent of the spouses’ families in traditional 
marriages or to consent of the spouses in a modern marriage.  Under Muslim law, a 
woman who has not been married before needs a guardian (wali) before she can enter 
into marriage.  The wali’s authority varies under the interpretations of the different 
schools of  Islam.  Under the Hanafi view, for example, the wali advises the girl who has 
reached puberty and tries to guide her in the decisionmaking process.  In Maliki, Shaf’i 
and Hanbali law, in contrast, a woman may never finalize her own marriage contract. 
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In the West, consent requirements are satisfied by the parties’ sworn statements 
that they are entering into the marriage voluntarily, along with the absence of any 
obvious condition vitiating such consent.  In the state of Georgia in the U.S., for 
example, drunkenness at the time of the marriage by either spouse may be used to 
show that the marriage was not in fact consensual. 
One underlying purpose of formalities is to assure that the parties’ marital status is 
known to the community and to the public at large.  Ceremonies often reflect the 
traditional importance of marriage. Hindu ceremonies, for example, can last for days, 
but short versions with English translations are available on the Internet for 
contemporary British Hindus.  The mix of customary and modern law which 
characterizes many States’ systems is often expressed in the ceremony itself.   In Israel, 
for example, although civil marriage is available, it is virtually unknown, the 
overwhelming majority of couples opting instead for ‘white weddings’ which include a 
religious ceremony. 
Formalities may also include the requirement that the couple register with a 
government authority.  In India, for example, the Compulsory Registration of Marriage 
Act passed in 2002 provides a means of monitoring child marriages or bigamist 
marriages.  Several smaller Indian states, including Rajasthan, have declined to require 
compulsory registration because of the continuing popularity of child marriages.  In 
1993, a UNICEF survey in Rajasthan found that 50% of the population had married 
before the age of 15 and 17% of this group were under the age of 10. 
In some countries, such as France, China, and Japan, registration is considered 
extremely important.  In Japan and France, accurate record-keeping ensures the 
integrity of family lineage.  In China, registration is necessary in order to qualify for 
State benefits, which may include housing and education.  In other countries, failure to 
register may be regarded as a mere oversight with no legal consequences for the 
parties. 
Consequences
Marriage affects the parties’ personal status. Marital status has public consequences, 
such as nationality or citizenship status, eligibility for insurance coverage, entitlement 
to social security, intestacy, and inheritance rules. Marital status also has private, 
social consequences, such as the recognition by the community of the couple as a 
household unit. 
Marriage may also involve contractual obligations between the husband and 
wife.  The contractual aspects of the parties’ relationship often includes  support 
obligations, either mutual or unilateral, and other expectations, such as sexual 
fidelity and the establishment of a household, including children. In the U.S., for 
example, the husband was historically required to support the wife and provide her 
with ‘necessaries’, such as food and shelter.  This obligation is now viewed as a 
mutual obligation; that is, either spouse may be required to support the other. Under 
traditional Islamic law, similarly, the husband was required to support the wife as 
long as she submitted to his control.  Under recent codifications, the obligation has 
Marriage 17 
been made gender-neutral.  Under the codified law of Libya, adopted in 1984, a 
wife ‘who is wealthy shall be required to support her husband . . . during [his] 
hardship.’ Under Islamic  law, marriage is viewed as a civil contract, and either 
party, in theory, may stipulate the terms.   In some countries, such as Nigeria, breach 
of the obligation of fidelity by the woman is considered a crime, even if it is 
involuntary.   Adultery by the woman, which may include rape, may be punishable 
by death.  In other States sexual infidelity is considered a breach of the agreement 
between the parties, rather than a criminal offense against the State. Thus, adultery 
may be grounds for divorce (see Chapter 4) or it may have a bearing on a property 
award in connection with divorce (see Chapter 5). 
Void Marriages 
The failure to comply with the prerequisites of marriage may render the marriage void 
or voidable.  A void marriage is one which is regarded as a nullity; a voidable 
marriage is one which may be considered a nullity but only if a court or similar 
authority so determines.  In some parts of the United States, for example, a marriage in 
which one of the spouses is underage is considered voidable.  The spouse or her 
parents may petition a court to declare the marriage a nullity.  A voidable marriage 
may be ratified, however, by the parties’ continuing cohabitation until the condition 
which rendered the marriage voidable is removed; that is, until the underage party 
attains the legal age for marriage. 
Recognition of Foreign Marriages
In general, a marriage which is valid under the law of the State where it is entered into 
will be recognized as valid by another State.  The exception to this is that if a marriage 
is void as a matter of public policy in the second State, it may not be recognized even 
if it were valid under the laws of the State in which it was entered into.  In countries 
where bigamy is unlawful, for example, polygamous marriages may be regarded as 
null and void.  In France, for example, the second and third wives of Muslim 
immigrants from Northern Africa or the Middle East are not considered the wives of 
their husbands even though they were recognized as legal wives in the State in which 
they were married.  Because polygamy is barred as a matter of public policy in France, 
they are not entitled to the legal protections accorded legal wives under French law. 
3. Cultural Variations
The consent of at least two parties is necessary for a valid marriage, but it need not be the 
consent of the prospective husband and wife.  Syria, for example, follows the Muslim law 
of the Hanafi school, which has been modified to allow a judicial override.  That is, under 
Syrian law, a wali (guardian) cannot unfairly block or delay the marriage of a woman 
who has attained majority.  If he does so, the woman can complain to a judge, who can 
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override the wali’s decision and perform the marriage himself. 
In Cameroon, couples can choose to be married under statutory law or customary 
law.  The latter permits polygamous marriages and requires the payment of a bride-
price.  Since the bride-price is paid to the family, represented by the family head, 
parental consent is implicitly required.  Customary law marriages join the two families
as well as the two spouses. 
An unusual local custom regarding consent may be found on the Indonesian island 
of Lombok, where parents traditionally arranged their daughters’ marriages.  If a lover 
broke into the daughter’s bedroom, however, and kidnaped her, the parents would 
condone their marriage.  Although globalization has eroded traditional customs, and 
arranged marriages are no longer the norm, many couples still carry out the charade of 
kidnaping because it is considered thrilling and romantic. 
A recent report by UNICEF on Early Marriage Child Spouse, including a detailed 
discussion of consent, is reproduced in Section 8 of this Chapter. 
4. Private International Law Conventions
Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages1
Article 2  The formal requirements for marriages shall be governed by the law of the State 
of celebration. 
* * * 
Article 5  The application of a foreign law declared applicable by this Chapter may be 
refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (‘ordre 
public’) of the State of celebration. 
* * * 
Article 8  This Chapter shall not apply to – 
(1) marriages celebrated by military authorities; 
(2) marriages celebrated aboard ships or aircraft; 
(3) proxy marriages; 
(4) posthumous marriages; 
(5) informal marriages. 
* * * 
Article 9  A marriage validly entered into under the law of the State of celebration or which 
subsequently becomes valid under that law shall be considered as such in all Contracting 
States, subject to the provisions of this Chapter.
* * *
Article 11  A Contracting State may refuse to recognize the validity of a marriage only 
where, at the time of the marriage, under the law of that State – 
(1) one of the spouses was already married; or 
(2) the spouses were related to one another, by blood or by adoption, in the direct line or as 
brother and sister; or 
(3) one of the spouses had not attained the minimum age required for marriage, nor had 
obtained the necessary dispensation; or 
 (4) one of the spouses did not have the mental capacity to consent; or 
 (5) one of the spouses did not freely consent to the marriage.
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However, recognition may not be refused where, in the case mentioned in sub-
paragraph 1 of the preceding paragraph, the marriage has subsequently become valid by 
reason of the dissolution or annulment of the prior marriage. 
* * * 
Article 14  Contracting State may refuse to recognize the validity of a marriage where such 
recognition is manifestly incompatible with its public policy (‘ordre public’).
5. Public International Law
Universal Declaration of Human Rights2
Article 16   1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.  They are entitled to equal rights as 
to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State.
International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights3
* * * 
Article 10.1.  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that the widest possible 
protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is 
responsible for the care and education of dependent children.  Marriage must be entered 
into with the free consent of the intending spouses.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4
Article 23  1.  The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall 
be recognized. 
3.   No marriage shall be entered into without the free and the full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
4.   States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of 
rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution.  In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary 
protection of any children. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women5
Article 16  1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
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(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free 
and full consent; 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; 
(d) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their 
children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to 
exercise these rights; 
(e) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family 
name, a profession and an occupation; 
(f) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, 
administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a 
valuable consideration. 
2.  The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect and all necessary 
action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and 
to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages6
Article 1  (1) No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of 
both parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity and in the 
presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage and of witnesses, as 
prescribed by law. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in paragraph 1 above, it shall not be necessary for one of the 
parties to be present when the competent authority is satisfied that the circumstances are 
exceptional and that the party has, before a competent authority and in such manner as may 
be prescribed by law, expressed and not withdrawn consent. 
Article 2  States parties to the present Convention shall take legislative action to specify a 
minimum age for marriage.  No marriage shall be legally entered into by any person under 
this age, except where a competent authority has granted a dispensation as to age, for 
serious reasons, in the interest of the intending spouses. 
Article 3  All marriages shall be registered in an appropriate official register by the 
competent authority.
6.  Regional Conventions
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms7
Article 8 –  1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man8
Article V – Every person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks 
upon his honor, his reputation, and his private and family life. 
Article VI – Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, 
and to receive protection therefor.
American Convention on Human Rights9
Article 17 – Rights of the Family 
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the state. 
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be 
recognized, if they meet the conditions required by domestic laws, insofar as such 
conditions do not affect the principle of nondiscrimination established in this
Convention. 
3.   No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
4.   The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights and the 
adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during marriage, 
and in the event of its dissolution.  In case of dissolution, provision shall be made for 
the necessary protection of any children solely on the basis of their own best interests.
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘Protocol of San Salvador’)10
Article 15. – Right to the formation and the protection of families.  1.  The family is the 
natural and fundamental element of society and ought to be protected by the State, which 
should see to the improvement of its spiritual and material conditions. 
2.  Everyone has the right to form a family, which shall be exercised in accordance with 
the provisions of the pertinent domestic legislation.
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter)11
Article 18 – 1.  The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society.  It shall be 
protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and morals. 
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and 
traditional values recognized by the community. 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child12
Article 21: Protection against Harmful Social and Cultural Practices 
* * * 
2. Child marriage and the bethrothal of girls and boys shall be prohibited and effective 
action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify the minimum age of marriage to 
be 18 years and make registration of all marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
22 International Family Law
7.  National Implementation
Following a regime change in 1991 in Ethiopia, the new government adopted a Charter 
which explicitly affirmed the rights set out in the Universal Declaration.  Ethiopia 
subsequently ratified the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CRC, and the Women’s 
Convention.  In the new Constitution of 1995, Ethiopia reaffirmed its commitment to 
women’s equality and the rights of children.  The Revised Family Code (RFC) of 2000 
was enacted in order to conform family law to the Constitution. 
Under the RFC, the age of marriage is set at 18, rather than 15, in accordance with 
the CRC.  The new law recognizes three forms of marriage: customary, civil, and 
religious. There are ongoing tensions between customary and religious norms, on one 
hand, and the norm of gender equality, on the other.  Laws from the 1961 Civil Code 
establishing the husband as head of the family, a duty of wifely obedience, wifely 
performance of household duties, and the husband’s right to choose the family 
residence, guide the wife in her conduct, and manage common property (not including 
the wife’s earnings), have all been repealed. 
The RFC, in contrast, requires the husband and wife to jointly manage the family, 
which includes jointly choosing the family’s place of residence.  In addition, the 
parties have mutual support obligations and they are to cooperate with respect to child 
rearing and management of family property.  The latter, however, may be modified by 
contract. 
8. IOs and NGOs 
IOs 
IOs and NGOs have increasingly focused on marriage, exposing the ways in which it 
has operated to effectively deny the human rights of women and children.  In the 
excerpt below, for example, UNICEF describes the effects of early marriage, that is, 
marriage below the age of 18. 
From UNICEF, Early Marriage Child Spouses (March 2001)
Birth, marriage and death are the standard trio of key events in most people’s lives.  But 
only one – marriage – is a matter of choice. The right to exercise that choice was recognized 
as a principle of law even in Roman times and has long been established in international 
human rights instruments. Yet many girls, and a smaller number of boys, enter marriage 
without any chance of exercising their right to choose.  
Some are forced into marriage at a very early age. Others are simply too young to make 
an informed decision about their marriage partner or about the implications of marriage 
itself. They may have given what passes for ‘consent’ in the eyes of custom or the law, but 
in reality, consent to their binding union has been made by others on their behalf.  
The assumption is that once a girl is married, she has become a woman – even if she is 
only 12. Equally, where a boy is made to marry, he is now a man and must put away 
childish things. While the age of marriage is generally on the rise, early marriage – marriage 
of children and adolescents below the age of 18 – is still widely practised. 
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While early marriage takes many different forms and has various causes, one issue is 
paramount. Whether it happens to a girl or a boy, early marriage is a violation of human 
rights. The right to free and full consent to a marriage is recognized in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and in many subsequent human rights instruments – 
consent that cannot be ‘free and full’ when at least one partner is very immature. For both 
girls and boys, early marriage has profound physical, intellectual, psychological and 
emotional impacts, cutting off educational opportunity and chances of personal growth. For 
girls, in addition, it will almost certainly mean premature pregnancy and childbearing, and 
is likely to lead to a lifetime of domestic and sexual subservience over which they have no 
control.  
Yet many societies, primarily in Africa and South Asia, continue to support the idea that 
girls should marry at or soon after puberty. Their spouses are likely to be a few years older 
than they are, but may be more than twice their age. Parents and heads of families make 
marital choices for daughters and sons with little regard for the personal implications. 
Rather, they look upon marriage as a family-building strategy, an economic arrangement or 
a way to protect girls from unwelcome sexual advances. 
Neglect of the Rights Perspective
Social reformers in the first part of the 20th century were concerned about early marriage, 
especially in India, and influenced the UDHR and other human rights conventions of the 
1950s and 1960s. In the latter part of the 20th century, interest centred on the behavioural 
determinants fuelling rapid population growth, for obvious reasons. Early marriage extends 
a woman’s reproductive span, thereby contributing to large family size, especially in the 
absence of contraception. 
More recently, advocates of safe motherhood have turned their attention to this issue. 
Pregnancies that occur ‘too early’ – when a woman’s body is not fully mature – constitute a 
major risk to the survival and future health of both mother and child.  Concern with the 
special health needs of adolescents has also recently been growing in a world where young 
people are particularly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. 
However, from a demographic health perspective, early marriage is seen primarily as a 
contributory factor to early child-bearing. And sometimes, even in this context, its role is 
overlooked: the phrase ‘teenage pregnancy’ is typically understood to mean pregnancy 
outside marriage. Yet  far more adolescent or teenage pregnancies occur within marriage 
than outside it. 
During the past decade, the movement for ‘Education for All’ has stressed the need to 
enroll more girls in school and to keep them from dropping out before completion.  In this 
context, the custom of early marriage is acknowledged as one of the reasons for girls’ 
exclusion from school, especially in cultural settings where girls are raised for a lifetime 
confined to household occupations and are expected to marry very young. 
Very recently, the situation of children in need of special protection, notably girls 
vulnerable to sexual abuse and HIV/AIDS, suggests that early marriage is being used as a 
strategy to protect girls from sexual exposure, or to pass the economic burden for their care 
to others. Thus, early marriage lingers on as a culturally and socially sanctioned practice 
according to some traditional sets of values and, among some highly stressed populations, it 
may even be on the rise. 
Despite the efforts of reformers in the early part of the 20th century, early marriage has 
received scant attention from the modern women’s rights and children’s rights movements. 
There has been virtually no attempt to examine the practice as a human rights violation in 
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itself. Children and teenagers married at ages well below the legal minimum become 
statistically invisible as ‘children’. Thus, in the eyes of the law, an adult male who has sex 
with a girl of 12 or 13 outside marriage may be regarded as a criminal, while the same act 
within marriage is condoned. 
To date, most studies on the effects of early marriage have focused on premature sex 
and pregnancy and school drop-out. Much work remains to be done, therefore, to analyse 
the full impact of this practice. 
 * * * 
Sanctions Against Early Marriage – The Legal Context
In many countries, early marriage falls into what amounts to a sanctions limbo. It may be 
prohibited in the existing civil or common law, but be widely condoned by customary and 
religious laws and practice. This is common where marriages typically take place according 
to customary rites and remain unregistered. 
The situation is further complicated in countries where legislation was introduced by the 
colonizing power on the understanding that many customary practices would continue even 
if they were inconsistent with new laws. Some were even codified to make them legal. In 
Benin, for example, Article 68 of the 1931 ‘Coutumier du Dahomey’ regulating customary 
marriage states that: ‘A marriage is not settled by the interested parties, but by their father, 
or in his absence by his older brother, or failing him, by the head of the family’. In 
Suriname, the legal minimum age of marriage is 15 according  to the Civil Code; but under 
the Asian Marriage Act, which codifies practice for a particular group, the minimum age for 
girls is 13.  
Although most countries have laws that regulate marriage, both in terms of minimum 
age and consent, these laws may not be applied and few prosecutions are ever brought 
against lawbreakers – parents, officiators or spouses. Some laws do not prescribe sanctions; 
the only outcome of a case would be to declare the marriage invalid, leaving the wife 
without legal protection. Moreover, such laws usually do not apply to customary marriages. 
In some countries, the legal minimum age of marriage set for boys and girls is clearly 
aspirational. Thus, the minimum age in two countries with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
– Uganda, where 50 per cent of girls aged 15-19 are married, and Zambia, where the figure 
is 27 percent – has been set at 21 for both males and females. 
In most cases where a minimum age is set, it is 18 or above for both males and females. 
In 15 countries, it is 16. A number of countries nonetheless allow marriages to take place at 
much younger ages with parental consent. 
In cases where there is a discrepancy between the minimum age of marriage for boys 
and girls, it is consistently lower for girls. However, at least 20 countries either do not have 
legislation to regulate marriage, or do not set any minimum age for either girls or boys. 
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that birth registration is so irregular that age at 
marriage may not be known. In addition, many marriages go unregistered; if there are 
problems in the marriage, the wife has no means of legal redress. 
Thus, the use of law as a means of regulating early marriage is in no way sufficient. This 
does not mean that legal reform should not be sought. The Indian Child Marriage Restraint 
Act, 1929 stemmed from a campaign that helped reposition women, family life, and 
childbearing within modern India. While the Act did not declare child marriages invalid, it 
helped pave the way for change. In 1978 it was strengthened to inhibit marriage of girls 
until the age of 18 and boys until age 21. However, the number of prosecutions under the 
Act did not exceed 89 in any year between 1994 and 1998.  Some governments have taken 
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steps to unify their customary law and civil or common law, or have passed legislation 
designed to protect those in customary marriages: South Africa’s Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act of 1998 sets 18 as the minimum age for such unions and requires their 
registration. 
In keeping with the spirit of the CRC, an increasing number of laws fix the minimum 
age at 18 years – the standard also set by the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child and suggested by the CEDAW Committee in its general 
recommendation 21 and by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. This 
standard responds to the growing consensus that the period of adolescence needs special 
support and protection. 
The Inter-African Committee (IAC) on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of 
Women and Children states that early marriage is: ‘Any marriage carried out below the age 
of 18 years, before the girl is physically, physiologically, and psychologically ready to 
shoulder the responsibilities of marriage and childbearing.’  The Forum on Marriage echoes 
this position. 
In their observations on States Parties’ reports, the CEDAW and CRC Committees have 
both consistently recommended that states adopt higher minimum ages of marriage and 
ensure that these are the same for boys and girls. The CRC Committee also takes the view 
that, in cases where girls are considered adults before the law upon marriage, they would be 
deprived of the comprehensive protection of the CRC. 
Consent: Law and Practice
The second issue at the heart of a rights approach to early marriage is that of consent. The 
picture is similar to that concerning minimum age: in the vast majority of countries the law 
grants women the right to consent. Only in Cameroon, Jordan, Morocco, Uganda and 
Yemen are women specifically not granted by law the right to ‘full, free and informed 
consent’ to their marriage. But in a large number of countries, these legal provisions are 
merely symbolic. 
The more important practical issue is, therefore, whether or not the idea of consent is 
socially rated. Difficult questions arise around the age a child should be before he or she 
can ‘consent’ as a mature, cognisant and independent being to sexual relations or marriage, 
but where no clear consent has been given by one or other partner, the marriage is clearly 
forced. 
In the case of marriages under the age of 10, consent – other than to dress up and play a 
game – is not a consideration. Toddlers married at Akha Teej ceremonies in Rajasthan 
cannot ‘consent’. Nor is consent given in the cases of young girls from very poor homes in 
the Indian city of Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, sold as wives to rich men in the Middle East. 
In Gojam, Ethiopia, marriages may be imposed from birth, with the girl sent to her future 
husband’s home at around the age of seven to begin her integration into her marriage 
family. Here again, consent by the girl does not enter the picture.  Similarly, in marriages at 
or around puberty – from roughly ages 10 to 14 – ‘consent’ cannot be said to have been 
given since, at such an early age, a child cannot be expected to understand the implications 
of accepting a lifetime partner. 
The question of marital consent becomes more difficult at age 15 or 16, by which stage 
a  girl may have reached the legal age of sexual consent. In the CEDAW Committee’s 
recommendation that the minimum age for marriage of both men and women should be 18, 
it commented that, ‘When men and women marry, they assume important responsibilities. 
Consequently, marriage should not be permitted before they have attained full maturity and 
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capacity to act.’ The Committee also observed that, ‘Some countries provide for different 
ages for marriage for men and women. As such provisions assume incorrectly that women 
have a different rate of intellectual development from men, or that their stage of physical 
and intellectual development at marriage is immaterial, these provisions should be 
abolished.’ 
It could be argued that even older children cannot be said to give informed consent to 
such a potentially damaging practice as early marriage. Beyond the issues of maturity and 
non discrimination, any argument for a child’s ability to consent to marriage is further 
undermined by the risk that marriage represents to his or her well-being. Many international 
bodies consider early marriage to be one of the ‘traditional practices prejudicial to the 
health of children’ cited in article 24(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Indeed, one of the key messages contained in this Digest is that both the physical and 
psychological impacts of early marriage may have serious implications for the well-being of 
those married. 
Furthermore, while in many countries a girl or boy may have reached the legal age of 
sexual consent at the age of 15 or 16, this should not be taken to mean that they are ready to 
enter marriage. A lack of legislative clarity over the different implications of consent to 
sexual activity and consent to marriage can result in strange anomalies. In Maryland, USA, 
the state law defines statutory rape as sex with a child younger than 14 by someone four or 
more years older. However, another law allows children under 16 (with no minimum) to 
marry with proof of pregnancy and parental permission, and this provision is sometimes 
used – in one notorious case to allow a 29-year-old man to marry a 13-year-old girl. 
In 1997, the Committee on the Rights of the Child protested a similar situation in 
Algeria.  Here, as in other countries such as Chad, Costa Rica, Lebanon, Libya, Romania 
and Uruguay, the law allows a perpetrator of rape, including statutory rape of a minor, to be 
excused of his crime if he marries his victim; a judge simply legitimizes the union. This has 
also happened in California in cases of under-age pregnancies where the man is willing to 
‘stand by’ the girl. In effect, the state welfare agency supports what is seen as a viable 
partnership as an alternative to costly state care for mother and child. 
In a number of countries, it takes only the parents’ consent to override the legal age of 
marriage – a judge is not required. In Colombia, the legal age is 18, but with parents’ 
permission girls of 12 and boys of 14 can be married. In the Dominican Republic there is no 
minimum age in exceptional circumstances and with parental consent. 
The UK Home Office Report into forced marriages of British girls of South Asian 
parentage distinguishes between ‘forced’ and ‘arranged’ marriages. In arranged marriages, 
the initiative is taken by the parents of the couple, but consent is required from both 
partners and either has the right to withdraw. However, the pressures from parents may be 
very high, and the younger the bride or groom the less real chance there is to exercise this 
right. Both types of marriage indicate the degree to which many societies view marriage as a 
family affair in which the views of people other than the couple are given priority. Parents’ 
views will override children’s, and men’s will override women’s – even taking precedence 
over the law. 
Cases of runaway brides highlight the issue of consent – or lack of it. In Pakistan, the 
Commission on the Status of Women reported in 1989: ‘Men are constantly fighting to 
retrieve their women because they have run away.’ There are reports of young wives being 
locked up by their husbands in India, and in Zimbabwe it is often forbidden for a young 
bride to visit her own family until she goes there to give birth to her first child.  In one 
tragic case in Nigeria, a 12-year-old girl unhappy with her new husband ran away so often 
that he cut off her legs to prevent her absconding. She subsequently died. 
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The CRC Committee has focused on laws and customs in its observations to a number 
of countries. Its most common complaints are low minimum age for girls and disparate – 
therefore discriminatory – marriage ages for girls and boys. 
 NGOs
Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Women’s Human Rights13 Women’s Status in the 
Family/Law and practices governing women’s personal status – their legal capacity and role 
in the family – continued to deny women rights.  While the type of discrimination varied 
from region to region, women throughout the world found that their relationship to a male 
relative or husband determined their rights. 
* * *
Personal status laws in Syria and  Morocco, among other countries, continued to curtail 
women’s rights entering into marriage, during marriage, and the dissolution of marriage.  In 
Syria, the minimum age for marriage was eighteen for boys and seventeen for girls.  If a 
woman over the age of seventeen married without the consent of a male guardian, the 
guardian could demand the annulment of the marriage if the husband was not of the same 
social standing as the wife, and as long as the wife were not pregnant.  Further, a Muslim 
Syrian woman could not marry a non-Muslim, while a Muslim man had absolute freedom to 
choose a spouse.  Syrian law also assigned different rights and responsibilities for women 
and men during marriage.  A wife’s ‘disobedience’ could lead to forfeiture of her husband’s 
responsibility to provide support.  A man could legally have up to four wives 
simultaneously, while a woman could have only one husband.
9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem 
As suggested in the Overview, the major question here is whether Ami’s marriage to 
Ratna was valid.  If it was, it was a bar to his marriage to Julia and Ami is in fact a 
bigamist (p. 15).  Although India recognizes multiple forms of marriage (p. 14), it 
seems unlikely that the early marriage to Ratna would be recognized for a range of 
practical as well as doctrinal reasons. 
First, the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 explicitly sets minimum ages for 
marriages (p. 15).  Although the Act does not invalidate the resulting marriage, it is 
evidence of the public policy against it.  The Compulsory Registration of Marriage Act 
of 2002 (p. 16) would obviously not cover Ami and Ratna’s marriage sixteen years 
earlier, but it suggests the ongoing tension between culture and legal norms in 
Rajasthan, where the marriage took place, and where UNICEF found that half of the 
population had married before the age of 15. 
Information about Ratna’s current situation would be helpful.  If she is married, for 
example, she may agree to an annulment.  Underage marriages are voidable, and there 
has been no ratification (by continuing cohabitation) here (p. 17). On the other hand, if 
Ratna hopes for British citizenship (or support from Ami), she may argue that the 
marriage was valid.  Further research would be necessary to determine whether the 
U.K. would refuse to recognize the marriage as void as a matter of public policy. 
If the U.K. is a party to the Convention on Celebration, set out in Section 4, it is 
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required to recognize foreign marriages unless ‘manifestly incompatible’ with the law 
of the State of celebration (India).  While the Convention explicitly exempts underage 
marriage, the exemption itself may be avoided by the ‘necessary dispensation.’  In the 
U.S., this would refer to the consent of the parents of an underage spouse.  While 
further research would be necessary to ascertain the substance of ‘necessary 
dispensation’ under other States’ law, an interpretation of this phrase that validated a 
marriage entered into without the actual consent of the parties (Ami and Ratna) would 
arguably vitiate the Convention. 
The excerpts from the human rights conventions set out in Section 5 show that the 
‘free consent’ of the parties to a marriage (as opposed to their families) is a widely 
recognized human rights norm.  As set out in Section 8, the rights of the girl child are a 
particular concern.  The regional conventions confirm the geographical scope of the 
norm, with some significant variations.  Under the European Convention, for example, 
the privacy protections of Article 8 would probably not bar a claim against Ami by 
Ratna.  The protection of ‘honor’ and family privacy under Article V of the American 
Convention, in contrast, might deter such threats by an outsider against the family.  
Section 7 highlights the political significance of the laws against child marriage in 
the developing world.  The new government in Ethiopia made a dramatic break with 
the past, affirming its commitment to human rights.  In India, on the other hand, as 
noted at page 15 and described in greater detail in Section 8, efforts to restrict child 
marriage have long been linked to colonialism.  While the national government has 
ratified many human rights instruments, local governments may resist ‘western’ 
restriction as a matter of cultural pride. 
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Chapter 2 
Partnerships Other Than Marriage
1. The Problem 
David and Keith have lived together in the Hague, the Netherlands, for the past nine 
years.  When the Dutch Parliament enacted legislation opening civil marriage to same 
gender couples in April, 2001, they decided to get married.  Their wedding was a 
glorious occasion, although it did not change their relationship. 
Keith is a freelance writer, who has been specializing in tour guides for the past 
few years.  He can work anywhere, but his job has no benefits.  David is a math 
professor.  His job provides the couple with health insurance and retirement benefits.
David has recently been offered positions in the United States and Canada.  Both pay 
more than his present job and he is seriously considering a change.  He and Keith are 
concerned, however, about the recognition of their marriage in either of these 
countries.  Would they be treated as a married couple in either of these countries?  
What benefits or rights, if any, would they lose? 
2. Overview 
Domestic partnerships are generally intended for same-sex partners in marriage-like 
relationships.  They provide such partners with many of the legal protections of 
marriage, although the symbolic impact, in terms of social status and acceptance, 
varies as a function of culture.  Legal rights include those available through the State, 
such as nationality, social security benefits, and tax advantages.  In addition, 
recognition of domestic partnerships by the State has consequences in the private 
sector, including benefits and insurance.  Even where the State does not provide for the 
recognition of domestic partnerships, political entities within the State, such as 
provinces or municipalities, may do so.  Even where political entities do not recognize 
domestic partnerships, similarly, private corporations may. 
Some countries and some states in the United States explicitly prohibit same-sex 
marriage.  The usual rule that a marriage which is valid in a State in which it is entered 
into will be recognized in other States, accordingly, does not follow in this context 
because same-sex marriages are considered void as a matter of public policy.  A void 
marriage, as noted in Chapter 1, is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Recognition 
of same-sex marriages in States that neither recognize nor preclude such marriages is 
an open issue.  Domestic partnerships, in contrast to ‘marriage’, are generally beyond 
the scope of such laws.  Nor do they trigger the presumption of validity. 
32 International Family Law
Some countries recognize domestic partnerships which are generally marriage-like, 
but do not contemplate parenthood.  Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Hungary, Iceland, and Spain, for example, have instituted registered domestic 
partnerships.  British Columbia, in Canada, added gays and lesbians to the definition 
of spouse and parent, giving them rights and obligations with respect to custody, 
access, guardianship, spousal and child support, support enforcement, domestic 
contract enforcement, and possessory rights to property.1
3. Cultural Variations
As noted above, homosexual relationships are widely recognized as entitled to some 
legal status throughout Europe.  This widespread acceptance results in detailed 
regimes of legal rights and obligations, like that of Germany, set out below.  Where 
there is less acceptance, as in South America, the result is very different, as Brazil’s 
experience demonstrates.  
Germany
In 2001, the German Parliament passed a registered partnership act.  Registered 
partnership is available only to two people of the same gender, unlike the Pacte Civil 
de Solidarité in France, which is open to all unmarried persons.  Like those entering 
into marriage, those entering  into a registered partnership must freely  consent, cannot 
be within a prohibited degree of blood relationship (consanguinity), and neither can be 
a party to an existent marriage or registered partnership.  Like parties seeking to enter 
into marriage, parties seeking to enter into a registered partnership must have attained 
majority.  Unlike those entering into marriage, however, attainment of majority cannot 
be waived in the case of domestic partnerships. 
The domestic partnership establishes mutual obligations of care and support.  This 
explicitly includes a mutual duty of financial support (the ‘obligation of solidarity’).  
Both parties are responsible for the necessaries of the other, including food, clothing, 
and household items.  This is predicated on a traditional gendered division of labor, in 
which one partner is a breadwinner and the other a homemaker, although it is not at all 
clear that this pattern will prevail in the case of same sex couples.  The parties may 
keep their own names or they may choose a new partnership name.  A registered 
partnership may be terminated through dissolution, but there is no procedure for 
annulment. 
Brazil 
Comprehensive legislation legalizing civil unions between same sex partners was 
introduced in Brazil in 1995, although it has not been enacted. 
The Civil Unions Bill provides specific benefits for gay and lesbian couples who 
register, including social security, health insurance, and the right to residence and 
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nationality if one of the partners is not Brazilian.  It further provides for the judicial 
termination of such unions, upon the demand of one or both of the partners, and the 
division of partnership assets upon such termination. 
Unlike Brazilian Law governing unmarried heterosexual couples, the proposed Bill
does not create any rights or duties regarding financial support.  In the absence of 
binding federal law, the courts and administrative agencies have addressed some of the 
issues raised by gay and lesbian couples in a piecemeal fashion.  
4.  Private International Law Conventions 
Although there are no private international law conventions governing recognition of 
domestic partnerships, there are literally thousands of private law policies, regulations, 
and agreements doing so.  A few samples of such policies are excerpted below.2
American Association of University Professors, Statement of Domestic Partnership
I. Declaration We (employee) and, (domestic partner) certify that we are domestic partners 
in accordance with the following criteria and eligible for an annual contribution from the 
American Association of University Professors to defray the costs of the domestic partner’s 
own purchase of health insurance: 
II. Status
1. Neither of us is married or related to the other by blood or marriage. 
2. We are each other’s sole domestic partner. 
3. We live together in the same residence and intend to do so indefinitely. 
4. We are responsible for each other’s welfare and share financial obligations, as evidenced 
by three of the following types of documentation, which we will provide if requested: 
 a. Joint mortgage or lease  
 b. Designation of domestic partner as beneficiary for life insurance conform 
 c. Designation of domestic partner as primary beneficiary in employee’s will 
 d. Domestic partnership agreement 
 e. Powers of attorney for property and health care 
 f. Joint ownership of motor vehicle, joint checking account, or joint credit account 
5. We certify that the subsidy will be used solely to purchase health insurance for the 
domestic partner. We agree to furnish the Association evidence of insurance payments. 
AFSCME (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees)  Local 57  
Side Letter on Domestic Partners
Effective May 1, 1998, UCSF Stanford Health Care implemented a policy which provided 
employees the opportunity to enroll same-sex domestic partners, and the children of 
domestic partners, in UCSF Stanford Health Care employee benefits plans available to 
spouses and dependent children of UCSF Stanford employees, excluding life insurance 
benefits. Domestic partners are also eligible for pension benefits when designated as a 
beneficiary by the employee. 
 In order to enroll a same-sex domestic partner in a benefit plan, the employee must 
certify that he/she shares a long-term committed relationship with the domestic partner. A 
domestic partnership must meet the following criteria:  partners must have been living 
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together for at least six months prior to enrollment; have an exclusive mutual commitment 
similar to that of marriage; and be financially responsible for each other’s well-being and 
debts to third parties. Neither partner may be married to anyone else or have another 
domestic partner. Dependent children of a same-sex domestic partner may also be eligible 
for benefits under this plea. In general, unmarried natural or adopted children, or children 
for whom an employee or his/her partner has legal guardianship, who live with and are 
dependent on an employee or his/her partner for support, are eligible to receive benefits. 
Although employees are not eligible for Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave to 
care for a domestic partner or dependent child of a domestic partner under federal law, 
UCSF Stanford Health Care will provide an equivalent type leave to employees who must 
care for a same-sex domestic partner or dependent child of that partner, who otherwise 
would be eligible for FMLA leave. 
Merrill Lynch, Questions & Answers on Qualified Adult Health Coverage
(For U.S. Employees Only)
The attached letter announces an enhancement to the Merrill Lynch Health Care Program, 
which expands dependent eligibility under most available plans, including the Merrill 
Lynch Medical Plan, the Merrill Lynch Dental Plan, and most HMOs. Beginning January 1, 
1999, eligible employees can cover either their spouse or one other qualified adult member 
of their household. Qualified adult means a domestic partner of the same or opposite sex, or 
an extended family member who lives with you and who meets the definition of a 
dependent under the Internal Revenue Code. This change means you can cover up to one 
adult (your spouse or a qualified adult) in addition to yourself. 
The following questions and answers were developed to help you better understand this 
new coverage. If eligible, you can enroll a qualified adult under most of the Medical 
Program options and the Dental Plan during the annual enrollment period in October 1998.
You will receive more information at that time. 
Q: What does Merrill Lynch mean by a qualified adult? 
A: For the purposes of coverage under the Merrill Lynch Health Care Program, a qualified 
adult may either be a domestic partner (same or opposite sex) or an extended family 
member. 
Q: What is Merrill Lynch’s definition of a domestic partner? 
A: To meet eligibility requirements as a same- or opposite-sex domestic partner under the 
Merrill Lynch Health Care Program, you and your domestic partner must: 
• Be age 18 or older; 
• Have lived together for at least one year, and have an exclusive, committed  
relationship; 
• Be mutually responsible for each other’s welfare on a continuing basis; 
• Not be related to each other; and 
• Not be legally married to anyone else. 
Q: Why is there a distinction between a domestic partner and an extended family member? 
A: This distinction exists because of the way current tax law requires Merrill Lynch to treat 
the value of benefits provided by the company to a domestic partner. For example, if you 
cover your spouse, an extended family member, or a domestic partner who satisfied the 
definition of a tax dependent, there is no additional taxable income. However, if your 
domestic partner does not satisfy the definition of a tax dependent under the Internal 
Revenue Code, the company is required to report the value of your domestic partner’s 
health care coverage which is paid by Merrill Lynch as taxable income to you. 
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5. Public International Law
Sexual orientation is not per se protected under international human rights law. 
However, in  Toonen v. Australia the Human Rights Committee recognized a right to 
be free of criminal prosecution under Articles 2 and 26 of the Civil Covenant. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3
Article 2 1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subjected to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party 
to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant. 
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violations has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy: 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
* * * 
Article 26  All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law.  In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
While the recognition of same-sex couples as ‘families’ under Article 23 has not 
yet been generally recognized in international law, torture, cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment of homosexuals is prohibited under the Civil Covenant. 
The following report by the NGO Amnesty International illustrates some of the 
issues. 
Egypt: Torture and imprisonment for actual or perceived sexual orientation4  Gays in 
Egypt suffer discrimination, persecution and violence simply for being who they are. Those 
who are detained because their actual or perceived sexual orientation is deemed to threaten 
socially accepted norms are at particular risk of torture and ill-treatment and other human 
rights violations. 
 Around the world, countless people are targeted simply because of their perceived or 
self-expressed sexual orientation. Their vulnerability to human rights violations is 
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underpinned by a web of laws and social practices which deny them an equal right to life, 
liberty and physical security as well as other fundamental rights such as freedom of 
association, freedom of expression and rights to privacy, employment, education and health 
care. The degree to which discrimination is institutionalized varies from country to country, 
but almost nowhere are they treated as equal before the law. 
 Discrimination is an assault on the very notion of human rights. It systematically denies 
certain people or groups their full human rights just because of who they are or what they 
believe. It is an attack on the fundamental principle underlying the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: that human rights are everyone’s birthright and apply to all without 
distinction. 
 Amnesty International calls on all governments to make the principle of 
non-discrimination a reality in practice as well as law. No one shall be discriminated on any 
grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 In Egypt in 2001 alone, dozens of men, including at least one juvenile, have been held 
for months in detention solely on the grounds of their actual or perceived sexual orientation. 
The effective criminalization of consensual sexual relations between adults of the same sex 
is discriminatory and violates international human rights standards. The right to freedom 
from discrimination on the basis of sex, which includes sexual orientation, is recognized in 
international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), to which Egypt is a State Party. 
 On 14 November 2001 23 men were sentenced to prison terms of between one and five 
years by the (Emergency) State Security Court for Misdemeanours in Cairo; 29 others in the 
same trial were acquitted. Twenty-one men were convicted of ‘habitual debauchery’, one of 
‘contempt of religion’ and another of both charges. Amnesty International has adopted 22 
of the 23 men as prisoners of conscience. The case of the twenty-third is still under 
consideration by the organization. In a related case, on 19 September 2001, Cairo Juvenile 
Court handed down a three-year prison term for ‘habitual debauchery’ to a juvenile. This 
was subsequently reduced by the Cairo Juvenile Appeal Court for Misdemeanours to a 
six-month prison sentence on 19 December 2001.
 Amnesty International considers all those who are detained solely on the grounds of 
their identity, including their actual or perceived sexual orientation, to be prisoners of 
conscience and calls for their immediate and unconditional release. 
Trinidad & Tobago/A summary of Concerns5  Criminalization of homosexual acts
Amnesty International is concerned that sexual acts in private between consenting male 
adults and between consenting female adults remain criminalized and punishable by 
imprisonment, pursuant to Sections 60 and 61 of the Offences against the Person Act No. 
10 (1925). Under the Sexual Offences Act No. 27 of 1986, such individuals can be charged 
under Sections 13 and 16. Article 16 punishes with up to five years imprisonment anyone 
convicted of committing any act of ‘serious indecency’. ‘Serious indecency’ is defined in 
law as, ‘an act, other than sexual intercourse (whether natural or unnatural), by a person 
involving the use of the genital organ for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual 
desire.’ The Act specifically excludes private acts of ‘serious indecency’ between a man and 
a woman over 16 years of age. 
 Amnesty International considers that the existence of such laws violate the prohibition 
against discrimination, the right to privacy and the right to equal protection under the law 
enshrined, respectively, in Articles 2(1), 17 and 26 of the ICCPR. 
 Both the Attorney General and the Minister for Trade have recently issued strong verbal 
criticisms of Amnesty International because of the organization’s support for the repeal of 
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laws criminalizing consensual gay relations. In an interview on BBC World Service 
(Caribbean) on 28 September 2000, the Attorney General suggested that the existence of 
such a law was not a human rights issue and was a matter for the people of Trinidad and 
Tobago to decide.(23)  
 Amnesty International does not have information about recent successful prosecutions 
of men for consensual homosexual activity in private in Trinidad and Tobago. However, if a 
person were to be imprisoned under these provisions as a result of consensual sexual 
activity between adults conducted in private, the organization would regard him or her as a 
prisoner of conscience, imprisoned in violation of Articles 2, 17 and 26 of the ICCPR, and 
would call for the immediate and unconditional release of individuals concerned.
6. Regional Conventions 
The descriptions of the difficulties confronting gays and lesbians before two major 
regional human rights bodies is revealing.  
From The International Lesbian and Gay Association, Finding a Place in 
International Law6
Regional treaty-based human rights bodies  In 1992 the refusal of the Government of 
Argentina to grant legal status to the non-governmental organisation Comunidad 
Homosexual Argentina was taken to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. The 
refusal had been confirmed in a decision of the Supreme Court of Argentina. Later that year 
the government granted legal recognition to the organisation, an act which the Commission 
considered an ‘amicable settlement’ of the matter. The same problem was repeated in 1995 
with the refusal of government agencies to register the Costa Rican group Abraxas and the 
Association of Honduran Homosexuals Against Aids. After protest, the Costa Rican 
organisation has been registered. 
In 1995 a petition was submitted to the African Commission on Human Rights asking it 
to open an inquiry into Zimbabwe’s laws and policies on homosexual conduct. The 
communication was withdrawn at the request of the country’s largest lesbian and gay 
organisation out of concern for possible reprisals by the government. Later in 1995, a large 
book fair, annually held in Harare, banned a gay rights exhibit under pressure from the 
government. Four organisations boycotted the fair in protest. President Robert Mugabe in a 
speech opening the fair denounced homosexuals, saying ‘We do not believe they have any 
rights at all.’ Later he called for an international campaign ‘to oppose those who support 
homosexuality.’ He said that homosexuality was not part of African culture. The barring of 
the lesbian and gay group from the book fair was repeated in 1996. 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms7
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been held by the European 
Court on Human Rights in Strasbourg to prohibit the criminalization of homosexual 
practices between consenting adults. 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom The Government right affected by the impugned legislation 
protects an essentially private manifestation of the human personality (see paragraph 52, third 
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sub-paragraph, above). As compared with the era when that legislation was enacted, there is 
now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of homosexual 
behaviour to the extent that in the great majority of the member States of the Council of 
Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual practices 
of the kind now in question as in themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the criminal 
law should be applied; the Court cannot overlook the marked changes which have occurred in 
this regard in the domestic law of the member States (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-
mentioned  Marckx judgment, p. 19, par. 41, and the Tyrer judgment of 25 April 1978, Series 
A no. 26, pp. 15-16, par. 31). In Northern Ireland itself, the authorities have refrained in recent 
years from enforcing the law in respect of private homosexual acts between consenting males 
over the age of 21 years capable of valid consent (see paragraph 30 above). No evidence has 
been adduced to show that this has been injurious to moral standards in Northern Ireland or 
that there has been any public demand for stricter enforcement of the law. It cannot be 
maintained in these circumstances that there is a ‘pressing social need’ to make such acts 
criminal offences, there being no sufficient justification provided by the risk of harm to 
vulnerable sections of society requiring protection or by the effects on the public. On the issue 
of proportionality, the Court considers that such justifications as there are for retaining the law 
in force unamended are outweighed by the detrimental effects which the very existence of the 
legislative provisions in question can have on the life of a person of homosexual orientation 
like the applicant. Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may 
be shocked, offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual acts, 
this cannot on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is consenting adults 
alone who are involved.
61. Accordingly, the reasons given by the Government, although relevant, are not 
sufficient to justify the maintenance in force of the impugned legislation in so far as it has 
the general effect of criminalizing private homosexual relations between adult males 
capable of valid consent. In particular, the moral attitudes towards male homosexuality in 
Northern Ireland and the concern that any relaxation in the law would tend to erode existing 
moral standards cannot, without more, warrant interfering with the applicant’s private life to 
such an extent. ‘Decriminalization’ does not imply approval, and a fear that some sectors of 
the population might draw misguided conclusions in this respect from reform of the 
legislation does not afford a good ground for maintaining it in force with all its unjustifiable 
features. To sum up, the restriction imposed on Mr. Dudgeon under Northern Ireland law, 
by reason of its breadth and absolute character, is, quite apart from the severity of the 
possible penalties provided for, disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved. 
62. In the opinion of the Commission, the interference complained of by the applicant 
can, in so far as he is prevented from having sexual relations with young males under 21 
years of age, be justified as necessary for the protection of the rights of others (see 
especially paragraphs 105 and 116 of the report). This conclusion was accepted and adopted 
by the Government, but disputed by the applicant who submitted that the age of consent for 
male homosexual relations should be the same as that for heterosexual and female 
homosexual relations, that is, 17 years under current Northern Ireland law (see paragraph 15 
above). The Court has already acknowledged the legitimate necessity in a democratic 
society for some degree of control over homosexual conduct notably in order to provide 
safeguards against the exploitation and corruption of those who are specially vulnerable by 
reason, for example, of their youth (see paragraph 49 above). However, it falls in the first 
instance to the national authorities to decide on the appropriate safeguards of this kind 
required for the defence of morals in their society and, in particular, to fix the age under 
which young people should have the protection of the criminal law (see paragraph 52 
above).  
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D. Conclusion  
63. Mr. Dudgeon has suffered and continues to suffer an unjustified interference with 
his right to respect for his private life. There is accordingly a breach of Article 8 . 
 * * * 
 For those Reasons, the Court 
1. Holds by fifteen votes to four that there is a breach of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention;  
The Court has recently upheld France’s decision to bar adoption by a homosexual, holding 
that France must be allowed ‘a certain leeway’ and noting that ‘child psychiatrists and 
psychologists are divided about the consequences of a child being raised by one or more 
homosexual parents’. 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,  Thirty-Third Ordinary  
Session Recommendation 924 (1981)8 on discrimination against homosexuals
The Assembly 
1. Recalling its firm commitment to the protection of human rights and to the abolition of 
all forms of discrimination; 
2. Observing that, despite some efforts and new legislation in recent years directed 
towards eliminating discrimination against homosexuals, they continue to suffer from 
discrimination and even, at time, from oppression; 
3. Believing that, in the pluralistic societies of today, in which of course traditional 
family life has its own place and value, practices such as the exclusion of persons on 
the grounds of their sexual preferences from certain jobs, the existence of acts of 
aggression against them or the keeping of records on those persons, are survivals of 
several centuries or prejudice;  
4. Considering that in a few member states homosexual acts are still a criminal offence 
and often carry severe penalties: 
5. Believing that all individuals, male or female, having attained the legal age of consent 
provided by the law of the country they live in, and who are capable of valid personal 
consent, should enjoy the right to sexual self-determination; 
6. Emphasizing, however, that the state has a responsibility in areas of public concern 
such as the protection of children, 
7. Recommends that the Committee of Ministers: 
 i. Urge those member states where homosexual acts between consenting adults are 
liable to criminal prosecution, to abolish those laws and practices; 
 ii. urge member states to apply the same minimum age of consent for homosexual 
and heterosexual acts; 
 iii. call on the governments of the member states: 
 a. to order the destruction of existing special records on homosexuals and to abolish 
the practice of keeping records on homosexuals by the police or any other authority; 
 b. to assure equality of treatment, no more no less, for homosexuals with regard 
to employment, pay and job security, particularly in the public sector; 
 c. to ask for the cessation of all compulsory medical action or research designed 
to alter the sexual orientation of adults; 
 d. to ensure that custody, visiting rights and accommodation of children by their 
parents should not be restricted on the sole grounds of the homosexual tendencies 
of one of them; 
 e. to ask prison and other public authorities to be vigilant against the risk of rape, 
violence and sexual offences in prisons. 
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7. National Implementation
In North America, recent decisions by the high courts of both Canada and the United 
States have reflected and reinforced growing acceptance of homosexuality.  Resistance 
to same-sex marriage remains, however, especially in the United States.  As set forth in 
the Lawrence decision below, the Supreme Court of the United States has only 
recently held that states cannot criminalize consensual homosexual acts. 
Canada 
Vriend v. Alberta9  The violation of s.15(1) of the Charter created by the omission of sexual 
orientation from the Act could not be saved by s.1 in that the two requirements for the 
application of the latter section were not met.  First, there was no evidence of a pressing and 
substantive objective in excluding sexual orientation from the Act.  Even if that objective 
could be determined by examining the Act as a whole, the exclusion of sexual orientation 
was antithetical to the Act’s overall goal of protecting the dignity and rights of all persons 
living in Alberta.  Further, even if the omission was for a pressing and substantive 
objective, the omission did not meet the second requirement of attempting to achieve that 
objective through means that were reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society.  First, there was no rational connection between the omission and the 
objective of the Act of protecting all Albertans from discrimination.  The argument that the 
objective of the Act could be met by incrementally expanding the scope of the Act was 
rejected, as there was no evidence of the Alberta legislature adopting such an approach with 
the Act.  Further, government incrementatalism is an inappropriate justification for Charter
violations, especially with respect to human rights legislation.  Second, the omission did not 
meet the minimal impairment requirement.  The argument that the legislature’s exclusion of 
sexual orientation was for the purpose of mediating between the conflicting interests of 
religious freedom and homosexuality was rejected in that there were provisions in the Act 
to deal with this conflict. As well, since the exclusion in this case was total, this was an 
inappropriate case for judicial deference. Finally, there was no evidence of any 
proportionality between the objective of the Act and the infringement of the appellant’s 
equality rights. 
Reading in sexual orientation as a prohibited grounds of discrimination into the 
impugned sections of the Act was the best remedy for the Charter violation. Case law has 
established that before choosing this remedy, a court must give regard to guiding principles 
of respect for the role of legislatures and respect for the purposes of the Charter. With 
respect to the first principle, reading in sexual orientation into the Act minimized 
interference with the Alberta legislature’s goal as set out in the Act of recognizing and 
protecting the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of Albertans through the elimination 
of discriminatory practices. In contrast, striking down the impugned sections would have, in 
effect, gutted the Act and thereby deprived all Albertans of human rights protection. This 
would have constituted an excessive intrusion into the legislative scheme enacted by the 
legislature. With respect to the second principle, adding to the list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination found in the Act was consistent with the purposes of the Charter, while the 
other option of striking down the impugned sections would have been inconsistent with the 
Charter in that it would have denied all Albertans protection from marketplace 
discrimination. With respect to the need for remedial precision before adopting the reading 
in remedy, the expression ‘sexual orientation’ is a term with an easily discernible common 
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sense meaning. In terms of budgetary repercussions, they were not sufficiently significant in 
this case to avoid the reading in remedy. As for the effect of reading in on the thrust of the 
legislation, there was no deleterious impact. It was reasonable to assume that the legislature 
would prefer to include sexual orientation in the Act than to having no human rights 
legislation. As well, reading in did not interfere with the legislative objective, as the 
evidence indicated that the legislature decided to defer to the courts on this controversial 
issue. Finally, reading in did not constitute judicial interference with democratic principles. 
Democracy involves more than majority rule and involves legislators taking into account 
the interests of majorities and minorities alike. Judicial interference is warranted where the 
interest of minorities have not been considered. As well, there were procedures in place, 
such as the s. 33 of the Charter override provision which allowed the legislature to override 
the reading in. 
Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality10 Introduction  Canadians enjoy a wide 
variety of close personal relationships – many marry or live with conjugal partners while 
others may share a home with parents, grandparents or a caregiver. The diversity of these 
relationships is a significant feature of our society, to be valued and respected. For many 
Canadians, the close personal relationships that they hold dear constitute an important 
source of comfort and help them to be productive members of society. 
The law has not always respected these choices, however, or accorded them full legal 
recognition. While the law has recently been expanding its recognition beyond marriage to 
include other marriage-like relationships, it continues to focus its attention on conjugality. 
The Law Commission believes that governments need to pursue a more comprehensive and 
principled approach to the legal recognition and support of the full range of close personal 
relationships among adults. This requires a fundamental rethinking of the way in which 
governments regulate relationships. 
The Diversity of Personal Adult Relationships  The diversity of personal relationships 
formed by Canadian adults is not a new phenomenon. Alongside the nuclear family centred 
on the conjugal couple, there have always been a variety of other living arrangements, 
including adult siblings sharing a home, widows and widowers forming blended families 
and multi-generational households. While domestic relationships appear to have become 
more diverse over the past thirty years, it may simply be that public awareness has increased 
as a result of the increased availability of statistical data. For example, the 2001 census was 
the first time that Statistics Canada collected data on same-sex unions. Many non-conjugal 
relationships are still largely invisible in mainstream social science research. As well, we 
have only limited information about relationships where adults are economically, 
emotionally and even physically interdependent, but do not share a residence. 
Conjugal Relationships  A majority of Canadians form a conjugal union at some point in 
their lives. While the marriage rate has declined steadily since 1971, marriages still 
constitute a predominant choice for opposite-sex conjugal unions. Nevertheless, 
opposite-sex cohabitation – whether as an alternative to marriage, as a prelude to marriage 
or as a sequel to marriage – is a growing phenomenon that now has widespread social 
acceptance. 
There is as yet no census data or reliable studies on the number of lesbian and gay 
couples living together in Canada. The available data from small-scale studies suggests that 
gays and lesbians form enduring conjugal relationships in numbers comparable to the 
population as a whole. It appears that a significant minority of Canadian households 
consists of same-sex couples. 
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Non-Conjugal Households and Non-Conjugal Relationships  A substantial minority of 
Canadian households involves adults living alone, lone-parent families or adults living 
together in non-conjugal relationships. Households centred around a conjugal relationship 
may also include other adults with no conjugal ties to the couple, such as relatives or close 
friends. In addition, adult children are often returning home to live with their parents, 
principally for financial reasons caused by unemployment or the need to complete their 
education. 
The concept of the economic family encompasses all relatives living in the same 
household, regardless of how they are related. Adult siblings living together form the largest 
component of this group. 
We know little about non-conjugal relationships between non-relatives, since the 1996
census did not differentiate between same-sex conjugal relationships and non-conjugal 
relationships between non-relatives. We do know that ‘families of friends’ can be of great 
importance, particularly within the gay and lesbian communities and among older adults, 
especially older women.  
Designing a Registration Scheme
1. Formal Attributes  There is no reason for governments to restrict a registration 
scheme to conjugal couples or only to same-sex couples. We also see no compelling 
reason to impose a residential requirement on registrations, just as there is no 
requirement that married couples live together. Registrations should be terminable by 
mutual agreement. Registered partners should also be able to register a unilateral 
dissolution of their registration. The state should ensure that the legal obligations and 
reasonable expectations of the registrants are respected when the relationship breaks 
down. 
2. Legal Implications of Registrations Registration should provide options to registrants: 
for example, models of predetermined rights and responsibilities reflecting a conjugal 
relationship or a variety of caregiving relationships. 
The legal consequences of registration might be limited to the private rights and 
responsibilities within the relationship – both during and after the relationship. Registration 
would be about clarifying the mutual responsibilities each party is voluntarily assuming, 
both for the parties themselves and for potentially interested third parties. 
3. Intergovernmental and International Implications Although the federal government 
has constitutional jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, including support and custody 
issues, it is unlikely that this jurisdiction would allow it to enact a registration regime that 
regulates the private legal obligations between adults in close personal relationships or to 
pass legislation regulating entry into, or exit from, this new civil arrangement. The best 
scenario would be a coordinated initiative among the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments. 
On the international level, Canada should participate in the efforts toward international 
recognition of registration systems. It should also attempt to design its international 
arrangements on the basis of the existence of a variety of relationships and move toward an 
international recognition of registrations. 
Marriage  In assessing whether our marriage laws continue to meet the needs of our 
evolving society, a first fundamental question is whether we need marriage laws at all. 
Could registration replace marriage, for all legal purposes? Would this better serve the 
objectives of the state? 
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Registration Instead of Marriage  A registration scheme could be used to replace marriage 
as a legal institution. Religious marriage ceremonies would continue to exist, but they 
would no longer have legal consequences. Only a system of civil registration would bind 
two people to a range of legal rights and responsibilities, and any two people who wanted to 
obtain public recognition and support of their relationship could register. We conclude that, 
while further debate about the appropriate role of the state in marriage is worthwhile, 
removing marriage as a legal mechanism for expressing commitment in a personal 
relationship is unlikely to be an attractive option for the majority of Canadians currently. 
Adequacy of Current Marriage Laws  An historical overview of marriage in the 
Western world shows that church and state have had varying degrees of control over 
this institution. In some countries, like France, the state has had exclusive jurisdiction 
over marriage for centuries, although of course people continue to participate in 
religious ceremonies. In Canada, civil marriage and religious marriage co-exist. 
Although it may be appropriate to revisit the role of religious authorities as 
state-delegates for the purpose of marriage celebrations, and consider adopting a 
regime that requires a civil ceremony for the marriage to have legal effect, it does lead 
to duplication for those who want a religious ceremony. 
The state’s interest in marriage is not connected to the promotion of a particular 
conception of appropriate gender roles, nor is it to reserve procreation and the raising of 
children to marriage. The state’s objectives underlying contemporary regulation of marriage 
relate essentially to the facilitation of private ordering: providing an orderly framework in 
which people can express their commitment to each other, receive public recognition and 
support, and voluntarily assume a range of legal rights and obligations. As the Supreme 
Court of Canada recognized in 1999 (M. v. H.), the capacity to form conjugal relationships 
characterized by emotional and economic interdependence has nothing to do with sexual 
orientation. If governments are to continue to maintain an institution called marriage, they 
cannot do so in a discriminatory fashion. Accordingly, the Report recommends that 
Parliament and provincial/territorial legislatures move toward repealing legislative 
restrictions on marriages between persons of the same sex. 
Conclusion  In this Report, we argue that governments have tended to rely too heavily on 
conjugal relationships in accomplishing important state objectives. Rather than advocating 
simply that the law cover a broader range of relationships, the Law Commission is of the 
view that it is time for governments to re-evaluate the way in which they regulate personal 
adult relationships. 
We are suggesting a new methodology for addressing the legal regulation of these 
relationships, consisting of four questions. Are the objectives of the legislation legitimate? 
If so, are relationships relevant to achieving them? If they are relevant, can individuals 
themselves choose which relationships should be subject to the law? Finally, if relationships 
are relevant and self-designation is not feasible, is there a better way for governments to 
include relationships? 
Implementation of this methodology would greatly diminish government reliance on 
relationship status. However, the state would still have an important role to play with 
respect to personal relationships, providing the legal framework for the voluntary 
assumption of rights and obligations between the two parties. It should broaden the range of 
relationships that receive this kind of state recognition and support through the creation of a 
registration scheme and the legalization of same-sex marriage.  
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United States
Supreme Court of the United States, Syllabus, Lawrence et al. v. Texas11  Responding to a 
reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered petitioner 
Lawrence’s apartment and saw him and another adult man, petitioner Garner, engaging in a 
private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual 
intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage 
in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held, inter alia,
that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The court considered Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, controlling on that 
point.
Held: The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in 
certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. Pp. 3-18.  
* * * 
In Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), the Court confronted a New 
York law forbidding sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to persons under 16 years 
of age. Although there was no single opinion for the Court, the law was invalidated. Both 
Eisenstadt and Carey, as well as the holding and rationale in Roe, confirmed that the 
reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the protection of rights of married adults. 
This was the state of the law with respect to some of the most relevant cases when the Court 
considered Bowers v. Hardwick.
The facts in Bowers had some similarities to the instant case. A police officer, whose 
right to enter seems not to have been in question, observed Hardwick, in his own bedroom, 
engaging in intimate sexual conduct with another adult male. The conduct was in violation 
of a Georgia statute making it a criminal offense to engage in sodomy. One difference 
between the two cases is that the Georgia statute prohibited the conduct whether or not the 
participants were of the same sex, while the Texas statute, as we have seen, applies only to 
participants of the same sex. Hardwick was not prosecuted, but he brought an action in 
federal court to declare the state statute invalid. He alleged he was a practicing homosexual 
and that the criminal prohibition violated rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution. The 
Court, in an opinion by Justice White, sustained the Georgia law. Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court and filed separate, concurring opinions. Four 
Justices dissented. 478 U. S., at 199 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, 
and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 214 (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, 
JJ.).  
The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as follows: ‘The issue presented 
is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such 
conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.’  Id., at 190. That statement, we now 
conclude, discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. 
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct 
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple 
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws 
involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than 
prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, 
and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal 
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.  
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This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define 
the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of 
an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to 
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and 
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice.  
Having misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented to it, and thus stating the 
claim to be whether there is a fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy, the 
Bowers Court said: ‘Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.’  Id., at 192. In 
academic writings, and in many of the scholarly amicus briefs filed to assist the Court in 
this case, there are fundamental criticisms of the historical premises relied upon by the 
majority and concurring opinions in Bowers. Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae 16-
17; Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 15-21; Brief for 
Professors of History et al. as Amici Curiae 3-10. We need not enter this debate in the 
attempt to reach a definitive historical judgment, but the following considerations counsel 
against adopting the definitive conclusions upon which Bowers placed such reliance.  
* * * 
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted 
that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European 
Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom. See P. G. & J. H. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, ¶56 (Eur. Ct. H. 
R., Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 
Eur. Ct. H. R. (1988). Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation 
of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. See 
Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12. The right the petitioners seek in this 
case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There 
has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing 
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.  
* * * 
  In his dissenting opinion in Bowers JUSTICE STEVENS came to these conclusions:  
‘Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not 
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual 
decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even 
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate 
choices by unmarried as well as married persons.’ 478 U. S., at 216 (footnotes and citations 
omitted).  
JUSTICE STEVENS’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and 
should control here.  
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to 
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.  
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be 
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be 
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek 
to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each 
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other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are 
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control 
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the 
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention 
of the government.  ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal 
liberty which the government may not enter.’ Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute 
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and 
private life of the individual.  
After the Lawrence case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court became the first to find a right 
to marriage for same sex partners under the state constitution. 
 Goodridge & others vs. Department of Public Health & another12
 Unofficial Synopsis Prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 
The Supreme Judicial Court held today that ‘barring an individual from the protections, 
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a person 
of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.’ The court stayed the entry of 
judgment for 180 days ‘to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem 
appropriate in light of this opinion.’ 
‘Marriage is a vital social institution,’ wrote Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall for the 
majority of the Justices. ‘The exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other 
nurtures love and mutual support; it brings stability to our society. For those who choose to 
marry, and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social 
benefits. In turn it imposes weighty legal, financial, and social obligations.’ The question 
before the court was ‘whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution,’ the 
Commonwealth could deny those protections, benefits, and obligations to two individuals 
of the same sex who wish to marry. 
In ruling that the Commonwealth could not do so, the court observed that the 
Massachusetts Constitution ‘affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals,’ and ‘forbids 
the creation of second-class citizens.’ It reaches its conclusion, the court said, giving ‘full 
deference to the arguments made by the Commonwealth.’ The Commonwealth, the court 
ruled, ‘has failed to identify any constitutionality adequate reason for denying civil marriage 
to same-sex couples.’ The court affirmed that it owes ‘great deference to the Legislature to 
decide social and policy issues.’ Where, as here, the constitutionality of a law is challenged, 
it is the ‘traditional and settled role’ of courts to decide the constitutional question. The 
‘marriage ban’ the court held, ‘works a deep and scarring hardship’ on same-sex families 
‘for no rational reason.’ It prevents children of same-sex couples ‘from enjoying the 
immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of  “a stable family structure in 
which children will be reared, educated, and socialized”.’ ‘It cannot be rational under our 
laws,’ the court held, ‘to penalize children by depriving them of State benefits’ because of 
their parents’ sexual orientation. 
The court rejected the Commonwealth’s claim that the primary purpose of marriage was 
procreation. Rather, the history of the marriage laws in the Commonwealth demonstrates 
that ‘it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, 
not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of marriage.’ 
The court remarked that its decision ‘does not disturb the fundamental value of 
marriage in our society.’ ‘That same-sex couples are willing to embrace marriage’s solemn 
obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and commitment to one another is a testament to 
the enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit,’ the court stated. 
The opinion reformulates the common-law definition of civil marriage to mean ‘the 
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voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others. Noting that ‘civil 
marriage has long been termed a “civil right”,’ the court concluded that ‘the right to marry 
means little if it does not include the right to marry the person of one’s choice, subject to 
appropriate government restrictions in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare.’
8.   IOs and NGOs 
IOs
The Human Rights Committee has heard testimony regarding the persecution of 
homosexuals, as set forth in the following briefing.
Trinidad & Tobago/A Summary of Concerns13 Amnesty International welcomes the 
opportunity to submit a summary of its concerns on human rights issues in Trinidad and 
Tobago to the Human Rights Committee for the consideration of Trinidad and Tobago’s 
combined third and fourth periodic reports submitted under article 40 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), acceded to by the Government of Trinidad 
and Tobago on 21 December 1978. Amnesty International notes that the third and fourth 
reports were due in 1990 and 1995 respectively.  
The organisation recently met with members of the Human Rights Unit, operating under 
the office of the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago. Amnesty International notes that 
the Unit’s responsibilities include coordination of reports to the Human Rights Committee. 
Amnesty International welcomes this step as a means of ensuring that the state party’s 
commitments under Article 40 are met. Amnesty also welcomes the commitment given by 
members of the unit to ensuring that Trinidad and Tobago is up to date with all its 
international reporting obligations by the end of the year. 
Amnesty International reiterates its hope that the filing of the combined periodic report 
currently under examination by the Human Rights Committee is a signal that the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago is prepared to take measures to ensure fuller 
implementation of the provisions of the ICCPR in line with the observations of the Human 
Rights Committee, to provide information to the Human Rights Committee and to 
implement recommendations of the Human Rights Committee in the context of individual 
cases. 
Amnesty International conducted research missions to Trinidad and Tobago in February 
and September 2000. Amnesty International’s requests for meetings with government 
officials were declined by the government, although a meeting did take place between the 
Human Rights Unit and AI researchers in September 2000. 
This document summarizes Amnesty International’s concerns regarding human rights 
violations in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Article 17 (1) and 26 (right to privacy; prohibition of discrimination; right to equality 
before the law)  
NGOs
NGOs stress the human rights implications of ongoing discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. 
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The International Lesbian and Gay Association14 ILGA’s aim is to work for the equality of 
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgendered people and their liberation from all forms of 
discrimination. We seek to achieve this aim through the worldwide cooperation and mutual 
support of our members. 
We focus public and government attention on cases of discrimination against lesbians, 
gay men, bisexuals and transgendered people by supporting programs and protest actions, 
asserting diplomatic pressure, providing information and working with international 
organisations and the international media. 
 * * * 
Many of ILGA’s international campaigns have helped to win major victories. Our pressure 
contributed to the legalisation of homosexuality in New Zealand, Russia, Ireland and other 
countries, repeal of the discriminatory US immigration policy and compliance by various 
nations with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. ILGA highlights the 
vicious oppression of sexual minorities in countries where it is too dangerous for any 
organised movement to exist, such as Iran. 
Support for emerging lesbian and gay movements.  In many countries ILGA has 
supported the emergence of the first autonomous lesbian and gay groups. ILGA has given 
impetus and support to groups in Latin America and Asia, and contributed to the growth of 
a democratic multiracial lesbian and gay movement in South Africa. ILGA also played a 
crucial role in the development of the first gay and lesbian organisations in the former 
East-Bloc countries through its ‘Eastern Europe Information Pool’, which operated from 
1982 to 1990, despite the surveillance of the secret police in these countries. ILGA also 
helped organise ten sub-regional conferences for Eastern Europe in the years 1987 to 1996
to allow the participation of people who could not travel to conferences in the West and to 
address the problems and needs specific to this part of Europe. 
Lobbying of International Organisations.  ILGA lobbies international organisations 
such as the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the European Union. 
ILGA has participated in many of the United Nations’ human rights activities, including 
the 2nd UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993) and the 4th UN World 
Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), as well as in regional preparatory conferences 
which preceded these world conferences. ILGA’s representatives have regularly presented 
evidence on human rights violations to the annual hearings in Geneva of the UN’s 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 
ILGA has taken part in the so-called Helsinki Process since 1980. At the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 1993 Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, ILGA 
persuaded the OSCE that its commitments in the area of non-discrimination should also 
cover sexual orientation. 
ILGA has promoted lesbian and gay rights within the framework of the Council of 
Europe in many ways, including lobbying the Parliamentary Assembly, putting forward 
proposals for the extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to cover sexual 
orientation, and supporting member organisations in taking test cases under the Convention. 
ILGA persuaded the Council of Europe to make the repeal of laws banning homosexuality a 
pre-condition for membership of the Council. This put significant pressure on membership 
applicants such as Lithuania, Romania, Albania, Moldova, and Macedonia to repeal their 
discriminatory laws. In 1998 ILGA was granted Consultative Status with the Council of 
Europe. 
* * * 
ILGA was also instrumental in the deletion of homosexuality from the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases, again, after many years of campaigning. 
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  HIV/AIDS.  The issue of AIDS has been another focus of ILGA and has always been an 
integral part of ILGA conferences. ILGA has co-operated closely with the Global 
Programme on AIDS of the World Health Organization and later with its successor, the 
joint UN agency to fight AIDS, UNAIDS. 
 The ILGA Conference.  Our World Conference attracts delegates from all over the 
globe. It provides international activists with the opportunity to learn from other countries, 
to present achievements, collaborate with other groups on national and international 
projects, and to help to set the international gay and lesbian agenda. The conferences are 
also a celebration of the diversity of the international gay, lesbian, bisexual and 
transgendered movement as we welcome representatives from a wide range of countries and 
constituencies. 
ILGA is registered as a non-governmental non-profit international association under 
Belgian law.  
9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem  
As indicated in the Overview, Keith and David are more likely to obtain benefits than 
recognition of their marital status.  Domestic partnerships are more widely recognized 
than same-sex marriage.  David and Keith may be willing to enter into such a 
partnership in a new location in order to be recognized as a couple and to obtain 
specified benefits, or they may view such partnerships as a second class status, but 
they should be aware of their options.   
As noted in Section 3, Cultural Variations, domestic partnerships are widely 
recognized throughout Europe, indicating widespread recognition of legally 
sanctioned, same-sex relationships.  Such recognition  is less widespread in Canada, 
and even more rare in the U.S., as set out in Section 7, National Implementation.  Even 
if benefits for Keith are not provided under local laws, they may be available through a 
private law policy adopted by David’s employer.  The specific benefits available under 
such policies are suggested in Section 4, Private International Law Conventions.  As 
indicated in Section 5, Public International Law, Keith and David have no right under 
international human rights law to have their relationship recognized, although 
criminalization of homosexual relationships has been condemned as violative of 
human rights.  As set out at Section 7, criminal prosecution is no longer an issue in 
Canada or the U.S.  Section 6, Regional Conventions, again highlights the very 
progressive approach of the European region compared to the Inter-American and 
African regional human rights authorities.   
The point is that by leaving Europe, David and Keith should be prepared to be 
faced with less enlightened legal regimes.  More specifically, as set out in Section 7, 
the U.S. has only recently barred state laws criminalizing homosexuality.  Unless they 
relocate to Massachusetts, where the state Supreme Court held that homosexuals could 
not be prohibited from marrying under the state constitution, recognition of their 
marriage is at best an open question in most states.  In Canada, in contrast,  
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has been held to violate the Charter.  
Opening marriage to gays and lesbians is one way a province can address this 
violation, but as the Report of the Law Commission of Canada, ‘Beyond Conjugality’ 
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points out, it is not necessarily the only way.  After Vriend, Canada seems generally 
more hospitable to homosexuals, but David and Keith should note that local law (and 
culture) may be more important.  Massachusetts, for example, may well be a better 
choice for them than Alberta.   
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Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, UCLA Women’s Law Journal , Vol. 8, 
p. 219. 
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(reviewing 43 empirical studies as well as other articles and concluding that ‘[N]ot a 
single study has found children of gay and lesbian parents to be disadvantaged in any 
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and Polikoff, M. (1999) ‘Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in the 20th
Century’, Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 33, 539 and n.50); Maxwell, N. et al. (2000), 
‘Legal Protection for All the Children: Dutch-United States Comparison of Lesbian 
and Gay Parent Adoptions,’ Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law,
Vol. 17, p. 309 (comparing Dutch and American law on adoption by homosexuals). 
3. Sadtler, E. (1999), ‘A Right to Same-Sex Marriage Under International Law: Can It 
Be Vindicated in the United States?’ Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, 
p. 405.
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Chapter 3 
Adoption
1. The Problems
Sergei
You are a lawyer in Boston, Massachusetts (U.S.) and you receive a telephone call 
from Allie, another lawyer in your office. She is in Romania at the office of the State 
Agency, holding ten month old Sergei and sobbing into the phone. She has just been 
advised that the government has imposed a complete bar on all foreign adoptions, 
including those in progress. The State Agency has no idea when the bar might be 
lifted. 
What can she do?  Does it matter whether there is a U.S. agency involved?  
Whether Romania is a party to the Hague Convention on  Protection of Children and 
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (‘Hague Convention on Adoption’)? 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)?  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)?  The International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)? 
Carlos 
Jean-Paul and Sophie live in Aix-en-Provence, France. They  have recently adopted 
Carlos, a four year old boy from Colombia. They received a detailed social and 
medical history of Carlos’s biological mother, a terse description of his biological 
father as a ‘healthy twenty-six year old,’ and no specific identifying information. They 
have been reading about the importance of roots and cultural identity for many 
adopted children, and have decided that they want more information. Can they get it? 
To whom can they address their request, and what law (if any) supports it? 
2. Overview
Adoption is the process through which a legal relationship is established between a 
child and a person or couple who are not her biological parents.  The primary purpose 
of adoption is to assure an otherwise parentless child a stable, secure and loving home. 
In addition, adoption enables those who want a child, or more children, to create or 
enlarge their families. 
In intercountry adoption, this may be achieved through a simple adoption, in which 
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the relationship with the child’s biological parents is not completely severed, or a full 
adoption, in which it is. Termination of the parent/child relationship may be 
involuntary, initiated by the State in cases of neglect or abuse.  In the alternative, the 
biological parents may terminate the relationship voluntarily, through abandonment of 
the child, or by surrendering the child to an agency or to the adoptive parents.  In many 
States, a surrender is not valid unless it occurs after the birth. That is, a biological 
mother cannot be held to a pre-birth agreement to give the child up for adoption.  This 
reflects the belief that a mother cannot agree to give up the baby in the abstract; only 
after the birth can she fully understand what she is giving up.  Often there is an 
additional period in which she can revoke her decision. 
This kind of protection may be extended to both parents.  In the Czech Republic, 
for example, under the Family Law Reform of 1998, the parents may submit a written 
declaration to a court or appropriate agency in which they agree to their infant’s 
adoption.  This consent is not valid, however, unless it is given after the infant is six 
weeks old.  In general, if the biological father is married to the child’s mother, he also 
has rights to the child.  If he is not married to the child’s mother, he usually has fewer 
rights and may have none.  If he has parental rights but does not want to exercise them, 
it is usually a simple matter for him to relinquish them.  In many States, for example, 
he need only sign a statement to that effect. 
Once the child’s relationship with the biological parents is legally terminated, the 
child is eligible for adoption. Standards for those who are eligible to adopt are 
established by the national law of the country in which the adoption will take place. 
This may be the child’s country of origin, the adoptive parents’ country of residence, 
or both. These standards for adoptive parents vary widely, but may  include: minimum 
(or maximum) age, proof of the ability to financially care for the child, and the absence 
of other children in the family. 
Screening is often delegated to public or private agencies, which may impose 
additional requirements.  In China, for example, adoptive parents are likely to be asked 
why they are adopting a Chinese child, whether they have any children now (either 
adopted or birth), details regarding their family background, an explanation as to their 
childlessness, and for assurances that the adopted child will be well-treated.  A home 
study, in which a social worker visits the parents in the home where they plan to raise 
the child, is frequently part of the screening process.  In countries where there are more 
parents seeking babies than babies needing parents, screening can become quite 
restrictive.  
Once the parents have been screened, the child may be placed with them and the 
adoption provisionally granted. There may be a mandatory waiting period, typically 
between six months and a year, before the order of adoption is finalized.  This final 
order typically gives the parents and child all of the legal rights and obligations of a 
biological family.  
Intercountry adoption raises many important legal issues, some of which may be very 
sensitive. National laws regarding the disclosure of the identity of the biological parents 
vary widely, for example, as discussed in Section 3.  The requirement of voluntary 
relinquishment, similarly, may be presumed from the circumstances or may be satisfied 
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only by a formal oath before a court.   In addition to the distinction between ‘full’ and 
‘simple’ adoptions, noted above, some States create other categories for adoptions.  The 
Czech Republic, for example, allows two types of adoption, one revocable on ‘important 
grounds,’ the other irrevocable.  The legal issues which must be addressed in intercountry 
adoption are complicated, finally, by the emigration and citizenship laws of the involved 
States. These may require that a child be adopted before leaving her State of origin, and 
be adopted again under the laws of the parents’ State. 
Agency or Independent Adoption
Some States allow adoptions to be arranged independently, that is, without the 
supervision of a State-authorized agency.  In an independent adoption, the prospective 
parents may deal directly with the biological parent, or they may hire an intermediary.  
Independent adoptions must comply with all applicable local or national laws 
governing adoption in general, such as prohibitions against baby-selling and 
requirements for voluntary consent.  But they are free of the additional requirements 
that may be imposed by agencies, whether as part of an effort to reduce the pool of 
applicants or to further what the agency views as the best interests of the child.  Instead 
of agency criteria, independent adoptions may be based on the specific preferences of 
the parties, such as a biological mother’s preference for parents of a particular 
religious denomination. 
A major risk in an independent adoption is that if the adoption is not finalized – for 
whatever reason – the prospective parents, as well as the biological parent, must begin 
the process all over again.  The prospective parents may lose any money advanced – 
for counseling, legal fees or medical care – depending on the terms of the contract 
between the parties.  Even if they are entitled to reimbursement, as a practical matter it 
may be impossible to recover funds already spent by an impoverished mother.  The 
psychological costs of a failed adoption may be devastating, especially where the 
prospective parents have bonded with the child. 
While these psychological costs are not entirely avoided in an agency adoption, 
they may be reduced.  Once the prospective parents are approved to receive a baby, 
the agency will generally find them another baby if an initial placement is not finalized 
through no fault of the parents.  This should be explicitly set out in the agreement with 
the agency, however.  Agency obligations vary from State to State, so prospective 
parents, as well as surrendering parents, must be wary.  Risk-averse prospective 
parents may decide to work through two agencies, one in the sending and one in the 
receiving State.  A domestic agency with a history of successfully finalized adoptions 
from the sending country – and with ties to agencies there – is a relatively safe choice, 
but it is not always an option. 
Alternatives to Adoption 
It should be noted that some States, particularly Muslim States in the Middle East, do 
not recognize ‘adoption’ as described here. In such States responsibility for a 
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parentless child is established through a system of kafalah, or guardianship, in which 
relatives of the child assume responsibility for the care of the child, who remains 
identified with the biological family. Kafalah is not subject to the Hague Convention 
on Intercounty Adoption and it will not be addressed in this chapter.  
3. Cultural Variations
There is a broad range of cultural views as to the importance of blood ties, the stigma 
attached to non-marital births, and the privacy rights of all parties in the adoption triad. 
This is reflected in the broad range of approaches to the question of access to 
information regarding the child’s biological family.  Legal approaches to such 
identifying information range from complete secrecy to complete openness.  In China, 
for example, the birth of an ‘unauthorized’ child may result in onerous fines and other 
penalties for the parents. In India, the birth of an out-of-wedlock child carries 
enormous social stigma.  Children born under these circumstances in these countries 
are likely to be abandoned. They are often left in some public place, such as a public 
marketplace, where it is hoped that they will be found. Identifying information for such 
children is simply unavailable. 
In New South Wales and Tennessee (U.S.), in contrast, relinquishing parents are 
expected to provide detailed information, including their names, addresses and 
telephone numbers.  The purpose of such laws is to make it possible for the child to 
contact the biological parents upon majority if the child chooses to do so.  The 
biological parent may veto such contact, however, and the adoptee may be subject to 
sanctions for violating a contact veto. 
State approaches to the disclosure of identifying information are also shaped by 
politics and history.  In Argentina, for example, the 1996 Adoption Act assures 
adoptees access to their original birth records. This law was passed following 
extensive lobbying by the Mothers of the Disappeared, whose adult children had been 
illegally detained and subsequently murdered by the military police (‘disappeared’), 
during Argentina’s ‘dirty war’ in the 1970s and early 1980s.  Many of the children of 
the Disappeared, including infants born while their mothers were in police custody, 
had been adopted by the same military police who killed their parents.  A few of these 
children were returned to their families of origin under the ‘best interests of the child’ 
standard during the 1980s, but the overwhelming majority was never found.  The 1996
Act enabled the adult children of the Disappeared to discover the identities of their 
biological parents. 
While few scandals on this scale have been exposed, Argentina is not the only State 
in which a traumatic history has shaped attitudes about a child’s right to identity. In 
Poland, for example, many Jewish children were informally adopted by non-Jews 
during World War II when their parents fled or were taken away by the Nazis.  A few 
of these parents returned to claim their children after the war.  While Polish law did 
not allow adult adoptees access to identifying information until 1995, in 1986 Poland 
joined with Argentina to propose that the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
Adoption 57
requires States to assist any child ‘illegally deprived of . . . his identity.’ 
Except in such cases of egregious State action, the rights of biological parents are 
rarely guaranteed. Rather, the emphasis is on the adoptee’s right of access to 
information.  Access to birth records is assured for adult adoptees in France, Germany, 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.  In England, there is a 
passive registry through which birth parents may be located, but there is no 
comparable registry through which birth parents can locate the biological children they 
surrendered.  In Croatia, adoption records may be made available to the adoptive and 
the biological parents, as well as to the minor adoptee, if it is determined that 
disclosure is in the best interest of the child.  
4. Private International Law
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption (‘The Hague Convention on Adoption’)
The full text of the Hague Convention on Adoption can be found at 
http://www.hcch.net/e/ conventions/text33e.html.  Rather than setting forth detailed 
substantive law, the Convention takes into account the different approaches of State 
parties to issues such as independent adoptions, the use of private intermediaries and 
the disclosure of identifying information.  These differences are resolved by allocating 
responsibility for different stages of the adoption process to the sending or receiving 
State.  In addition, the Convention allows either State to veto the action of the other at 
various points during the process, or under the comprehensive veto power of Art. 
17(c), which requires the Central Authorities of both States to affirmatively agree that 
the adoption should proceed.  
Chapter I sets forth the scope of the Convention, which applies to adoptions 
involving residents of different Contracting States.  Art. 2.  Chapter I also clarifies the 
Convention’s objectives, specifically, ‘to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place 
in the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as 
recognized in international law.’  Art. 1(a).  
Chapter II establishes the requirements for intercountry adoptions, including, 
importantly, a determination ‘that an intercountry adoption is in the child’s best 
interest . . . [after] possibilities for placement of the child within the State of origin 
have been given due consideration’  (emphasis added).  This provision reflects the 
assumption that it is in the child’s best interest to remain in her country of origin, if she 
can be properly cared for there.  Unlike the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC, Art. 21), however, the Hague Convention assumes that it is better for a child to 
be adopted abroad than raised in an institution in her country of origin. 
Chapter II further requires the freely given consent, after counseling if needed, of 
all persons ‘whose consent is necessary,’ including that of a mature child. It expressly 
prohibits ‘payment or compensation of any kind’ to induce such consents.  These 
provisions prevent the kind of  problems that followed the U.S. ‘Operation Baby Lift’ 
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at the end of its war in Vietnam. Babies were ‘rescued’ from orphanages in the final 
days of the war and placed with families in the U.S.  It was later discovered that many 
of these babies had been placed in orphanages by their families with the understanding 
that such placement would be temporary, and that the child would be returned to its 
family when it was safe. The premature ‘rescue’ of these children resulted in several 
lawsuits, and courts ordered some of these babies returned to their biological parents 
(see Note 6, in For Further Research at the end of this chapter).  Finally, Chapter II 
addresses the placement of the child in the receiving State (Art. 5), requiring that the 
competent authorities of that State ‘have determined that the prospective adoptive 
parents are eligible and suited to adopt’ and that the children will be ‘authorized to 
enter and reside permanently in that State.’ Art. 5.1(c). 
Chapter III requires the Contracting State to designate a Central Authority which 
will carry out the State’s duties under the Convention. This allows other States, as well 
as agencies and prospective adoptive parents, to know who they should be dealing with 
in what is often a complex bureaucracy.  The Central Authority is also responsible for 
providing information regarding national adoption laws and otherwise cooperating 
with their counterparts in other Contracting States. This includes the duty to ‘reply, in 
so far as is permitted by the law of their State, to justified requests from other Central 
Authorities or public authorities for information about a particular adoption situation.’ 
Art. 9(e). 
The Central Authority is ultimately responsible for ensuring that adoptions proceed 
in accordance with Chapter IV of the Convention. These duties may be delegated to 
other public authorities or ‘duly accredited’ bodies, such as private adoption agencies. 
Under Art. 22(2), a State may declare that these functions may also be performed by 
other ‘qualified’ bodies or persons, such as lawyers or social workers.  A sending State 
may specify, however, that adoption of its children may only take place where such 
functions are performed by public or accredited bodies. 
The Procedural Requirements set out in Chapter IV include the preparation of a 
report about the applicants ‘including information about their identity, eligibility and 
suitability to adopt, background, family and medical history, social environment, 
reasons for adoption, ability to undertake an intercountry adoption, as well as the 
characteristics of the children for whom they would be qualified to care.’  Art. 15.  
This report is to be prepared by the Central Authority of the receiving State. After 
determining that a child is  adoptable, the Central Authority of the child’s State of 
origin is required to ‘transmit to the Central Authority of the receiving State its report 
on the child, . . . taking care not to reveal the identity of the mother and the father if, in 
the State of origin, these identities may not be disclosed.’  Art. 16(d). 
Chapter V requires Contracting States to recognize and give full legal effect to 
adoptions made in accordance with the Convention.  Art. 23.  Such recognition may be 
refused ‘only if the adoption is manifestly contrary to its public policy, taking into 
account the best interests of the child.’  Art. 24.  This contemplates simple as well as 
full adoptions.  Under Art. 26, recognition explicitly includes recognition of the ‘legal 
parent-child relationship between the child and his or her adoptive parents’ and ‘the 
termination of a pre-existing relationship between the child and his or her mother and 
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father, if the adoption has this effect in the Contracting State where it was made.’ 
Under Art. 26, the law of the State of adoption governs.  Under Art. 27, however, if 
the sending State grants a simple adoption, the receiving State may convert such 
adoption to a full adoption unless the consents were specifically limited. 
Limited deference to the domestic laws of the Contracting States is also shown in 
Art. 29, which prohibits contact between the perspective adoptive parents and the 
biological parents until the required consents have been given, unless such contact is 
‘pursuant to conditions’ established by the State of origin.  Thus, independent 
adoptions are allowed under the Convention if such adoptions are allowed in the 
child’s State of origin.  Art. 30.1, similarly, requires the State to ‘preserve’ identifying 
information and medical histories of the child’s biological parents, but leaves the 
question of actual access to such information to State law: 
(1) The competent authorities of a Contracting State shall ensure that information held by 
them concerning the child’s origin, in particular information concerning the identity of his 
or her parents, as well as the medical history, is preserved.  
(2) They shall ensure that the child or his or her representative has access to such 
information, under appropriate guidance, in so far as is permitted by the law of that State.
Other provisions reflect greater consensus among Contracting States, and their 
shared intention to establish some common standards.  Article 32, for example, 
provides  that:  ‘(1) No one shall derive improper financial or other gain from an 
activity related to an intercountry adoption.  (2) Only costs and expenses, including 
reasonable professional fees may be charged or paid.’  Art. 40, similarly, prohibits 
States from taking reservations to the Convention.  Some of the Convention’s 
requirements are vague and the Convention expressly contemplates variations in 
domestic law.  The Convention nevertheless establishes clear bottom lines – with 
regard to the parents’ and child’s rights, reporting requirements, monitoring and 
administration – to which all Contracting Parties are bound. 
U.S. State Department, Summary of the Convention’s Provisions1
• The Convention will apply to all adoptions between countries becoming parties to it.  
• An adoption will take place only if:  1) the country of origin has established that the 
child is adoptable, that an intercountry adoption is in the child’s best interests, and that 
after counseling, the necessary consents to the adoption have been given freely, AND, 
the receiving country has determined that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible 
and suited to adopt, and that the child they wish to adopt will be authorized to enter and 
reside permanently in that country. 
• Every country must establish a national government-level Central Authority to carry out 
certain non-delegable functions which include cooperating with other Central 
Authorities, overseeing the implementation of the Convention in its country, and 
providing information on the laws of its country. 
• Other functions under the Convention are delegable to public authorities and, in many 
cases, to adoption agencies and other international adoption service providers.    
• Services provided by persons/entities other than adoption agencies are permitted if both 
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the country of origin and the receiving country permit them. 
• Persons wishing to adopt a child resident in another party country must apply to a 
designated authority in their own country. 
• The Convention provides that, with limited exceptions, there can be no contact between 
the prospective adoptive parents and any person who cares for the child until certain 
requirements are met. 
• All adoption service providers must be accredited/approved to provide services under 
the Convention. 
5.   Public International Law
A broad range of human rights may be implicated in international adoption.  First, 
rights denied a mother, such as procreational rights, may affect, if not determine, 
whether there is a baby at all.  Second, other rights denied a mother, such as prenatal 
care, may result in infants with special needs.  Third, gender discrimination, in the 
form of sex-selective abortion and female infanticide, may affect the number and 
gender of babies available for adoption.  Finally, the rights climate may affect the 
mother’s decision to relinquish the infant.  Indeed, the rights climate may be so 
oppressive that the ‘voluntary’ relinquishment required under the Hague Convention 
may in fact be impossible. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2
Article 3.  The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the 
present Covenant. 
Article 4.  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of 
those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may 
subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this 
may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting 
the general welfare in a democratic society. 
* * * 
Article 10.  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:  1.  The widest 
possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is 
responsible for the care and education of dependent children.  Marriage must be entered 
into with the free consent of the intending spouses. 
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and 
after childbirth.  During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or 
leave with adequate social security benefits. 
3.  Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children 
and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. 
Children and young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation.  
Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to 
hamper their normal development should be punishable by law. 
* * * 
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Article 11.  1.  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.  The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent.
* * * 
Article 12.  1.  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3
Article 17.  1.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
2.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
* * * 
Article 23.  1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 
Article 24.  1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of 
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the 
State. 
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. 
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women4
Article 1.  For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against 
women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or 
any other field. 
Article 2.  States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women and, to this end, undertake: 
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national 
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to 
ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this 
principle;  
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where 
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; 
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to 
ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective 
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protection of women against any act of discrimination; 
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to 
ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this 
obligation; 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any 
person, organization or enterprise; 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women; 
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women. 
Article 3.  States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, 
economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the 
full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality 
with men. 
Article 4.  1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered 
discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a 
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be 
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been 
achieved. 
2.  Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in 
the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered 
discriminatory. 
Article 5.  States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:  (a) To modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of 
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women; 
(b)  To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social 
function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of 
the children is the primordial consideration in all cases. 
* * * 
Article 11.  2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage 
or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate 
measures: 
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of 
pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital 
status; 
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss 
of former employment, seniority or social allowances; 
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents 
to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, 
in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of 
child-care facilities; 
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be 
harmful to them. 
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed 
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periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, 
repealed or extended as necessary.
* * * 
Convention on the Rights of the Child5
* * * 
Article 1.  For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being 
below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is 
attained earlier. 
Article 2.  1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present 
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, 
irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, 
disability, birth or other status.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected 
against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, 
expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family 
members.
Article 3.  1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for 
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, 
legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, 
shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. 
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the 
care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by 
competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and 
suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.
* * * 
Article 5.  States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents 
or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided 
for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, 
to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, 
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights 
recognized in the present Convention. 
Article 6.  1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life. 
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and 
development of the child.
Article 7.  1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to 
know and be cared for by his or her parents. 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their 
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this 
field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
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Article 8.  1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her 
identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without 
unlawful interference. 
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, 
States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to 
reestablishing speedily his or her identity.
Article 9.  1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her 
parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review 
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is 
necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a 
particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one 
where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place 
of residence. 
2.  In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties 
shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views 
known. 
3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both 
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular 
basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests. 
4.  Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as the 
detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from any 
cause while the person is in the custody of the State) of one or both parents or of the 
child, that State Party shall, upon request, provide the parents, the child or, if 
appropriate, another member of the family with the essential information concerning the 
whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless the provision of the 
information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. States Parties shall 
further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself entail no adverse 
consequences for the person(s) concerned. 
Article 10.  1. In accordance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9, 
paragraph 1, applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for 
the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, 
humane and expeditious manner. States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of 
such a request shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and for the members 
of their family. 
2. A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a 
regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts 
with both parents. Towards that end and in accordance with the obligation of States 
Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, States Parties shall respect the right of the child and 
his or her parents to leave any country, including their own, and to enter their own 
country. The right to leave any country shall be subject only to such restrictions as are 
prescribed by law and which are necessary to protect the national security, public order 
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others and are 
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Convention. 
Article 11.  1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return 
of children abroad. 
2. To this end, States Parties shall promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements or accession to existing agreements. 
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Article 12.  1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in 
any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or 
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the 
procedural rules of national law. 
* * * 
Article 16.  1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or 
her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour 
and reputation. 
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
* * * 
Article 20.  1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family 
environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that 
environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State. 
2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care for 
such a child. 
3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if 
necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering 
solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing 
and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.
* * * 
Article 21.  States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall 
ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they 
shall: 
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities who 
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all 
pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child’s 
status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons 
concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of such 
counseling as may be necessary; 
(b) Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative means of 
child’s care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in 
any suitable manner be cared for in the child’s country of origin; 
(c) Ensure that the child concerned by inter-country adoption enjoys safeguards and 
standards equivalent to those existing in the case of national adoption; 
(d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in inter-country adoption, the placement 
does not result in improper financial gain for those involved in it; 
(e) Promote, where appropriate, the objectives of the present article by concluding bilateral 
or multilateral arrangements or agreements, and endeavour, within this framework, to 
ensure that the placement of the child in another country is carried out by competent 
authorities or organs.
* * * 
Article 27.  1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living 
adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. 
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to 
secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary 
for the child’s development. 
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3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take 
appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement 
this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, 
particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing. 
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for 
the child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, 
both within the State Party and from abroad. In particular, where the person having 
financial responsibility for the child lives in a State different from that of the child, States 
Parties shall promote the accession to international agreements or the conclusion of such 
agreements, as well as the making of other appropriate arrangements.
6. Regional Conventions
Two major regional agreements address the adoption of minors, the European 
Convention on the Adoption of Children, E.S.T. no. 58, 1967, and the Inter-American 
Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the Adoption of Minors (1984) 
(http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-48.htm) (last visited 6/9/02).  In 
addition, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. 
C.A.B./L.E.G./24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999, addresses adoption in 
Article 24.  While the regional conventions are neither as important in establishing 
procedures and substantive norms as national law, nor as comprehensive and widely-
ratified as the Hague Convention on Adoption, they indicate the range of problems that 
are addressed in intercountry adoptions, as well as those that are limited to a particular 
region.  Even where common problems are recognized, moreover, they suggest a range 
of approaches. 
The European and the Inter-American Conventions have similar approaches to the 
following issues:  revocability, succession, the adoptees’s ties with the family of 
origin, and disclosure of identifying information.  Under Article 12 of the Inter-
American Convention, only full adoptions, in which ties to the biological family are 
completely severed, are irrevocable.  Under Article 13 of the European Convention, 
adoptions are revocable ‘only on serious grounds,’ by judicial or administrative 
authorities, where explicitly permitted by national law. 
Under both the Inter-American and European Conventions, adopted children are 
treated the same as legitimate family members for purposes of succession.  The only 
exception is the adopted child born into lawful wedlock.  Under the European 
Convention, the adopter’s rights to inherit from the child may be restricted under these 
limited circumstances.  This presumably refers to the adopter’s right to inherit any 
property of the child received from the child’s  family of origin. 
Under both the European Convention (Article 10) and the Inter-American 
Convention (Article 9), the adopted child’s ties with the family of origin are 
terminated.  The Inter-American Convention notes that ‘impediments to marriage shall 
continue.’  The European Convention specifies that the spouse of the adopter retains 
rights regarding his or her own legitimate, illegitimate or adopted child; that is, step-
parent adoption does not affect the pre-existing relationship between the other parent 
and the child. 
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Both the Inter-American and the European Conventions permit, but do not require, 
secrecy with respect to disclosure of identifying information.  The European 
Convention seems to leave the choice to the adopting family: ‘Provision shall be made 
to enable an adoption to be completed without disclosing to the child’s family the 
identity of the adopter.’  Art. 20.1.  Under the Inter-American Convention, in contrast, 
Article 7 guarantees secrecy ‘where called for’ under national law, but requires 
medical information regarding the minor and the birth parents – without identifying 
information – to be communicated to the adopting family. 
Under Article 24(a) of the African Charter, States are to establish ‘competent 
authorities.’  Under Article 4 of the European Convention, similarly, an adoption is 
valid only if granted by a ‘competent authority.’  The African Charter, like the 
European Convention, prohibits trafficking or ‘improper financial gain.’  While Article 
15 of the European Convention applies generally, however, Article 24(d) of the 
African Charter prohibits ‘improper financial gain for those who try to adopt a child’
(emphasis added). 
Under the African Charter, unlike the European and Inter-American Conventions, 
intercountry adoption is a ‘last resort,’ to be utilized only if a child cannot be placed in 
a foster or adopted family or ‘in any suitable manner,’ including institutionalization, be 
cared for in the country of origin.  Art. 24(b).  (Recall the Hague Convention’s  
preference for adoption over institutionalization, including adoption outside the 
country of origin over institutionalization within it.)  The African Convention further 
restricts intercountry adoption to those countries which have ratified either the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) or the African Charter. 
The regional conventions differ in their approaches to the law which should govern 
the adoption.  The European Convention (Art. 8) merely requires that the adoption be 
in the ‘best interest of the child,’ leaving more specific criteria to the States involved.  
Appropriate screening mechanisms, or enquiries to be made at the time of adoption, 
are suggested in Article 9.2, with the understanding that these will be tailored to 
individual circumstances. 
Under the Inter-American Convention, in contrast, responsibilities are allocated 
between the sending and receiving States.  The authorities of the habitual residence of 
the adoptee are competent to grant the adoption under Article 15, or to convert a 
simple adoption into a full adoption.  The law of the minor’s habitual residence, 
similarly, governs capacity, consent and procedure.  The law of the adopter’s domicile 
governs capacity to adopt, including the age and marital status requirements to be met 
by adopters, but if the adopter’s law is ‘manifestly less strict,’ the law of the adoptee’s 
habitual residence governs these issues as well. 
With respect to the required consents, the European Convention requires the 
consent of the mother, not less than six weeks after birth, and the father, but only if the 
child is legitimate.  As noted above, under the Inter-American Convention, consents 
are governed by the national law of the adoptee’s habitual residence.  Under Article 
18, however, ‘The authorities of a State Party may refuse to apply the law declared 
applicable under this Convention when the law is manifestly contrary to its public 
policy.’ 
68 International Family Law
Both the European and the Inter-American Convention require that any 
reservations be addressed to specific provisions.  Under the European Convention, 
moreover, a State may not take more than two reservations with respect to Part II, 
Essential Provisions.  Reservations are in effect only for five years under the European 
Convention. 
As set forth in the Explanatory Report on the European Convention, the objective 
was to establish ‘a minimum of essential principles of adoption practice.’ Para. 5(a).  
The Inter-American Convention takes a different approach.  Rather than seeking to 
establish agreed-upon minimum standards, it sets out rules for governing conflicts 
between national laws. 
7. National Implementation
The Hague Convention on Adoption does not provide a model which States can adapt 
to serve as their national adoption law.  Rather, it provides a framework within which a 
broad range of national, and sub-national, laws can coexist.  Since it sets forth no 
substantive norm with respect to the release of identifying information, for example, 
requiring merely that such information be ‘preserved,’ neither States which require 
identifying information nor those which prohibit it are required to change their 
domestic law upon ratifying the Convention. 
Canada and the U.S.
Ratification of the Convention may nevertheless encourage domestic reform.  In 
Canada and the United States, for example, ratification of the Convention was 
followed by the amendment of domestic law to extend the rights of citizenship to 
children adopted abroad.  After ratifying the Hague Convention on December 19, 
1996, Canada amended its federal Immigration Act on April 1, 1997.  Under the 
amended Act, however, adopted children were still treated as immigrants.  In 1998, 
accordingly, the Citizenship Act was amended to treat children adopted abroad by 
Canadian citizens the same as children of Canadian citizens born abroad. 
The United States, similarly, enacted the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, which 
became effective on February 27, 2001, after ratifying the Convention.  Under this 
Act, a child who is born abroad and adopted by a U.S. citizen automatically becomes a 
U.S. citizen, whether the adoption is finalized abroad or in the United States.  The 
child must be in the physical custody of the U.S. parent in the United States, having 
been lawfully admitted.  The Act amends § 320 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act. 
Romania
Some States find that they are either unable to meet international standards or to 
adequately protect their own nationals.  Romania, for example, following a period of 
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embarrassing scandal and unwanted international attention, recently announced a 
moratorium. 
Update on Romanian Moratorium on International Adoption (6/1/02)6
The Romanian Adoption Committee (RAC) announced a one-year moratorium on inter-
country adoption beginning June 21, 2001. That decision formalized a de facto suspension 
of international adoptions that had been in effect since Prime Minister Nastase’s 
government took office in December 2000. The government subsequently extended that 
moratorium until as late as October 8, 2002, pending passage and implementation of new 
legislation intended to eliminate corruption from Romania’s adoption system. 
We know that this issue is a difficult one for the many Americans who are interested in 
adopting Romanian children. . . . In our dialogue with Romania on this issue, we have 
focused on two tracks: 
First, we have pressed the Romanian government to allow those children whose matches 
with prospective parents have been approved by the government, and whose adoptions thus 
are in the final stages, to be exempt from the current moratorium. In response, the 
Romanian government announced on October 29, 2001 its intention to review these so-
called ‘pipeline’ cases with a view to their early resolution, even while the moratorium 
remains in effect. 
Second, there is widespread agreement that the prior Romanian legal framework did not 
always protect the best interests of children, creating opportunities for corruption at many 
levels. Reforms underway now will, we hope, lead to the creation of a more transparent 
inter-country adoption system that safeguards children while preventing fraud. The United 
States government . . . has made recommendations to the Romanian government on how to 
improve its adoption process and has offered to assist in drafting a new adoption law. We 
intend to continue our close and frank dialogue with Romanian officials on these issues.  
However, fundamental decisions on these issues are the purview of the Romanian 
government.
We know that there are disappointed prospective parents whose plans to adopt Romanian 
children have been adversely affected by this moratorium. The U.S. Government places 
great importance on resolving this issue so that these children can be placed in loving 
homes.  We will continue to press for prompt completion of the new adoption law that is 
needed before international adoptions can resume. This will remain a high priority until the 
moratorium is lifted. This site will be updated as new information becomes available.
8. IOs and NGOs
IOs 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has established a policy against the 
adoption of refugee children in emergency contexts for the reasons set forth below: 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Geneva, UNHCR Policy on 
Adoption of Refugee Children (August 1995) UNHCR’s Policy on Adoption: 
1. UNHCR’s policy on adoption is set out on pages 130-133 of the Guidelines on 
protection and Care of Refugee Children. It is the Office’s policy that refugee children in an 
emergency context are not available for adoption. Since most unaccompanied children are 
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not orphans, what they need is suitable interim care with a view to possible reunification 
with their families, not adoption. Staying with relatives in extended family units is a better 
solution than uprooting the child completely. Serious efforts to trace family members are 
essential before a child is considered eligible for adoption, and these are impossible in an 
emergency. Any adoption of an unaccompanied child of concern to the High Commissioner 
must be determined as being in the child’s best interests and carried out in accordance with 
applicable national and international law. 
2. It is UNHCR’s policy that adoption should not be carried out if: a. there is reasonable 
hope for successful tracing and family reunification in the child’s best interests; 
b. a reasonable period (normally at least two years) has not yet elapsed during which time 
all feasible steps to trace the parents or other surviving family members have been 
carried out; 
c. it is against the expressed wishes of the child or the parent; or voluntary repatriation in 
conditions of safety and dignity appears feasible in the near future and options in the 
child’ s country of origin would better provide for the psychosocial and cultural needs 
of the child than adoption in the country of asylum or a third country. 
NGOs
Even in States which are parties to the Hague Convention, and have established 
Central Authorities to facilitate and coordinate intercountry adoptions, NGOs play a 
crucial role.  Families with Children from China (FWCC), for example, is a U.S. NGO
for families adopting from China, the major source of adoptees in the United States 
(surpassing Russia with 5,053 children to Russia’s 4,269 in 2000).  Through FWCC, 
its members network, lobby, and engage in a wide range of social and educational 
activities.  FWCC also provides its members with access to a wide variety of goods 
and services.  FWCC shows how useful, and influential, NGOs can be in the adoption 
context. 
First, FWCC serves as an information clearinghouse for prospective adoptive 
parents.  Its web site (www.fwcc.org) provides links to agencies which facilitate
adoptions in China, information about the process, message boards and listserves for 
those who are going through the process, links to Internet sources about adoption, and 
Internet sources about China. 
Second, FWCC offers adoptive families social, professional and commercial 
contacts.  There are links to more than 40 local chapters.  While many are relatively 
small, similar to an extended family, others are large and active, and function more 
like a community.  The Greater New York chapter, for example, recently invited 
members to participate in six events over a one-month period.  These ranged from play 
groups to parenting panels, culminating in an all-day celebration of Chinese Culture 
Day on Liberty Island, home of the Statute of Liberty.  Throughout the year, families 
have a wide choice of events, from informal get-togethers to highly organized 
conferences, to discuss and exchange information about their experiences.  The 
Greater New York group is a distinct community, with its own social networks, in 
which biracial families are the norm rather than the exception. 
FWCC also provides its members with commercial contacts.  ‘The Mall’ link on 
the FWCC website leads to a list of over one hundred links to companies that sell 
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items related to Chinese adoption, from a bagel shop near the White Swan Hotel (‘100 
yards from the U.S. Consulate where every family adopting from China must go for 
INS paperwork’) in Guangzhou to nutrition counseling for developmentally delayed 
babies. 
FWCC also lobbies the U.S. government, including in its web site a link to pending 
U.S. legislation affecting adoptions from China.  Members were urged to express their 
support for the Child Citizenship Act discussed above, for example.  There is no 
lobbying aimed at the Chinese government, however.  This is consistent with U.S. 
State Department warnings that adoptions are extremely sensitive in China and may be 
curtailed, to the detriment of all, if adoptive parents offend the government.  
Rather, FWCC focuses on charitable initiatives benefitting Chinese orphanages.  
There are also links to ongoing academic research projects on Chinese adoptions, such 
as a study conducted by the University of Georgia on the bonding process in families 
with children from China. 
Finally, a major purpose of the NGO is to assure that babies adopted from China, 
most of whom are ethnically different from their adoptive parents and the larger 
communities in which they live, have a strong and positive sense of the culture of their 
State of origin.  Thus, while the U.S. has not ratified the ICESCR, the New York 
Chapter of FCC has in effect undertaken to assure the Article 16 ‘cultural rights’ of 
these children, as set forth in its Mission Statement: 
Our mission is to provide a loving community that nurtures the adoption and parenting of 
children from China.  We celebrate our cultural and racial differences to help one another 
fully integrate into our families the diverse roots, cultures and contexts from which we and 
our children come.
9. Possible Approaches to the Problems
Sergei 
As set out in the Overview, if there is a U.S. agency involved, it may place another 
baby with Allie is she is unable to adopt Sergei.  As described in Section 4, if Romania 
is a party to the Hague Convention Allie should be able to deal with the designated 
Central Authority (which may well have delegated authority to the State Agency as 
described in Section 4).  Under Chapter V, moreover, Romania would be required to 
‘recognize and give full legal effect to adoptions made in accordance with the 
Convention.’  Unfortunately, Sergei’s adoption has not been finalized.  Allie has no 
‘right’ to Sergei under any of the cited human rights instruments because there is no 
legal parent/child relationship.   
Indeed, it can be argued that the number of children available for adoption would 
be drastically reduced if the rights set out in the excerpted provisions were in fact 
enjoyed by biological parents, including the ‘special protection’ to be accorded 
mothers under Article 10 of the Economic Covenant, the child’s right, under Article 7 
of the Children’s Convention, ‘to know and be cared for by his or her parents,’ and the 
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State’s obligations to parents under Article 27 of the Children’s Convention.   
Section 7 provides more detail about the situation in Romania.  Since the 
moratorium was initiated to eliminate corruption, the situation may be too sensitive for 
diplomatic intervention, but Allie should contact her senator or congressperson and 
explain her situation.  The critical question is whether Sergei would be considered a 
‘pipeline’ case.  This requires more information about the precise status of the 
adoption.  Hopefully, it has already been approved.  In any case, the web site set out in 
footnote 8 should be checked for updated information. 
Carlos
As indicated in Section 3, there is a broad range of cultural approaches to the question 
of access to information regarding the child’s biological family.  While it may be 
necessary to consult a Columbian lawyer, accordingly, the first step is to find out if 
Columbia is a party to the Hague Convention.  If so, as set out in Section 4, Article 
30.1 requires Columbia to preserve identifying information, but leaves the question of 
actual access to such information to State law (Columbian law or French law).   
The adoptive parents’ request for information is further supported by Article 7 of 
the Children’s Convention, which affirms the ‘right to know ... his or her parents [as 
far as possible’].  As set out in Section 6, moreover, the Inter-American Convention 
guarantees secrecy if required under Columbian law, but requires non-identifying 
medical information to be communicated.  (Jean-Paul and Sophie have only received 
such information about Carlos’ biological mother.)  The lawyer should check, of 
course, whether Columbia is a party to the Inter-American Convention.   
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Chapter 4
Divorce/Marital Status
1. The Problem
Azizah married Abu in 1997 in Egypt.  He was 56 years old and a successful lawyer; 
she was 20 years old and eager to marry a rich, handsome man like Abu.  He had a 
magnificent house on the outskirts of Cairo and her quarters were luxurious.  She 
knew that she was Abu’s second wife and that his first wife, Zahra, was still living.  
Zahra was the same age as her husband, however, and had gone through menopause. 
She seemed like an old woman next to her fit, vibrant husband.  Abu mentioned that 
she had been involved in a serious car accident several years earlier and had never 
regained her health.  Although she seemed vague and distracted, she and Azizah got 
along well.  Azizah became pregnant within three months of the wedding and gave 
birth to a son, Nasr. 
Two years later, Abu informed his wives that the family was moving to France.  
Abu had been appointed to a prominent post with UNESCO in Paris.  Azizah was 
unhappy about leaving her parents and her brothers, but excited about the move to a 
city she had heard much about.  Zahra cried when she said good-bye to her three 
grown children, but she did not complain. 
After eight months in Paris, Abu began staying late at the office every night.  Once 
he mentioned a ‘business meeting’, but usually he gave no explanation. Azizah was 
shocked when he brought a woman about her age to their home one weekend and 
perfunctorily introduced Azizah and Zahra to her as ‘mes soeurs.’ Then they left in his 
new BMW.   
You are not admitted to the French Bar but you are doing some consulting work 
with a French firm in Paris.  Azizah was given your name by a mutual friend at 
UNESCO.  She and Zahra want divorces.  Zahra would like to return to Egypt; Azizah 
wants to stay in Paris with her son. What do you advise? 
2. Overview
Divorce is the legal mechanism through which parties change their legal status from 
married to single.  They are ‘free of the bonds of matrimony’ and free of marriage’s 
rights and obligations, except as specifically provided in the decree of divorce.  
Although property rights and ongoing support obligations are separate matters, treated 
in Chapters 5 and 6, in many States a court will only decide these issues in the context 
of divorce. 
76 International Family Law
Thus, if the State does not recognize a marriage or a particular form of marriage, 
divorce – and the determination of these issues – may not be available. This has 
serious consequences for women in customary or polygamous marriages, which many 
States refuse to recognize.  Even in those States that may address issues of property 
distribution and support absent an extant marriage, in the interest of fairness or as a 
matter of equity, the rules and principles applied are different from those applied at 
divorce. 
In general, the availability of divorce means better protections for the economically 
vulnerable party, although these protections may be minimal.  In some States, those 
concerned with the welfare of economically vulnerable spouses, usually women, have 
sought to make divorce difficult to obtain, on the theory that women were likely to be 
better off economically if they remained married. 
Divorce is also important because it enables the parties to re-marry.  In Kabul, 
Afghanistan, for example, most of the 15 women in the Kabul jail in 2003 were 
accused, or convicted, of marrying a second time.  Some had refused to live in 
marriages arranged by their parents and married for love instead.  Others claimed that 
they had in fact obtained divorces, but that their first husbands were attempting to 
extort money from their second husbands.  Absent formal proof of divorce, a second 
marriage was a crime for women under Afghan and Islamic law.  Under Islamic law, a 
woman may have only one husband, although a man may have four wives. 
     Because divorce is viewed as a question of status, in some States any court having 
jurisdiction over the party seeking divorce can grant it.  Under some interpretations of 
Muslim law, a husband may unilaterally divorce the wife (talaq) by unambiguously 
telling his wife, in writing or verbally, that they are divorced.  A woman can divorce 
her husband under Islamic law by obtaining a decree from a Muslim judge (Khul).
Recognition of a foreign divorce depends on the law of the State in which such 
recognition is sought.  This may be governed by any treaties, such as those excerpted 
in Sections 4 and 6, below, to which the State is a party.  In determining whether to 
recognize a foreign divorce, a civil law country will generally look to the national law 
of the spouses.  In common law countries, in contrast, the question is whether the court 
which granted the divorce had jurisdiction to do so. 
Historically, the availability of divorce has been related to the role of marriage in a 
particular society.  When marriage was a means of forming alliances among families, 
for example, divorce was unknown in the Western world.  When marriage served a 
larger societal purpose, the couples’ interests were secondary.  Once companionate 
marriage became the norm; that is, when people began to marry for love, divorce 
became easier because there were no overarching societal interests at stake.  
Divorce may be adversarial or by consent.  When divorce is adversarial, or 
contested, one party asserts that the other is responsible for the breakdown of the 
marriage.  Common grounds include adultery, desertion, cruelty, drunkenness, or 
failure to support.  Under Islamic law, the wife’s disobedience is also a ground. 
Fault grounds have been criticized, however, as an unrealistic understanding of the 
marital relationship.  All of the grounds for divorce occur in some enduring marriages; 
those that do break up do so because the parties are unable or uninterested in 
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continuing the marriage.  In addition, assigning fault has been viewed as arbitrary and 
artificial by some because spouses can grow apart without either being at fault. 
Under no-fault divorce laws, guilt need not be established in court.  Acts of 
misconduct need not be proven unless required to show ‘irreconcilable differences’ 
between the parties or that the marriage is ‘irretrievably broken’, or if such acts are 
relevant to the issue of child custody.  Some States have pure no-fault laws while 
others have added no-fault or ‘incompatibility’ grounds to their preexisting law.  A few 
States still prohibit divorce, and marriage can be ended only by death or annulment. 
3. Cultural Variations
While fault is generally recognized as a ground for divorce, what constitutes fault 
varies by culture.  Even adultery, possibly the most widely accepted ground for 
divorce, is interpreted differently in different cultures.  In Nigeria, for example, a 
woman who has been raped may nevertheless be guilty of adultery.  The practice of 
polygamy, similarly, which allows men in some Islamic states to take up to four wives, 
means that men may have multiple partners without committing adultery while women 
may not. 
In Egypt, following reforms in 1979, a woman had an automatic right to a divorce 
from a husband who took another wife.  The 1985 law, in contrast, removed the 
presumption of injury and required the wife to prove that she had suffered harm by 
reason of her husband’s subsequent marriage.  This represented a return to the classical 
position. 
In 2000, Egypt adopted a version of no-fault divorce under which a woman, for the 
first time, can obtain a divorce without proving abuse, adultery or some other ground.  
Proceedings for establishing such grounds often took years because of the rights 
granted husbands to appeal.  Under the new law, upon a wife’s petition the matter is 
submitted to court-supervised mediation.  If the divorce is granted, the wife must 
return any property given her under the marriage contract. 
In India, in addition to divorce by mutual consent, divorce is available for fault for 
adultery, cruelty, desertion, or if the spouse has ‘ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to 
another religion’; or ‘has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental 
disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be 
expected to live with the respondent.’ 
In Uganda, fault is still required for divorce.  While adultery is grounds for a 
divorce for either a wife or a husband, the wife must also prove that the husband was 
cruel or had deserted her.  The Ugandan Law Reform Commission has recommended 
that the law should allow divorce on no-fault grounds, which could be claimed by 
either spouse. 
In Ethiopia, in contrast, divorce law was reformed following the change of 
government in 1991.  The new government ratified  the International Bill of Rights, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and  enacted the 1995 Constitution, under 
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which women are equal to men. The Revised Family Code (RFC) of 2000, in 
accordance with these reforms, now provides for no-fault divorce.  While divorce was 
available under the old Civil Code, it was complicated and difficult to obtain. 
In France, in addition to divorce on joint petition and divorce for separation for 
over six years, divorce is available for fault making it ‘intolerable to continue conjugal 
life’ and amounting to a grave or persistent violation of the duties of marriage  
(Rubellin-Devichi, 2000). 
Under Islamic law, the husband has the unilateral right to terminate a marriage 
without a showing of fault on the part of the wife.  This is known as  ‘talaq’.  Upon 
exercise of the husband of his right of talaq, he must pay the wife her dowry.  In 1961, 
in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, Pakistan restricted the right to triple talaq, 
under which the husband could immediately obtain a divorce upon the repetition of an 
unequivocal pronouncement of his intention to divorce his wife.  In addition, a 
husband who wanted to marry more than one wife had to seek permission of the 
existing wives and the Arbitration Council.  Upon contracting a polygamous marriage, 
moreover, he was liable for payment of dower to his existing wives. 
4. Private International Law Conventions
As divorce becomes more common, and more accepted, it becomes increasingly 
important that legal mechanisms be available for assuring transnational recognition of 
divorce.  As populations become increasingly mobile as a result of globalization, such 
mechanisms become even more necessary.  There are problems, however, because 
differences remain about the underlying meaning of ‘marriage.’  Does it include 
polygamous marriages, for example?  The following Convention is an early effort to 
address these issues.
Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (concluded June 
1st, 1970)1
The States signatory to the present Convention, 
Desiring to facilitate the recognition of divorces and legal separations obtained in their 
respective territories, 
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed on the following 
provisions: 
* * * 
Article 1  The present Convention shall apply to the recognition in one Contracting 
State of divorces and legal separations obtained in another Contracting State which 
follow judicial or other proceedings officially recognized in that State and which are 
legally effective there. 
The Convention does not apply to findings of fault or to ancillary orders pronounced on 
the making of a decree of divorce or legal separation; in particular, it does not apply to 
orders relating to pecuniary obligations or to the custody of children. 
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Article 2  Such divorces and legal separations shall be recognized in all other Contracting 
States, subject to the remaining terms of this Convention, if, at the date of the institution of 
the proceedings in the State of the divorce or legal separation (hereinafter called ‘the State 
of origin’) – 
(1) the respondent had his habitual residence there; or 
(2) the petitioner had his habitual residence there and one of the following further 
conditions was fulfilled – 
a) such habitual residence had continued for not less than one year immediately prior to 
the institution of proceedings; 
b) the spouses last habitually resided there together; or 
(3) both spouses were nationals of that State; or 
(4) the petitioner was a national of that State and one of the following further conditions 
was fulfilled – 
a) the petitioner had his habitual residence there; or 
b) he had habitually resided there for a continuous period of one year falling, at least in 
part, within the two years preceding the institution of the proceedings; or 
(5) the petitioner for divorce was a national of that State and both the following further 
conditions were fulfilled – 
a) the petitioner was present in that State at the date of institution of the proceedings 
and 
b) the spouses last habitually resided together in a State whose law, at the date of 
institution of the proceedings, did not provide for divorce.  
*   *   * 
Article 6  Where the respondent has appeared in the proceedings, the authorities of the State 
in which recognition of a divorce or legal separation is sought shall be bound by the 
findings of fact on which jurisdiction was assumed. 
The recognition of a divorce or legal separation shall not be refused – 
a) because the internal law of the State in which such recognition is sought would not 
allow divorce or, as the case may be, legal separation upon the same facts, or, 
b) because a law was applied other than that applicable under the rules of private 
international law of that State. 
Without prejudice to such review as may be necessary for the application of other 
provisions of this Convention, the authorities of the State in which recognition of a divorce 
or legal separation is sought shall not examine the merits of the decision. 
Article 7  Contracting States may refuse to recognize a divorce when, at the time it was 
obtained, both the parties were nationals of States which did not provide for divorce and of 
no other State. 
Article 8  If, in the light of all the circumstances, adequate steps were not taken to give 
notice of the proceedings for a divorce or legal separation to the respondent, or if he was 
not afforded a sufficient opportunity to present his case, the divorce or legal separation may 
be refused recognition. 
Article 9  Contracting States may refuse to recognize a divorce or legal separation if it is 
incompatible with a previous decision determining the matrimonial status of the spouses 
and that decision either was rendered in the State in which recognition is sought, or is 
recognized, or fulfils the conditions required for recognition, in that State.  
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5. Public International Law 
The right to equal rights of the spouses at divorce, as well as during the marriage, has 
been recognized in international human rights law since its inception.  The meaning of 
‘equality’ in this context, however, remains contested. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2
Article 23 4.  States parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure 
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution.  In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection 
of any children. 
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 21 (13th session, 1994)3
Equality in marriage and family relations 1. The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (General Assembly resolution 34/180, annex) 
affirms the equality of human rights for women and men in society and in the family. The 
Convention has an important place among international treaties concerned with human 
rights. 
2. Other conventions and declarations also confer great significance on the family and 
woman’s status within it. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(General Assembly resolution 217/A (III)), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex), the Convention on the Nationality 
of Married Women (resolution 1040 (XI), annex), the Convention on Consent           
to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (resolution 
1763 A (XVII), annex) and the subsequent Recommendation thereon (resolution  
2018 (XX)) and the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of 
Women.  
3. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
recalls the inalienable rights of women which are already embodied in the 
above-mentioned conventions and declarations, but it goes further by recognizing the 
importance of culture and tradition in shaping the thinking and behaviour of men and 
women and the significant part they play in restricting the exercise of basic rights by 
women. 
(c) Background  4. The year 1994 has been designated by the General Assembly in its 
resolution 44/82 as the International Year of the Family. The Committee wishes to take the 
opportunity to stress the significance of compliance with women’s basic rights within the 
family as one of the measures which will support and encourage the national celebrations 
that will take place. 
5. Having chosen in this way to mark the International Year of the Family, the Committee 
wishes to analyze three articles in the Convention that have special significance for the 
status of women in the family: 
* * * 
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Article 16 1. States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
* * * 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; 
              
* * * 
Various forms of family 13. The form and concept of the family can vary from State to 
State, and even between regions within a State. Whatever form it takes, and whatever the 
legal system, religion, custom or tradition within the country, the treatment of women in the 
family both at law and in private must accord with the principles of equality and justice for 
all people, as article 2 of the Convention requires. 
Polygamous marriages 14. States parties’ reports also disclose that polygamy is practised in a 
number of countries. Polygamous marriage contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men, 
and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependants 
that such marriages ought to be discouraged and prohibited. The Committee notes with 
concern that some States parties, whose constitutions guarantee equal rights, permit 
polygamous marriage in accordance with personal or customary law. This violates the 
constitutional rights of women, and breaches the provisions of article 5 (a) of the Convention. 
Article 16 (1) (a) and (b) 15. While most countries report that national constitutions and 
laws comply with the Convention, custom, tradition and failure to enforce these laws in 
reality contravene the Convention. 
16. A woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter freely into marriage is central to her life 
and to her dignity and equality as a human being. An examination of States parties’ reports 
discloses that there are countries which, on the basis of custom, religious beliefs or the 
ethnic origins of particular groups of people, permit forced marriages or remarriages. Other 
countries allow a woman’s marriage to be arranged for payment or preferment and in others 
women’s poverty forces them to marry foreign nationals for financial security. Subject to 
reasonable restrictions based for example on a woman’s youth or consanguinity with her 
partner, a woman’s right to choose when, if, and whom she will marry must be protected 
and enforced at law. 
* * * 
18. Moreover, generally a de facto union is not given legal protection at all. Women living in 
such relationships should have their equality of status with men both in family life and in the 
sharing of income and assets protected by law. Such women should share equal rights and 
responsibilities with men for the care and raising of dependent children or family members.  
* * * 
6. Regional Conventions
The European Council has acknowledged the importance of recognizing divorce 
judgments in connection with the free movement of persons within the Community.
Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for 
children of both spouses4
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1. The Member States have set themselves the objective of maintaining and developing 
the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of 
persons is assured.  To establish such an area, the Community is to adopt, among 
others, the measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matter needed for the 
proper functioning of the internal market. 
2. The proper functioning of the market entails the need to improve and simplify the 
movement of judgments in civil matters. 
3. This is subject now falling within the ambit of Article 65 of the Treaty. 
4. Differences between certain national rules governing jurisdiction and enforcement 
hamper the free movement of persons and the sound operation of the internal market.  
There are accordingly grounds for enacting provisions to unify the rules of conflict of 
jurisdiction in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility so as to 
simplify the formalities for rapid and automatic recognition and enforcement of 
judgments. 
* * * 
10. This Regulation should be confined to proceedings relating to divorce, legal separation 
or marriage annulment.  The recognition of divorce and annulment rulings affects only 
the dissolution of matrimonial ties; despite the fact that they may be interrelation [sic], 
the Regulation does not affect issues such as the fault of the spouses, property 
consequences of the marriage, the maintenance obligation or any other ancillary 
measures. 
11. This Regulation covers parental responsibility for children of both spouses on issues 
that are closely linked to proceedings for divorce, legal separation or marriage 
annulment. 
12. The grounds of jurisdiction accepted in this Regulation are based on the rule that 
there must be a real link between the party concerned and the Member State 
exercising jurisdiction; the decision to include certain grounds corresponds to the 
fact that they exist in different national legal systems and are accepted by the other 
Member States. 
* * * 
16. The recognition and enforcement of judgments given in a Member State are based 
on the principle of mutual trust.  The grounds for non-recognition are kept to the 
minimum required.  Those proceedings should incorporate provisions to ensure 
observance of public policy in the State addressed and to safeguard the rights of 
the defence and those of the parties, including the individual rights of any child 
involved, and so as to withhold recognition of irreconcilable judgments. 
* * * 
Article 2 – Divorce, legal separation and marriage annulment
1. In matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction shall 
lie with the courts of the Member State: 
(a) in whose territory: 
-  the spouses are habitually resident, or 
-  the spouses were last habitually resident, in so far as one of them still resides there, or 
-  the respondent is habitually resident, or 
-  in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or 
- the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year 
immediately before the application was made, or 
-  the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months 
immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member 
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State in question or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his 
‘domicile’ there;  
* * * 
Article 15 – Grounds of non-recognition
1. A judgment relating to a divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment shall not be 
recognised: 
(a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State 
in which recognition is sought; 
(b) where it was given in default of appearance, if the respondent was not served with 
the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in 
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the respondent to arrange for his or 
her defence unless it is determined that the respondent has accepted the judgment 
unequivocally; 
(c) if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in proceedings between the same parties 
in the Member State in which recognition is sought;  
* * * 
Relations with certain multilateral conventions.  In relations between Member States, 
this Regulation shall take precedence over the following Conventions in so far as they 
concern matters by this Regulation: the Hague Convention of 5 October 
1961concerning the Powers of Authorities and the  Law Applicable in respect of the 
Protection of Minors, the Luxembourg Convention of 8 September 1967 on the 
Recognition of Decisions Relating to the Validity of Marriages, the Hague 
Convention of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations,  
the European Convention of 20 May 1980 on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Decision concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children, 
the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children, provided that the child concerned is 
habitually resident in a Member State. 
7. National Implementation
As the following examples indicate, divorce by mutual consent is now widely 
recognized, although fault grounds may also be available. 
China/Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China5
Chapter Four/Divorce Article 31   Divorce shall be allowed if both husband and wife are 
willing to divorce. Both parties shall apply to the marriage registration authority for 
divorce. The marriage registration authority issues a certificate of divorce after confirming 
that both parties are indeed willing to divorce and have made proper arrangements for their 
children and have properly disposed of their property. 
Article 32 Where either the husband or wife applies to get divorced, the departments 
concerned may make mediations, or he or she may file a suit at the peoples court for 
divorce. The peoples court shall make mediations in the process of hearing a divorce suit; 
divorce shall be granted if mediation fails because mutual affection no longer exists. 
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Divorce shall be granted if any of the following circumstances occurs and mediation fails: 
a. either party is a bigamist or a person who has a spouse but co-habits with another person; 
b. there is family violence or maltreatment or desertion of any family member; 
c. either party is indulged in gambling, drug-abuse or has other vicious habits and refuses to 
mend his or her ways despite of repeated admonition; 
d. both parties have lived separately due to lack of mutual affection for up to two years; 
e. other circumstances that have led to the nonexistence of mutual affection as husband and wife. 
If either party has been declared by court as to be missing and the other party applies to be 
divorced, divorce shall be granted. 
Article 33 The application of the spouse of a soldier in active service for divorce shall be 
granted by the soldier unless the soldier is in grave fault. 
Article 34 The husband may not apply for divorce when his wife is pregnant or within one 
year after giving birth to a child or within six months after terminating gestation. This 
restriction shall not apply to the case where the wife applies for divorce or the people’s 
court deems it necessary to accept the application of the husband for divorce. 
* * * 
Article 36 The relationship between parents and children does not terminate due to the 
divorce of parents. After the divorce of the parents, the children remain the children of both 
parties no matter they are supported directly by either the father or mother. Both father and 
mother shall, after divorce, have the right and the obligation of upbringing their children. 
It is the principle that the children during lactation shall be brought up by their mother 
after the divorce of the parents. If any dispute arises concerning which party shall bring up 
the children beyond lactation, such dispute shall be settled by the people’s court according 
to the specific conditions of both parties and in light of protecting the rights and interests of 
the children. 
Article 37 If, after the divorce of parents, the children are to be brought up by either 
party, the other party shall undertake a part or all of the necessary living and education 
expenses. The amount and term of payment shall be agreed upon by both parties; if no 
agreement is achieved, the amount and term shall be decided by the people’s court. No 
agreement or judgment concerning the expenses for the living and education of the 
children may in no way prevent the children from making reasonable requests, where 
necessary, to either parent for an amount beyond the amount as determined in the said 
agreement or judgment.
French Divorce Law6
Divorce Divorce is pronounced: 
• by mutual consent, upon a joint request, or upon the request of either party when 
accepted by the other one. 
• by fault. 
• by termination of common life. 
In any case, the assistance of a lawyer is indispensable. In a joint request, both parties may 
request the assistance of the same lawyer. If your income is not sufficient to pay for the 
services of a lawyer, you may request, and be granted, judicial aid. Information on how to 
obtain legal aid is provided by the city hall. 
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When Your Spouse Consents to Divorce  To sue for divorce by mutual agreement, there are 
two possibilities: 
1.  Divorce upon mutual consent: 
The two of you file a joint request. You do not have to give the judge the reason why 
you want to divorce, because you are in agreement to settle the conditions of your 
divorce. You submit your written request for the judge’s approval, one stating the 
mutual conditions for the duration of the divorce proceedings, and another request 
stating permanent conditions to be reached after the divorce is pronounced (child 
custody, visiting rights, alimony, allowance, lodging and partition of real property). If 
you confirm your desire to divorce in the presence of the judge, you will need to 
confirm your wish to divorce after the expiration of a probationary period of three to 
nine months. N.B.: This proceeding can be done only if you have been married for 
more than six months. 
2.  Divorce requested by one party and accepted by the other: Only one party files for 
divorce. The other party accepts it in principle. The divorcing spouse submits to the judge, 
through a lawyer, a request, accompanied by a statement of the facts which led him/her to 
decide to divorce. A copy of such request is given to the other party. If the other party 
recognizes the facts, the judge enters them into the record and sends the case to court for a 
final divorce decree. 
When You and Your Spouse Are Not in Agreement to Divorce
1. Divorce requested for fault: 
I- There are facts to be charged to one of spouses concerning violations of the duties and 
obligations of marital life, which render the marriage untenable: adultery or violence, for 
example. These facts are submitted for the judge’s comment 
2. Request to divorce because of breach of communal life: 
I- When you have lived apart for at least six years. 
II- When the mental faculties of your spouse have, for at least the past six years, become so 
altered that life together is no longer possible. 
N.B.: The spouse who is requesting the divorce assumes responsibility for all fees involved, 
and must continue to meet his/her obligations to the children and the other spouse. The 
court will reject the request if either one of the spouses can prove that the divorce may 
result in severe moral or material consequences toward the other spouse or the children. In 
either case, the divorcing spouse must start the divorce proceedings with the judge, through 
an attorney. Such a request must specify how the spouse requesting the divorce will assure 
his/her obligations to the other spouse and children. 
3. Consequences of Divorce for Ex-spouses 
III- Ex-spouses may remarry once the final divorce is pronounced. A woman must, in 
principle, wait 300 days after the dissolution of the marriage or after the official decree 
authorizing spouses to reside separately (e.g ordonnance de non-conciliation) before 
remarrying. This waiting period can be waived in certain cases (such as by medical 
certificate stating non-pregnancy at the time of divorce). 
IV- Each spouse assumes usage of his/her name before marriage unless: 
a) both spouses agree otherwise; 
b) there is a judge’s authorization; 
c) if in a case of breach of common life, the party that did not request the divorce is in 
accord. 
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V- If the divorce causes the ‘innocent’ spouse to suffer moral or material damages, he/she 
may sue for damages. 
VI- If the termination of marital life has a negative effect on either of the ex-spouses, he/she 
may, if desired, request payment of a compensatory allowance (except in the event of breach of 
common life). Such an allowance should be equal to whatever it would have been if life 
together still existed. If one-time payment is not possible, the compensatory allowance may be 
paid as either a temporary or lifetime annuity. The amount of the compensatory allowance is 
fixed by the judge, and can be revised only in very exceptional cases. 
VII- If the divorce is pronounced due to breach of common life, the ex-spouse may, if 
necessary, request alimony, in an amount to be determined in accordance with the financial 
situation of the ex-spouse. 
VIII- Concerning the annulment of communal life and the settlement of accounts between 
husband and wife, the spouses must address themselves to the notary (notaire) appointed in 
the divorce decree. In the case of a joint request, a list of items belonging to the estate must 
be submitted to the judge with the final request. 
In Case 93 - 325 DC,7 the French Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the ban on the issuance of residence cards to aliens living in France in polygamous 
marriages: 
Regarding section 9: 
29. This section forbids the issuing of this residence card to aliens living in a situation of 
polygamy and to spouses of the same; 
30. The Deputies, authors of the second referral, state that this section does not recognise 
the role of the judicial authority in guaranteeing the respect of individual freedom and that 
this is contrary to the principle of equality since this provision only applies to aliens and 
implies that children of the same father would be treated differently with regard to their 
right to reside in the same country as their father; 
31. In the first place, a residence card is only issued to aliens; therefore, with regard to the 
regulations on the issuing of this card there can be no question of discrimination between 
nationals and aliens; 
32. Secondly, the contested provision must be understood as applicable only to aliens living 
in France in a situation of polygamy; subject to this interpretation, the legislature acting in 
the public interest, as set out in the legislation, has not violated any constitutional principles 
or regulations 
India/Hindu Marriage Act8
13.  Divorce. 
1.   Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, 
on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of 
divorce on the ground that the other party 
1. [Has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with 
any person other than his or her spouse; or 
2. Has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or 
3. Has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years 
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or] 
4. Has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or 
5. [Has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or 
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intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the 
petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. 
6. Has [* * *] been suffering from a virulent and incurable, form of leprosy; or 
7. Has [* * *] been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or 
8. Has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or 
9. Has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those 
persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive; [* * *]  
* * * 
2.  A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of 
divorce on the ground, 
1. In the case of any marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act, that 
the husband had married again before such commencement or that any other wife 
of the husband married before such commencement was alive at the time of the 
solemnization of the marriage of the petitioner: 
Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of 
the petition; or 
2. That the husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of rape, 
sodomy or [bestiality; or] 
3. [That in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956
(78 of 1956), or in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (or under the corresponding section 488 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)), a decree or order, as the case may be, has 
been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife not 
withstanding that she was living apart and that since the passing of such decree or 
order, cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one year or 
upwards; 
4. That her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnized before she 
attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining 
that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years. 
* * * 
13B.  Divorce by mutual consent. 
Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a 
decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a 
marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the 
commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the 
ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that 
they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the 
marriage should be dissolved. 
On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of 
the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than 
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eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the 
meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after 
making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that 
the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the 
marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.] 
14.   No petition for divorce to be presented within one year of marriage. 
1. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall not be competent for 
any court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of 
divorce,[unless at the date of the presentation of the petition one year has 
elapsed] since the date of the marriage: 
Provided that the court may, upon application made to it in accordance with such 
rules as may be made by the High Court in that behalf, allow a petition to be 
presented [before one year has elapsed] since the date of the marriage on the 
ground that the case is one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of 
exceptional depravity on the pail of the respondent, but if it appears to the court at 
the hearing of the petition that the petitioner obtained leave to present the petition
by any misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the court may, 
if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition that the decree shall not 
have effect until after the [expiry of one year] from the date of the marriage or 
may dismiss the petition without prejudice to any petition which may be brought 
after [expiration of the said one year] upon the same or substantially the same 
facts as those alleged in support of the petition so dismissed.     
           
2. In disposing of any application under this section for leave to present a petition
for divorce before the [expiration of one year] from the date of the marriage, 
the court shall have regard to the interests of any children of the marriage and 
to the question whether there is a reasonable probability of a reconciliation 
between the parties before the expiration of the [said one year]. 
15.  Divorced persons when may marry again. 
When a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce and either there is no right of 
appeal against the decree or, if there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has 
expired without an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has been presented but has 
been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the marriage to marry again.  
Russia 
The Russian Family Code was adopted on December 25, 1995 and came in to force on 
March 1, 1996.  These reforms were part of a comprehensive revision of Russian law 
undertaken to conform that law to the new Russian Federation Constitution (adopted in 
1993), the U.N. Convention on the right of the child, and the new value of freedom 
and openness embodied in Perestroika.
An explicit objective was to simplify the procedure for obtaining a divorce, 
especially in cases of mutual consent.  The new code provides in part: ‘an agreement 
concerning the payment of alimony (amount, conditions, and procedure for payment of 
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alimony), is made between the person obliged to pay alimony and the recipient 
thereof.’9  It should be noted that the ‘person obliged to pay alimony’ refers very 
specifically to three basic, and very limited, contexts.  Under Russian Law, the person 
is obliged to pay alimony only to: 1) a needy ex spouse who is unable to work, 2) a 
needy ex spouse during pregnancy and for three years after the birth of the common 
child; and 3) a needy ex spouse caring for a common disabled child.  Except in these 
very limited circumstances, a spouse is not entitled to maintenance. 
This is consistent with the underlying premise of gender equality, which has been a 
feature of Russian Law since 1917.  In Russia, as in most states, the ideal of gender 
equality is quite different from the reality, in which women assume most responsibility 
for care of the home and the family.  Since the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
however, and the end of State supported social safety nets, including child care, many 
women have been unable to remain in the labor force.  This is exacerbated by high 
unemployment.  Thus, without maintenance, they are destitute. 
8.  IOs and NGOs
IOs 
The Committee established by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women has addressed the availability of divorce in its review 
of State party reports. 
Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women/Third 
and fourth periodic reports of States parties. New Zealand, Addendum/Status of 
women in New Zealand 1998: supplementary material10
Article 16. Marriage and family life/Property rights/Matrimonial property rights  
10. The De Facto Relationships (Property) Bill introduces a property regime to apply on the 
breakdown of a de facto relationship. There is currently no specific statute law for dividing 
property when a de facto relationship ends. The proposed property regime includes a 
presumption of equal sharing of the family home and chattels. The division of other 
relationship property will reflect both financial and non-financial contributions – unlike the 
Matrimonial Property Act where there is a presumption of equal sharing. 
Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Article 18 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women/Fifth 
Periodic Reports of State Parties, Peru 
* * * 
328.  At the initiative of the Commission on Women and Human Development, the 
Congress is currently holding a plenary session to mark up a bill ordering that physical 
separation of at least three years shall constitute grounds for divorce. 
* * *
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Consideration Of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 18 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women/Second
Periodic Reports of States Parties, Armenia  
* * * 
Article 16 115. In the Republic of Armenia, spouses have equal rights in entering into a 
marriage, during a marriage and at its dissolution. During a divorce, the interests of the  
children are considered paramount. Right and obligations concerning marriage and family 
 relations are codified in the Marriage and Family Code of the Republic of Armenia. 
116. According to article 1 of the Marriage and Family Code, the Code’s purpose is to 
contribute to the building of family relations based on the free and full consent of the 
spouses, free of any financial motivation, and on love and respect. Marriages may be 
concluded only by mutual consent (art. 14). 
According to article 15, the minimum legal age for marriage is 17 years, but in exceptional 
circumstances it may be lowered by one year for women. 
117. The new Civil Code does not provide for punishment for polygamy, since this is not a 
current problem in Armenia. 
118. Women have equal rights with men to initiate divorce proceedings, to remarry and 
have custody of children, and also to receive support from children. 
* * *
NGOs
NGOs have focused on divorce from a range of perspectives.  Some view it as crucial 
to women’s independence and lobby for increased access to divorce.  Others view the 
easy availability of divorce as a threat to family stability, the stability of the nation and 
morality in general. The first view is expressed in the excerpt from Human Rights 
Watch and the second in the excerpt from Focus on the Family – Malaysia. 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Women’s Human Rights11 Women’s Status in 
the Family.  The family remained one of the most contested sites for progress on women’s 
rights. During Beijing + 5 at the U.N. in June, governments congratulated themselves on 
their efforts to ensure equality for women in all spheres of life. Some governments did, in 
fact, change national legislation to guarantee women’s equality in the family. For example, 
according to a September 2000 United Nations Population Fund (unfpa) report, both the 
Czech Republic and Cape Verde enacted new family codes that guaranteed women 
equality. Nevertheless, many other governments were unyielding in their resistance to 
reform personal status laws that discriminated against women. Governments justified their 
inaction as preserving their societies’ morals, unity, religion, culture, and tradition. 
Countries like Morocco, Rwanda, Algeria, Israel, and Egypt maintained laws and practices 
that blatantly discriminated against women in marriage, access to divorce, child custody, 
and inheritance, among other issues. These laws and practices relegated women to a 
subordinate status in the family and restricted their autonomy to make decisions about 
their lives.  
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In Morocco, the Family Code granted different rights to women and men and consistently 
rendered women’s autonomy subject to male guardianship and authority. The introduction 
by Prime Minister El-Yousoufi of a national plan for the integration of women in 
development in March 1999 raised hopes that women’s status would improve in critical 
areas. However, by late 2000, the government had made negligible progress toward 
implementing the plan, as a result of resistance by conservative and Islamist factions to the 
plan’s section on reforming the Family Code. The section on the reform of the personal 
status code calls for, among other things, raising the age of marriage for girls and women 
from fifteen to eighteen, canceling the guardianship requirement for adult women, 
outlawing polygamy except in certain cases, giving women the right to half of their 
husbands’ property after a divorce, and allowing divorced women to maintain custody of 
their children if they remarry. In March 2000, conservative and Islamist factions organized 
a march in Casablanca in opposition to the plan, while progressive factions organized a 
march in Rabat in support of it. In May 2000, in response to the intense public debate 
around the proposed legal reforms, the prime minister appointed a committee of scholars 
and religious authorities to consider the controversial aspects of the plan and make 
recommendations to King Mohamed VI. As of late October 2000, this committee had not 
met. Moroccan women’s rights activists argued that, since the plan addresses only a 
minimum of their demands, a self-described progressive government should have no 
problem meeting them.  
In Israel, an amendment to the Equal Rights for Women Law was passed in March 2000. 
The amendment deals with, inter alia, equal social rights for women in all spheres of life: 
the right of women over their bodies, protection against violence and trafficking, and 
representation for women in the public sector. The equality proposed by this law extended 
to all spheres of life except family life. Issues of marriage and divorce continued to be 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the religious courts, be they Jewish, Christian, 
Muslim, or Druze. These courts controlled women’s lives and their right to administer 
their lives. For example, under these religious courts, women did not have equal access to 
divorce. According to the Israel Women’s Network, thousands of Jewish women 
continued to be a gunot, ‘chained’ women whose husbands refused to divorce them. 
Mevoi Satum (Impasse), an Israeli organization dedicated to helping a gunot, estimated 
that over 97 percent of men who deny their wives a divorce were physically abusive.  
In January 2000, the Egyptian parliament passed a new law on divorce. The Khole’ law 
opened the possibility for the first time for women unilaterally to request divorce on 
grounds of incompatibility, while requiring women to forgo alimony and to repay their 
husbands any dowry. Many women’s rights activists acknowledged that the new law 
facilitated women’s access to divorce, but noted that it is too early to assess its full impact.  
In Uzbekistan, despite the constitutional guarantee of full legal equality between men and 
women, in practice, women continued to face discrimination in their access to divorce and 
to marital property. Privileging ‘protection of the family,’ over women’s equality and 
autonomy, the Uzbek government erected legal and administrative barriers to divorce. 
Courts refused to grant women divorce without permission from local authorities. Also, a 
husband’s refusal to divorce barred his wife’s legal claim to marital property, although he, 
relying on the lax enforcement of laws against bigamy, could re-marry at will.  
Focus on the Family Malaysia12  Focus on the Family Malaysia was established in 1998 
by Lee Wee Min out of concern for the deterioration of the family unit. Alarming police 
92 International Family Law
statistics show an increase in crime involving juveniles. Some 1,719 were arrested in 1997 
for offences including murder, armed robbery, thefts and housebreaking, rape, and assault.  
In the year 2000, over 7,300 juvenile cases have been recorded. This is indeed a reason to 
worry for a small nation like Malaysia. This tip of the iceberg excludes unreported petty 
crimes, vandalism, sexual promiscuity, school gangsterism, truancy, drugs, smoking, 
gambling, and the infamous hanging out lepak culture around shopping complexes. Not 
only are juvenile crimes escalating, the delinquents are getting younger as well.  
Many fingers are pointed in as many directions with many solutions proposed for this 
malaise in our society. However, from whichever angle we scrutinise this problem, there is 
no escaping the fact that the rapid breakdown of the family as the basic functional unit of 
our society is largely to be blamed. 
Poor parenting skills, polygamous marriages, divorces, and the lack of or total 
abdication of parenting responsibilities arising from career and material pursuits have 
taken a heavy toll on family life. This, in concert with peer pressure, media influence and 
the invasion of technology like the Internet into homes have all contributed to the decline 
in the quality of family life.  
Our Mission  Focus on the Family Malaysia is a non-profit organisation with a clear 
mission. We believe that the family is the basic functional unit of our society, and that the 
well being of the family is essential to the stability, morale, security and prosperity of the 
nation. We are committed to strengthening families through education, training and 
support to help achieve this objective.  
To do this, Focus on the Family Malaysia will be working through a network of 
professional counsellors, educationists, family support organisations, resource agencies 
and volunteers.  
Our Activities Awareness Campaign Focus on the Family Malaysia has in place, a 
comprehensive programme to reach out to families and to train and equip people to help 
fulfil our mission. These include: 
Raising public awareness on family issues and providing practical solutions through the 
mass media and corporations. Radio, television programmes and talk shows, feature 
articles in press and magazines, dedicated and regular columns in selected publications 
and newsletters of organisations are some of the planned activities.   
With everything from wholesome entertainment and values-packed stories for children 
to character-builders for teenagers and adults, you can be assured of the very best family 
products from Focus on the Family.   
Author Al Janssen, The Marriage Masterpiece takes a fresh look at the exquisite design 
God has for your marriage and brings to light the reasons your union was intended to last a 
lifetime. 
Education and Training   Seminars, Education and Training with the view to help families 
gain practical skills, information, support and assist them to be more affective in finding 
fulfilment in their roles. These seminars and workshops will be conducted at community 
centres, educational institutions and any organisation who wants to promote strong family 
values. Through these, we hope to tap into the people resource of the various bodies to 
eventually build up a network of people with the skills to help others. Retreats for families 
with on-site counselling are also being planned.   
Counselling Referral Network  Counselling forms an important part of our help 
programme. Counselling services are offered via telephone calls, letters and e-mails. A 
counselling referral network has also been set up through which we can refer people to a 
service that is nearer to, or will meet, a special need.  
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9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem 
Both women want divorces, so the first question is whether they are eligible for 
divorce under French or possibly Egyptian law.  As explained in Section 2. Overview, 
divorce is not available unless the parties are married.  Azizah, as the second wife in a 
polygamous marriage, is not legally married under French law.  Rather, she (and Abu) 
are bigamists and their marriage is void.  Indeed, as set out in Section 7, there is a ban 
on the issuance of residence cards to aliens living in France in polygamous marriages.  
(This might be an important factor for Abu, but additional facts regarding the family’s 
legal status in France are necessary.) 
As explained in Section 3, under the Egyptian version of no-fault divorce adopted 
in 2000, both women may be able to obtain divorces without actually proving adultery 
or any other ground.  Assuming their applications are granted, after the mandatory 
court-supervised mediation, they would be required to return any property received 
under their respective marriage contracts.  In addition, as set out in greater detail in 
Section 8, they would also forgo alimony.  It is doubtful that this is a practical option 
for either. 
Zahra may be able to obtain a divorce under French law, as indicated in 
Section 7, with or without Abu’s consent.  As emphasized in that Section, it will 
be necessary for her to retain French counsel.  Since she wants to return to Egypt, 
however, she should be aware that a French divorce may not be recognized in 
Egypt.  While Egypt is a party to the Convention on the Recognition of Divorces 
excerpted in Section 4, France is not and the Convention only requires 
recognition of divorces obtained in other Contracting States.  Even if France were 
a party, moreover, Zahra has not been a habitual resident there for at least a year 
as required under Article 2.  Whether Zahra’s French divorce, including property 
settlement or maintenance provisions, would be recognized in Egypt, accordingly, 
would be a question of Egyptian law. 
While Azizah cannot obtain a divorce in France, she does not need one.  She can 
leave Abu whenever she likes, although this may be difficult as a practical matter 
unless she finds a job.  She cannot obtain property or maintenance for herself from 
Abu, since she is not his wife under French law, but it is unlikely that she will be 
required to return any dowry either.  She may also be able to obtain support for Nasr 
from Abu, as considered in greater detail in Chapter 10. 
As explained in Section 5, under international human rights law, polygamy is 
generally viewed as harmful to women.  As this problem illustrates, however, State  
refusal to recognize polygamous marriages may also present a dilemma for women like 
Azizah.
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Chapter 5
Divorce/Maintenance and Support
1. The Problem
Isabelle and Ferdinand were married in the Philippines in 1980.  Isabelle was 20 and
Ferdinand was 30.  They have three children and the youngest, Gloria, is 17 and still 
lives at home.  Isabelle took care of the home and the family and Ferdinand supported 
them through his government job.  When her youngest daughter was in middle school, 
Isabelle decided that she would like to work as a legal secretary and told Ferdinand 
about a training program she had seen advertised on television.  Ferdinand said that 
he was perfectly capable of providing for his family and that he would prefer if she 
did not work outside the home.  She deferred to his wishes. 
In 2000, Isabelle and Ferdinand moved to California. There they lived 
comfortably on income from Ferdinand’s investments.  Isabelle had a brief, torrid 
affair with the young man who installed their swimming pool. She confessed to 
Ferdinand, who immediately demanded a divorce.   
Is Isabelle entitled to support?  If so, how much?  How long should she receive 
such support?  What additional facts would be helpful in answering these questions? 
2. Overview
As described in Chapter 4, Divorce/Marital Status, divorce remains problematic in 
many States.  The extent to which a woman’s role in society is determined by her role 
within the family is the major factor in determining the extent to which divorce will be 
viewed as a problem in that society.  Where marriage determines a woman’s social 
role, for example, divorce creates a social problem.   
This chapter focuses on the termination of marriage as an economic relationship.  
Women everywhere in the world earn less than men.  Marriage enables them to benefit 
from their husbands’ higher incomes.  Women who have not been employed outside 
the home (or who cannot be employed outside the home because of social restrictions), 
face a lower lifestyle at divorce, and sometimes destitution.   
The question of maintenance or support is often a question of who is responsible 
for the  support of divorced women?  In many States, the answer depends on who was 
responsible for the divorce. An ‘innocent’ wife is entitled to support from her husband, 
while a wife whose adultery or ‘disobedience’ led to the divorce is not.  In some 
States, if the divorce is the fault of the husband, the wife may be entitled to relatively 
generous maintenance until she remarries or dies. 
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As this brief summary has already indicated, there are many variables.  These 
include:  the parties’ standard of living before the divorce, the length of the 
marriage, the parties’ respective economic situations, property owned by either 
party, the contribution of each party to the marriage, including child care and 
home-making responsibilities, and the age and health of the parties at the time of 
the divorce.  Because of the range of variables, and the similarly broad range of 
State approaches to each, different States are unlikely to reach the same results in 
a particular case.  Whether a State will respect and enforce a decision of another 
tribunal depends on whether both States are parties to a treaty requiring 
recognition of such foreign judgments.  States which have very different 
perspectives on these issues are unlikely to become parties to the same 
agreements. 
3. Cultural Variations
As the examples below demonstrate, dependent spouses generally get little support at 
divorce.  In some states, they get nothing.   
United States
The modern consensus in the United States is that alimony should be awarded at the 
dissolution of a long marriage when the parties would otherwise have very different 
living standards. There is considerably less consensus when the specifics are 
addressed.  How equal should the standard of living be after divorce?  How long 
should a spousal maintenance award continue?  If alimony is not based on gender roles 
or limited to fault cases, what is its justification? 
The influential American Law Institute has proposed that alimony be 
reconceptualized as compensation for loss, rather than as relief in connection with 
need.  This reflects the understanding that there may be need without any unfairness, 
or that there may be no need in a situation where a denial of alimony would be unfair.  
The ALI draft is limited to financial loss; emotional damages are not taken into 
account unless they rise to the level of a tort.  Under the ALI proposal, a spouse is 
entitled to compensable loss where there has been a long marriage and a loss of living 
standard after divorce, where one spouse has taken more responsibility for childcare or 
other nurturing care, or where there has been a loss of earning capacity. 
Compensable losses are also recognized in a short-term marriage when the 
marriage is dissolved before the spouse who has incurred the loss has not received a 
return on her investment or where there is an unfair disparity between the spouses’ 
post-marital ability to recover the premarital standard of living.  More specifically, 
compensable loss is recognized if one spouse has made significant expenditures from 
separate assets, or given up specific opportunities, to allow the other spouse to pursue 
opportunities or some other mutually agreed upon purpose and those assets are not 
recoverable at the time of divorce. 
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Rehabilitative alimony is a popular alternative to long-term or indefinite alimony.  
It is recognized in a growing number of U.S. jurisdictions.  Rehabilitative alimony 
refers to a short-term award for an otherwise dependent spouse, the purpose of which 
is to enable her to become self-sufficient.  Many commentators have noted the irony of 
the term ‘rehabilitative alimony,’ which suggests that a homemaker spouse is in need 
of ‘rehabilitation.’ 
Islamic Family Law
In the Philippines, a wife is entitled to spousal support during idda, or her waiting 
period. A husband is also required to provide maintenance if a divorced mother is 
nursing for up to two years.  A married woman may work in the Philippines with her 
husband’s consent and may appeal to an arbitration council if he unreasonably 
withholds that consent.   
In Malaysia, an innocent wife may apply for maintenance during her idda and she 
may also apply for a mut’a (consolatory gift).  The amount of maintenance is set by a 
court.  In Algeria, similarly, an innocent wife may seek ‘damages’ if the husband 
wrongfully exercised his right to divorce.  The amount of maintenance is left to the 
discretion of the court.  A divorced woman is often entitled to maintenance during her 
waiting period, as required by the Hanafi school. 
United Kingdom
In some States, such as the United Kingdom, the factors taken into account in 
determining maintenance  are inextricably bound up with those taken into account in 
determining property distribution.  These factors are set out in Chapter 6, Section 7.  
This recognizes the reality that as a practical matter  maintenance and property awards 
are basically fungible in most cases. 
The Law relating to finances and divorce in a nutshell1
Maintenance  Maintenance is often called ‘periodical payments’. Interim Maintenance/This 
can be claimed as soon as the Petition has been issued and is intended to be an emergency 
measure to provide income before the final amount is settled or dealt with at a final hearing. 
A recent case in the Court of Appeal has said that the Court can order part of a spousal 
order to include payments in respect of children pending a CSA assessment. Dorney 
Kingdom-V-Dorney Kingdom 15/6/00. This overturned the previous thought that the court 
could only make a children order by consent.   
Maintenance Pending Suit  Similar to Interim Maintenance but will end upon Decree 
Absolute, so we would advise you apply for both.  Maintenance can be for a fixed term (e.g. 
2 years) to cover a period of training or to allow for children to reach school age and for the 
receiving party to obtain employment.  It can also be for life and will usually end upon
remarriage, cohabitation and death. 
After Retirement Where a petition for divorce is sent to the court after 1st July 1996, the 
court can order maintenance or the lump sums that may be available on retirement to be 
paid direct from any pension scheme in which one or other spouse has a benefit. (This is 
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called pension earmarking).  This will only usually apply where the parties are fairly close 
to retirement age.  
4. Private International Law Conventions
The question of international maintenance was addressed almost 50 years ago.  
Dramatic changes in domestic laws regarding maintenance, along with broader social 
and economic changes, have inspired an effort to draft a new instrument, as described 
in Section 8.   
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance2
Preamble Considering the urgency of solving the humanitarian problem resulting from the 
situation of persons in need dependent for their maintenance on persons abroad, 
Considering that the prosecution or enforcement abroad of claims for maintenance 
gives rise to serious legal and practical difficulties, and 
Determined to provide a means to solve such problems and to overcome such 
difficulties, 
The Contracting Parties have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 scope of the convention 1.  The purpose of this Convention is to facilitate the 
recovery of maintenance to which a person, hereinafter referred to as claimant, who is in the 
territory of one of the Contracting Parties, claims to be entitled from another person, 
hereinafter referred to as respondent, who is subject to the jurisdiction of another 
Contracting Party.  This purpose shall be effected through the offices of agencies which will 
hereinafter be referred to as Transmitting and Receiving Agencies. 
2. The remedies provided for in this Convention are in addition to, and not in substitution 
for, any remedies available under municipal or international law. 
Article 2 designation of agencies 1.  Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the 
instrument of ratification or accession is deposited, designate one or more judicial or 
administrative authorities which shall act in its territory as Transmitting Agencies. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the instrument of ratification or 
accession is deposited, designate a public or private body which shall act in its territory 
as Receiving Agency. 
3. Each Contracting Party shall promptly communicate to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations the designations made under paragraphs 1 and 2 and any changes made 
in respect thereof. 
4. Transmitting and Receiving Agencies may communicate directly with Transmitting and 
Receiving Agencies of other Contracting Parties. 
Article 3 application to transmitting agency 1.  Where a claimant is in the territory of one 
Contracting Party, hereinafter referred to as the State of the claimant, and the respondent is 
subject to the jurisdiction of another Contracting Party, hereinafter referred to as the State 
of the respondent, the claimant may make application to a Transmitting Agency in the State 
of the claimant for the recovery of maintenance from the respondent. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall inform the Secretary-General as to the evidence normally 
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required under the law of the State of the Receiving Agency for the proof of 
maintenance claims, of the manner in which such evidence should be submitted, and of 
other requirements to be complied with under such law. 
3. The application shall be accompanied by all relevant documents, including, where 
necessary, a power of attorney authorizing the Receiving Agency to act, or to appoint
some other person to act, on behalf of the claimant.  It shall also be accompanied by a 
photograph of the claimant and, where available, a photograph of the respondent. 
4. The Transmitting Agency shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the requirements 
of the law of the State of the Receiving Agency are complied with; and, subject to the 
requirements of such law, the application shall include: 
a. The full name, address, date of birth, nationality, and occupation of the claimant, 
and the name and address of any legal representative of the claimant; 
b. The full name of the respondent, and, so far as known to the claimant, his addresses 
during the preceding five years, date of birth, nationality, and occupation; 
c. Particulars of the grounds upon which the claim is based and of the relief sought, 
and any other relevant information such as the financial and family circumstances 
of the claimant and the respondent. 
Article 4 transmission of documents 1.  The Transmitting Agency shall transmit the 
documents to the Receiving Agency of the State of the respondent, unless satisfied that the 
application is not made in good faith. 
2. Before transmitting such documents, the Transmitting Agency shall satisfy itself that 
they are regular as to form, in accordance with the law of the State of the claimant. 
3. The Transmitting Agency may express to the Receiving Agency an opinion as to the 
merits of the case and may recommend that free legal aid and exemption from costs be 
given to the claimant. 
* * * 
Article 6 functions of the receiving agency 1.  The Receiving Agency shall, subject always 
to the authority given by the claimant, take on behalf of the claimant, all appropriate steps 
for the recovery of maintenance, including the settlement of the claim and, where necessary, 
the institution and prosecution of an action for maintenance and the execution of any order 
or other judicial act for the payment of maintenance. 
2. The Receiving Agency shall keep the Transmitting Agency currently informed.  If it is 
unable to act, it shall inform the Transmitting Agency of its reasons and return the 
documents. 
3. Notwithstanding anything in this Convention, the law applicable in the determination 
of all questions arising in any such action or proceedings shall be the law of the State of 
the respondent, including its private international law. 
* * * 
Article 18 reciprocity A Contracting Party shall not be entitled to avail itself of this 
Convention against other Contracting Parties except to the extent that it is itself bound by 
the Convention. 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations (Concluded October 
2nd, 1973)
The States signatory to this Convention, 
Desiring to establish common provisions concerning the law applicable to maintenance 
obligations in respect of adults, 
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Desiring to coordinate these provisions and those of the Convention of the 24th of October 
1956 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations in Respect of Children, 
Have resolved to conclude a Convention for this purpose and have agreed upon the 
following provisions: 
Chapter I – Scope of Convention
Article 1  This Convention shall apply to maintenance obligations arising from a family 
relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity, including a maintenance obligation in respect 
of a child who is not legitimate. 
Article 2  This Convention shall govern only conflicts of laws in respect of maintenance 
obligations. 
* * * 
Article 8  Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 4 to 6, the law applied to a divorce 
shall, in a Contracting State in which the divorce is granted or recognised, govern the 
maintenance obligations between the divorced spouses and the revision of decisions 
relating to these obligations. 
The preceding paragraph shall apply also in the case of a legal separation and in the 
case of a marriage which has been declared void or annulled. 
Article 9  The right of a public body to obtain reimbursement of benefits provided for the 
maintenance creditor shall be governed by the law to which the body is subject. 
Article 10  The law applicable to a maintenance obligation shall determine inter alia – 
1. whether, to what extent and from whom a creditor may claim maintenance; 
2. who is entitled to institute maintenance proceedings and the time limits for their 
institution;
3. the extent of the obligation of a maintenance debtor, where a public body seeks 
reimbursement of benefits provided for a creditor. 
Article 11    The application of the law designated by this Convention may be refused only 
if it is manifestly incompatible with public policy (‘ordre public’). 
However, even if the applicable law provides otherwise, the needs of the creditor and 
the resources of the debtor shall be taken into account in determining the amount of 
maintenance. 
* * * 
Article 13   Any Contracting State may, in accordance with Article 24, reserve the right to 
apply this Convention only to maintenance obligations – 
1. between spouses and former spouses; 
2. in respect of a person who has not attained the age of twenty-one years and has not 
been married. 
Article 14  Any Contracting State may, in accordance with Article 24, reserve the right not 
to apply this Convention to maintenance obligations – 
1. between persons related collaterally; 
2. between persons related by affinity; 
3. between divorced or legally separated spouses or spouses whose marriage has been 
declared void or annulled if the decree of divorce, legal separation, nullity or 
annulment has been rendered by default in a State in which the defaulting party did 
not have his habitual residence. 
* * * 
Article 18   This Convention shall replace, in the relations between the States who are 
Parties to it, the Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations in Respect 
of Children, concluded at The Hague, the 24th of October 1956. 
However, the preceding paragraph shall not apply to a State which, by virtue of the 
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reservation provided for in Article 13, has excluded the application of this Convention to 
maintenance obligations in respect of a person who has not attained the age of twenty-one 
years and has not been married. 
* * * 
Article 24   Any State may, not later than the moment of its ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, make one or more of the reservations referred to in Articles 13 to 15. 
No other reservation shall be permitted. 
Any State may also, when notifying an extension of the Convention in accordance with 
Article 22, make one or more of the said reservations applicable to all or some of the 
territories mentioned in the extension. 
Any Contracting State may at any time withdraw a reservation it has made. Such a 
withdrawal shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 
Such a reservation shall cease to have effect on the first day of the third calendar month 
after the notification referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
5. Public International Law Conventions
Human rights instruments refer generally to equality within marriage and at its 
dissolution.   
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women3
Article 16  1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their 
free and full consent; 
 (c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; 
* * * 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family 
name, a profession and an occupation; 
* * *
The following Report suggests how the CEDAW Committee actually shapes 
maintenance regimes. 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the CEDAW/ 
Luxembourg4  The divorce legislation was reformed in 1978 and a provision was introduced 
into article 300 of the Civil Code whereby one spouse may be required to pay alimony to 
the other, even when both parties were at fault.  Before the Act of 15 March 1993, in such 
cases the court had to take into account the seriousness of the fault of the spouse requesting 
alimony.  The Act eliminated the reference to the fault of the spouse requesting alimony, 
but it does prohibit the partner by whose sole fault the divorce is granted from receiving 
alimony.  When one party is solely to blame for the divorce damages can be awarded to 
compensate for the material or moral injury the other partner will sustain due to the 
dissolution of the marriage.  This is intended to protect a wife who is financially dependent 
on her husband because she was engaged in unpaid activity in the family home.  Also with a 
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view to protecting the wife, the Ministry of Social Security has drafted a bill providing for 
the sharing of contributory pensions in case of divorce, as well as certain measures intended 
to complement the pension coverage of a spouse who abandoned or cut back on her career 
during the marriage.  Its purpose is to improve the pension coverage of a divorced spouse 
by granting her a part of the former spouse’s pension proportional to the length of the 
marriage, and also to make it possible for a spouse – divorced or not – who interrupted her 
career to build up her own pension. 
6. Regional Conventions
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
The Council of the European Union                                                                        
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 
61(c) and Article 67(1) thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission. 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament.  Having regard to the opinion of 
the Economic and Social Committee. 
Whereas: 
(1) The Community has set itself the objective of maintaining and developing an area of 
freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is ensured.  In 
order to establish progressively such an area, the Community should adopt, amongst 
other things, the measures relating to judicial cooperation in civil matters which are 
necessary for the sound operation of the internal market. 
(2) Certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of 
judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal market.  Provisions to unify the 
rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and to simplify the 
formalities with a view to rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of judgments 
from Member States bound this Regulation are essential. 
(3) This area is within the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters within the meaning 
of Article 65 of the Treaty. 
(4) In accordance with the principles of subsidiary and proportionally as set out in Article 5 
of the Treaty, the objectives of this regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore be better achieved by the Community.  This 
Regulation confines itself to the minimum required in order to achieve those objectives 
and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. 
* * * 
(6) In order to attain the objective of free movement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matter, it is necessary and appropriate that the rules governing jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments be governed by a Community legal 
instrument which is binding and directly applicable. 
(7) The scope of this Regulation must cover all the main civil and commercial matters apart 
from certain well-defined matters. 
Article 1 
1. This regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the 
court of tribunal.  It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or 
administrative matters.  
* * * 
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2. In this Regulation, the term ‘Member State’ shall mean Member States with the 
exception of Denmark. 
Chapter II/Jurisdiction/Section I/General provision/Article 2  1.  Subject to this Regulation, 
persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of 
that Member State.  
2. Persons who are not nationals of the Member State in which they are domiciled shall be 
governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to national, of that State. 
Article 3 
1. Persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of another Member 
only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of this Chapter. 
2. In particular the rules of national jurisdiction set out in Annex I shall not be applicable 
as against them. 
Article 4 
1. If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of 
each Member State shall, subject to Articles 22 and 23, be determined by the law of 
that Member State. 
2. As against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a Member State may, whatever 
his nationality, avail himself in that State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and 
in particular those specific in Annex I, in the same way as the nationals of that State. 
Section 2/Special jurisdiction/Article 5  A person domiciled in a Member State, may be sued: 
1. in matters relating to maintenance, in the courts for the place where the maintenance 
creditor is domiciled or habitually resident or, if the matter is ancillary to proceedings 
concerning the status of person, in the court which, according to its own law, has 
jurisdiction to entertain those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the 
nationality of one of the parties. 
The United States has entered into a series of bilateral agreements, primarily with States in 
North and South America.  These apply to child support as well as to spousal maintenance and 
are set forth in Chapter 10, Section 7. 
7. National Implementation
United Kingdom 
The Law relating to finances and divorce in a nutshell5
Maintenance Maintenance is often called ‘periodical payments’. Interim Maintenance/This 
can be claimed as soon as the Petition has been issued and is intended to be an emergency 
measure to provide income before the final amount is settled or dealt with at a final hearing. 
A recent case in the Court of Appeal has said that the Court can order part of a spousal 
order to include payments in respect of children pending a CSA assessment. Dorney 
Kingdom-V-Dorney Kingdom 15/6/00. This overturned the previous thought that the court 
could only make a children order by consent.
Maintenance Pending Suit  Similar to Interim Maintenance but will end upon Decree 
Absolute, so we would advise you apply for both.  Maintenance can be for a fixed term (e.g. 
2 years) to cover a period of training or to allow for children to reach school age and for the 
receiving party to obtain employment.  It can also be for life and will usually end upon
remarriage, cohabitation and death.
After Retirement Where a petition for divorce is sent to the court after 1st July 1996, the 
court can order maintenance or the lump sums that may be available on retirement to be 
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paid direct from any pension scheme in which one or other spouse has a benefit. (This is 
called pension earmarking).  This will only usually apply where the parties are fairly close 
to retirement age. 
The following excerpts, from Indian and Californian law, reflect their very different 
approaches to this subject.              
India/The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 6
1. Short title and extent. – (1) This Act may be called the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
(2)  It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
2.  Definition. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, –  
(a) ‘divorced woman’ means a Muslim woman who was married according to Muslim law,  
and has been divorced  by, or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with  
Muslim law; 
(b) ‘iddat period’ means, in the case of a divorced woman, –  
(i)  three menstrual courses after the date of divorce, if she is subject to menstruation; 
(ii) three  lunar months after her divorce, if she  is not  subject to menstruation; 
(iii) if she is enceinte at the time of her divorce, the  period between the divorce and the 
delivery of her child or the termination of her pregnancy whichever is earlier; 
(c) ‘Magistrate’ means a Magistrate of of the First Class exercising jurisdiction under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the area where the divorced  woman resides. 
(d) ‘prescribed’ means  prescribed by rules made under this Act. 
3.   Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce.  –  
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a 
divorced woman shall be entitled to – 
(a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the 
iddat period by her former husband; 
(b) where she herself maintains the children born to before or after the divorce, a reasonable 
and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period 
of two years from the respective date of birth of such children; 
(c)  an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid  to her at the time of her 
marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim Law; and 
(d)  all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after the marriage by 
her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends. 
(2)  Where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the amount of mahr or dower 
due had not been made or repaid or the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) 
have  not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or anyone duly authorised 
by her may, on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of 
such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the delivery of properties, as the case 
may be. 
(3)   Where an application has been made under  sub-section (2) by a divorced woman, the 
Magistrate may, if he is satisfied that –  
(a)  her husband having sufficient means, has failed or neglected to make or pay her 
within the iddat period a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for her and the 
children; or 
(b)  the amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower has not been paid or that the properties 
referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1)  have not been paid or that the properties referred 
to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to her, make an order, within one 
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month of the date of the filing  of the application, directing  her former husband to pay such 
reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to the divorced woman as he may determine 
as fit and proper having regard to the needs of the divorced  woman, the standard of life 
enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband or, as the case may 
be, for the payment of such mahr or dower or the delivery of such properties referred to in 
clause (d) of sub-section (1) to the divorced woman: 
Provided  that if the Magistrate finds it impracticable to dispose of the application within the 
said period, he may, for reasons to be recorded by him, dispose of the application after the 
said period. 
(4) If any person against whom an order has been  made under sub-section (3) fails without  
sufficient cause to comply with the order, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the 
amount  of maintenance or mahr or dower  due in the manner provided for levying fines 
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and may  sentence such person, for the whole 
or part of any amount remaining unpaid  after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to one year or until  payment if sooner made, subject to such 
person being heard in defence and the said sentence being imposed according to the 
provisions of the said Code. 
4. Order for payment of maintenance. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the 
foregoing provisions of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where a 
Magistrate is satisfied that a divorced woman has not re-married and is not able to maintain 
herself  after the iddat period, he may make an order directing such of her relatives as would 
be entitled to inherit her property on her death according to Muslim law to pay such 
reasonable and fair maintenance to her as he may determine fit and proper, having regard to 
the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage 
and the means of such relatives and such maintenance shall be payable by such relatives in 
the proportions in which they would inherit her property and at such periods as he may 
specify in his order: 
Provided that where such divorced woman has children, the Magistrate shall order only 
such children to pay maintenance to her, and in the event of any such children being unable 
to pay such maintenance, the Magistrate shall order the parents of such divorced woman to 
pay maintenance to her: 
Provided further that if any of the parents is unable to pay his or her share of the 
maintenance ordered by the Magistrate on the ground of his or her not having the means to 
pay the same, the Magistrate, on proof of such inability being furnished to him, order that 
the share of such relatives in the maintenance ordered by him be paid by such of the other 
relatives as may appear to the Magistrate to have the means of paying the same in such 
proportions as the Magistrate may think fit to order. 
(2) Where a divorced woman is unable to maintain herself and she has no relatives as 
mentioned in sub-section (1) or such relatives or any one of them have not enough means to 
pay the maintenance ordered by the Magistrate or the other relatives have not the means to 
pay the shares of those relatives whose shares have been ordered by the Magistrate to be 
paid by such other relatives under the second proviso to sub-section(1), the Magistrate may, 
by order direct the State of Wakf Board established under Section 9 of the Wakf Act, 1954,
or under any other law for the time being in force in a State functioning in the area in which 
the woman resides, to pay such maintenance as determined by him under sub-section (1) or, 
as the case may be, to pay the shares of such of the relatives who are unable to pay, at such 
periods as he may specify in his order. 
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United States (California)
Cal. Fam. Code §4320 (a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is 
sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage … ; (b) The 
extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, 
a career position, or a license by the supporting party; (c) The ability to pay of the 
supporting party, taking into account the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and 
unearned income, assets, and standard of living; (d) The needs of each party based on the 
standard of living established during the marriage; (e) The obligations and assets, including 
the separate property, of each party; (f) The duration of the marriage; (g) The ability of the 
supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the 
interests of dependent children in the custody of the party; (h) The age and health of the 
parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress resulting from 
domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party where the 
court finds documented evidence of a history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 
6211, against the supported party by the supporting party; (i) The immediate and specific 
tax consequences to each party; (j) The balance of the hardships to each party; (k) The goal 
that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. Except 
in the case of a marriage of long duration as described in Section 4336, a ‘reasonable period 
of time’ for purposes of this section generally shall be one-half the length of the marriage. 
However, nothing in this section is intended to limit the court’s discretion to order support 
for a greater or lesser length of time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section, 
Section 4336, and the circumstances of the parties; and (l) Any other factors the court 
determines are just and equitable.  
8. IOs and NGOs
IOs 
The Hague Conference on Private International law has addressed the problem of 
transnational maintenance in series of thoughtful studies.  In 2003, in response to the 
results of an exhaustive questionnaire, excerpted below, it called for a new convention.
From Maintenance Obligations – Drawn up by Michel Pelichet, Deputy Secretary 
General, 9/95
* * * 
16 The two Conventions drafted at the Eighth Session are restricted in their scope ratione 
personae, since they only apply to maintenance creditors who are children, the latter being 
defined in both Conventions as any legitimate, illegitimate or adopted child who is 
unmarried and under the age of twenty-one. On the other hand, the two Conventions of 
1973 do not contain any limitation ratione personae, but on the contrary apply to any 
maintenance creditor, hence also to children. It should be borne in mind in this connection 
that initially, when the Member States of the Conference decided at the Tenth and Eleventh 
Sessions to resume work on maintenance obligations, such work was to be confined ‘to 
maintenance obligations not governed by the Conventions of 1956 and 1958 (maintenance 
obligations in respect of adults)’. In the course of the discussions of the Special 
Commissions, at the proposal of several delegations, in particular that of Belgium, it was 
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decided to revert to the subject-matter of maintenance obligations as a whole and to 
constitute two new treaties, one dealing with the determination of the applicable law, the 
other facilitating the recognition and enforcement of decisions in respect of all maintenance 
creditors, including children, who had already been covered by the Conventions drafted at 
the Eighth Session. However, the two Conventions of 1973 contain a series of reservations 
enabling the scope of the two Conventions to be exclusively restricted to certain categories 
of creditors. 
30 b Article 8 of the 1973 Convention lays down an exceptional rule which is in derogation 
of the provisions of Articles 4-6 and which exclusively concerns maintenance obligations 
between divorced spouses, those who are legally separated or whose marriage has been 
declared void or annulled. The uncertain nature of the maintenance allowance to a divorced 
spouse (which, according to the State, may have the character of maintenance or of an 
indemnity, or a mixed character) justified the Convention containing a special solution for 
problems which could not readily be assimilated to the other maintenance obligations 
covered by the Convention. Hence maintenance obligations between divorced spouses are 
governed, under the terms of Article 8, by the law applied to the divorce. This rule may 
naturally confirm the one provided for under Articles 4-6 of the Convention, either if the 
judge applied to the divorce the law of the spouses’ common nationality, or if he applied 
the lex fori. But the special feature of the rule in Article 8, which departs from the general 
principle of the Convention, is that for the revision of maintenance decisions in case of 
divorce, this rule confirms the so-called ‘perpetuatio juris’ solution: the law applied to the 
divorce will remain applicable to variation of such decisions. 
Information Note and Questionnaire Concerning A New Global Instrument on the 
International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance – Drawn 
up by William Duncan, Deputy Secretary General 
I  Background
The Special Commission on Maintenance Obligations of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law of April 1999 met ‘to examine the operation of the Hague Conventions 
on maintenance obligations and the New York Convention of 20 June 1956 on the 
Recovery Abroad of Maintenance and to examine the desirability of revising those Hague 
Conventions, and the inclusion in a new instrument of judicial and administrative co-
operation’.
On the question of reform of the system, the Special Commission reached the following 
unanimous recommendation: 
The Special Commission on the operation of the Hague Conventions relating to 
maintenance obligations and of the New York Convention on the Recovery Abroad of 
Maintenance, 
– having examined the practical operation of these Conventions and having taken into 
account other regional and bilateral instruments and arrangements, 
– recognising the need to modernise and improve the international system for the 
recovery of maintenance for children and other dependent persons, 
– recommends that the Hague Conference should commence work on the elaboration of 
a new worldwide international instrument. 
The new instrument should: 
– contain as an essential element provisions relating to administrative co-operation, 
– be comprehensive in nature, building upon the best features of the existing 
Conventions, including in particular those concerning the recognition and enforcement of 
maintenance obligations, 
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– take account of future needs, the developments occurring in national and international 
systems of maintenance recovery and the opportunities provided by advances in information 
technology, 
– be structured to combine the maximum efficiency with the flexibility necessary to 
achieve widespread ratification. 
The work should be carried out in co-operation with other relevant international 
organisations, in particular the United Nations. 
* * * 
II  Plan of Action
The Permanent Bureau is currently carrying out research and consultations to prepare the 
ground for negotiations within the Hague Conference on the new global instrument on 
maintenance obligations.  A report will be prepared by the Permanent Bureau to provide 
Member and other States with background information on developments at the national and 
international level, and to identify some of the issues which are likely to be the subject of 
debate when negotiations over the new instrument begin.  It is planned that this report 
should be available to States before the end of 2002, and that a first Special Commission to 
begin the negotiations should be convened in the first part of the year 2003. 
* * * 
Form of maintenance decision
1.  What form may a maintenance decision take in respect of (a) a child and (b) a spouse or 
other family member?  In particular, are they confined to periodic payments of money?  Are 
there any circumstances in which a lump sum, property transfer or similar order may be 
made to satisfy a maintenance obligation? 
Eligibility
2. Who is eligible in your country to benefit from a maintenance decision? (e.g. child, 
spouse, other relative, etc). 
* * * 
4. Which is the law applicable to the question of eligibility of (a) child and (b) a spouse or 
other family member to obtain maintenance? 
* * * 
6. Is the process different where either the applicant or the respondent live abroad?  If so, 
please give details. 
7. Is the process different where the application is for maintenance for a spouse or other 
family member rather than a child? If so, can the two processes be joined? 
* * * 
10. Is the method different when the application is for maintenance in respect of a spouse 
or other family member rather than a child? 
* * * 
12. Are maintenance payments in respect of children or spouses or other family members 
subject to automatic reassessment, and if so, by whom and with what frequency? 
13. Are such payments subject to automatic adjustment in accordance with an external 
marker, such as the cost of living index, and if so, by what mechanisms and with what 
frequency? 
14. In what circumstances may a maintenance decision or assessment in respect of a child 
or a spouse or other family member be varied/modified upwards or downwards?  Is this 
done by the same authority that made the original determination? 
15. In what circumstances may a foreign decision or assessment be varied/modified on the 
application of a resident debtor? 
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Towards a New Global Instrument on the International recovery of Child Support and 
Other Forms of Family Maintenance Report drawn up by William Duncan, Deputy 
Secretary General
* * * 
D) Some relevant developments in national systems
13. ‘A quarter of a century has passed since the last two Hague Conventions on 
maintenance obligations were drawn up. It is worth noting certain trends in the 
development of domestic systems of family support which have been in evidence during the 
intervening years, and which may have some relevance in considering appropriate reforms 
at the international level. Some of the legal systems represented during the negotiations 
twenty-five years ago shared certain common features. Maintenance awards were for the 
most part determined by courts on an individualised basis, with the judge having a 
considerable degree of discretion in determining what constituted reasonable maintenance 
for a dependant having regard to the resources of the liable relative and the needs of the 
dependant. This system of individualised justice has come under increasing criticism in 
several jurisdictions on the basis that in its practical operation it tends to be very costly and 
ineffective. The amounts of maintenance awarded are often small, not justifying the expense 
of a detailed judicial inquiry, and problems of enforcement have tended to be chronic 
especially in the longer term. The burden on lone parents of instituting maintenance 
proceedings and taking measures to enforce judgements has been a heavy one, often 
undertaken with little prospect of obtaining an adequate or regular income in the long term. 
The problems of poverty surrounding single parent families has been met in part by 
increased public assistance. At the same time, many governments have become concerned 
by the consequent fiscal burden in so far as it arises from a failure by liable relatives to 
honour family commitments. The result has been the introduction of various reforms, some 
still at an experimental stage, designed on the one hand, to reduce the burden on individuals 
of pursuing maintenance claims and to secure a regular income for dependant family 
members, especially children, and on the other, to enforce more effectively and at lower 
cost private support obligations ... ’ 
14. This passage taken from the 1999 Note, was followed by a description of more specific 
developments in national child support systems. These are recalled here with some 
additions and updates. 
In some countries there has been a change in the way in which maintenance is assessed 
from a broad discretionary basis to one (which has a longer history in certain States) in 
which calculation proceeds on the basis of a more or less refined formula, designed to 
increase predictability and certainty (and indirectly encourage agreement) and to reduce the 
length and costs of hearings. The formulae differ from one country to another: they are 
often complex and sometimes difficult to understand. This is a matter of some relevance 
when considering whether it is desirable to adopt applicable law rules requiring 
authorities/judges in one country to apply the assessment criteria which are peculiar to 
another country. 
In some countries the function of determining the amount of maintenance to be paid, at 
least in the first instance, has become an administrative rather than a judicial function, not 
necessarily involving a hearing, with the objective again of reducing costs and improving 
efficiency. Administrative procedures are sometimes limited to claims for maintenance at or 
below a subsistence level. 
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There has been a tendency in a number of countries for systems of child support, on the one 
hand, and systems for spousal support or the support of other family members, on the other, 
to diverge in terms of both procedure and substance. In particular, most of the newer 
administrative systems have been established primarily for child support purposes and, 
although there is sometimes provision for cases of child and spousal support to be joined, 
maintenance for spouses and other family members is usually left for determination 
judicially.  These divergences can make international cooperation more complicated in that 
interaction may be required between a diversity of administrative and judicial authorities in 
respect of one family’s maintenance needs. 
There is a further complication in that it is not yet clear whether some of the newer 
administrative authorities will or will not play a role in respect of international cases. For 
example, the UK child support authorities deal only with domestic cases and international 
cases are dealt with by the courts. The Australian child support authority, on the other hand, 
handles international cases  and there is a special agreement between Australia and New 
Zealand providing for co-operation between the support agencies in international cases. 
Mechanisms for locating liable relatives, determining their resources, and enforcing 
maintenance orders have become more sophisticated. The use, for example, of orders 
providing for automatic deductions from wages at source has by now become 
commonplace. Government controlled databases (relating for example to revenue, social 
welfare or public licensing) are being employed more frequently both in gathering relevant 
information and in assisting with enforcement. 
State involvement in securing private maintenance, motivated in part by a wish to reduce 
costs to the State, has intensified in certain jurisdictions. There is a tendency in some States 
towards the integration of public and private support systems, and an acceptance that the 
effective enforcement of private obligations often requires the initiative of the State in 
bringing and enforcing claims against the recalcitrant maintenance debtors.  Systems of 
advance payment by the State of maintenance due to a maintenance creditor are sometimes 
used. 
15. The system established by the New York Convention of 1956, though still providing the 
only global framework for administrative co-operation in the international recovery of 
maintenance, suffers from major operational problems. It remains clear that a large number 
of States Parties do not fulfil even their most basic obligations under the Convention. 
Among those that do, there exist divergences in interpretation and practice under the 
Convention relating to a wide range of issues which are described in more detail below. The 
system of co-operation set out in the Convention lacks specifics in areas such as 
documentation and translation requirements, time lines, progress reports, information 
exchange and paternity establishment. At the same time, other instruments, such as the 
Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions 
Relating to Maintenance Obligations, suffer from the absence of an integrated system of 
administrative co-operation. It is obvious, both from the Conclusions and recommendations 
of the Special Commission of April 1999, as well more recently from the responses to the 
2002 Questionnaire, that the establishment of an effective system of administrative co-
operation will be an essential, and perhaps the most important, element in the new 
instrument on the international recovery of maintenance. 
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16. Our consultations suggest that, in devising a modern system of administrative 
cooperation, the following objectives should be kept to the fore –  
1. The system should be capable of processing requests swiftly, in particular making full 
use of the new communication technologies; 
2.   The system should be cost effective. The costs involved should not be disproportionate, 
having regard to the relatively modest level of most maintenance orders. It should be 
seen to give good value for money when comparing administrative costs against the 
amounts of maintenance recovered; 
3.   The obligations imposed on co-operating States should not be too burdensome and 
should take into account differing levels of development and resource capacities. On 
the other hand, it has to be recognised that an efficient structure must involve some 
outlay of resources. No purpose is served by devising a cheap but ineffective system; 
4.   The system should be flexible enough to provide effective links between very different 
national systems, administrative or judicial, for the collection, assessment and 
enforcement of maintenance; 
5.   The system should be efficient in the sense of avoiding unnecessary or over complex 
formalities and procedures; 
6.   The system should be user-friendly – easy to understand and transparent. 
NGOs
NGOs have mobilized support for destitute women, as shown in the excerpt from the 
Japanese NGO below.  There are also organizations of disgruntled former spouses, as 
shown in the excerpt from the ‘Alliance for Freedom from Alimony’ which follows. 
Poverty7   There is a social security system in Japan, but the system does not work well for 
women and only a limited number of women are able to receive its benefits. Because of 
this, the system instead tends to create further poverty and discrimination against women. 
Women receive only half the amount of the employee pension of men, because the amount
is based on wages and term of payment of premium. Women’s wages are very low, and the 
systems of wages, taxes, pensions and social security are all based on a family that has a 
husband as a breadwinner and a wife as a dependent. If a woman gets divorced, she has to 
face poverty. 
The social security system provides two kinds of services. One is public assistance. Even 
though this is based on the principle of giving support to anyone who needs it, this principle 
is not followed. There are many obstacles, such as a means test, a test of work eligibility, 
and an investigation into support responsibility, before people can receive the service. The 
feeling of stigmatization toward recipients is so strong that the application rate is under one 
third of people who are eligible to receive the service. (There was an incident in which a 
solo mother and her child died of starvation in Tokyo in 1996.) Undocumented foreign 
residents have no right to ask for assistance. 
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The other kind of service provides accommodation for women. Women can stay at facilities 
which are run under the Child Welfare Law, the Anti-Prostitution Law, the Daily Life 
Security Law, or at Women’s Advice Centers. However, the number of facilities is very 
limited, and some are reluctant to accept foreigners. 
Alliance for Freedom from Alimony8  What we are The Alliance For Freedom From 
Alimony, Inc. is a non profit Florida Corporation formed exclusively to reform the current 
Alimony Laws. We will educate the general public on the way that the State imposes 
lifetime Alimony on, mostly men, requiring them to pay involuntarily against their will 
under threat of jail, for the rest of their natural life. We will provide assistance mentally, 
emotionally, and judicially to individuals that need our assistance to engage in the program 
to Reform Alimony Laws. 
Alimony Today The forceful collection of lifetime Alimony is a form of involuntary 
servitude, prohibited by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. It also violates the laws 
against ‘Peonage’ and the new 9th Amendment to Florida’s Constitution. 
 Our organization is dedicated to eliminating this form of Involuntary Servitude called 
‘Alimony’. We are engaged in educational, political and judicial means to stop this abuse 
that presently exists. 
Times Have Changed Both the State and Federal Constitutions have equal protection 
clauses that identifies that we are all equal in the eyes of the Law. However, there still exists 
laws on the books of statutes that make one class less equal than another and those are the 
laws of Alimony. Never before has a potential court challenge to those laws existed as they 
do today, in the State of Florida. Indeed in 1979 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
Alabama’s law that provided Alimony only to women. 
 Women are no longer the property of men, non-voters, uneducated and whose only 
career options were to become school teachers or prostitutes, as the old men argued. We 
represent male voters and their second wives who in many cases live substandard to their 
first wives. We have heard too many horror stories from men, who have been horribly 
treated in matters of divorce. There are pretended financial ‘dependents’. These will reduce 
a man to ruin through biased courts, and enemies in the increasingly venomous battle of the 
sexes. 
 Generally trial lawyers are in love with the current system of Alimony. We would 
expect they would consider Alimony Reform to be a major reduction in billable hours, 
however there may be exceptions. 
9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem
As set out in the Overview, maintenance is usually a function of many variables.  In 
the U.S., as set out in Section 3, it is generally awarded at the end of a long marriage, 
like the twenty-four year marriage here, where the parties would otherwise have very 
different standards of living, as they would here because Isabelle is unemployed.  
Under the guidelines proposed by the ALI, Isabelle would also be entitled to some 
compensation for the years she presumably took care of her family and their home.  
Isabelle was not employed outside the home because Ferdinand preferred that she not 
be.
At the time of the divorce, Isabelle is only 44 years old and her youngest child is 
17.  At the very least, she is likely to be entitled to rehabilitative alimony, that is, short-
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term alimony intended to enable her to obtain the training or education necessary for 
her to support herself.  Her affair would not be a bar.   
If Isabelle is considering going back to the Phillippines, the situation would be very 
different, especially if she and Ferdinand are Muslims.  As set out in Section 3, she 
would be entitled, at most, to support during her idda, or waiting period (defined in 
more detail in Section 7).  If she had been more insistent about joining the labor force, 
and Ferdinand had refused to consent, however, she could have appealed to an 
arbitration council. 
A list of the relevant factors for awarding maintenance under California law is 
set out in Section 7.  Given the length of their marriage, Isabelle may be entitled 
to long term support, unless the court finds that she is able to support herself, or, 
with additional training or education, to become self-supporting.  Additional facts 
necessary to determine the amount and duration would include: detailed budgets, 
net worth statements of both parties, and analyses of the specific tax 
consequences to each party.   
For Further Research
1. The Hague Conference site includes an excellent bibliography on this topic.  
Some noteworthy examples follow: cited there follow Cavers, D.F. (1973), ‘Draft 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to 
Maintenance Obligations (Introductory Note),’ American Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 21, p. 154; Cavers, D.F. (1973), ‘Recognition and Enforcement of 
Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations; Report of the United States 
Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law,’ International Legal Materials, Vol. 12, p. 869; Cavers, D.F. 
(1973), ‘Twelfth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law: 
Supplementary Report,’ American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 21, p. 593; 
Cavers, D.F. (1981), ‘International Enforcement of Family Support,’ Columbia 
Law Review, Vol. 81, p. 994; DeHart, G.F. (Spring 1994), ‘Comity, Conventions, 
and the Constitution: State and Federal Initiatives in International Support 
Enforcement,’ Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 28, p. 89; Duncan, W. (2000), ‘The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law and its Current Programme of 
Work Concerning the International Protection of Children and Other Aspects of 
Family Law’, Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. II, p. 41; Kikuchi, Y. 
(1987), ‘Japan’s acceptance of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations’, The Japanese Annual of International Law, p. 36; 
Raday, F. (1978), ‘Transnational Maintenance Obligations’, Israel Law Review,
Vol. 13, p. 525; 
2.  On the economic status of women globally, see, e.g., U.N. Statistic Division, 
Indicators on Income and Economic Activity, 
http://unstata.un.org/unsd/demographic/social/inc-eco.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). 
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Chapter 6
Divorce/Property Distribution
1. The Problem
In Kenya, as in much of Africa, husbands and wives may choose among civil, religious 
and customary marriages.  These choices determine the law governing the parties’ 
marriage and divorce, including their respective property rights. As set out in 
considerable detail in the Report of Human Rights Watch, set out in Section 8, below, 
this has had grave consequences for Kenyan women who have opted for religious or 
customary marriages. 
 First, assume that you are a member of the CEDAW Committee.  You have 
reviewed the pertinent section of Kenya’s Report, also excerpted in Section 8, as well 
as the Human Rights Watch Report.  How can the Committee respond constructively? 
Second, assume that you are a member of the Task Force referred to in Kenya’s 
Report.  What changes, if any, do you propose for your national law?  What kinds of 
opposition do you anticipate?  How should this opposition be addressed? 
2. Overview
Property division refers to the law governing the division of property owned by the 
husband and wife, individually and both of them together, at the time of divorce.  This 
is distinguished from alimony, or spousal support, which refers to an ongoing 
obligation from one spouse to the other.  Property division is generally a one-time 
event and the distribution of property is usually final. 
In the civil law tradition of countries such as France and Spain, all property 
acquired by the husband or wife during the marriage is the community property of both 
of them.  The only property acquired by either which is exempt is that which is 
acquired by gift, devise, or descent.  Community property does not require in-kind 
division; that is, each asset is not necessarily divided in half.  Rather, the division is 
practical as well as equal.  The crucial consideration is that the assets received by each 
spouse are equal in value. 
The increase in value of an asset that one of the parties owned coming into the 
marriage may be community property if the increase is attributable to spousal labor.  If 
the increase in value is a ‘natural’ increase, such as an increase in the market value of a 
piece of real estate, the increase remains the separate property of the spouse to whom it 
originally belonged. 
In common law countries, such as the U.K. and the U.S., in contrast, the traditional 
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rule was that each spouse owned the property he or she earned and everything derived 
from it.  Thus, in the traditional breadwinner-breadmaker marriage, the breadwinner 
left the marriage with all the property acquired through his  breadwinning activity  
during the marriage.  The breadmaker got nothing, although some courts developed 
flexible doctrines to justify some award to the dependent spouse.  Alimony was also a 
possibility. 
Under traditional Islamic law, there was no provision for property division at 
divorce, except to the extent that the marriage contract so provided.  If the marriage 
contract does not explicitly state when dower shall be paid to the wife, under the 
Hanafi school, half is due when the marriage contract is concluded and payment of the 
other half is to be made if the marriage ends by death or divorce.  In some Islamic 
states, the traditional law has been codified.  In Malaysia, for example, upon the  
granting of a judicial divorce, the court divides the assets of the parties that were 
acquired by joint effort during the marriage.  Where one party has contributed to the 
acquisition of assets by the other, through housework or caring for the family, she may 
share in that property although she will always receive a smaller portion.  The wife is 
entitled to reside in the marital home during the ‘idda’ (waiting period) or if there is a 
minor child and her former husband cannot provide another suitable residence.  
Whether pension and retirement benefits are considered marital property or the 
sole property of the wage-earning spouse is an important question, especially when 
older couples separate.  In the U.S., the general rule is that the amount invested in the 
pension during the marriage was earned during the marriage.  The other spouse, 
accordingly, has a claim to that portion of the pension acquired during the marriage.  
In Japan, the Tokyo District Court held in 1999 that a court can take a husband’s 
retirement pay into account in determining a property award if the husband is within 6 
years of retirement.  While Japanese courts generally refuse to award a wife any share 
of a pension at divorce, the Yokohama District Court in 1999 ordered the husband, 
who had already begun to collect his pension, to make periodic payments to his former 
wife.   
3. Cultural Variations 
Africa  
Kenya/Marriage Laws and Practices.1  There are five separate legal systems for marriage in 
Kenya: civil (under the Marriage Act), Christian (under the African Christian Marriage and 
Divorce Act and the Marriage Act), Islamic (under the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce 
ans Succession Act), Hindu (under the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act), and customary 
(under customary laws).  All types of marriages other than customary must be registered, 
but there are different and unconnected registries for each type, making it possible to have 
multiple marriages registered under different systems, in contravention of the law. 
Marriages under civil, Christian, and Hindu regimes are legally required to be 
monogamous. A spouse who enters into another marriage while married under these 
regimes commits bigamy under Kenya’s criminal law, but this crime is rarely prosecuted.  
Marriages under the Islamic and Customary regimes are potentially polygamous.  Islamic 
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law allows a man to have up to four wives; customary laws do not limit the number of 
wives. 
Although cohabitation is not formally recognized under Kenya’s statutes, courts have 
developed the common law principle of presumption of marriage, conferring some marital 
rights and duties on cohabiting couples meeting certain criteria.  The exact criteria vary, but 
judges generally weigh the length of the cohabitation, whether there are children, and 
whether the man and woman held themselves out as husband and wife. 
The existence of customary marriages can be difficult to prove since they are not 
registered, but are rather formed through a series of customary steps.  The steps vary among 
the ethnic groups but generally include elements such as dowry payment by the man’s 
family to the woman’s family (not to the woman directly); consent of the parties and their 
families; the slaughter of a ram or goat; and cohabitation.  Although women married under 
customary laws are considered part of their husband’s clan, when it come to property 
ownership, they are regarded as neither full members of their natal nor their marital clans.
Namibia In Namibia, unless the parties explicitly agree otherwise, the distribution of 
property at the time of divorce depends on the race of the couple and the place where 
the marriage was entered into.  Thus, while marital property is treated as community 
property for those in the South, ‘natives’ in the North are subject to a different 
property regime because they are still subject to the Native Administrative 
Proclamation of 1928.  Under the Communal Land Reform Bill, men and women have 
equal rights with respect to customary land.  If the land was acquired by the husband, 
however, which has historically been the case, the woman will have no claim to it upon 
divorce.  Namibia is an agricultural country and most of the population depends upon 
the land for their livelihood.  Since divorce will effectively deprive a woman of access 
to the land, it becomes economically impossible. 
Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China2
Article 39 At the time of divorce, both husband and wife shall agree upon the disposal of 
the jointly owned property; if they fail to come to any agreement, the people’s court shall 
decide the disposal thereof, taking into consideration the actual circumstances of the 
property and following the principle of favoring the children and the wife. 
 The rights and interests that both husband and wife enjoy in the contracted management 
of land shall be protected by law. 
Article 40 In the case both husband and wife agree to separately own the property they 
respectively obtain during the existence of their marriage and if either of them has spent 
considerably more effort on supporting children, taking care of the old or assisting the other 
party in work, etc, this party shall be entitled to demand the other party to make 
compensations at the time of divorce, and the requested party shall make compensations. 
Article 41 At the time of divorce, the debts jointly incurred by both husband and wife for 
the common life shall be paid out of the jointly owned property. If the jointly owned 
property is not enough to pay the debts or if the property is individually owned, both parties 
shall agree upon the payment of the debts. If both parties fail to reach any agreement, the 
people’s court shall decide on the payment of the debts. 
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Article 42 If, at the time of divorce, either party has difficulties in life, the other party shall 
render appropriate assistance from his or her personal property like house, etc. Specific 
arrangements shall be agreed upon by both parties. In case no agreement is agreed upon, the 
people’s court shall make a decision. 
* * * 
4. Private International Law Conventions
Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes (concluded 
March 14, 1978)3
Chapter I – Scope of the Convention Article 1.  This Convention determines the law 
applicable to matrimonial property regimes. 
Chapter II  – Applicable Law Article 3.  The matrimonial property regime is governed by 
the internal law designated by the spouses before marriage. 
The spouses may designate only one of the following laws – 
(1) the law of any State of which either spouse is a national at the time of designation; 
(2) the law of the State in which either spouse has his habitual residence at the time of 
designation; 
(3) the law of the first State where one of the spouses establishes a new habitual residence 
after marriage. 
The law thus designated applies to the whole of their property. 
Nonetheless, the spouses, whether or not they have designated a law under the previous 
paragraphs, may designate with respect to all or some of the immovables, the law of the 
place where these immovables are situated. They may also provide that any immovables 
which may subsequently be acquired shall be governed by the law of the place where such 
immovables are situated. 
Article 4.  If the spouses, before marriage, have not designated the applicable law, their 
matrimonial property regime is governed by the internal law of the State in which both 
spouses establish their first habitual residence after marriage. 
Nonetheless, in the following cases, the matrimonial property regime is governed by the 
internal law of the State of the common nationality of the spouses – 
(1) where the declaration provided for in Article 5 has been made by that State and its 
application to the spouses is not excluded by the provisions of the second paragraph of that 
Article; 
If the spouses do not have their habitual residence in the same State, nor have a common 
nationality, their matrimonial property regime is governed by the internal law of the State 
with which, taking all circumstances into account, it is most closely connected. 
Article 5.  Any State may, not later than the moment of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, make a declaration requiring the application of its internal law according to 
sub-paragraph 1 of the second paragraph of Article 4. 
This declaration shall not apply to spouses who both retain their habitual residence in the 
State in which they have both had their habitual residence at the time of marriage for a 
period of not less than five years, unless that State is a Contracting State which has made 
the declaration provided for in the first paragraph of this Article, or is a State which is not a 
Party to the Convention and whose rules of private international law require the application 
of the national law. 
Divorce/Property Distribution 121
Article 6.  During marriage the spouses may subject their matrimonial property regime to an 
internal law other than that previously applicable. 
The spouses may designate only one of the following laws – 
(1) the law of any State of which either spouse is a national at the time of designation; 
(2) the law of the State in which either spouse has his habitual residence at the time of 
designation. 
The law thus designated applies to the whole of their property. 
Nonetheless, the spouses, whether or not they have designated a law under the previous 
paragraphs or under Article 3, may designate with respect to all or some of the immovables, 
the law of the place where these immovables are situated. They may also provide that any 
immovables which may subsequently be acquired shall be governed by the law of the place 
where such immovables are situated. 
Article 7.  The law applicable under the Convention continues to apply so long as the 
spouses have not designated a different applicable law and notwithstanding any change of 
their nationality or habitual residence. 
5. Public International Law 
As noted in earlier chapters, public international law requires that women and men be 
treated equally.  What this requires in practical terms is often controversial in the 
family law context.  Public international law also requires the State to respect minority 
cultures within the State.  International law provides little guidance on reconciling 
these norms, which may be in tension with each other, or on which norm should 
prevail if they cannot be reconciled. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4
Article 27. In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 21 (13th session, 1994)5
Equality in marriage and family relations 1. The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (General Assembly resolution 34/180, annex) 
affirms the equality of human rights for women and men in society and in the family. The 
Convention has an important place among international treaties concerned with human 
rights. 
* * * 
Article 16 (1) (c) 17. An examination of States parties’ reports discloses that many countries 
in their legal systems provide for the rights and responsibilities of married partners by 
relying on the application of common law principles, religious or customary law, rather 
than by complying with the principles contained in the Convention. These variations in law 
and practice relating to marriage have wide-ranging consequences for women, invariably 
restricting their rights to equal status and responsibility within marriage. Such limitations 
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often result in the husband being accorded the status of head of household and primary 
decision-maker and therefore contravene the provisions of the Convention.
6. Regional Conventions
The European Communities have explicitly exempted property rights from the 
jurisdictional regime established in Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, set out 
more fully in Chapter 5, Section 6. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001of December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
The Regulation shall not apply to: 
(a) the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a 
matrimonial relationship, wills and succession.
7. National Implementation
Ethiopia
The 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia governed property distribution until the enactment 
of the Revised Family Code of 2000 (RFC).  In 1991, there was a change of 
government in Ethiopia.  The new government sought to distinguish itself from the 
prior military regime by establishing laws that complied with international human 
rights law.  The Charter enacted by the new government, for example, explicitly 
referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The government went on to 
ratify the International Bill of Rights, including the Civil and Economic Covenants, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  In 1995, the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was drafted, which explicitly provided for 
the equal rights of women in connection with marriage (Article 34). 
Under the old Civil Code, fault was taken into the account in determining the 
allocation property in divorce.  Thus, the innocent spouse could be awarded more than 
half or even all of the marital property.  The arbitrators responsible for allocating 
property at divorce could go further; up to 1/3 of the property of the party responsible 
for the divorce could be awarded to the innocent spouse.  Under the RFC, in contrast, 
the old Civil Code has been replaced by no-fault divorce.  Only ‘when justice requires’ 
may a court award damages to the innocent spouse. 
Singapore
In 1981, courts in Singapore were given the authority to divide marital property by an 
amendment to the Women’s Charter.6 This Act authorizes the court to ‘order the 
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division between the parties of the assets acquired by them during the marriage by 
their joint efforts [or] the sole effort of one party [and even of] assets owned before the 
marriage by one party which have been substantially improved by the marriage.’  As of 
2002, between 35% to 45% of the matrimonial property is typically awarded to a full-
time homemaker spouse.  In 1996, the law was again amended to allow courts the 
discretion to order property division ‘in such proportions as the court thinks just and 
equitable.’7
In Sherli Koo v. Kenneth Mok Kong Chua, the high court of Singapore held in 
1989 that all assets acquired during the marriage were matrimonial assets and subject 
to distribution.  Where the wife has worked outside the home, the trend seems to be 
toward an equal division of matrimonial assets.  
Uganda 
In Uganda, women own only 7% of the land, although they comprise more than 80% 
of agricultural workers.  Women’s access to land is through marriage.  An amendment 
to the Land Act was proposed which would give women 50% ownership of the 
matrimonial home upon marriage.  The amendment was omitted from the final bill, 
however.  Thus, upon divorce women are not entitled to any of the land. 
United Kingdom
Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
25. Matters to which court is to have regard in deciding how to exercise its powers under ss. 
23, 24 and 24A. 
(1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 
23, 24 or 24A above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all circumstances of the 
case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family 
who has not attained the age of eighteen. 
(2) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23 (1) (a), (b) or (c), 24 
or 24A above in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard 
to the following matters 
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of 
the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in 
the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion 
of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire; 
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the 
marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; 
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; 
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; 
(f) the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future 
to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home 
or caring for your family; 
(g) the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of 
the court be inequitable to disregard it; 
(h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value of each of the 
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parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of 
the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring. 
(3) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23 (1) (d), (e) or (f), (2) 
or (4), 24 or 24A above in relation to a child of the family, the court shall in particular have 
regard to the following matters 
(a) the financial needs of the child; 
(b) the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child; 
(c) any physical or mental disability of the child; 
(d) the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him 
to be educated or trained; 
(e) the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs (a), 
(b), (c) and (e) of subsection (2) above. 
(4) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1) (d), (e) or (f), (2) 
or (4), 24 or 24A above against a party to a marriage in favour of a child of the family who 
is not the child of that party, the court shall also have regard 
(a) to whether that party assumed any responsibility for the child’s maintenance, and, if so, 
to the extent to which, and the basis upon which, that party assumed such responsibility and 
to the length of time for which that party discharged such responsibility; 
(b) to whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that party did so knowing 
that the child was not his or her own; 
(c) to the liability of any other person to maintain the child.  
* * * 
  Lump Sum Orders The court can only make one order dealing with capital. A lump sum 
order can be made by installments, and if it is, then it can be varied (although that is rare). 
If there is an ongoing order for maintenance, the court can be asked to make a capital order 
whenever the maintenance is varied to achieve a Clean Break. This is an exception to the 
general position set out above. 
Maintenance can always be varied up or down as circumstances often change, maintenance 
rights can also be dismissed. 
Lump sums can be payable in respect of savings, stocks and shares, investment policies 
such as endowments and ISA’s. 
Property Adjustment Orders  The court can order that all or part of a party’s share in 
privately owned property be transferred to the other party or to the children. This will 
usually either be for a fixed term such as to a child’s 18th birthday or remarriage. The court 
can order that the other party’s share be paid later on. Where the parties are in rented 
accommodation the courts can transfer the tenancy to the other party.  If there is a potential 
to buy under the Right to Buy Scheme for council property this can be taken into account. 
Orders for Sale   The Court can order that any property owned by the parties is sold and can 
make orders for the division of the proceeds and payment of mortgage legal fees and other 
debts. 
Property Protection  The Court can hear emergency applications to protect property or 
money being disposed of before a final hearing. This is known as a Mareva Order or in 
Matrimonial matters a Section 37 order (s.37 Matrimonial Causes Act 1974). 
If you believe the other side is hiding money or property you can apply to the High Court 
for an ‘Anton Piller’ order requiring the other side to allow your representatives to enter 
their premises to search for and seize documents or property. This order is rarely used 
except in High Value cases.  
Divorce/Property Distribution 125
8. IOs and NGOs
IOs 
The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
has encouraged States to report on reforms in their marital property regimes, as 
Guatemala and Kenya do below. 
Combined third and fourth periodic reports of States parties: Guatemala8
With regard to the administration of the marital property, the Civil Code establishes the 
following: 
Article 116.  Marriage settlements.  ‘The economic regime governing the marriage shall be 
that specified in the marriage settlements concluded by the spouses before or during the 
celebration of the marriage.’ 
‘Article 121.  Marriage settlements must include: 1.  A detailed description of the property 
owned by each of the spouses at the time of entering into marriage; 2.  A statement of the 
debts owed by each spouse; 3.  An express declaration by the spouses as to whether they are 
adopting the regime of absolute community of property, that of separation of acquisitions or 
such other procedures and conditions as they may choose for the administration of the 
marital property.’ 
Article 122.  Absolute community of property.  ‘Under the regime of absolute community, 
all the property brought by the spouses to the marriage or acquired during it forms part of 
the marital property and shall be divided equally between them in the event of dissolution 
of the marriage.’ 
Article 123.  Absolute separation of property.  ‘Under the regime of absolute separation, 
each spouse retains ownership and control of the property belonging to him/her and remains 
exclusive owner of the proceeds and acquisitions resulting therefrom. 
Each spouse shall also retain ownership of any wages, salaries, emoluments or earnings 
obtained by providing personal services or engaging in trade or industry.’ 
Article 124.  Community of acquisitions.  ‘Under the regime of community of acquisitions,
the husband and the wife retain ownership of such property as they had upon entering into 
marriage and of such property as they acquire during marriage either without paying for it 
or by paying equal amounts, but the following shall be divided equally between them in the 
event of dissolution of the marital property: 1.  The proceeds of the property owned by each 
of the spouses, after deduction of the corresponding production, repair and maintenance 
costs and taxes and municipal charges; 2.  Property purchased with or exchanged for such 
proceeds, even if it was purchased in the name of only one of the spouses; 3.  Property 
acquired by each spouse through his/her work, job, profession or industry.’ 
Article 125.  Alteration of marriage settlements.  The spouses have an inalienable right, 
during the marriage, to alter the marriage settlements and adopt another economic regime 
for the marital property. 
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The alteration of marriage settlements must be effected by means of a public deed which 
shall be recorded in the corresponding register; the alteration shall have a prejudicial effect 
on third parties only from the date on which it is recorded. 
Article 126.  Subsidiary regime.  ‘In the absence of property settlements, the marriage shall 
be understood to have been entered into under the regime of community of acquisitions.’ 
Article 127.  Property of each spouse.  ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding 
articles, the following shall be considered the personal property of each spouse: property 
acquired by inheritance, gift or otherwise without payment; and accident compensation or 
personal injury or sickness insurance payments, after deduction of the premiums paid 
during the community property regime.’ 
With regard to the administration of the family property, article 131 of the Civil Code used 
to stipulate: ‘Administration.  The husband is the administrator of the marital property 
under the regime of absolute community or that of community of acquisitions, although his 
powers may not exceed the limits of normal administration.  In order to be valid, the 
disposal or encumbrance of the community’s immovable property must have the consent of 
both spouses.’ 
As amended by Decree No. 80-98, the article now reads: ‘Under the regime of absolute 
community or that of community of acquisitions, both spouses shall administer the marital 
property, either jointly or separately.  In order to be valid, the disposal or encumbrance of 
the community’s immovable property must have the consent of both spouses.’ 
Article 141.  ‘Unjustified abandonment of the marital home by one of the spouses shall 
terminate for that spouse, as from the date of such abandonment, the effects of the 
community property regime that are favourable to him/her.’ 
In the draft preliminary amendments to the Civil Code, this article is expanded to include 
the obligation to report the abandonment to the competent judge and to notify the other 
party.  This means that if one party is forced to leave the marital home for reasons not 
attributable to him/her, he or she will be able to request a family court judge to draw up a 
document stating the reasons which prompted the decision to leave, thereby ensuring that 
the effects of the community property regime that are favourable to him/her are not 
terminated.
Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Kenya9
Article 16 
(i) Generally women have the same right to enter into marriage as men.  Kenya 
however, has various laws governing marriage and divorce, based on the different 
major religions recognized in the country.  This is one area where the administration 
does not strictly follow the letter of the law.  For example the Mohammedan 
marriage and divorce Act, allows the marriage of minors where a school age girl is 
forcibly  married under this Act, the administration interferes on the ground that the 
minor complete her education first.  Under the said law however, both parties must 
give consent to the marriage. 
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(ii) Should a woman elect to get married under African Customary Law, then she has 
expressly given consent to possible polygamous union.  Divorce also depends on the 
form of marriage law the couple celebrated.  As regards custody of children both have 
equal rights and the courts decide the cases in accordance with the best interest of the 
children. 
(iii) There are equal rights as provided for under the law regarding guardianship, wardship, 
trusteeship and adoption of the children. 
(iv) The right to choose a family name is not legally provided for the law does not interfere 
in this area. 
(v) Women whether married or not, have a right to choose a profession and an occupation. 
A woman may acquire or dispose of her property freely, however in some instances 
especially where the property is owned jointly with the husband the consent of the 
husband may be required. 
(vi) Marriage of children is forbidden and the administration takes all possible measures to 
prevent this occurring. 
Conclusion  Article 24 provides that state parties undertake to adopt all the necessary 
measures at the National level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present convention. 
In realization of the above requirement, the Government set up a Task Force to review all  
laws relating to women as well as the on going Constitutional Review Process as a way of 
realizing this objective.  The Task Force was mandated not just to review the laws and 
regulations but also to consider practices, customs and policies that should be put in place
in order to give full effect to the CEDAW Conventions.
NGOs
The following case studies are drawn from the field work of Human Rights Watch.  
They illustrate the impact of the multiple legal systems, and the related lack of 
consistent enforcement, on Kenyan women and children.  
Human Rights Watch, Double Standards: Women’s Property Rights Violations in 
Kenya10
There is no one to go to if you want part of the family property. It’s hard, because you 
won’t get it back. Elders exist, but they would never give property to a woman. If I dare go 
back I would be tortured. My husband would beat me. As a wife, you don’t own any 
property.
– Tipira Kamuye, divorced woman, Ngong, October 24, 2002
Divorced or Separated Women Divorced and separated women told Human Rights Watch 
of leaving their homes with nothing but clothing and never getting a share of the family 
property. Despite case law establishing that women can be awarded half of the family 
property, men typically keep the house and almost everything in it, and women leave with 
practically nothing. Women are expected to go ‘home’ and live with their parents, which is 
not always an option. Domestic violence victims are hardest hit, often staying in abusive 
relationships for years because they  think it is hopeless to have their husbands leave, and 
128 International Family Law 
the women have nowhere else to go. ‘In most cases it’s the women who leave the 
matrimonial home upon separation.... Lots of abused women are held back by that,’ said a 
lawyer who handles domestic violence and property cases.   
Human Rights Watch interviewed women whose husbands had significant property 
during the marriage, but the women got none of it upon separation or divorce. Many said 
they had no idea they could claim a share of the family property. Tipira Kamuye, a thirty-
five-year-old Maasai woman, was abused by her husband for years before they divorced in 
1999. ‘My husband cut me on the head,’ she said. ‘He was going to kill me.... He told me, 
“I’ll cut your neck,” and tortured me.’  
Kamuye and her three children fled to her parents’ home, and her father returned the 
dowry to her husband. At the time, her husband owned at least two hundred sheep and 
cattle, but she got none of them. She explained:  ‘When I left my husband’s home, I didn’t 
try to take property... . In Maasai custom, women are not supposed to go back for property. 
A woman has to look for new livestock... . If a woman buys property during the marriage or 
brings it to the marriage, she would leave that with the husband upon divorce... . When I 
married, my parents-in-law gave me twenty sheep and twenty cattle. These were not really 
mine, even though they were given to me. I had to leave them.’  Kamuye did not try to get a 
share of the matrimonial property: she believed elders would never allow a woman to keep 
family property and her husband would attack her if she tried to claim it. When asked 
whether  she considered hiring a lawyer, she laughed. ‘There’s nothing like that here,’ she 
said. ‘Maasais don’t have that.’  
 Some women who suffered domestic violence knew they were entitled to family 
property, but were so frightened of further attacks, they did not attempt to claim a share. 
Mary Atieno, a Luhya woman living in Nairobi, separated from her husband in 1998 after 
his beatings and rapes became life threatening. She had briefly  left her husband and 
reported the violence to police in 1996, but they took no action. Having nowhere else to 
stay, Atieno went back to her husband: ‘The police said this was a domestic issue. I went to 
my parents, but my father said that as an African woman, I should stay with my husband. I 
received no help from anyone, so I went back to my husband.... It made it worse that my 
husband knew no one would help me. I was at his mercy.... I had no money to look for a 
place of my own. If I had money, I would have moved out.’ When Atieno left the marriage 
for good, she did not take property. ‘I didn’t try to get the property because I was trying to 
save my life. I don’t even want to dream about getting the property. I want nothing to do 
with my husband. I won’t bother.’ The family property at the time consisted of a 
commercial plot, money in a bank, a pension fund, household goods, and furniture. Atieno 
purchased most of the household goods and furniture. The house she shared with her 
husband had a tile roof, brick walls, cement floor, electricity, and running water. 
 She and her children now live in Nairobi’s Kibera slum in a one-room mud and iron 
shelter, where they initially slept on cardboard boxes. Her slum shelter has no electricity, 
water, or sanitation, and there are no public schools nearby. Atieno’s parents would not let 
her live with them: ‘To them it was not good that I left my husband and was spoiling 
tradition. Leaving a husband is like being a prostitute.’   
Ellen Achieng, a Luo woman, left her violent husband and the matrimonial home in 
2002. Achieng had separated from him for short periods in the past, once reporting his 
abuse to the local chief. ‘In spite of all that was happening, I still wanted the house.... The 
chief said I should go back to my husband if he wanted me to.... So I went back to live with 
him.’ The violence escalated when she returned, but she said she had no alternatives.  ‘I 
would have left years earlier if I could have,’ she said, ‘but the costs of setting up another 
home were beyond my reach.’ When Achieng left her husband permanently, the 
matrimonial property included a house, furniture, cash, a pension fund, and rural land. 
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Achieng has none of that property. ‘When I left home I didn’t take anything – just the 
clothes I was wearing.... My husband had locked me out with nothing.’ 
 Achieng filed for divorce with the assistance of a women’s organization, but did not 
seek division of the matrimonial property. ‘I just wanted to leave my husband.... He had 
said, “I’ll kill you,” even in front of our children.... My major concern is the children. I just 
want maintenance [child support] for them. I’m not interested in the other property.’ 
Achieng did not realize that under Kenyan case law she could claim property on the basis of 
a non-monetary contribution. ‘All the property belongs to my husband. I don’t own 
anything,’ she said. The house Achieng shared with her husband was of solid block 
construction with electricity, running water, sanitation, schools nearby, and convenient 
public transportation. Now she and her three children live in a one-room metal shanty with 
no bathroom, electricity, running water, or sanitation and no school nearby. 
 Maisy Wanjiku, a forty-six-year-old woman with a graduate-level education, lost her 
home and virtually all her property when she and her husband separated. After Wanjiku 
discovered her husband’s infidelity in 1999, he became brutally violent and started 
threatening to kill her. One night, after Wanjiku’s husband told her, ‘This is the final threat 
– it’s the last time I’ll tell you I’m going to kill you,’ she fled with her three children, their 
school clothes, and nothing for herself. She briefly stayed with her brother, who insisted 
that she return to her husband. She went back to her husband until the day he said, ‘I hate 
you. I mean what I’ve told you – I’m going to kill you,’ and punched her in the mouth so 
hard she lost all of her front teeth. She left again with no property. She stayed with her 
sister until she was pressured by her sister to return to her husband, at which point Wanjiku 
moved to a small hotel room with her children. 
Wanjiku and her husband were well off, but she has none of the matrimonial property. 
When they separated in 2000, their property included rural land, a modern house on that 
land, a house in Nairobi, several cars, a beach plot, a commercial plot, shares in companies, 
money in a bank, a pension fund, furniture, and household goods. Wanjiku was formally 
employed throughout her marriage and bought most of the household goods and appliances. 
Her husband paid the mortgages and she paid school fees for the children.  
Wanjiku sought help from traditional, governmental, and religious authorities to resolve 
her marital problems, get some protection from the violence, and obtain maintenance for her 
children. These attempts ended so disastrously, and her husband is so threatening, that 
Wanjiku has not dared to pursue this further. When Wanjiku told the police about her 
husband’s death threats, an officer said, ‘You women – I always tell you when your 
husband comes home you should smile and cook good food.’ When she talked to a priest, 
he told her, ‘God is punishing you for giving birth to only three children when you could 
have had more.’ She went to a lawyer, who asked for a deposit of KSh30,000 (U.S.$377). 
Wanjiku paid the deposit, but could not afford to pay the lawyer to handle a legal 
separation. She also sought help from clan leaders in her husband’s rural hometown. A clan 
meeting was organized, and the elders seemed sympathetic. Yet when Wanjiku asked if she 
could live in the rural home, her father-in-law left the decision to her husband, who refused. 
Wanjiku not only lacks the money to pursue a property claim, but also fears for her life if 
she tried. ‘I can’t go to the police, a lawyer, the church, or my family. There is no help. All 
doors are closed,’ she said.  
Even women who pay for property and have title solely in their name are not immune 
from property rights violations. Ndunge Ritah, a thirty-four-year-old Kamba woman, was 
separated from her husband on and off for several years. During one period of separation, 
she borrowed money, purchased land, and constructed a house, all in her name alone. When 
she reconciled with her husband in 2001, they moved into the house together. 
He became violent again, and accused her of sleeping with everyone who helped her 
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construct the house. He threatened to kill her, slashed her face with a knife, and beat her so 
severely she could not get out of bed for three days. Ritah fled to her mother’s house. She 
obtained legal services from a women’s organization and filed for legal separation. Ritah’s 
lawyer sent her husband a letter demanding that he move out of the house, which he 
ignored. At a preliminary hearing, a judge refused to order Ritah’s husband to vacate the 
house even though the judge knew that Ritah paid for it herself and had title to the house. 
Ritah still pays the mortgage while she stays with friends and family, and her husband pays 
nothing. The experience of losing her home has been demoralizing. ‘Sometimes I cry until 
there are no more tears to cry,’ she said.  
Dowry also impedes women from getting a share of family property upon divorce. For 
the Maasai, payment of dowry even means that the woman and any children she has or 
property she acquires for the rest of her life belong to her husband. Unless the dowry is 
returned to the husband, he can even take children the woman has with other men. Divorced 
women in such communities do not get family property because the dowry is supposed to 
suffice, even if the woman does not benefit from the dowry. Naiyeso Samperu, a forty-five-
year-old Maasai woman who was forced to marry at age ten, separated from her husband 
because of his savage beatings. ‘I was tortured all over my body,’ she said, and pointed out 
scars on her head, legs, and arms. Samperu’s husband had more than one hundred cattle and 
sheep, but when she ran away from him, she took only the clothes she was wearing. Her 
husband asked her father to return the dowry, but her father refused. Later, her husband 
took a child Samperu had had with another man. She reported this to the chief and elders in 
her village. The elders told her to ‘let the child stay with him to represent the dowry that 
was not repaid.... I just cried and left.’ The child was two years old at the time, and Samperu 
has not seen him for the last seventeen years. 
 Of the sixteen divorced and separated women Human Rights Watch interviewed, only 
two were able to stay in their home from the time of separation. In one case, the woman was 
wealthy and thus had resources to afford an expensive court battle to keep her there. In the 
other, the woman was able to stay because her husband moved out of their dilapidated 
Nairobi shelter and into a modern Mombasa house. Gacoka Nyaga, a Kikuyu woman with 
three children, managed to stay in her home when she and her husband separated. ‘We had 
lots of property,’ she said. ‘My concern was not to end up without a home. More than 
anything, I wanted shelter.’ Nyaga filed in court for division of family property and later 
divorce. Although she initially sought half of the family property, she settled for about one-
fourth but was able to stay in her home. All told, Nyaga spent approximately KSh8 million 
(U.S.$100,645) in legal fees.  
Sophie Yusuf, a Muslim woman from the Luhya ethnic group, said her husband 
abandoned her in 1998.  They lived in Nairobi in a two-room, semi-permanent house on her 
husband’s employer’s land. After they had children, they built a modern, six-room house in 
Mombasa with running water and electricity. They continued living in Nairobi but visited 
the Mombasa house on weekends. When Yusuf’s husband left her and their six children, 
she stayed in the Nairobi dwelling (thanks to the largesse of her husband’s employer) and 
he moved into the luxurious Mombasa house with a new wife, whom he married without 
Yusuf’s consent. Yusuf asked for a divorce and hoped for some amount of maintenance. He 
refused the divorce and did not give her maintenance or any other property. Yusuf went to 
an imam for help. The imam summoned Yusuf’s husband, but he did not appear. The imam 
said there was nothing more he could do, and Yusuf did not pursue this further. ‘I was tired 
of the whole thing.... But if I die today, I don’t know what will happen to my children.’  
Some Kenyans say that divorced women should not get property because they can go 
back to their parents. With the transformation that community and family structures have 
undergone since pre-colonial days, this is not always an option or the desire of the woman. 
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Women who do turn to their families are often ordered to go back to their husbands, even 
when they are abusive. Women who have lost their property have a hard time contributing 
to costs in their families’ homes and are considered an unwelcome economic burden.  
Mary Abudo, a fifty-four-year-old Luo woman with eight children, said that when she 
and her husband separated, he kept all of the property, including vehicles, the land she 
cultivated, household goods, furniture, and bicycles, and she received nothing. Her violent 
husband forced her out of their home, and she went to her parents. They wanted her to 
return to her husband, but he would not take her back. Abudo stayed in her mother’s hut, 
but was forced out when her mother died: ‘A daughter is not supposed to stay in her 
parents’ homestead [after the mother dies], so I became homeless... . I wanted to stay there, 
but there was so much pressure from the clan that I should move out. My relatives set upon
me and beat me viciously. I was afraid I’d die... I fled after the attack. I went to Nairobi, but 
even there I didn’t have a place to stay... Now I’m thrown out by my husband and I’m 
landless... . My major desire is to get a house of my own to live in.’ Abudo did not try to 
claim any matrimonial property: ‘I didn’t dare to go back. My husband had issued threats.’ 
He told Abudo’s sister that if he saw Abudo he would ‘kill her, and he was certain the 
government wouldn’t do anything to him.’ Abudo, who now has HIV, lives in a Nairobi 
slum and cannot afford medical treatment.  
Divorced and separated women from all social classes and ethnic groups experience 
property rights violations. In several cases, educated, formally-employed women who 
married men with high salaries and ample property told Human Rights Watch that they 
were evicted and left empty-handed just like poorer women. These women had enough 
knowledge of their rights to pursue legal claims, but had only limited success. Ruth Odish, 
a forty-eight-year-old Luo woman, endured years of beatings and death threats from her 
husband. She often reported this to police and her local chief, but they did nothing. In 1997, 
she went to the only shelter in Nairobi for battered women. Odish’s husband owned eight 
modern houses in Nairobi and had a high salary as a company manager. Odish obtained 
legal counsel from a women’s organization, and her lawyer sent a letter to her husband 
demanding maintenance and a share of the property. Her husband did not respond, and no 
case was ever filed in court. Odish now lives in a dangerous part of Nairobi’s Kayole slum.  
 Priscilla Echaria, a university-educated woman who worked as a teacher, lived in a 
modern house on a tea plantation that she and her diplomat husband purchased and 
operated together. Echaria said her husband was so physically and psychologically abusive 
that in 1987 she and her children moved to her father’s house and she filed for divorce.  
Echaria then rented a bare, simple house, and her husband continued to live in their 
modern home. Echaria hired lawyers to seek division of the property and a divorce. She 
wrangled in and out of court for years before regaining possession of her house and half the 
property. Even then, several years elapsed before the judgment was enforced. As of 
February 2003, fifteen years after filing the lawsuits, an appeal is still pending. Often on 
appointed hearing dates, her case would be missing from the court calendar and a new date 
would be set for a year later. The ordeal took a toll on Echaria: 
‘This was a very expensive case. I don’t have running water because of paying lawyers. 
It cost five million shillings [U.S.$62,893]... . By the time the case is done, it may be three 
or four million more. I also wasted lots of time. It’s like an obsession... . I’d be abandoning 
myself if I abandoned this.... It’s not in my nature to take nonsense... . Most women would 
give up. It’s so difficult to live this way. They talk about African traditions, but there is no 
tradition you can speak of – just double standards.’ 
My husband hits me if I say the property was mine and shouldn’t be sold.
– Ndati Muita, Maasai woman, Ngong, October 24, 2002 
132 International Family Law 
Married Women’s Lack of Control over Property Married women in Kenya often have 
little control over family property. According to the customary laws of some ethnic groups, 
all property a woman acquires before or during the marriage belongs to her husband, who 
can sell it without her consent. Kenyan law recognizes women’s right to own separate 
property during marriage, but there is no legal presumption of co-ownership of matrimonial 
property. To stop a husband from disposing of family property, wives must rely on legal 
maneuvers (such as arguing that the property is held in an implied trust),which only help in 
limited circumstances.  
Ndati Muita, a Maasai woman with seven children, said that her alcoholic husband sold 
cow after cow until they were gone and the family was destitute. Muita’s husband did not 
ask her consent before selling the livestock, and beat her when she complained: ‘My 
husband sold the livestock.... I didn’t consent. He sold them when I wasn’t there.... I didn’t 
go to the elders or police. I fear my husband. If I report, maybe my husband will abuse 
me...My husband hits me if I say the property was mine and shouldn’t be sold.  He beats me 
– specifically when I talk about the sheep and the cattle.... As a woman, you have nothing.’  
Samperu, a Maasai woman with six children, explained how limited married women’s 
rights are to livestock, an important asset in the Maasai community. ‘Women don’t have 
rights to cows or sheep during marriage – only the milk,’ she said. ‘We just take care of the 
sheep and cows.’  
Gacoka Nyaga said that before she and her husband divorced, he sold family land and 
invested the proceeds in company shares in his name. ‘I didn’t have access to the property,’ 
she said. ‘I told him I wanted my name on the investment, but he refused.’ When Nyaga 
initiated a division of property case, her husband threatened to sell everything. Nyaga says 
she was only able to prevent him from doing so because she had an attorney. 
Consequences of Women’s Property Rights Violations As the accounts above illustrate, 
when a woman’s property rights are violated, the consequence is not just that she loses 
assets. The repercussions reverberate throughout women’s lives, often resulting in poverty, 
inhuman living conditions, and vulnerability to violence and disease for women and their 
dependents. Each of these consequences is amplified by Kenya’s high HIV/AIDS rates: 
with increasing AIDS deaths, there are more widows who face potential property grabbing 
and its consequences. HIV infected and affected women and their dependents experience 
the hardships of losing property all the more intensely.  
Living in squalor is one common consequence of women’s property rights violations. 
The housing women resort to when evicted by their relatives is often decayed, cramped, and 
unsafe. In the case of women with HIV/AIDS, these conditions can lead to earlier death. As 
reflected in many of the testimonies above, women whom Human Rights Watch interviewed 
consistently described being forced to live in substandard housing: the physical structures 
are dilapidated; services (including running water, energy, and sanitation) are unavailable; 
and the locations (in terms of schools, health-care facilities, and safety) are bad. For 
example, Mary Adhiambo was forced to leave her rural home and land in 1998 after her 
husband beat her and demolished her home. ‘Where I live now is a bad place in the Kibera 
slums,’ she said. ‘It’s a very small room. When it rains, water comes through the roof. I 
have no money for a better house. I have no electricity. I buy water from a stand pipe, but 
when I have no money, I have no water.’ 
 Josephine Omuga, a widow from Siaya district, said that after her husband died in 
1997, her in-laws took her land and other property, forced her to have sex with a jater, and 
evicted her from the homestead. Before her husband died, she lived in a solid three-room 
hut. Now she lives in a small barn that she shares with cows and goats. 
Women who lose their property lose their economic base and often descend into abject 
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poverty. Many of the women Human Rights Watch interviewed said the property rights 
violations left them poor and struggling to pay school fees, buy food and water, obtain 
medical treatment, and meet other subsistence needs. Some were poor before the property 
rights violations but became infinitely poorer when their possessions, and especially their 
land, were taken from them. The traditional solutions to this dilemma – being inherited by a 
male in-law, remaining with an abusive husband, or returning to a father’s homestead – 
keep women economically dependent on men and preserve their inequality.  
The poverty resulting from women’s property rights abuses affects children, too. A 
teacher said: ‘It’s very common for children to drop out of school when their mothers are 
disinherited... . Some drop out because of general poverty, but when it comes to widows, 
it’s even more serious... . I know a lady whose husband had built a house, but her mother-
in-law came after the husband died and grabbed it. The child dropped out of school last 
week because the mother couldn’t pay the school fees.’ 
Violence is another by-product. Some women said they stayed in violent relationships 
for years because they believed no court or other authority would give them a share of the 
family property or remove the abusive partner from the home. Some women were beaten, 
threatened, and harassed by husbands or relatives when they protested about property rights 
violations. Women are also abused for trying to learn about their property rights. A 
paralegal who offers trainings on property rights said, ‘Husbands have threatened, “don’t 
ever go [to a training] again or I’ll kick you out... .” One woman was beaten senseless for 
coming to our meeting.’ 
Property rights violations also threaten women’s health. Women who succumb to 
customary practices like wife inheritance and cleansing are vulnerable to all types of 
sexually transmitted diseases. An expert on HIV/AIDS and the law said women’s property 
rights violations increase their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS: ‘Because women do not own 
property as such, men have more say over them. They can’t negotiate safer sex, and this 
increases infection.’  Many women with HIV/AIDS are likely to die sooner because of their 
unequal property rights, depriving them of the resources and shelter they need to survive. 
Women who have lost their property often cannot afford medical treatment. 
9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem
This problem is unlike those in the previous chapters in that it requires a broad, policy- 
oriented response rather than a specific course of action for an individual.  The major 
dilemma here is grounded in the tension between religious or cultural norms and 
human rights, which are effectively denied under certain regimes.  As set out in Section 
3, there are five separate legal systems for marriage in Kenya.  Since the registries are 
unconnected, it is possible to have multiple marriages registered under different 
systems within Kenya.  
 Since all of the systems are subject to Kenyan law, resolution should be possible.  
As the Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes set out in 
Section 4 indicates, moreover, the State obviously has an interest in assuring the fair 
and orderly disposition of property, especially immovables, or real property, within its 
territory.  As set out in Section 5, religious and customary practices, including those 
regarding marriage, are protected under international human rights law.  At the same 
time, as set out in the CEDAW General Recommendation No. 21, these practices may 
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conflict with women’s right to equality.   
This would probably be the focus for a member of the CEDAW Committee.  The 
Human Rights Watch Report, although anecdotal, persuasively documents the denial of 
Kenyan women’s human rights at divorce.  Despite case law to the contrary, women are 
routinely denied their share of marital property.  Husbands routinely refuse to 
recognize their ex-wives’ entitlements, and the courts and police routinely refuse to 
protect women’s rights.  A CEDAW member is likely to insist that Kenya take 
whatever measures are necessary to rectify this.  The CEDAW Committee’s comments, 
while not legally binding, may serve as leverage for those seeking to further women’s 
rights within Kenya.  While Kenya’s submission of a Report to the CEDAW 
Committee indicates it is a party to the CEDAW, further research would be necessary 
to ascertain the precise status of the Convention under domestic law, i.e., whether its 
provisions (as opposed to the Committee’s comments) are considered legally binding.  
If so, demands by the Committee are likely to be taken more seriously.   
A member of the Kenyan Task Force has a very different mandate.  As a threshold 
issue, it appears that law that should protect women is not in fact being enforced.  
Familiarity with local law and conditions is necessary to determine whether this may be 
most constructively addressed by a high-level directive, by fines or other sanctions (for 
officials or recalcitrant husbands), or by fee-shifting mechanisms assuring payment to 
wives’ representatives.  The potential for importing foreign enforcement mechanisms, 
such as those set out in Section 7, employed in the U.K. similarly requires an 
understanding of the local cultural and political context. 
One possible change in domestic law would be to provide access to the civil courts 
for women who have been denied their human rights under customary or religious laws. 
The women denied their rights to their family homes, for example, would be allowed to 
sue in civil court.  Traditional tribal and religious leaders are likely to object 
strenuously to such modifications as violative of Kenyan law and of the human right to 
culture.  Pragmatic limits on such access to civil courts would be one way to respond to 
such objections.  Access could be limited, for example, to those who would otherwise 
be destitute.  Legal representation would need to be provided for such women.   
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Chapter 7 
 
Reproductive Rights and Abortion 
 
 
 
 
1. The Problem 
 
You are a lawyer for Women on Waves (WOW), a group which travels on a medical 
ship (The Aurora) flying under the flag of the Netherlands.  WOW provides 
counseling, contraceptives, and abortions for women whose countries do not.  WOW 
anchors outside of the territorial sea of a country and women are ferried from the 
mainland to obtain its services.  WOW plans to go to Ireland and has asked you to 
advise regarding the following legal issues: 
 
1. Whether Ireland can prohibit women from taking the ferry out to The Aurora? 
2. Even if Irish women cannot be prevented from coming out to the boat, can 
Irish teenagers be prohibited from doing so? 
3. If either Irish women or Irish teenagers return from the boat with  instructions 
for follow-up care after taking the abortion pill, can they be arrested under 
Irish law? 
 
The Aurora also plans to visit Morocco, and WOW would like you to consider the 
same questions with regard to that visit. 
 
 
2. Overview 
 
Reproductive rights generally refer to the cluster of rights which enable an individual 
to decide on the number and spacing of children by preventing unwanted pregnancies. 
These rights, which include education about family planning, access to contraception, 
and freedom from gender discrimination, are widely recognized throughout the world. 
Almost every State allows access to contraception, and several States provide 
contraceptives as a free public health benefit. Abortion, the termination of an 
unwanted pregnancy, is more problematic. 
 
Reproductive Rights 
 
Access to information and education regarding contraception is the crucial first step.  
This includes the effects of spacing children on maternal health as well as on infant 
and child mortality.  Second, equally crucial, families must have access to effective, 
dependable, and safe contraception.  This includes sterilization, condoms, spermicides, 
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diaphragms and other barrier methods, as well as intrauterine devices and oral 
contraceptives.  Hormonal emergency contraception (EC), the ‘morning-after pill,’ 
prevents pregnancy by preventing a fertilized egg from becoming attached to the 
uterine wall.  The morning-after pill, accordingly,  is also properly considered a form 
of contraception.   
Women’s equality is increasingly recognized as a factor in their enjoyment of 
reproductive rights. If women do not enjoy equal rights within the family, the 
reproductive rights of the couple are apt to be exercised by the husband.  If a woman 
cannot support herself, but is dependant on her husband for her sustenance, her 
reproductive rights may well be illusory. The Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women has criticized rules requiring women to obtain spousal 
consent in order to undergo tubal ligation or abortions even when their health was in 
danger.  In its General Comment No. 24 on Article 12 of the Women’s Convention, 
the Committee recognizes that women’s health issues are of central importance to the 
family as a whole but notes that an imbalance of power may effectively deprive women 
of access to health care.  The General Comment concludes that in interpreting Article 
12 of the Convention there should be ‘no restrictions on the ground that women do not 
have the authority of husbands, partners, parents or health authorities.’  
While the State should recognize the reproductive rights of individuals and 
couples, the State also has legitimate interests in promoting the use of contraceptives. 
The UK, for example, launched  a national campaign to reduce teen pregnancy in the 
Spring of 2002. As part of this campaign, the Tesco supermarket chain began 
distributing free morning-after pills to teenagers.  In order to combat the AIDS 
epidemic, States such as Brazil, in cooperation with international organizations and 
non-governmental organizations, have initiated widespread condom distribution 
programs.   
Other States, confronted with burgeoning populations, have adopted comprehensive 
population policies in order to assure basic human rights, including rights to an adequate 
standard of living, education, and healthcare.  The means adopted by the State in 
connection with such policies cannot be ‘compulsory or discriminatory,’ according to the 
Human Rights Committee. Thus, incentives, propaganda, and education are generally 
considered acceptable, while coerced sterilizations or abortions, criminal sanctions, and 
onerous fines are not.  In China, for example, the infamous one-child policy was adopted 
in 1980, limiting each family to one or at most two children. This policy was enforced 
through a broad range of methods, including onerous fines on excess children, forced 
sterilizations and abortions, the refusal to register ‘unauthorized’ children, and oppressive 
campaigns in which committees would monitor women’s menstrual cycles and pay 
unwelcome visits to women who became pregnant, sometimes harassing them for hours 
until they agreed to abortions. 
 
Abortion 
 
Abortion refers to the termination of a pregnancy after the fertilized egg has become 
attached to the uterine wall.  Unlike reproductive rights in general, there is no 
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international consensus on abortion in particular. The controversy is grounded in the 
belief in some States that abortion involves two lives, that of the fetus as well as that of 
the mother, unlike contraception, which only involves the decision by the mother (or 
the parents) whether or not to become pregnant.  Among those States which recognize 
a State interest in the preservation of human life, moreover, there is a range of views as 
to when fetal life comes into being.  The Inter-American Convention, for example, 
refers to ‘a right to life from the moment of conception.’  German law, in contrast, 
accepts as a matter of scientific fact that life begins fourteen days after conception.  
Under the Hanafi school of Islamic law, ‘ensoulment’ occurs at four months, before 
which abortion may be permitted. 
Even where abortion is legal, moreover, there is growing condemnation of sex-
selective abortions as a ‘cleaner’ form of female infanticide.  In China, for example, 
almost one million baby girls are missing annually.  That is, gender ratios predict that 
one million more baby girls will be born every year than appear on national registries.  
Approximately fifteen percent, or 191,089 of these baby girls are missing because of 
selective female mortality or infanticide, sex-selective abortions, or neglect.  
 
 
3. Cultural Variations 
 
Abortion includes a broad range of procedures, depending in part upon the stage of 
fetal development.  Abortion includes a similarly broad range of social and political 
meanings.  These vary as a function of several distinct but related factors, including the 
position of women in society, state population policy, what the UN calls the 
‘reproductive health context’ in the country, including the availability of 
contraceptives, and the status of the fetus under national law, which may reflect the 
influence of religious groups in the country.   
China, South Africa, and Germany have all reformed their abortion laws within the 
past ten years.  In South Africa, the debate over the new abortion law became a 
microcosm of national politics, as Islamic, tribal, and other factions struggled with the 
rhetoric of equality and the bitter legacy of apartheid.  In China, abortion is both a 
human rights rallying cry against the coerced abortions performed pursuant to the one- 
child policy (and a ground for asylum claims), and a privilege limited to those who can 
afford the sex-selective abortions that remain technically illegal. In Germany, 
unification forced a problematic synthesis between pro-natalists and those eager to 
exorcise any trace of the Nazi policies in the West, and the far more liberal abortion 
laws of the formerly socialist East. 
Before the reforms in the 1990s, there were dual systems governing abortion for 
German, South African, and Chinese women.  For German and South African women, 
this reflected the dual legal systems in which abortion laws were embedded.  East and 
West Germany were separate political entities, with distinct laws and distinct 
conceptions of women’s role in society.  South Africa under apartheid had two 
similarly distinct legal systems, one for Blacks and one for whites.  Although China 
had a unified legal system, that system functioned in two very distinct urban and rural 
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contexts.  Thus, the same one-child policy that allowed urban women to participate in 
economic life subjected rural women to forced abortions and sterilizations.  The two-
tiered systems in each state were serviceable for some women, and disastrous for 
others.  
In each state, the abortion law reforms of the 1990s were shaped by the larger 
domestic political contexts from which they emerged.  In China, globalization and the 
accompanying scrutiny from the international community resulted in a rhetorical nod 
to human rights.  In South Africa, abortion was reconstructed within rhetorical 
frameworks of human rights and liberation to which the new government was 
authentically committed.  In Germany, the Court (which actually set out the parameters 
of the new law), crafted an uneasy synthesis between women’s rights and the 
recognition of fetal rights urged by Christian groups and grounded, like the First 
Abortion Decision, in recognition of the Basic Law’s ‘human dignity.’ 
 
China  
 
Historically, large families were the ideal in China, especially for the vast majority of 
the population that lived in rural areas.  As in most agrarian, pre-industrial societies, 
children were valued as laborers.  Children were also valued as members of the family, 
the most important unit of social organization.  In part because girls joined their 
husbands’ families upon marriage, boys were more important to their parents.  Sons 
were their parents’ social security and old age insurance.   
By 1980, however, China’s Communist leadership viewed the burgeoning 
population as a major national crisis, putting all other national policies, including those 
regarding modernization and economic stability, at risk.  Fertility rates of over five live 
births per woman would make it impossible to maintain, let alone improve, an already 
dismal standard of living.  The country faced imminent disaster, including widespread 
famine (Greenhalgh, 2001).  
Although the statistics compiled by the government were challenged by 
demographers outside of China at the time, and later by Chinese demographers, the 
State mobilized its vast bureaucracy to cope with the emergency, the government 
crafted a comprehensive population control policy.  Local party cadres were ordered to 
‘grasp birth control work firmly,’ to make it part of the ‘fierce struggle between the 
two classes [and]’ to reassert ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ in family planning 
work (Joint Economic Committee, 1982). 
In terms of population, the one-child policy was an unprecedented success.  
Fertility rates fell dramatically.  By 1990, the child-bearing rate had dropped to 2.31 
from 5.81 in 1970.  (2.1 is the rate at which the population does not grow, but merely 
replaces itself.)  The one-child policy, however, was never formally rescinded.  On the 
contrary, in a recent statement by the State Family Planning Commission, the 
government reiterated its commitment to family planning work.  But the recent 
clarification of policy insists that ‘family planning personnel . . . perform their duties in 
accordance with the law and ... in a just and civilized way [so] that the legitimate rights 
and interests of the people are protected.’  Rather, the focus is to be on education and 
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publicity, to change public attitudes, especially in rural areas, and to explicitly draw 
women into the process (State Family Planning Commission, 2001). 
 
South Africa 
 
In 1975, South Africa enacted the Abortion and Sterilization Act which medicalized 
the abortion decision, basically leaving it to the woman’s doctor.  Only if he 
determined that the pregnancy posed a ‘serious threat’ or actually caused ‘permanent 
damage’ to the woman was abortion permitted, and then only following compliance 
with a rigid set of procedural requirements.  Of those who applied for abortions 60% 
were denied.  The 40% (approximately 800-1000 women annually) who were 
approved were overwhelmingly white.  Of these, more than 70% were approved on 
psychiatric grounds.  As Najma Moosa observes, ‘Access was thus largely affected by 
class position and racial background.  Very few black women who might have 
qualified had access to psychiatric assessment or knowledge of the qualifications.’ In 
South Africa, as in West Germany, wealthy women also had the option of going 
abroad to obtain abortions. 
Although the 1975 law had serious consequences for South African women, 
especially poor Black women unable to go abroad for safe, legal abortions, abortion 
remained a divisive issue.  In part, this may be attributed to a range of Muslim and 
Christian religious beliefs.  As Najma Moosa observes, neither the Qu’ran nor Sunna 
provide ‘a clear directive on abortion.  While classical jurists and religious authorities 
do deal with the subject, juristic rulings on abortion differ between the legal schools.’ 
While most Muslim scholars agree that abortion is permitted in certain circumstances, 
‘they disagree as to the circumstances ... [and] when an abortion may be permitted.’  
According to one interpretation of Islamic law, for example, ‘the period of gestation 
before which abortion can be allowed is deemed to be 120 days (16 weeks or 4 
months) ... [after which] the fetus is considered to possess a soul or spirit (ruh), the 
possession of which sets human life above other life forms.’  However, ‘a second 
“authentic” Hadith relating to conception and also reported in Muslim texts ... [set the 
cutoff time for abortion at 7 weeks]’ (Moosa, 2002). 
While abortion will be allowed if it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother, 
rape or incest is not a ground for abortion under Islamic law.  This is further 
complicated by the different positions on abortion taken by the four schools of Islamic 
law. For example, ‘social abortions to protect the health of existing children or to 
ensure a better standard of living for the family during the first 40 days of pregnancy if 
it occurred by mistake and her husband consents thereto’ is permitted by the Maliki 
school.  The Hanafi school approves abortion ‘before the 4
th month of pregnancy, if 
the survival of an already nursing infant depends on it.’ Christian pro-life groups 
similarly opposed liberalized abortion. 
The ANC, in contrast, championed liberalized abortion as part of its 
comprehensive platform to promote human rights.  This expressly included women’s 
rights  women’s equality rights in general and reproductive rights more particularly.  
It also explicitly included economic rights, such as the right to health.   
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Germany 
 
During the Nazi regime, there were both state coerced abortions for those considered 
‘unfit’ to procreate because of hereditary defects or ‘racial inferiority,’ and a pro-
natalist policy, including strict laws prohibiting abortion for ‘racially valuable’ women. 
After World War II, the Allies partitioned Germany.  East Germany joined the Soviet 
bloc and West Germany soon became part of the European Community.  Although 
they shared a common culture and law before partition, their very different trajectories, 
toward capitalism and democracy in the West and toward socialism in the East, led to 
very different roles for women.  These different roles were reflected in their respective 
abortion laws (Telman, 1998). 
East Germany hoped to increase population after the war.  In 1950, accordingly, a 
very  restrictive abortion law was enacted. Under this law, abortion was permitted only 
‘if the life or health of the mother was endangered or if either parent suffered from a 
severe hereditary defect.’ After five years, during which an estimated 20,000 to 
100,000 illegal abortions were performed annually, the law was replaced by a much 
more liberal law (Zielinska, 1987). 
Like women in China, women in East Germany were to be equal to men under 
communism.  They were expected to join their husbands in building the socialist State. 
 The government recognized that women workers had to have control over their own 
reproduction.   
The government also recognized that motherhood had to be accommodated if 
women were to participate fully in the labor force.  For example, in 1975 the East 
German government introduced the ‘baby year,’ which allowed ‘women, [b]eginning 
with their second child, [to] take a year off with 65-90% pay and with  a guaranteed 
right to return to their job with accumulated seniority.  State-supported daycare was 
guaranteed at a [reasonable] cost’ (Telman, 1998). 
In West Germany, in contrast, women were relegated to the private sphere of the 
home and the family.   At the same time West Germany was grappling with its 
shameful past.  Strongly repudiating the eugenics laws and ethnic cleansing of the 
Nazis, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic provides in Article 1(1) 
that: ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable.’  Article 2(2), similarly, guarantees that: 
‘Everyone shall have the right to life and inviolability of his person.’  Abortion was 
strictly regulated.   
As in East Germany in the 1950s, the difficulty of obtaining a legal abortion only 
increased the number of illegal abortions.   In 1974, following energetic lobbying, the 
Reform Act, liberalizing abortion, was passed.  It was soon challenged.  Reimposing 
stringent limitations, the Federal Constitutional Court reiterated its commitment to 
‘human dignity’ in the First Abortion Decision: ‘[T]he categorical inclusion of the 
inherently self-evident right to life in the Basic Law may be explained principally as a 
reaction to the “destruction of life unworthy to live”, the “final solution”, and 
“liquidations” that the National Socialist regime carried out as government measures.’ 
  These two trends in West Germany; i.e., one, encouraging women to take care of 
their homes and families (and, as a corollary, discouraging the participation of married 
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women in the labor force) and two, rejecting the Nazi past, resulted in a very 
restrictive abortion law.  Rather, the emphasis was on providing single women with the 
support to raise children on their own.  The proximity of the Netherlands, where 
abortion was readily available, provided a safety valve, an alternative to dangerous 
back street abortions (Miedel, 1993-1994). 
By the time of reunification, women in East Germany had relied on unrestricted 
access to first trimester abortion for 20 years.  Women in East Germany had no desire 
to relinquish the right to control their own reproduction that they had taken for granted 
for twenty years.   At the same time, however, most East Germans were eager for 
reunification and the more liberal political climate, increased affluence, and restoration 
of German culture that it promised. 
 
 
4. Private International Law Conventions 
 
There are no private international law conventions on reproductive rights and abortion. 
This reflects both the absence of consensus on these issues and the recognition in many 
States that although their nationals, including women seeking abortion, regularly travel 
to neighboring States for medical services unavailable at home, they cannot exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over these nationals while they are abroad.  Some States 
prohibit traveling for such purposes, however, although enforcement of such 
prohibitions remains problematic.   
 
5. Public International Law 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1    
 
Reproductive rights are increasingly recognized as part of international human rights 
law.  Article 3 of the ICCPR requires States parties to ‘ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights’ set forth in the Covenant, 
although there is no explicit reference to reproductive rights.  The right to privacy set 
out in Article 17 has not been interpreted to include the right to reproductive privacy, 
unlike the right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution.  Although ‘privacy’ has been held 
to encompass reproductive rights under some national laws, such as the Constitution of 
the United States, this reading of ‘privacy’ has been explicitly rejected under other 
laws, including the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Article 23 of the ICCPR assures the ‘right of men and women of marriageable age 
to marry and to found a family’ and requires the State to ‘take appropriate steps to 
ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during 
marriage, and at its dissolution.’  As the Human Rights Committee observed in its 
General Comment No. 19 in 1990, this implies protection for reproductive rights: 
 
The right to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate and live 
together.  When States parties adopt family planning policies, they should be compatible 
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with the provisions of the Covenant and should, in particular, not be discriminatory or 
compulsory. . .  . 
 
But in times of ‘public emergency’ such as China’s  population crisis in the early 
1980s, Article 4 allows States to derogate from, or abridge, certain rights, including 
reproductive rights.  While forced abortions or sterilizations should be prohibited even 
under this standard, fines for unauthorized children might be acceptable, if they are not 
onerous.   
Even in the absence of  a ‘public emergency,’ international human rights law 
permits its States to limit some rights, if necessary to ensure ‘the public welfare.’ Such 
permissible limits might include incentives for families with only one child, such as 
preferred housing or bonuses. 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
2   
 
Articles 2 and 3 of the ICESCR  similarly  require States to ‘ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social, and cultural rights.’ Article 
10 refers to ‘family rights’ and Article 12 refers to the ‘right to health.’  It has been 
argued that both necessarily include ‘reproductive rights,’ since without these rights, 
parents cannot determine the most fundamental issues of family membership; i.e., the 
spacing or number of children. 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
3 
 
The Women’s Convention is considerably more expansive.  Article 1 begins by 
defining the term ‘discrimination against women’ to mean ‘any distinction, exclusion 
or restriction made on the basis of sex, which has the effect or purpose of impairing or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women . . . of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field.’ 
Article 2 of the Women’s Convention further requires the State: 
 
(d) to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to 
ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this 
obligation; 
(e) to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any 
person, organization or enterprise; 
(f)  to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women. 
 
The Women’s Convention makes the State responsible for all discrimination on the 
basis of gender, whether through State policy or private prejudice.  The Women’s 
Convention arguably imposes an affirmative obligation on the State to counteract  
cultural bias which leads to sex-selection abortion. 
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 Article 12 explicitly requires the State to ‘ensure access to healthcare services, 
including those related to family planning’ and, more specifically, to ‘ensure to women 
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement in the postnatal 
period, granting free services when necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during 
pregnancy and lactation.’ Article 14 reiterates the right to family planning services for 
rural women in particular and Article 16, relating generally to women’s rights within 
marriage, again emphasizes that women have ‘the same rights [as men] to decide freely 
and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children.’  
 
 
6. Regional Conventions 
 
Africa 
 
The only regional convention that explicitly addresses abortion is the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
adopted by the African Union Summit in Maputo, Mozambique on July 11, 2003. The 
Protocol requires fifteen signatories to come into force. 
 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa. 
* * * 
Article 14.  Health and Reproductive Rights
1. State Parties shall ensure that the rights to health of women are respected and promoted. 
These rights include: 
a) the right to control their fertility; 
b) the right to decide whether to have children; 
c) the right to space their children; 
d) the right to choose any method of contraception; 
e) the right to protect themselves against sexually transmitted diseases, including 
HIV/AIDs; 
f) the right to be informed on one’s health status and on the health status of one’s partner. 
2. State Parties shall take appropriate measures to: 
a) provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services to women especially those in 
rural areas; 
b) establish pre-and post-natal health and nutritional services for women during pregnancy 
and while they are breast-feeding; 
c) protect the reproductive rights of women particularly by authorising medical abortion in 
cases of rape and incest. 
Europe 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights does not address abortion specifically, 
but the Commission has rejected arguments that abortion is either prohibited by Article 
2,4 or required  by Article 8’s guarantee of privacy. The European Court of Human 
Rights has held, however, that the right to freedom of information assured by Article 
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10 was violated when Ireland banned the provision of information on abortion abroad 
on the ground that such provision was contrary to public morals. 
 
European Convention on Human Rights
5 
* * * 
Article 2.  Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.  
* * * 
Article 8.  1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 
* * * 
Article 10. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers ... 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others …  
 
In Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany,  the Commission 
rejected the argument of the petitioners that German legislation restricting abortion 
contravened Article 8, noting that ‘pregnancy cannot be said to pertain uniquely to the 
sphere of private life. Whenever a woman is pregnant, her private life becomes closely 
connected with the developing foetus.’ In addition, the Commission pointed out that at 
the time the Convention entered into force in 1953, ‘the law on abortion in all member 
States was as least as restrictive as the one now complained of.’ 
 
Open Door Counselling Ltd v. Ireland (A/246)/Dublin Well Woman Centre v. 
Ireland (A/246)/Open Door Counselling Ltd v. Ireland (14234/88, 
14253/88)/(ECHR) European Court of Human Rights 29 October 1992/Abstract: 
On a complaint from the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, the Irish 
Attorney General applied for an injunction to prevent two counselling 
organizations from assisting clients to have abortions in England. Their actions, it 
was claimed, infringed the Irish constitution which protects the unborn’s right to 
life. The counsellors challenged the injunction insofar as it specifically prevented 
them from giving information that might help clients contact abortion clinics. 
This, they claimed, infringed the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
Art. 10 which guaranteed freedom of expression. The government argued that the 
exception to Art. 10 applied in that the injunctions were necessary in a democratic 
society to protect morals. Summary: Held: The ban constituted an infringement of 
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Art. 10. The court accepted that because the constitutional protection reflected 
majority opinion about abortion, the legal basis of the injunctions was the 
protection of morals but although governments had a wide discretion in this area 
they could not necessarily take any actions they saw fit. Freedom of expression 
included information which offended the majority. The ban was too general, 
allowing no exception. The counsellors proposed to confine the information given 
to an explanation of available options, and as the information on abortion was 
available elsewhere in Ireland without supervision to protect women’s health, the 
result of denying information could constitute a risk to health. For all these 
reasons the ban exceeded what could be described as ‘necessary,’ and so 
infringed Art. 10. 
 
Americas  
 
The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man6 provides, ‘Every human 
being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person.’ The American 
Convention on Human Rights7 is more specific: 
Article 4.1 Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be 
protected by law, and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.  In White and Potter v. United States,8 petitioners 
argued that the United States was in violation of the Declaration, which it had signed, 
and which should be interpreted in light of the American Convention, which the 
United States had not ratified. The Commission rejected this argument and refused to 
‘impose upon the  United States Government, or that of any member State of the OAS, 
by means of “interpretation”, an international obligation  based upon a treaty that such 
State has not duly accepted or ratified.’ 
7. National Implementation 
 
South Africa 
 
African National Congress (ANC) had promised to decriminalize abortion and to eliminate 
the onerous procedures that effectively precluded legal abortion for the vast majority of 
South African women.  After the ANC won the election, the old abortion law was discarded 
along with apartheid.   Reproductive rights were explicitly assured in the new South African 
Constitution, which establishes the right ‘to make decisions concerning reproduction’ and 
the right to ‘security in and control over [the] body’. (Moosa, 2002)  
 
The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (CTOP) was enacted in South Africa 
in 1997.  It requires the state to provide abortion on request during the first 12 weeks 
of pregnancy.  Women were deliberately made part of the drafting process.  15 women 
were on the 1995 parliamentary committee which reviewed the restrictive 1975 Act; 
11 were men.  
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Germany  
 
Under the terms of the German Reunification Treaty, West German law replaced 
inconsistent East German law.  Abortion was treated differently, however. The Aid for 
Pregnant Women and Families Act of July 27, 1992 (the ‘1992 Act’) represented a 
compromise between the very liberal abortion laws of the socialist East and the very 
restrictive abortion laws of the democratic West.  Under the new law, extensive 
counseling was provided with the express goal of protecting the unborn fetus, and 
preventing future unwanted pregnancies.  Like the 1974 Reform law before it, the new 
law was challenged before the Constitutional Court on the ground that it conflicted 
with the German Basic Law.  The Court found that the law was indeed in conflict with 
the Basic Law and established a new model.   
The core principle of the new law was to prevent abortion through counseling and, 
at the same time, to decriminalize abortion.  Some features of the 1992 Act were 
retained by the Court.  Abortions within the first twelve weeks, after counseling, for 
example, are not criminal.  Since criminal sanctions have basically been eliminated in 
the new law, it is enforced for the most part by denial of state insurance benefits.  
Women will not be reimbursed for abortions unless they are authorized by a certificate 
of indication.  An exception is made, however, for  poor women who cannot otherwise 
afford an abortion.  The new law is in continuing tension with other provisions of 
German law, however, because of its characterization of fetuses as legal persons and 
bearers of rights.   
 
United Nations Population Division/Country Profiles
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Ireland  Abortion is permitted in Ireland only if necessary to save the life of the woman.  
Abortion in Ireland has been illegal since the founding of the Republic. The major source of 
abortion law is the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, the same legislation that governs 
abortion in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which remained in 
effect in Ireland after the country gained its independence from the United Kingdom. Under 
the Act, the performance or procuring of an abortion ‘unlawfully’ is a crime, with both the 
person performing the abortion and the pregnant woman subject to imprisonment. The Act 
does not provide which abortions, if any, will not be considered unlawful.   
Although court decisions in the United Kingdom ... gradually developed an exception 
to this ban for abortions performed for medical purposes, including mental health purposes, 
in Ireland no such development occurred and it was presumed that almost all abortions were 
prohibited, with the possible exception of an abortion performed to save the life of the 
pregnant woman.  Despite this fact, a constitutional amendment was approved by 
referendum in 1983 adding the following even stronger anti-abortion language to the Irish 
Constitution: ‘The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn  and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.’  In essence, this amendment 
placed the lives of the mother and the unborn child on an equal level and obligated the State 
to adopt measures to protect the latter. 
Although under this amendment abortions were prohibited completely in Ireland and 
rarely if ever performed, an Irish woman who wanted to obtain one was not without 
recourse. After 1967, when England liberalized its abortion law by statute, women could 
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easily travel to England to have an abortion performed legally and safely.  
Approximately 4,000 Irish women chose this approach each year, with a significant 
number of them aided by Irish family planning associations and other groups that  
provided abortion counseling, the names and addresses of abortion providers in England, 
and, in some cases, direct referral services. After the approval of the 1983 amendment, 
these services became the centre of an abortion controversy in Ireland, with critics 
charging that they were in violation of the 1983 amendment.  At the request of the 
Government, in 1988 and 1990, the Supreme Court of Ireland issued permanent 
injunctions against the provision of these services by family planning groups and student 
groups.  It based its decisions on the Government’s duty to defend and vindicate the 
rights of the unborn. 
The issue continued to generate controversy. In 1993 it was revealed that, in 
negotiations over the text of the Treaty of European Union, which the member States of the 
organization were drafting in order to create even closer economic, social, and political ties, 
language had been agreed upon that would exempt Ireland’s abortion law from any 
oversight by the European Union and its laws.  In addition, a lawsuit challenging the 
Supreme Court of Ireland’s denial of the right to provide information on abortion was 
brought before the court of a larger European organization, the Council of Europe. One of 
the responsibilities of that organization is to monitor human rights in member States in the 
light of the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. The court of the Council of Europe found that the denial violated 
the right to impart and receive information contained in the Convention. Under the 
Convention, Ireland was obligated to change its law to correct this violation. 
The controversy over abortion took on a new dimension following a 1992  court case 
concerning a suicidal fourteen year-old girl who had been raped by an older man and whose 
parents wished to take her to England for an abortion. The attorney-general of Ireland, acting 
to defend the right of the unborn in furtherance of the 1983 constitutional amendment, sought 
an injunction prohibiting the family from leaving the country. In a landmark decision, the 
Supreme Court allowed the family to go to England, holding for the first time that there were 
exceptions in Ireland to the blanket prohibition of abortion and that, even under the 1983 
amendment to the Constitution, an abortion could be legally performed if there was a real and 
substantial risk to a pregnant woman’s life, including a risk of suicide.  
The ongoing debate over both the right to impart and receive abortion information and 
the right to travel to obtain an abortion prompted the Government to enact legislation 
authorizing a constitutional referendum on the two issues, as well as on the broader issue of 
whether there should be constitutionally worded provisions allowing abortions in some 
circumstances.  With respect to the latter issue, it proposed language that would have 
specifically allowed abortions to be performed to save the life of the mother in case of risk 
to physical, but not mental health.  In the referendum, the Irish public approved the rights to 
information and to travel, but defeated the proposed wording on exceptions to the ban on 
abortions, thus allowing the decision of the Supreme Court on this issue to stand. 
Owing to controversy  over the issue, however, successive Governments delayed for 
over two years, until early 1995, to announce proposed legislation to implement the results 
of the referendum.  As approved by the Irish Parliament in March 1995, the legislation was 
designed primarily to define the right to impart and receive information in Ireland on 
abortion and, as argued by its supporters, to reduce the need for abortions through 
counselling. The legislation authorizes the provision of information that would likely be 
needed by a woman desiring to obtain an abortion outside Ireland, such as information on 
the identity, location and method of communication with clinics for the termination of 
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pregnancy. However, it places a number of restrictions on the way in which such 
information can be provided. This information must be about services that are lawful where 
provided, must be truthful and objective, and must not advocate or promote abortion.  In 
addition, the manner in which it is provided must be lawful in the jurisdiction where the 
abortion services are provided. The information may not be displayed by notice in a public 
place and may not be provided in publications that are distributed without having been 
solicited by recipients. 
Further restrictions apply if the information is provided by a person who engages in 
giving information, advice or counselling to the public on matters related to pregnancy. 
That person must not advocate or promote abortion; must also provide information, 
counselling, and advice on all courses of action open to the woman; must not provide the 
abortion service him- or herself or have an interest in a body providing such services; must 
not gain directly or indirectly any financial or other benefit from any person who provides 
the services or, with respect to the provision of information, from the woman; and must not 
make an appointment or any other arrangement for the woman for such services. 
The legislation was opposed by both those who thought that it was too liberal and those 
who believed it to be too conservative. Because of this opposition and doubts about the 
law’s constitutionality, the President of Ireland referred the law to the Supreme Court for 
review before it came into effect.  Here the Court appointed lawyers to present opposing 
arguments to the Court, as well as letting the Government argue that the legislation was 
constitutional. Subsequently, in May 1995, in a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the 
legislation did not violate the Constitution. It concluded that the approval of the referendum 
on information in 1992 was clearly intended to modify the State’s duty to defend the 
unborn in the area of information and that there was no natural law superior to the 
Constitution. On the other hand, it concluded that the amendment did not overly restrict the 
activities of a physician who was treating a pregnant woman whose life was endangered 
because, although the physician could not make a direct referral, he was free to provide the 
pregnant woman with full information on her state of health and with materials identifying 
an abortion clinic, discuss all aspects of the case with the clinic once the pregnant woman 
had made an appointment, and give the woman her medical records when she went to the 
clinic. The Court also rejected the argument that the legislation was unconstitutional 
because it did not take into consideration the rights of parents with respect to minors, and 
husbands with respect to wives, in the decision over abortion. The Court found these rights 
not to be affected by the legislation. Overall, the Court held that the legislation was a ‘fair 
and reasonable balancing of conflicting rights.’ 
The decision was greeted with approval by most Irish political parties, including those 
that originally opposed it as being too conservative.  Leaders of the family planning 
organizations involved in litigation were also pleased since it resulted in a consent 
agreement in the High Court to allow them to distribute information on abortion. Leaders of 
the pro-life movement and the Catholic Church, however, were seriously disappointed. The 
Church issued a detailed statement on the right to life that took exception, in particular, to 
the Supreme Court’s rejection of the superiority of natural law over man-made law. They 
continued actively to oppose the idea that abortion could ever be permitted in Ireland.   
* * * 
The provision of contraceptives in Ireland has also aroused considerable controversy. For 
example, since contraception was forbidden by the law, the Irish Family Planning 
Association clinic that opened in Dublin in 1969 operated only semi-legally until a 
Supreme Court decision in 1973 ruled that, on the basis of a right to marital privacy, it was 
unconstitutional to ban the importation of contraceptives and allowed adults to import and 
possess contraceptives. Nonetheless, the decision did not nullify the sections of the law 
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forbidding the sale of contraceptives.  In 1979, the Health (Family Planning) Act was 
enacted by Parliament.  It allowed the importation and sale of contraceptives only by 
pharmacists and by prescription. In 1985, an amendment to the Act enlarged the categories 
of persons allowed to sell contraceptives, also authorizing medical practitioners, employees 
of health boards and family planning services that were approved by the Department of 
Health (since 1997, the Department of Health and Children), as well as employees of 
hospitals that provided maternity services or services for the treatment of sexually 
transmitted diseases. The Act also allowed persons over 18 years of age to buy condoms 
and spermicides without prescription. Other contraceptives are still sold in Ireland only by 
prescription. Owing in part to the rise in the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, new 
legislation removing further restrictions on the sale and distribution of contraceptives was 
enacted in 1992 and 1993. 
 
Morocco  In Morocco, abortion is available to save the life of the woman or to preserve 
her physical or mental health with the consent of her spouse.  Morocco’s abortion law 
was first liberalized in 1967. At that time, Article 453 of the Penal Code was amended by 
Royal Decree No. 181-66 (1 July 1967) to provide that the performance of an abortion 
shall not be punished when it is a necessary measure to safeguard the health of  
the mother and is openly performed by a physician or a surgeon with the consent of the 
spouse. If there is no husband or the husband refuses or is prevented from giving his 
consent, the physician or surgeon may not perform the abortion without the written 
opinion of the chief medical officer of the province or prefecture, certifying that the 
intervention is the only means of safeguarding the health of the woman. If the physician 
believes that the woman’s life is in jeopardy, the consent of the spouse or opinion of the 
chief medical officer is not required. The physician or surgeon must, however, give his 
opinion to the chief medical officer of the province or prefecture.  
In all other cases, abortion is illegal under the Penal Code, although some evidence 
exists that foetal impairment may be taken into account under medical indications. Any 
person performing an illegal abortion is subject to one to five years’ imprisonment and 
payment of a fine of 120-500 Moroccan dirhams (DH). The penalty of imprisonment is 
doubled in the case of persons who regularly perform abortions.  Medical and health 
personnel who perform an illegal abortion are subject to the same penalties, as well as to 
temporary or permanent suspension from exercising their profession. A woman who 
induces her own abortion or consents to it being induced is subject to six months’ to two 
years’ imprisonment and payment of a fine of DH 120-500.  
Family planning in Morocco has encountered strong religious and political opposition. 
Consequently, moves to strengthen family planning efforts have been quite cautious. In the 
case of abortion, the issue has been complicated by the views of religious scholars 
concerning the beginnings of life. Some believe that abortion should be allowed only in 
exceptional circumstances and that the abortion law of Morocco should not be liberalized. 
The Government of Morocco has supported family planning since independence in 
1956 and has recognized the influence of demographic factors on national development. 
Royal Decree No. 181-66 of 1 July 1967, which modified the abortion law, also repealed 
the French law of 10 July 1939, which prohibited the advertisement and sale of 
contraceptives.  Since then, contraceptives have been distributed free of charge in 
government family planning centres. Beginning with the development plan of 1968-1972, 
population issues, including family planning, have been accorded high priority in the 
planning process in Morocco.  In 1971, the Association Marocaine de planification 
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familiale, a private body, was established.  Its role has evolved over the years, expanding its 
informational and educational activities to include clinical services. 
Family planning activities in Morocco have been fully integrated into the overall health-
care facilities, which has resulted in some financial difficulties and has actually hampered 
access to contraception by subsuming it under medical services.  For these reasons, in the 
early 1980s, the Government assigned to the Ministry of Public Health the responsibility for 
undertaking a policy of ‘de-medicalization’ of family planning services in order to increase 
access to contraception.  In addition, two innovative programmes were introduced, one 
involving mobile clinics providing maternal and child health and family planning services 
in remote rural areas and the other involving systematic home visits to encourage the use of 
contraception and to provide family planning and primary health-care services.  
Illegal abortion appears to be quite widespread in Morocco, with many women resorting 
to abortion as a contraceptive method.  In addition, it appears that the incidence of illegal 
abortion is underestimated, given the fact that many women obtaining an illegal abortion 
appear to be married women from the urban upper and middle classes who undergo an 
abortion in a private clinic. Surveys of public hospitals suggest that a significant number of 
admissions are of women from lower socio-economic groups suffering from complications 
due to septic abortion. 
 
 
8. IOs and NGOs 
 
In 1994, at the International Conference on Population and Development held in 
Cairo, the focus of international population policy shifted from demographic targets to 
the enhancement of women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights.  This has not 
percolated down to the national level in many states, however, and absent national 
legislation or adherence to the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention there are 
no legal mechanisms through which this can be implemented.  IOs and NGOs have 
nevertheless made significant advances. 
 
IOs 
 
The United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) sponsors a broad range of projects 
promoting reproductive rights, as described in the following press releases describing 
projects in Pakistan, Iraq, and Timor-Leste. 
 
UNFPA and Partners Expand Family Planning in Pakistan10  To combat high levels of 
maternal mortality and meet people’s needs for family planning, UNFPA and other partners 
have agreed to significantly expand the delivery of reproductive health commodities and 
services in Pakistan during the next five years. The agreement, signed earlier this month in 
Islamabad with the Government of Pakistan, is intended to save the lives of Pakistan’s 
mothers and help stabilize its population growth.  
Under the agreement covering a five-year period, UNFPA will spend a total of $18 
million for the procurement of contraceptives, $8 million from its own funds and $10 
million from the United Kingdom Department for International Development. In addition, 
the United States Agency for International Development will provide $50 million to help 
communities purchase contraceptives and services. The Pakistan Government will seek to 
earmark a minimum of $7 million each year to procure contraceptives.   
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UNFPA will be responsible for international procurement of all contraceptives. It will 
also provide technical assistance to improve the distribution of contraceptives to public 
health centres around the country, with special attention to rural areas suffering from 
insufficient supplies.  
 
Reproductive Health Supplies from UNFPA Arrive in Mosul11 A shipment of much-needed 
reproductive health supplies and medications arrived last week in the northern Iraqi city of 
Mosul.  
The supplies, sent by UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund, included 
emergency obstetric care supplies, clean delivery equipment, contraceptives, essential drugs 
and other medical products. They also included equipment for blood transfusion and 
testing. The shipment is intended to serve a population of 400,000 people for a 3-month 
period.  
 
Midwives Get Motorcycles to Save Mothers’ Lives in Timor-Leste12  Midwives in Timor-
Leste will be able to better reach pregnant women across the country by moving around on 
motorcycles contributed by UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund. The 80 new 
motorcycles, delivered to Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Health yesterday, will help the 
midwives to widen their outreach to the communities they serve, especially in remote rural 
areas.  
Expanding midwives services is among the main health objectives of the newly 
independent State. That is particularly crucial to reduce the country’s high level of maternal 
deaths, which, at an estimated 850 per 100,000 live births, is the highest in Asia and the 
Pacific. It is estimated that only one quarter of all deliveries in Timor-Leste are currently 
attended by a trained midwife. Increasing the number of midwife-assisted deliveries will 
help lower maternal death rates.  
 
NGOs 
 
There are many active NGOs in this area, ranging from local groups to powerful 
international organizations.  There was a major upheaval in 1984, however, when then 
U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced what came to be known as the Mexico City 
Policy.  Under this policy, the U.S. refused to fund any organization that either 
provided abortions or provided counseling regarding abortions.  Many NGOs took the 
position that they could not serve their clients without informing them that abortion 
was an option.  Some NGOs reorganized; that part of the NGO that provided 
counseling, including counseling regarding abortion, became a separate entity.  Some 
sought funds from other sources.   
The examples below indicate the range of NGO activities in connection with 
reproductive rights and abortion. 
 
International Planned Parenthood Federation, The Young Person’s Guide to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of a Child and Sexual and Reproductive Health13  This guide 
makes the links between the rights, as laid out in the Convention, and sexual and 
reproductive rights – traditionally one of the most controversial areas in UN discussions. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most powerful legal 
instrument available to all children for the protection and enforcement of their human 
rights. It has been ratified by every country in the world, with the exception of USA and 
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Somalia. By ratifying this instrument, national governments have committed themselves to 
protecting and ensuring children’s rights and they have agreed to hold themselves 
accountable for this commitment before the international community. Despite this, there has 
been little progress in the protection and promotion of adolescent sexual and reproductive 
health. Written for young people, in a clear, youth-friendly language, the guide aims to 
highlight specific links between this legally binding international instrument and sexual and 
reproductive health.  
 
Center for Reproductive Rights, Nepal’s King Legalizes Abortion14  Reversing 150 years of 
legal discrimination against women, today King Gyanendra of Nepal signed the 11th 
Amendment Bill, officially legalizing abortion and bringing about sweeping changes in 
many other discriminatory laws. Effective September 27, 2002, abortion will be legal under 
certain conditions, including upon request during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, when a 
woman’s life or health is in danger, and in cases of rape, incest, and fetal impairment.  
While today is considered a landmark victory for women, the law does not address the 
rights of women who are currently in prison on charges of abortion and infanticide. Of 
additional concern is that abortion will remain out of reach for many Nepalese women as a 
function of the Bush Administration’s Global Gag Rule, which prohibits non-governmental 
organizations receiving U.S. assistance from performing abortions or making necessary 
referrals. The Center for Reproductive Rights is working closely with local Nepalese 
advocacy groups to help address these particular issues.  
 
Uganda to support youth initiative15 The Family Planning Association of Uganda (FPAU) 
in collaboration with IPPF Africa Region plans to develop a comprehensive youth 
programme that will address sexual and reproductive health (SRH) issues and related 
concerns such as employment and the empowerment of young people in Uganda.  
Uganda’s Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development will also fully 
participate in the programme’s development and implementation, according to the Minister, 
Mrs Zoe Bakoko. Other key actors from the private sector, civil society and donor 
community, will also be involved in the programme. 
The Minister who was addressing IPPFAR staff in Nairobi on 4th June said the youth 
programme initiative was one of the outcomes of the visit to Uganda by the Regional 
Director, Mr. Tewodros Melesse, at the end of May.  Mrs. Bakoko visited the Regional 
Office to share ideas and experiences with the staff. 
Mrs. Bakoko, whose portfolio covers gender, culture, youth and children, elderly and 
disabled, labour and industrial relations, as well as economic and civic rights and micro-
finance emphasized the urgent need to address SRH need of the youth, including the 
prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
In traditional society there were established ways of communicating about sexuality, 
said the Minister who has vast experience in public health. ‘Today, parents are embarrassed 
to talk to their children about sex. We are not counseling them and they are turning to the 
internet and TV for information’. 
Mrs. Bakoko, a FPAU volunteer from the rural Arua, and a member of its national 
executive Council (NEC) also pledged to take a lead in organizing an Africa women 
ministers’ caucus to champion SRH issues and concerns. She also lauded IPPFAR’s efforts 
to integrate SRH and other social aspects into the NEPAD framework and assured the 
regional office of her support in pushing the initiative forward. 
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Vehicles Promoting Reproductive Health Tour China16  Special vehicles carrying 
reproductive health experts will be dispatched to China’s vast rural areas starting this week, 
according to sources from the State Family Planning Commission (SFPC).  
These vehicles, whose task is to educate people about pregnancy, reproduction and 
adult sexual life, will begin in north China’s Hebei Province and in Beijing and Tianjin 
municipalities. According to Xiao Shaobo, director of the science and technology 
department of the SFPC, the experts will lecture local farmers on contraception, women’s 
health and prenatal and postnatal care. They will also offer free consultations and provide 
free contraceptives.  
‘With the arrival of the Spring Festival, they will also hand out traditional new year 
paintings and verses written on scrolls to local residents for their celebrations,’ Xiao said.  
Initiated by China Population News (CPN), the promotional vehicles will tour the 
country for about a year. CPN’s director Xi Xiaoping said that there is still widespread lack 
of knowledge about reproductive health mattters, relating to physiology, psychology, 
morality, emotions, ethics and other social aspects. 
 
9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem 
 
The problem poses three related questions regarding 1) access to The Aurora in 
general, 2) access by teenagers in particular, and 3) potential sanctions by the State 
against women who avail themselves of certain services.  First, in view of the history 
and resulting legislation regarding the right to travel and to receive information in 
connection with abortion, set out in Section 7, it seems unlikely that Ireland would 
attempt to prohibit women from taking the ferry out to The Aurora.  As set out in 
Section 5, moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has already held that the 
right to freedom of information under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights was violated when Ireland banned the provision of information on 
abortion abroad. 
Additional information would be helpful to determine whether a bar might be 
imposed with respect to underage women.  Teenagers’ right to information received 
support in the May 1995 Supreme Court decision rejecting claims of parental rights 
with respect to such information.  It is unclear, however, which restrictions on 
contraception were removed by the legislation in the 1990s and which, if any, remain 
in place for those under 18. 
Since The Aurora would be outside the territorial sea of Ireland, in general, Irish 
law would not apply.  (There may be a few exceptions.  Laws regarding smuggling, for 
example, may well extend several nautical miles beyond the territorial sea.)  Thus, 
Irish women could not be prosecuted for taking the abortion pill aboard The Aurora. 
The same questions will have very different answers if The Aurora visits Morocco. 
Under the provisions of Moroccan criminal law, set out in Section 7, women as well as 
minors could be subject to fines and up to two years’ imprisonment for ‘inducing’ or 
‘consenting to’ their own abortions.  Thus, any female who was pregnant when she 
went out to The Aurora and was no longer pregnant when she returned could face 
serious penalties.  
 
156 International Family Law 
 
For Further Research 
 
1. Abortion has generated a considerable comparative jurisprudence.  See, e.g., 
Wardle, L. (1983),  ‘“Crying Stones”: A Comparison of Abortion in Japan and the 
United States,’ New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
Vol. 14, pp. 183ff.; Savage, M. (1988), ‘The Law of Abortion in the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China: Women’s Rights in Two 
Socialist Countries,’ Stanford Law Review, Vol. 40, pp. 1027-1117; Schlegel, C.P. 
(1997), ‘Landmark in German Abortion Law: The German 1995 Compromise 
Compared with English Law,’  International Journal of Law, Policy, and Family, Vol. 
11, p. 36.  For a comparative analysis of sex-selection abortion in Korea and the 
United States, see Kim (2000), ‘Breaking Free from Patriarchy: A Comparative Study 
of Sex-Selection Abortions in Korea and the United States,’ University of California at 
Los Angeles Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol. 17, p. 301.  
 
2. For analyses of the German law, see Funk, N. (1996), ‘Abortion Counseling in the 
1995 German Abortion Law,’ Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 12,      
p. 33; Will, R. (1996), ‘German Unification and the Reform of Abortion Law,’  
Cardozo Women’s Law Journal, p. 399. 
 
3. For an in-depth analysis of the WHO’s efforts to promote reproductive rights, see  
Fuluss, S. (2000), ‘The World Health Organization and Women,’ in Askin, K. and 
Koenig, D. (eds), Women in International Human Rights Law. 
 
4. For more information on China’s population policy, see State Family Planning 
Commission, Population Planning for 1995-2000 www.unefcat.org/pop/database/law-
china/ch-record015.htm (last visited 9/27/02); Joint Economic Committee, Congress of 
the United States (1982), China Under the Four Modernizations, Part I, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington; Greenhalgh, S. (2001), ‘Fresh Winds in 
Beijing: Chinese Feminists Speak Out on the One-Child Policy and Women’s Lives,’ 
Signs, Vol. 26, p. 847. 
 
5. For more on abortion in Germany, see Telman, D.A.J. (1998), ‘Abortion and 
Women’s Legal Personhood in Germany:  A Contribution to the Feminist Theory of 
the State,’ New York University Review of Law and Social Change, Vol. 24, pp. 91-
146; Bridenthal, R.  (1984), When Biology Becomes Destiny; Meidel, F., ‘Is West 
Germany’s 1975 Abortion Decision a Solution to the American Abortion Debate?’, 
New York University Review of Law and Social Change, Vol. 20, p. 471 (1993-1994). 
 
6. For detailed accounts of the genesis of abortion law in South Africa, see Moosa, N. 
(2002), ‘A Descriptive Analysis of South African and Islamic Abortion Legislation 
and Local Muslim Community Responses,’ Medicine and Law, Vol. 21, pp. 257-276; 
Sarkin, J. (1998), ‘Patriarchy and Discrimination in Apartheid South Africa’s Abortion 
Law,’ Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 141-183. 
 Reproductive Rights and Abortion 157 
 
7. For a comparative survey of reproductive rights, see Symposium, Texas 
International Law Journal, Vol. 35 (2000) (including: Dorner, D., ‘Human 
Reproduction: Reflections on the Nachmani Case,’ pp. 1-12; Gowry, A., 
‘Reproduction, Rights, and Public Policy: A Framework for Assessment,’ pp. 13-30;  
Skene, L. ‘An Overview of Assisted Reproductive Technology Regulation in Australia 
and New Zealand,’ pp. 31-50; Ping, X., ‘Population Policy and Program in China: 
Challenge and Prospective,’ pp. 51-64; Marquez, C.L., ‘Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) in South America and the Effect on Adoption,’ pp. 65-92; te 
Braake, T.A.M.,  ‘Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the 
Netherlands,’ p. 93.   
 
 
Notes 
 
1   1999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6I.L.M. 368 (1967).  Adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on December 16, 1966; entered into force on March 23, 1976. 
2    933 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).  Adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on December 16, 1966; entered into force on January 3, 1976. 
3   19 I.L.M.33 (1980).  Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 
19, 1979, entered into force on September 3, 1981. 
4  8416/79 (U.K.) D.R.. 9.244, cited in Janis, M. and Kay, R. (1990), European Human 
Rights Law. 
5  213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.S.T. 5. Entered into force September 3, 1953.   
6  O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States 
(March 30-May 2, 1948), Bogota, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA  /Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965). 
7  9 I.L.M. 101(1970). 
8  Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEA ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev.1 (1981). 
9   http://www.un.org.esa/population/publications/abortion/profiles.htm. 
10  http://www.unfpa.org/news/news.cfm?ID=318 (May 22, 2003). 
11   http://www.unfpa.org/news/news.cfm?ID=316 (May 12, 2003).  
12   http://www.unfpa.org/news/news.cfm?ID=309 (April 25, 2003). 
13  http://www.ippf.org/youth/young_person.htm.  
14   http://www.crlp.org/pr_02_0926nepal.html (Sept. 26, 2002). 
15  http://ippfnet.ippf.org/pub/IPPF_News/News_Details.asp?ID=2727 (June 6, 2003). 
16   Xinhua General News Service (China), at http://ippfnet.ippf.org/pub/IPPF_News/ 
News_Details_s.asp?ID=2541 (Jan. 15, 2003). 
 
This page intentionally left blank 
Chapter 8 
Visitation
1. The Problem 
Tessa and her son Jomo, age 8, have recently moved from Nairobi, Kenya to Brussels, 
Belgium.  Jomo’s biological father, Arnold, lives in Kenya.  Tessa and Arnold never 
lived together, although Arnold visited his son at least twice a month, even after Tessa 
ended her relationship with him five years ago.   
Tessa’s former husband, Justin, lives in London.  Tessa and Jomo lived with Justin 
until Tessa divorced him six years ago.  Justin, too, has maintained ties with Jomo, 
visiting him weekly until he moved to London two years ago.  Even after his move, he 
returned to Kenya twice a year (including the week of Jomo’s birthday) and sent cards 
and little gifts to the boy he considered his son. 
Arnold’s mother, Gloria, who visited her son and her grandson every year at 
Christmas, now lives in Lieden, the Netherlands. 
Gloria, Arnold and Justin all want to maintain contact with Jomo.  Gloria and 
Justin would like to see him every other weekend – although not, of course, at the 
same time.  Arnold would like Jomo to come stay with him for two weeks twice a year 
during winter and summer school breaks.  In addition, he would like to see Jomo 
when he comes to Brussels every year for a few weeks.  All of them want unrestricted 
telephone and email contact. 
Tessa has no serious objections to any of them having contact with Jomo. She does 
not want Jomo to visit Arnold in Kenya, however, unless she can be certain that 
Arnold will not keep him there.  She is happy for Jomo to maintain contact with 
Gloria and Justin, but she would like to have her son to herself some weekends.  She is 
also reluctant to agree to a rigid schedule. 
Tessa comes to you for advice.  What are her rights with respect to determining the 
adults who have contact with her son?  What are Jomo’s rights?  What are the rights 
of Gloria, Justin, and Arnold, respectively?  What additional information if any, 
would you need before you can advise Tessa? 
2. Overview
The right of visitation, or access of noncustodial parents to a child, is  favored in many 
States.  In the West, denial of visitation is rare and generally requires a finding of 
actual harm, such as physical violence to the child.  In a 1988 U.S. case, Suttles v. 
Suttles, the father was convicted on four counts of assault with intent to murder.  Even 
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though two of these counts were against the wife and child, the father was allowed to 
phone and write to his child and possibly regain visitation if he underwent successful 
psychological counseling while in prison.  In addition, drug addiction, sexual abuse, 
severe conflict or the child’s absolute refusal to cooperate may result in the denial of 
visitation.  More often, the court is likely to order supervised visitation, that is, 
visitation in a specified ‘safe’ place or in the presence of a neutral third party.  The 
objective is to enable the noncustodial parent to maintain a relationship with the child 
while assuring the child’s security. 
The specific harm feared by the custodial parent may well be that the noncustodial 
parent will abduct the child. Under the Hague Convention on Abduction, discussed in 
Chapter 9, a parent may be found to have wrongfully retained or wrongfully removed 
the child if the parent neglects to return the child or retains her beyond the agreed-
upon visitation.  The concern in such situations is that the noncustodial parent will 
remove the child from her place of habitual residence and persuade a court in the new 
country to assume jurisdiction and rule in his favor.  This is more appropriately 
considered in the context of custody, however, since that is the real issue. 
3. Cultural Variations 
Cultural approaches to contact with a child cover a broad range.  In some Islamic 
States, for example, visitation is allowed only with the permission of the custodial 
father, and upon terms which he establishes.  At the other extreme is the emerging 
trend in Northern Europe not only to encourage liberal visitation by non-custodial 
parents, but to allow the child to have contact with non-family members, even over the 
objection of a parent. 
This reflects and reinforces fundamentally different conceptions of the child’s 
place within the family and of ‘children’ themselves.  Under the strict version of 
Islamic law, for example, the father is viewed as the child’s protector and guardian and 
it would be a violation of religious law for the State to interfere in that relationship, or 
to substitute its assessment of the child’s ‘best interest’ for the father’s judgment.  
Deference to the father, moreover, does not necessarily mean the denial of visitation to 
the mother; as set forth below. 
International Parental Child Abduction/Jordan1 Right of Visitation In cases where 
the father has custody of a child, the mother is guaranteed visitation rights. It has been 
the experience of the Embassy in Amman that the father and the paternal grandparents 
of the child are generally very open and accommodating in facilitating the right of the 
mother to visit and maintain contact with the child.
In the industrialized North, in contrast, the child is increasingly viewed as a 
rightsholder.  Thus, the emphasis is on the child’s right to contact, or to refuse contact, 
rather than the rights of the child’s parents to determine what is best for the child.
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4. Private International Law Conventions
The growing need for harmonization of national laws is reflected in the following 
convention.
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and 
Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection 
of Children (Concluded 19 October 1996)
The States signatory to the present Convention, 
Considering the need to improve the protection of children in international situations, 
Wishing to avoid conflicts between their legal systems in respect of jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of measures for the protection of children, 
Recalling the importance of international co-operation for the protection of children, 
Confirming that the best interests of the child are to be a primary consideration, 
Noting that the Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning the powers of authorities and the 
law applicable in respect of the protection of minors is in need of revision, 
Desiring to establish common provisions to this effect, taking into account the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, 
Have agreed on the following provisions – 
Chapter I – scope of the convention
Article 1  1.  The objects of the present Convention are – 
a. to determine the State whose authorities have jurisdiction to take measures directed to 
the protection of the person or property of the child; 
b. to determine which law is to be applied by such authorities in exercising their 
jurisdiction; 
c. to determine the law applicable to parental responsibility; 
d. to provide for the recognition and enforcement of such measures of protection in all 
Contracting States; 
e. to establish such co-operation between the authorities of the Contracting States as may 
be necessary in order to achieve the purposes of this Convention. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘parental responsibility’ includes parental 
authority, or any analogous relationship of authority determining the rights, powers and 
responsibilities of parents, guardians or other legal representatives in relation to the person 
or the property of the child. 
Article 2  The Convention applies to children from the moment of their birth until they 
reach the age of 18 years. 
Article 3  The measures referred to in Article 1 may deal in particular with – 
a. the attribution, exercise, termination or restriction of parental responsibility, as well as 
its delegation; 
b. rights of custody, including rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in 
particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence, as well as rights of 
access including the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other 
than the child’s habitual residence; 
c. guardianship, curatorship and analogous institutions; 
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d. the designation and functions of any person or body having charge of the child’s person 
or property, representing or assisting the child; 
e. the placement of the child in a foster family or in institutional care, or the provision of 
care by kafala or an analogous institution; 
f. the supervision by a public authority of the care of a child by any person having charge 
of the child; 
g. the administration, conservation or disposal of the child’s property. 
* * * 
Chapter II – Jurisdiction
Article 5  1.  The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the 
habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection 
of the child’s person or property. 
2. Subject to Article 7, in case of a change of the child’s habitual residence to another 
Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction. 
Article 6  1.  For refugee children and children who, due to disturbances occurring in their 
country, are internationally displaced, the authorities of the Contracting State on the 
territory of which these children are present as a result of their displacement have the 
jurisdiction provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 5. 
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply to children whose habitual 
residence cannot be established. 
* * * 
Article 7  1.  In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the authorities of the 
Contracting State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal 
or retention keep their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in 
another State, and 
a. each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the 
removal or retention; or 
b. the child has resided in that other State for a period of at least one year after the person, 
institution or other body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge of 
the whereabouts of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still 
pending, and the child is settled in his or her new environment. 
2. The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – 
a. it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other 
body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and 
b. at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or 
alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. 
* * * 
Article 8  1.  By way of exception, the authority of a Contracting State having jurisdiction 
under Article 5 or 6, if it considers that the authority of another Contracting State would be 
better placed in the particular case to assess the best interests of the child, may either 
–  request that other authority, directly or with the assistance of the Central Authority 
of its State, to assume jurisdiction to take such measures of protection as it considers to 
be necessary, or 
–  suspend consideration of the case and invite the parties to introduce such a request 
before the authority of that other State. 
* * * 
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Chapter III – applicable law
Article 15  1.  In exercising their jurisdiction under the provisions of Chapter II, the 
authorities of the Contracting States shall apply their own law. 
2. However, in so far as the protection of the person or the property of the child requires, 
they may exceptionally apply or take into consideration the law of another State with 
which the situation has a substantial connection. 
* * * 
Article 17   The exercise of parental responsibility is governed by the law of the State of the 
child’s habitual residence. If the child’s habitual residence changes, it is governed by the 
law of the State of the new habitual residence. 
* * * 
Chapter IV – recognition and enforcement 
Article 23  1.  The measures taken by the authorities of a Contracting State shall be 
recognised by operation of law in all other Contracting States. 
2. Recognition may however be refused – 
a. if the measure was taken by an authority whose jurisdiction was not based on one of the 
grounds provided for in Chapter II; 
b. if the measure was taken, except in a case of urgency, in the context of a judicial or 
administrative proceeding, without the child having been provided the opportunity to be 
heard, in violation of fundamental principles of procedure of the requested State; 
c. on the request of any person claiming that the measure infringes his or her parental 
responsibility, if such measure was taken, except in a case of urgency, without such 
person having been given an opportunity to be heard; 
d. if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy of the requested State, taking 
into account the best interests of the child; 
e. if the measure is incompatible with a later measure taken in the non-Contracting State 
of the habitual residence of the child, where this later measure fulfils the requirements 
for recognition in the requested State; 
f. if the procedure provided in Article 33 has not been complied with. 
* * * 
Article 28  Measures taken in one Contracting State and declared enforceable, or registered 
for the purpose of enforcement, in another Contracting State shall be enforced in the latter 
State as if they had been taken by the authorities of that State. Enforcement takes place in 
accordance with the law of the requested State to the extent provided by such law, taking 
into consideration the best interests of the child. 
* * * 
Article 33  1.  If an authority having jurisdiction under Articles 5 to 10 contemplates the 
placement of the child in a foster family or institutional care, or the provision of care by 
kafala or an analogous institution, and if such placement or such provision of care is to take 
place in another Contracting State, it shall first consult with the Central Authority or other 
competent authority of the latter State. To that effect it shall transmit a report on the child 
together with the reasons for the proposed placement or provision of care. 
2. The decision on the placement or provision of care may be made in the requesting State 
only if the Central Authority or other competent authority of the requested State has 
consented to the placement or provision of care, taking into account the child’s best 
interests. 
* * * 
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Article 50  This Convention shall not affect the application of the Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as between Parties to both 
Conventions. Nothing, however, precludes provisions of this Convention from being 
invoked for the purposes of obtaining the return of a child who has been wrongfully 
removed or retained or of organising access rights. 
* * *
5.  Public International Law Conventions 
The emerging focus on the best interests of the child is grounded in the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, as set forth below.
Convention on the Rights of the Child2
Article 9   1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her 
parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review 
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is 
necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a 
particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one 
where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place 
of residence.  
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties 
shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known.  
3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both 
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular 
basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.  
4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as the 
detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from any cause 
while the person is in the custody of the State) of one or both parents or of the child, that State 
Party shall, upon request, provide the parents, the child or, if appropriate, another member of 
the family with the essential information concerning the whereabouts of the absent member(s) 
of the family unless the provision of the information would be detrimental to the well-being of 
the child. States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself 
entail no adverse consequences for the person(s) concerned.  
Article 10 1. In accordance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, 
applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of 
family reunification shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, humane and 
expeditious manner. States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a request 
shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and for the members of their family.  
2. A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a 
regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts with 
both parents. Towards that end and in accordance with the obligation of States Parties under 
article 9, paragraph 1, States Parties shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents 
to leave any country, including their own, and to enter their own country. The right to leave 
any country shall be subject only to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and which are 
necessary to protect the national security, public order (order public), public health or 
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morals or the rights and freedoms of others and are consistent with the other rights 
recognized in the present Convention.  
Article 11 1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return 
of children abroad.  
2. To this end, States Parties shall promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements or accession to existing agreements.  
Article 12 1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his  or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views 
of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.  
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in 
any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national law.  
* * * 
Article 18 1.  States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle 
that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the 
child.  Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for 
the upbringing and development of the child.  The best interests of the child will be their 
basic concern. 
2.  For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present 
Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians 
in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development 
of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children. 
3.  States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of working 
parents have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for which they are 
eligible. 
6.  Regional Conventions
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child3
2. Every child who is separated from one or both parents shall have the right to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis. 
See Chapter 9 for pertinent excerpts from the 1980 Council of Europe Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on 
Restoration of Custody of Children,4 and Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters 
of parental responsibility for children of both spouses5
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms6
Article 8 right to respect for private and family life  1.  Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.  2.  There shall be no 
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interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in their interest of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime ... 
Article 14 – Prohibition of discrimination  The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
Explanatory Report to the Convention on contact concerning children7
Contact with children and the possible restrictions thereto, when these are considered 
necessary in the best interests of the child, is a major concern for the member States of the 
Council of Europe. 
The inherent problems with respect to the exercise of contact give rise to significant 
disputes in many countries. Some parents – and sometimes rightly so – are reluctant to grant 
contact rights while others are deprived of the possibility of obtaining or of maintaining any 
type of contact at all with their child. Disputes relating to contact are often long and painful 
for the parties concerned and raise problems as regards making, modifying and enforcing 
court orders relating to contact. Furthermore, the internationalisation of family relations and 
the difficulties created by geographical separation, which brings with it the application of 
different legal systems, different languages as well as cultural differences, illustrate just 
some of the problems encountered in transfrontier contact. 
However, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights ‘ “respect” 
for a family life (...) implies an obligation for the State to act in a manner calculated to 
allow these ties to develop normally.’ (Eur. Court HR, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italie of 13 
July 2000, A, par. 221) 
The aim of the Convention is to improve certain aspects of the right of national and 
transfrontier contact and, in particular, to specify and reinforce the basic right of children 
and their parents to maintain contact on a regular basis. This right may be extended, if 
necessary, to include contact between a child and other persons than his or her parents, in 
particular when the child has family ties with such a person. 
In this respect, the object of the Convention is to determine the general principles to be 
applied to contact orders, as well as to fix appropriate safeguards and guarantees to ensure 
the proper exercise of such contact and the immediate return of children at the end of the 
period of contact. It establishes co-operation between all the bodies and authorities 
concerned with contact orders and reinforces the implementation of relevant existing 
international legal instruments in this field. 
The Convention also addresses non-member States of the Council of Europe and will 
therefore also be open to their accession to this Convention. The Convention was opened 
for signature on 15 May 2003 and signed by 12 States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Italy, Malta, Moldova, Portugal, San Marino and Ukraine. 
Convention on contact concerning children8
Preamble The member States of the Council of Europe and the other Signatories hereto, 
Taking into account the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children of 20 
May 1980 (ETS No. 105); 
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Taking into account the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction and the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children; 
Taking into account the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and 
in matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses; 
Recognising  that, as provided in the different international legal instruments of the Council 
of Europe as well as in Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child of 20 November 1989, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration; 
Aware of the need for further provisions to safeguard contact between children and their 
parents and other persons having family ties with children, as protected by Article 8 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 
1950 (ETS No. 5); 
Taking into account Article 9 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
which provides for the right of a child, who is separated from one or both parents, to 
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except 
when this is contrary to the child’s best interests; 
Taking into account paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which provides for the right of the child whose parents reside in 
different States to maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances, personal 
relations and direct contacts with both parents; 
Aware of the desirability of recognising not only parents but also children as holders of 
rights; 
Agreeing consequently to replace the notion of ‘access to children’ with the notion of 
‘contact concerning children’; 
Taking into account the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (ETS 
No. 160) and the desirability of promoting measures to assist children in matters concerning 
contact with parents and other persons having family ties with children; 
Agreeing on the need for children to have contact not only with both parents but also with 
certain other persons having family ties with children and the importance for parents and 
those other persons to remain in contact with children, subject to the best interests of the 
child; 
Noting the need to promote the adoption by States of common principles with respect to 
contact concerning children, in particular in order to facilitate the application of 
international instruments in this field; 
Realising that machinery set up to give effect to foreign orders relating to contact 
concerning children is more likely to provide satisfactory results where the principles on 
which these foreign orders are based are similar to the principles in the State giving effect to 
such foreign orders; 
Recognising the need, when children and parents and other persons having family ties with 
children live in different States, to encourage judicial authorities to make more frequent use 
of transfrontier contact and to increase the confidence of all persons concerned that the 
children will be returned at the end of such contact; 
Noting that the provision of efficient safeguards and additional guarantees is likely to 
ensure the return of children, in particular, at the end of transfrontier contact; 
Noting that an additional international instrument is necessary to provide solutions relating 
in particular to transfrontier contact concerning children; 
Desiring to establish co-operation between all central authorities and other bodies in order 
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to promote and improve contact between children and their parents, and other persons 
having family ties with such children, and in particular to promote judicial co-operation in 
cases concerning transfrontier contact; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Chapter I – Objects of the Convention and definitions 
Article 1 – Objects of the Convention The objects of this Convention are: 
a. to determine general principles to be applied to contact orders; 
b. to fix appropriate safeguards and guarantees to ensure the proper exercise of contact 
and the immediate return of children at the end of the period of contact; 
c. to establish co-operation between central authorities, judicial authorities and other 
bodies in order to promote and improve contact between children and their parents, and 
other persons having family ties with children. 
Article 2 – Definitions For the purposes of this Convention: 
a. ‘contact’ means: 
i. the child staying for a limited period of time with or meeting a person mentioned in 
Articles 4 or 5 with whom he or she is not usually living; 
* * *
d. ‘family ties’ means a close relationship such as between a child and his or her 
grandparents or siblings, based on law or on a de facto family relationship; 
* * *
Article 4 – Contact between a child and his or her parents
1.  A child and his or her parents shall have the right to obtain and maintain regular contact 
with each other. 
2. Such contact may be restricted or excluded only where necessary in the best interests of 
the child. 
3. Where it is not in the best interests of a child to maintain unsupervised contact with one 
of his or her parents the possibility of supervised personal contact or other forms of 
contact with this parent shall be considered. 
Article 5 – Contact between a child and persons other than his or her parents 
1. Subject to his or her best interests, contact may be established between the child and 
persons other than his or her parents having family ties with the child. 
2. States Parties are free to extend this provision to persons other than those mentioned in 
paragraph 1, and where so extended, States may freely decide what aspects of contact, 
as defined in Article 2 letter a shall apply. 
Article 6 – The right of a child to be informed, consulted and to express his or her views 
1. A child considered by internal law as having sufficient understanding shall have the 
right, unless this would be manifestly contrary to his or her best interests: 
– to receive all relevant information; 
– to be consulted; 
–  to express his or her views. 
2. Due weight shall be given to those views and to the ascertainable wishes and feelings of 
the child. 
Article 7 – Resolving disputes concerning contact When resolving disputes concerning 
contact, the judicial authorities shall take all appropriate measures: 
a. to ensure that both parents are informed of the importance for their child and for both of 
them of establishing and maintaining regular contact with their child; 
b. to encourage parents and other persons having family ties with the child to reach 
amicable agreements with respect to contact, in particular through the use of family 
mediation and other processes for resolving disputes; 
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c. before taking a decision, to ensure that they have sufficient information at their 
disposal, in particular from the holders of parental responsibilities, in order to take a 
decision in the best interests of the child and, where necessary, obtain further 
information from other relevant bodies or persons. 
Article 8 – Contact agreements
1. States Parties shall encourage, by means they consider appropriate, parents and other 
persons having family ties with the child to comply with the principles laid down in 
Articles 4 to 7 when making or modifying agreements on contact concerning a child. 
These agreements should preferably be in writing. 
2.    Upon request, judicial authorities shall, except where internal law otherwise provides, 
confirm an agreement on contact concerning a child, unless it is contrary to the best 
interests of the child. 
Article 9 – The carrying into effect of contact orders States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that contact orders are carried into effect. 
Article 10 – Safeguards and guarantees to be taken concerning contact
1. Each State Party shall provide for and promote the use of safeguards and guarantees. It 
shall communicate, through its central authorities, to the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe, within three months after the entry into force of this Convention for 
that State Party, at least three categories of safeguards and guarantees available in its 
internal law in addition to the safeguards and guarantees referred to in paragraph 3 of 
Article 4 and in letter b of paragraph 1 of Article 14 of this Convention. Changes of 
available safeguards and guarantees shall be communicated as soon as possible. 
2. Where the circumstances of the case so require, judicial authorities may, at any time, 
make a contact order subject to any safeguards and guarantees both for the purpose of 
ensuring that the order is carried into effect and that either the child is returned at the 
end of the period of contact to the place where he or she usually lives or that he or she 
is not improperly removed. 
a. Safeguards and guarantees for ensuring that the order is carried into effect, may in 
particular include: 
– supervision of contact; 
– the obligation for a person to provide for the travel and accommodation expenses of 
the child and, as may be appropriate, of any other person accompanying the child; 
– a security to be deposited by the person with whom the child is usually living to 
ensure that the person seeking contact with the child is not prevented from having 
such contact; 
– a fine to be imposed on the person with whom the child is usually living, should 
this person refuse to comply with the contact order. 
b. Safeguards and guarantees for ensuring the return of the child or preventing an 
improper removal, may in particular include: 
– the surrender of passports or identity documents and, where appropriate, a 
document indicating that the person seeking contact has notified the competent 
consular authority about such a surrender during the period of contact; 
– financial guarantees; 
– charges on property; 
– undertakings or stipulations to the court; 
– the obligation of the person having contact with the child to present himself or 
herself, with the child regularly before a competent body such as a youth welfare 
authority or a police station, in the place where contact is to be exercised; 
– the obligation of the person seeking contact to present a document issued by the 
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State where contact is to take place, certifying the recognition and declaration of 
enforceability of a custody or a contact order or both either before a contact order is 
made or before contact takes place; 
– the imposition of conditions in relation to the place where contact is to be exercised and, 
where appropriate, the registration, in any national or transfrontier information system, of 
a prohibition preventing the child from leaving the State where contact is to take place. 
3. Any such safeguards and guarantees shall be in writing or evidenced in writing and 
shall form part of the contact order or the confirmed agreement. 
4. If safeguards or guarantees are to be implemented in another State Party, the judicial 
authority shall preferably order such safeguards or guarantees as are capable of 
implementation in that State Party. 
* * * 
Article 16 – Return of a child
1.  Where a child at the end of a period of transfrontier contact based on a contact order is 
not returned, the competent authorities shall, upon request, ensure the child’s 
immediate return, where applicable, by applying the relevant provisions of international 
instruments, of internal law and by implementing, where appropriate, such safeguards 
and guarantees as may be provided in the contact order. 
2. A decision on the return of the child shall be made, whenever possible, within six 
weeks of the date of an application for the return. 
*  *  * 
Chapter IV – Relationship with other instruments 
Article 19 – Relationship with the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement 
of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 of the European Convention of 20 May 1980 (ETS N°
105) on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on 
Restoration of Custody of Children shall not be applied in relations between States Parties 
which are also States Parties of the present Convention. 
Article 20 – Relationships with other instruments 1.   This Convention shall not affect any 
international instrument to which States Parties to the present Convention are Parties or 
shall become Parties and which contains provisions on matters governed by this 
Convention. In particular, this Convention shall not prejudice the application of the 
following legal instruments: 
a. the Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 on the competence of authorities and the 
applicable law concerning the protection of minors, 
b. the European Convention on the recognition and enforcement of decisions concerning 
custody of children and on restoration of custody of children of 20 May 1980, subject 
to Article 19 above, 
c. the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the civil aspects of international child 
abduction, 
d. the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition,
enforcement and co-operation in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the 
protection of children. 
7. National Implementation
Many courts, in keeping with the emphasis in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the child’s best interest, have held that visitation rights run to the child rather 
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than to  the parent.  In Argentina, for example, the applications of mothers seeking to 
have visitation suspended for failure of the fathers to meet their support obligation 
have been denied based on the ground that: 
Visitation rights belong to the minor, so their suspension or denial based on maintenance 
arrears amounts to a violation of the rights of children and a failure to take account of their 
interests, whereas they are not responsible for the father’s conduct.  To interrupt any regime 
of visits in view of the conduct of a parent towards a child or children is a measure to be 
used sparingly, even though the right is not absolute, to the extent that the exercise of the 
right should only be blocked for reasons so serious as to pose a threat to the children’s 
safety or to their physical or mental health.
In Australia, similarly, a court refused the mother’s petition to relocate to her 
native Scotland. Three of the four children also hoped to relocate to Scotland but the 
application was rejected because of the risk of emotional harm to the youngest child 
presented by depriving him of visitation with his father. R.v. R.
In Botswana, the courts have recently affirmed that the right to parental visitation 
belongs to non-marital as well as marital children.  In Langbaecher v. Chipe, the father 
had lived with the mother and the two extra-marital children, aged 7 and 2.  In granting 
the father access to the child every weekend, the court held that, 
Access should be regarded as a basic right of the child rather than a basic right of the 
parent, and save in exceptional circumstances, to deprive the parent of access is to deprive a 
child of an important contribution to his emotional and material growing up in the long 
term.  In my view, for the purpose of access, ‘parents’ includes the biological father of an 
illegitimate child.
Following its ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, 
Argentina sought to bring family law into compliance with the norms of the 
Convention.  The emphasis on the overriding interest of the child in Article 3 has been 
interpreted to make the child’s interest in maintaining a relationship with both parents 
the most important factor in visitation.  Thus, where a custodial mother has restricted a 
visiting father’s access to the child, courts have ordered family therapy.  Failure to 
cooperate may result in a change of custody. 
Under the Dutch Civil Code, in addition to parents, a person who has developed a 
relationship with a child that amounts to ‘family life’ as understood in Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights may also be granted visitation, or ‘access’ to 
the child  (Sumner and Forder, 2002). Under this standard, access has been granted to 
grandparents, foster parents and unmarried fathers. 
Hoppe v. Germany 9
Peter Hoppe is a German national, born in 1957 and living in Herne. In April 1990 a 
daughter, Svenja, was born to the applicant and his wife and in December 1992 the 
applicant and his wife separated. Svenja stayed with her mother who instituted divorce 
proceedings against her husband. On 19 October 1994 Wuppertal District Court, following 
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two hearings, decided that the applicant was entitled to see Svenja every second Saturday as 
well as St Stephens day, Easter Monday and Whit Monday. All the experts heard in the 
proceedings gave evidence that four-year-old Svenja was exposed to a conflict of loyalty 
and that she could not cope with the situation. The applicant was incapable of accepting 
restrictions on access and did not show concern for the child’s psychological health. 
Svenja’s mother had not yet managed to give Svenja such a feeling of security as to permit 
her to visit the applicant without feelings of fear. Svenja therefore needed the intervals of 
two weeks as times of rest in her mother’s home. The applicant appealed. On 9 March 1995 
Düsseldorf Court of Appeal increased the applicant’s right of access by ruling that every 
first visiting weekend a month the applicant was entitled to see Svenja from Saturday 
morning until Sunday evening. The remainder of his appeal was dismissed. The court found
that, as long as there was no agreement between the parents, any visit was an emotional 
strain for the child. The applicant’s right of access had therefore to be assessed in the 
context of the continuing conflict between the parents. The applicant referred the case to the 
Federal Constitutional Court, which considered that the applicant’s complaint did not raise 
any issue of fundamental importance. The applicant’s visiting rights were later extended to 
every weekend. On 24 October 1994 Wuppertal District Court granted the divorce and gave 
Svenja’s mother parental authority, as being in Svenja’s best interests. She educated and 
looked after her daughter in an atmosphere of love and understanding and took an intense 
interest in ensuring her well-being. Svenja needed a stable life without being torn between 
different apartments and different styles of education. The Court noted that the applicant 
failed to see that his wishes obstructed Svenja’s psychological development. The applicant 
appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, which had considered that an oral hearing 
with the parties was not necessary, the relevant facts being clear from the case-file. The 
Federal Constitutional Court also refused to entertain the applicant’s constitutional 
complaint as not raising any issue of fundamental importance. The applicant alleged, in 
particular, that the German courts’ decisions concerning his right of access to his daughter 
and the awarding of parental authority breached his right to respect for his family life, that 
he was denied a fair hearing in the relevant proceedings and that he had been subjected to 
discrimination. He relied on Articles 6 (right to a fair hearing), 8 (right to respect for private 
and family life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination). 
Concerning Article 8, the European Court of Human Rights found that the domestic 
courts carefully considered the questions of access and of awarding parental authority. The 
District Court relied on expert reports and on the evidence given by the parents at hearings 
and was thus in a better position than the European judges to strike a fair balance between 
the competing interests involved. Furthermore, the District Court judgments were upheld by 
the Court of Appeal. The Court was therefore satisfied that when reducing the applicant’s 
rights of access and awarding parental authority to the child’s mother, the national 
authorities acted within the margin of appreciation afforded to them in such matters. The 
Court further noted, in particular in the first-instance proceedings, that the applicant, 
assisted by counsel, had the opportunity to present his arguments in writing and orally. The 
Court was satisfied that no hearing before the Court of Appeal appeared necessary, 
however. The Court further considered that the case was decided with special diligence, as 
required in cases concerning a person’s relationship with his or her child, in view of the risk 
that the passage of time might result in a de facto determination of the matter. The Court 
was therefore satisfied that the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 were complied 
with and that the applicant was involved in the decision-making process to a degree 
sufficient to provide him with the requisite protection of his interests. Accordingly, the 
Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 8. 
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Judgment in the Case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal10
In a judgment delivered at Strasbourg on 21 December 1999 in the case of Salgueiro da 
Silva Mouta v. Portugal, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there 
had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) taken together 
with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and that it was unnecessary to rule on the complaints made under Article 8 taken 
alone. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court held that the 
judgment constituted of itself sufficient just satisfaction for the damage alleged by the 
applicant; it awarded him 1,800,000 Portuguese escudos (PTE) for costs and PTE 350,000
for expenses.
1. Principal facts The applicant, João Manuel Salgueiro da Silva Mouta, a Portuguese 
national, was born in 1961 and lives in Queluz (Portugal). 
He was prevented by his ex-wife from visiting his daughter M., in breach of an 
agreement reached at the time of their divorce. He sought an order giving him parental 
responsibility for the child, which was granted by the Lisbon Family Affairs Court in 1994.
M. lived with the applicant until 1995 when, he alleges, she was abducted by her mother. 
On appeal, the mother was given parental responsibility whereas the applicant was granted 
a contact order which, he maintained, he was unable to exercise. The Lisbon Court of 
Appeal gave two reasons in its judgment for granting parental responsibility for M. to her 
mother, namely the interest of the child and the fact that the applicant was a homosexual 
and living with another man. 
3. Summary of the judgment/Complaints The applicant complained of an unjustified 
interference with his right to respect for his private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 
8 of the Convention and discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. He 
maintained, too, that contrary to Article 8 he had been forced by the court of appeal to hide 
his homosexuality when seeing his daughter. 
Decision of the Court Article 8 taken together with Article 14 of the Convention The Court 
noted at the outset that under the case-law of the Convention institutions Article 8 applied 
to decisions concerning granting parental responsibility for a child to one of the parents on 
a divorce or separation. The judgment of the Lisbon Court of Appeal constituted an 
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life in that it had reversed the 
judgment of the Lisbon Family Affairs Court granting parental responsibility to the 
applicant. 
The Court went on to observe that although the court of appeal had considered the 
interest of the child in deciding to reverse the judgment of the Lisbon Family Affairs Court 
and, consequently, to grant parental responsibility to the mother rather than the father, it 
had had regard to a new factor, namely the fact that the applicant was a homosexual and 
living with another man. There had therefore been a difference in treatment between the 
applicant and M.’s mother based on the applicant’s sexual orientation, a notion that fell 
within Article 14 of the Convention. Such a difference in treatment was discriminatory 
under that provision if it had no objective or reasonable justification, that is if it did not 
pursue a legitimate aim or if there was not a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. 
The court of appeal had pursued a legitimate aim in reaching its decision, namely the 
protection of the child’s health and rights. In order to decide whether there was no 
reasonable basis for the decision that was finally made, the Court examined whether the 
new factor taken into account by the Lisbon Court of Appeal – the applicant’s 
homosexuality – was a mere obiter dictum with no direct impact on the final decision, or 
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whether, on the contrary, it was a decisive factor. To that end, the Court reviewed the 
Lisbon Court of Appeal’s judgment and noted that after finding that there were no sufficient 
reasons for depriving the mother of parental responsibility – which the parents had agreed 
she should exercise – it had gone on to say: ‘... even if that had not been so, we consider 
that the mother should be granted custody of the child’. In so doing the court of appeal had 
noted that the applicant was a homosexual and living with another man and had stated: ‘the 
child must live in ... a traditional Portuguese family’ and ‘it is unnecessary to examine 
whether or not homosexuality is an illness or a sexual orientation towards people of the 
same sex. Either way, it is an abnormality and children must not grow up in the shadow of 
abnormal situations’. 
The Court was of the view that those passages from the judgment of the Lisbon Court of 
Appeal were not simply clumsy or unfortunate, or mere obiter dicta; they suggested that the 
applicant’s homosexuality had been decisive in the final decision and thus amounted to a 
distinction dictated by factors relating to the applicant’s sexual orientation that it was not 
permissible to draw under the Convention. That conclusion was supported by the fact that, 
when ruling on the applicant’s contact rights, the court of appeal had discouraged the 
applicant from behaving during visits in a way that would make the child aware that he was 
living with another man ‘as if they were spouses’. 
The Court therefore held that there had been a violation of Article 8 taken together with 
Article 14. 
8.  IOs and NGOs 
IOs 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has published Guidelines for States Parties 
in preparing the self-monitoring reports required under Article 44 of the CRC.  
Pertinent excerpts from the Guidelines for initial and periodic reports are set out 
below. 
Committee on the Rights of  the Child, general guidelines regarding the form and 
content of initial reports to be submitted by States Parties11 CRC/C/5.
Family environment and alternative care
16. Under this section, States parties are requested to provide relevant information, 
including the principal legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures in force, 
particularly how the principles of the ‘best interests of the child’ and ‘respect for the views 
of the child’ are reflected therein;  
factors and difficulties encountered and progress achieved in implementing the relevant 
provisions of the Convention; and implementation priorities and specific goals for the 
future in respect of: 
* * * 
(b) Parental responsibilities (art. 18, paras. 1-2);
(c) Separation from parents (art. 9); 
(d) Family reunification (art. 10); 
* * * 
(h) Illicit transfer and non-return (art. 11);
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Committee on the rights of the child, general guidelines for periodic reports 
CRC/C/58. 20/11/96.  
C. Separation from parents (art. 9)     
68. Please indicate the measures adopted, including of a legislative and judicial nature, to 
ensure that the child is not separated from his or her parents except when such separation is 
necessary for the best interests of the child, as in cases of abuse or neglect of the child or 
when the parents live separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of 
residence. Please identify the competent authorities intervening in these decisions, the 
applicable law and procedure and the role of judicial review. 
69. Please provide information on the measures taken pursuant to article 9, paragraph 2 to 
ensure to all interested parties, including the child, an opportunity to participate in any 
proceedings and to make their views known. 
70. Please indicate the measures adopted, including of a legislative, judicial and 
administrative nature, to ensure that the child who is separated from one or both parents has 
the right to maintain personal relations and direct contacts with both parents on a regular 
basis, except if it is contrary to the best interests of the child. Please further indicate the 
extent to which the views of the child are taken into consideration in this regard. 
71. Please indicate the measures adopted pursuant to article 9, paragraph 4 to ensure that in 
the case of the child’s separation from one or both of his or her parents as a result of any 
action initiated by the State, essential information on the whereabouts of the absent 
member(s) of the family is provided, upon request, to the child, to the parents or, if 
appropriate, to another member of the family, unless the provision of the information would 
be detrimental to the well-being of the child. Also indicate the measures undertaken to 
ensure that the submission of such a request entails no adverse consequences for the 
person(s) concerned.  
72. Relevant disaggregated information (for example, by age, gender and national, ethnic 
and social origin) should be provided inter alia in relation to situations of detention, 
imprisonment, exile, deportation or death, together with an assessment of progress achieved 
in the implementation of article 9, difficulties encountered and targets set for the future.
NGOs
NGOs focusing on the problems of transnational visitation have begun to establish 
websites and international networks.  Some, such as Children’s Rights Council/Japan, 
are basically lobbying efforts by non-custodial parents stymied by local laws which 
effectively deny them contact with their children.  Others, such as the Supervised 
Visitation Network, attempt to facilitate transnational visitation by reducing the risks 
of violence, confrontation, or abduction. 
Children’s Rights Council/Japan
About CRC Japan12 The Japan chapter of Children’s Rights Council (CRC) was initially 
established on May 5, 1996, ‘Children’s Day’ in Japan, by David Brian Thomas (British 
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citizen) and Walter Benda (U.S. citizen) in response to our own difficulties obtaining access
to our children in Japan.  Both of us are the ‘left behind parent’ victims of parental 
abductions committed in Japan. The Children’s Rights Council of Japan is a 501(c)(3) IRS 
nonprofit under the group exemption of the United States national Children’s Rights 
Council headquartered in Hyattsville, Maryland. Our Motto is:  ‘The Best Parent is Both 
Parents.’ 
Japan Visitation Rights Nearly Non-Existent; Non-Enforceable Once custody is awarded to 
a Japanese parent, or in the case of unmarried parents where custody goes to the mother by 
default, the same allegedly biased Family Court gets to decide on visitation rights.  Court 
ordered visitation is typically a maximum of only several hours per month and usually does 
not allow the child to leave the country to see other relatives.  Even then, the custodial 
parent often seeks to cut off all contact with the other parent for traditional cultural reasons, 
and so actively denies visitation. 
The only recourse is to return to the Family Courts.  But the court processes take years, 
and neither courts nor the police will enforce court ordered visitation. So the offending 
parent can easily continue to be uncooperative.  This is another common form of Japanese 
government sanctioned separation from one parent, and hence legalized parental child 
abduction. The responsibility to ensure regular visitation is a direct consequence of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was ratified by Japan in its 
entirety on May 22nd 1994. 
The poster child for this ‘uniquely Japanese’ practice is none other than Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, who as reported by the Washington Post and LA Times, has denied his 
ex-wife any contact with their two children in his custody. 
Supervised Visitation Network13
Mission  The mission of SVN is to facilitate opportunities for children to have safe and 
conflict-free access to both parents through a continuum of child access services delivered 
by competent providers. 
Purpose 1. To develop and disseminate  standards  for practice of child access services. 
2.  To maintain a directory of supervised child access providers. This is a large (615K) file. 
Please be patient while it loads. 
3. To provide public education regarding the importance of children having safe 
conflict-free contact with both parents and other family members. 
4. To provide public education regarding the role of child access programs in the 
continuum of services for divorced and separated families and for children in out-of-home 
placement. 
5. To collect and make available research relevant to safe child access. 
6. To gather and disseminate training and program materials for child access providers. 
7. To provide professional conferences and forums for networking and sharing of 
information. 
8. To educate public and private decision-makers regarding the importance of funding for 
child access services and provide information on funding to courts and service providers. 
Functions    1. Our members throughout the world provide direct services to children and 
their families designed to keep families in safe contact. 
2. We help families find services that are convenient to them and will meet their needs by 
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maintaining a directory of services nationwide. 
We receive many calls from parents, attorneys, social workers, judges, and others looking 
for services in their area. Our goal is to have a comprehensive directory so services can 
easily be found by the families that need them. You can access this directory by clicking on 
the Service Providers Directory link in the navigation bar on this page. 
3. We collect and disseminate research information relevant to safe child access and 
provide public education regarding the importance of children having access to their 
parents. 
4. We work to improve the quality of services. This is accomplished in several ways: 
• We develop and disseminate standards for practice. 
• We provide opportunities for members to network with each other and exchange 
information that will help them in their practice. 
• We hold an annual Conference that provides outstanding training for service providers. 
• We disseminate resources and helpful information to members through our Newsletter 
and on our web site. 
• We maintain a library of training and program materials. 
5. We encourage the development of new programs in under-served areas and provide 
support through our members for new and developing programs. 
6. We share information with each other about funding sources that will help provide 
affordable services. 
9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem 
There are as many legal systems with a potential interest in Jomo’s future as there are 
concerned adults.  The first question is which laws apply.  Tessa and Jomo have 
‘recently moved from Nairobi, Kenya to Brussels, Belgium’ and it is not clear whether 
Brussels would qualify at this point as Jomo’s ‘habitual residence’ under Chapter II, 
Article 5 of the Convention on Jurisdiction set out in Section 4, although presumably it 
will become his ‘habitual residence’ in the future.  If Kenya and Belgium are both 
parties to the Convention, they are both likely to consider Belgium the new habitual 
residence and Belgian law applicable under Article 17. 
While Tessa will obviously want to consult a Belgian lawyer, the Explanatory 
Report and the accompanying Convention on contact concerning children set out in 
Section 6 provides a useful introduction to the European perspective.  It is noteworthy 
that the Convention explicitly adopts the international human rights standard, the ‘best 
interest of the child,’ as its ‘primary consideration.’  It further recognizes the child’s 
right, under the Children’s Convention, to maintain contact with both parents, the 
recognition of children as ‘rightholders,’ and the ‘need for children to have contact ... 
with certain other persons having family ties ... subject to the best interests of the 
child.’  Thus, Jomo’s interests are the focus of the inquiry.  He is only 8, however, and 
is not mature enough to make the final decision, although his wishes should be taken 
into account.   
As the custodial parent, Tessa can arrange for Jomo to visit with all of the adults in 
his life.  If she decides to prevent contact, however, Gloria, Justin, and Arnold have 
very different bases for their claims to contact with Jomo. 
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Gloria, Jomo’s grandmother, lives nearby in Lieden, and travel should not be a 
problem.  While the Convention on contact recognizes the rights of non-parents, like 
Gloria, her visitation rights are subject to the other demands on Jomo’s time, 
consistent with his best interests.  Tessa might suggest a flexible, modified schedule, in 
which Gloria sees Jomo every third or fourth week.  Gloria could come to Brussels for 
every third or fourth Sunday afternoon, for example, subject to confirmation with 
Tessa, while Jomo could visit her in Lieden twice a year.  If Jomo had a similar 
arrangement with Justin, Tessa would have her son at home most weekends, while 
Jomo would have contact with two people who have always been a part of his life.  
While Justin is not Jomo’s biological father, since the boy was born into an extant 
marriage between Justin and his mother, Justin may well be his legal father.  This 
would be determined, in the first instance, under Kenyan law. 
Visitation with Arnold in Kenya is the most problematic issue here because of 
Tessa’s concern that Arnold might try to keep him.  While abduction (including 
abduction of a biological child) is the subject of Chapter 9, whether Kenya is a party to 
the Convention on Jurisdiction set out in Section 4, or the Abduction Convention, set 
out in Chapter 9, is pertinent here.  Even if Kenya is a party to both, moreover, 
enforcement may be difficult.  The safest course, especially while Jomo is so young, is 
to limit Arnold’s visitation to Brussels.  If Tessa wants Jomo to retain ties with his 
country of origin, and the biological father who still lives there, another alternative 
would be to arrange supervised visitation in Kenya, perhaps annually, though a trusted 
intermediary. 
While everyone wants unrestricted telephone and email contract with Jomo, Tessa, 
as the custodial parent, certainly has the authority to impose reasonable restrictions on 
the amount of time Jomo spends on the phone or on email.  Again, the adults’ interests 
should be subordinated to those of the child, as determined by his mother at this point.  
For Further Research
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Chapter 9
Child Custody and Abduction 
1. The Problems
Maria  
Lisa, who was born in South Africa, and Arturo, who was born in Italy, were married 
in South Africa in 1989. They lived in Italy for a few years, where their daughter, 
Maria, was born in 1996.  In 1997, the family emigrated to Canada and in 1998 Lisa 
and Arturo separated.  In 1999, a consent order was entered into before the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia.  It granted the mother sole custody of Maria and the father 
rights of access.   
The order further provided that the child was not to be removed from British 
Columbia in the absence of a further court order or written permission, with the 
exception that the child would be permitted to travel outside the jurisdiction between 
her parents for a period not to exceed 30 days.  If either party took Maria out of 
Canada for more than 30 days, sole custody would be awarded to the other party.   
Lisa and Maria left for South Africa on June 1, 2002.  By July 21, 2002, Arturo 
realized that they would not be coming back and he filed an application with the 
central authorities of Canada demanding the return of Maria.  Lisa argued that the 
South African Constitution prohibited such return, which would not be in the best 
interest of Maria. 
You are a clerk to a justice on the South African Constitutional Court.  What do 
you advise? 
Anwar 
Mahmout left his home in Cairo to work as a surgeon in Los Angeles, California.  
There he met Nora, who was also a surgeon.  They fell in love and in 1996 they 
married.  In 1999, Nora gave birth to a baby boy, Anwar, who is now 5.  In 2000, 
Mahmout was offered a top post in a teaching hospital in Cairo. After much soul-
searching, Mahmout told Nora that he felt compelled to return to Egypt, in part to be 
closer to his large family, especially his ageing parents. Nora said that she would 
never  move to Egypt or raise her son there.  They have agreed to obtain a no-fault 
divorce in California. 
Mahmout comes to see you because he is concerned about custody of Anwar.  
Under Egyptian law, the divorced mother is entitled to custody of boys until 7 years, 
after which the father becomes the child’s legal custodian.  After speaking with her 
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lawyer, Nora has told Mahmout that this is not the law in the United States and that 
she would not voluntarily agree to transfer custody of her son in two years.  Mahmout 
has dual U.S./Egyptian citizenship and Nora and Anwar are citizens of the United 
States. Mahmout is willing to agree to allow Nora custody now, if she will agree to 
transfer custody when Anwar becomes 7. 
Is there any reason for Nora to agree to Mahmout’s request?  What are 
Mahmout’s prospects for convincing a U.S. court to apply Egyptian law here?  Does 
he have any other options for legally acquiring custody of Anwar? 
2. Overview
Custody refers to the post-divorce or post-separation living arrangements of the minor 
child.   The parent who has custody typically has responsibility for supervision of the 
child and for meeting the child’s daily needs.  Custody is not necessarily exclusive.  
The other parent may have input into decision-making regarding the child’s education 
or religious training, for example.  The non-custodial parent may also have actual 
physical custody of the child for agreed-upon periods of time.  Whether this is 
characterized as visitation or joint custody depends on the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which it is ordered and on the intention of the parties.  Visitation generally refers to 
briefer periods of time (during summer vacations, for example), while joint custody 
refers to a more equal balance of responsibility. 
It should be noted that custody is generally distinct from child support.  That is, 
where a parent has a legal obligation to support a child, that obligation applies 
regardless of the child’s living arrangements.  It can be argued, accordingly, that the 
parent’s relative wealth should not be a factor in determining custody.  Rather, if 
custody is awarded to the less well-off parent, the child will still have access to the 
resources of the better-off parent through child support (see Chapter 10). 
In some States, custody may be claimed by either legal parent, whether married or 
not.  ‘Legal’ parents include biological parents, the mother’s husband, adoptive 
parents, or fathers who have acknowledged paternity on a birth certificate or on a 
putative father’s registry.  Custody proceedings typically take place in the context of 
divorce, but claims for custody may also be made in the context of a contested 
adoption or if a court has jurisdiction over the parties and either party seeks a change 
in the custody arrangements.  There is often a threshold requirement that a substantial 
change in circumstances has occurred, warranting a change in custody. Such a 
requirement is intended to limit frivolous applications. 
Some States determine custody by the age of the child.  Under Islamic law, for 
example, a divorced mother is typically entitled to custody of boys until 7 years and 
girls until 9 years, subject to classical conditions.  The father is generally considered 
the custodian of older children.  In some Islamic States, such as Malaysia, a child who 
has reached the ‘age of discernment may choose with which parent to live’, unless 
otherwise ordered by a court.  In Algeria, a divorced wife may be granted custody of 
boys until the age of 16 years (or 10 if she remarries) and retain girls until 18 years, as 
 Child Custody and Abduction 183
long as the mother does not remarry or marry someone within a prohibited degree of 
relation to the daughter.  Under Egyptian law, a father has custody of sons over the age 
of 7 and daughters over the age of 9. 
In most States in the West, in contrast, custody is to be determined according to the 
‘best interest of the child’.  This standard encourages a detailed case-by-case analysis, 
ultimately depending on the discretion of the trial court.  Because custody is such an 
emotional issue, and because it is often difficult to predict how a court will rule, the 
less risk-averse spouse has considerable leverage in a contested proceeding.  In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, however, custody is not disputed.  In most of these 
cases, the mother becomes the custodial parent. 
Different states have adopted different presumptions regarding the best interest of 
the child.  These presumptions vary from State to State and may change over time.  In 
the United States, for example, under the ‘tender years’ presumption the mother was 
presumed to be the better caretaker for children of ‘tender years,’ generally children 
under 10.  This has been replaced by a gender-neutral standard, at least formally.   
The Hague Convention applies where a child physically resides in one contracting 
State and then is taken to another by the noncustodial parent.  The purpose of the 
Convention is to restore the status quo: that is, to return the child to the place of 
habitual residence for the determination of custody by a court there.  The Hague 
Convention does not apply unless both States are contracting parties to the 
Convention. (For a list of present contracting parties, see Status Sheet convention 
number 28, http://www.htch.nt/e/status/abdshte.html.) The point of the Hague 
Convention is to return the child to the jurisdiction of habitual residence so as not to 
reward the abducting parent.  The Convention does not address the merits of the 
underlying dispute, but only decides which court has jurisdiction to do so. 
When the Hague Convention was drafted, it was expected that it would be used 
against fathers exercising visitation rights and absconding with their children.  In fact, 
it is frequently used against custodial mothers who want to return to their home 
country with their children after a divorce from a foreign spouse. 
In order to do so legally, such mothers are generally required to file a petition with 
the court in which custody was originally awarded.  Thus, the petitioner is in the often 
awkward position of arguing why it is in the child’s best interest to leave the State in 
which that court is located, and of which its judges are nationals. 
3.  Cultural Variations
Joint custody, under which the parents share custody of the minor child after divorce 
or after the child’s birth in the case of unmarried parents, illustrates the range of 
cultural variations in this area.  The trend in the West is increasingly toward 
recognizing both the ability and the responsibility of the father to parent.  In Germany, 
for example, joint custody was not allowed until 1982, when it was ordered by the 
German Constitutional Court.  The parent had to explicitly request joint custody and 
aver that sole custody was not in the best interest of the child.  The Parentage Law 
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Reform Act of 1998 established a presumption in favor of joint custody when the 
parents are separated or divorced.  Sole custody is awarded only if it is specifically 
requested and if the other parent agrees or the court finds that sole custody is in the 
best interest of the child. Even if both parents oppose joint custody, it may 
nevertheless be ordered if the judge believes that they can cooperate. 
In Sweden, similarly, joint custody has become the norm.  In 1982, parents could 
acquire joint custody by notifying the Population Registration Authority.  In 1991, 
unmarried parents were able to acquire joint custody by completing an 
acknowledgment of paternity form.  In 1998, it was proposed that unmarried parents 
be granted joint custody automatically after 3 months from an acknowledgment of 
paternity, unless either parent objected.  If there is an objection, the mother remains 
the sole custodian.  A father can initiate proceedings to challenge this.  Fifty-four 
percent of Swedish children are born of unmarried parents.  Ninety-five percent of 
parents who cohabit file an acknowledgment of paternity, establishing joint custody.  
Only fifty percent of non-cohabitating parents file such an acknowledgment. 
In the Netherlands, joint custody is automatic after divorce unless either or both 
parents explicitly ask for sole custody on the ground that it is in the child’s interest  
(Sumner and Forder, 2002).  The presumption that joint custody is best for the child is 
quite strong, and is not rebutted by the parents’ inability to cooperate, unless there is 
an ‘unacceptable risk that the child will be caught between warring parents’ (ibid.).  
In Islamic States, in contrast, custody is determined by the age and sex of the child, 
in accordance with Islamic law, as set out below: 
U.S. Dept. of State, International Parental Child Abduction/Islamic Family Law1
Note:  The information contained in this flyer is intended as an introduction to the basic 
elements of Islamic family law. It is not intended as a legal reference. 
It is designed to make clear the basic rights and restrictions resulting from marriages 
sanctioned by Islamic law between Muslim and non-Muslim partners. For Americans, the 
most troubling of these restrictions have been: 
– the inability of wives to leave an Islamic country without permission of their husbands; 
– the wives’ inability to take their children from these countries without such permission; 
and 
– the fact that fathers have ultimate custody of children. 
* * * 
Mixed Marriages  With few exceptions, a Christian or Jew who marries a Muslim and 
resides in an Islamic country will be subject to provisions of Islamic family law in that 
country. In these circumstances: 
– Any children born to the wife will be considered Muslim. They will usually also be 
considered citizens of the father’s country. 
– The husband’s permission is always needed for the children to leave an Islamic country 
despite the fact that the children will also have, for example, American citizenship. 
Foreign immigration authorities can be expected to enforce these regulations. The 
ability of U.S. consular officers to aid an American woman who wishes to leave the 
country with her children is very limited. 
– The wife may be divorced by her husband at any time with little difficulty and without a 
court hearing. 
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– At a certain point in age, the children will come under the custody of the father or his 
family. 
– In Islamic countries, the wife will need the permission of her husband to leave the 
country. 
Children’s Rights  There are three types of guardianship which are fixed for a child from 
the time of its birth; 
– The first is guardianship of upbringing, which is overseen by women during the age of 
dependence. The age at which this period of dependence terminates varies: anywhere 
from 7 years for a son and 9 for a daughter to 9 and 11, respectively. In the case of 
divorced parents, it is permissible for a daughter to remain with her mother if the 
parents agree. But such an agreement cannot be made for a son. 
– The second is the child’s spiritual guardianship. The spiritual guardian may be the 
father or a fullblooded male relative of the father. 
– The third is guardianship over the child’s property which usually is carried out by the 
father. 
4. Private International Law Conventions
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction  (concluded October 
25, 1980) 
The States signatory to the present Convention,  
Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters 
relating to their custody. 
Desiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful 
removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of 
their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access, 
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed upon the following 
provisions 
Chapter I B scope of the convention  Article 1  The objects of the present Convention are – 
a. to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 
Contracting State; and 
b. to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are 
effectively respected in the other Contracting States. 
* * * 
Article 3  The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – 
a. it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other 
body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and 
b. at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or 
alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. 
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by 
operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an 
agreement having legal effect under the law of the State. 
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Article 4   The Convention  shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a 
Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights.  The 
Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years. 
* * * 
Article 12   Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 
and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or 
administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than 
one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority 
concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. 
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced 
after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall 
also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its 
new environment. 
* * * 
Article 13  Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or 
administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if 
the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – 
a. the person, institution or other body having the care of the person or the child was not 
actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had 
consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or 
b. there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it 
finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity 
at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. 
* * * 
Article 16   After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense 
of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the 
child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of 
rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this 
Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a 
reasonable time following receipt of the notice. 
* * * 
Article 20  The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this 
would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
* * * 
Article 29  This Convention shall not preclude any person, institution or body who claims 
that there has been a breach of custody or access rights within the meaning of Article 3 or 
21 from applying directly to the judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State, 
whether or not under the provisions of this Convention. 
* * * 
5. Public International Law Conventions
The Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly incorporates the ‘best interests of 
the child’ standard developed in Western custody law.  It also requires States to deter 
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the non-return of children abroad.  As the Committee makes clear in its guidelines for 
States, excerpted below, States are expected to explain how their domestic laws 
comports with this standard. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child2
Article 3  1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for 
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal 
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take 
all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. 
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the 
care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent 
authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their 
staff, as well as competent supervision. 
* * * 
Article 11  1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return 
of children abroad. 
2.  To this end, States Parties shall promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements or accession to existing agreements. 
Committee on the Rights of the Child,  General guidelines regarding the form and 
content of initial reports3
Family environment and alternative care 16.  Under this section, States parties are 
requested to provide relevant information, including the principal legislative, judicial, 
administrative or other measures in force, particularly how the principles of the ‘best 
interests of the child’ and ‘respect for the views of the child’ are reflected therein; factors 
and difficulties encountered and progress achieved in implementing the relevant 
provisions of the Convention; and implementation priorities and specific goals for the 
future in respect of: 
(a) Parental guidance (art. 5); 
(b) Parental responsibilities (art. 18, paras. 1-2); 
(c) Separation from parents (art. 9); 
(d) Family reunification (art. 10); 
(e) Recovery of maintenance for the child (art. 27, para. 4); 
(f) Children deprived of a family environment (art. 20); 
(g) Adoption (art. 21); 
(h) Illicit transfer and non-return (art. 11). 
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6. Regional Conventions
The 1980 Council of Europe Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of 
Children, attempted to confine recognition of foreign judgments and enforcement with 
the automatic termination of custody of children removed in violation of the 
Convention.  In May 2000, Council Regulation (EC) NO 1347/2000, excerpted below, 
entered into force.  The basis is that the free movement of people, required under 
Community instruments, would be facilitated by a Community instrument dealing with 
the recognition of matrimonial judgments.  It has been argued, however, that an 
international solution would be more appropriate (this has been called ‘inverted’ or 
‘reverse’ subsidiarity). 
Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for 
children of both spouses4
1. The Member States have set themselves the objective of maintaining and developing 
the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of 
persons is assured. To establish such an area, the Community is to adopt, among others, 
the measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters needed for the proper 
functioning of the internal market. 
2. The proper functioning of the internal market entails the need to improve and simplify 
the free movement of judgments in civil matters. 
3. This is a subject now falling within the ambit of Article 65 of the Treaty. 
* * * 
7. In order to attain the objective of free movement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in 
matters of parental responsibility within the Community, it is necessary and appropriate that 
the cross-border recognition of jurisdiction and judgments in relation to the dissolution of 
matrimonial ties and to parental responsibility for the children of both spouses be governed by 
a mandatory, and directly applicable, Community legal instrument. 
* * * 
11. This Regulation covers parental responsibility for children of both spouses on issues that are 
closely linked to proceedings for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment. 
* * * 
Article 3  Parental responsibility
1. The Courts of a Member State exercising jurisdiction by virtue of Article 2 on an 
application for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment shall have jurisdiction 
in a matter relating to parental responsibility over a child of both spouses where the 
child is habitually resident in that Member State. 
2. Where the child is not habitually resident in the Member State referred to in paragraph 
1, the courts of that State shall have jurisdiction in such a matter if the child is 
habitually resident in one of the Member States and: 
(a) at least one of the spouses has parental responsibility in relation to the child; and 
(b) the jurisdiction of the courts has been accepted by the spouses and is in the best 
interests of the child. 
3. The jurisdiction conferred by paragraphs 1 and 2 shall cease as soon as: 
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(a) the judgment allowing or refusing the application for divorce, legal separation or 
marriage annulment has become final; or 
(b) in those cases where proceedings in relation to parental responsibility are still 
pending on the date referred to in (a), a judgment in these proceedings has become 
final; or 
(c) the proceedings referred to in (a) and (b) have come to an end for another reason. 
Article 4  Child abduction  The courts with jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 3 
shall exercise their jurisdiction in conformity with the Hague Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and in particular Articles 3 and 
16 thereof. 
Article 5 Counterclaim  The court in which proceedings are pending on the basis of Articles 
2 to 4 shall also have jurisdiction to examine a counterclaim, in so far as the latter comes 
within the scope of this Regulation. 
* * * 
2. A judgment relating to the parental responsibility of the spouses given on the occasion 
of matrimonial proceedings as referred to in Article 13 shall not be recognised: 
(a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in 
which recognition is sought taking into account the best interests of the child; 
(b) if it was given, except in case of urgency, without the child having been given an 
opportunity to be heard, in violation of fundamental principles of procedure of the Member 
State in which recognition is sought; 
(c) where it was given in default of appearance if the person in default was not served with 
the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient 
time and in such a way as to enable that person to arrange for his or her defence unless it is 
determined that such person has accepted the judgment unequivocally; 
(d) on the request of any person claiming that the judgment infringes his or her parental 
responsibility, if it was given without such person having been given an opportunity to be 
heard; 
(e) if it is irreconcilable with a later judgment relating to parental responsibility given in the 
Member State in which recognition is sought; or 
(f) if it is irreconcilable with a later judgment relating to parental responsibility given in 
another Member State or in the non-member State of the habitual residence of the child 
provided that the later judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the 
Member State in which recognition is sought. 
* * * 
European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning 
Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children5
The member States of the Council of Europe, signatory hereto, 
Recognizing that in the member States of the Council of Europe the welfare of the child is 
of overriding importance in reaching decisions concerning his custody; 
Considering that the making of arrangements to ensure that decisions concerning the 
custody of a child can be more widely recognized and enforced will provide greater 
protection of the welfare of children; 
Considering it desirable, with this end in view, to emphasize that the right of access of 
parents is a normal corollary to the right of custody; 
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Noting the increasing number of cases where children have been improperly removed 
across an international frontier and the difficulties of securing adequate solutions to the 
problems caused by such cases; 
Desirous of making suitable provision to enable the custody of children which has been 
arbitrarily interrupted to be restored; 
Convinced of the desirability of making arrangements for this purpose answering to 
different needs and different circumstances; 
Desiring to establish legal co-operation between their authorities, 
Have agreed as follows: 
* * * 
Part 1 – Central authorities
Article 2   1. Each Contracting State shall appoint a central authority to carry out the 
functions provided for by this Convention. 
2. Federal States and States with more than one legal system shall be free to appoint more 
than one central authority and shall determine the extent of their competence. 
3. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall be notified of any appointment 
under this Article. 
* * * 
Part II – Recognition and enforcement of decisions and restoration of custody of children
Article 7  A decision relating to custody given in a Contracting State shall be recognized 
and, where it is enforceable in the State of origin, made enforceable in every other 
Contracting State. 
Article 8  1.  In the case of an improper removal, the central authority of the State addressed 
shall cause steps to be taken forthwith to restore the custody of the child where: 
2. at the time of the institution of the proceedings in the State where the decision was 
given or at the time of the improper removal, if earlier, the child and his parents had as 
their sole nationality the nationality of that State and the child had his habitual 
residence in the territory of that State, and 
3. a request for the restoration was made to a central authority within a period of six 
months from the date of the improper removal. 
4. If, in accordance with the law of the State addressed, the requirements of paragraph 1 of 
this Article cannot be complied with without recourse to a judicial authority, none of 
the grounds of refusal specified in this Convention shall apply to the judicial 
proceedings. 
5. Where there is an agreement officially confirmed by a competent authority between the 
person having the custody of the child and another person to allow the other person a 
right of access, and the child, having been taken abroad, has not been restored at the 
end of the agreed period to the person having the custody, custody of the child shall be 
restored in accordance with paragraphs 1.b and 2 of this Article. The same shall apply 
in the case of a decision of the competent authority granting such a right to a person 
who has not the custody of the child. 
Article 9  1.  In cases of improper removal, other than those dealt with in Article 8, in which 
an application has been made to a central authority within a period of six months from the 
date of the removal, recognition and enforcement may be refused only if: 
a. in the case of a decision given in the absence of the defendant or his legal 
representative, the defendant was not duly served with the document which 
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instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable 
him to arrange his defence; but such a failure to effect service cannot constitute a 
ground for refusing recognition or enforcement where service was not effected 
because the defendant had concealed his whereabouts from the person who 
instituted the proceedings in the State of origin; 
b. in the case of a decision given in the absence of the defendant or his legal 
representative, the competence of the authority giving the decision was not 
founded: 
i. on the habitual residence of the defendant, or 
ii. on the last common habitual residence of the child’s parents, at least one parent 
being still habitually resident there, or 
iii. on the habitual residence of the child; 
c. the decision is incompatible with a decision relating to custody which became 
enforceable in the State addressed before the removal of the child, unless the child 
has had his habitual residence in the territory of the requesting State for one year 
before his removal. 
2. Where no application has been made to a central authority, the provisions of paragraph 
1 of this Article shall apply equally, if recognition and enforcement are requested within 
six months from the date of the improper removal. 
3. In no circumstances may the foreign decision be reviewed as to its substance. 
*  *  * 
Article 14   Each Contracting State shall apply a simple and expeditious procedure for 
recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to the custody of a child. To that end it 
shall ensure that a request for enforcement may be lodged by simple application. 
*  *   * 
Part V  – Other instruments
Article 19   This Convention shall not exclude the possibility of relying on any other 
international instrument in force between the State of origin and the State addressed or on 
any other law of the State addressed not derived from an international agreement for the 
purpose of obtaining recognition or enforcement of a decision.
Common Law Countries 
Although the Common Law countries are not located in the same geographical region, 
the following joint statement represents a significant consensus among a group of 
States. 
The Common Law Judicial Conference on International Child Custody6 Best practices
Judges representing the six delegations (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom and the United States) attending the Common Law Judicial Conference on 
International Child Custody hosted by the U.S. Department of State (Washington, D.C., 
September 17-21, 2000) propose the following ‘best practices’ to improve operation of the 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(‘Hague Child Abduction Convention’). The views expressed are those of the judicial 
members of the delegations, and do not necessarily reflect the official views of their 
countries or judiciaries. 
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1. This Conference supports the conclusions adopted at the analogous Judicial Seminar on 
the International Protection of Children at the Conference Centre De Ruwenberg, June 
3-6 2000, and adopts parallel resolutions, as follows:  
a. Such conferences are important events in emphasizing mutual understanding, 
respect and trust between the judges from different countries – factors which are 
essential to the effective operation of international instruments concerned with the 
protection of children, and in particular, the Hague Child Abduction Convention. 
b. The format adopted, involving intensive discussion among judges, administrators, 
academics and practitioners from six common law countries (two of which are 
bi-jural) around a number of selected topics, has been a success and is a model for 
such conferences in the future. Differences of approach, where they exist, have 
been revealed and the way has been opened to greater consistency in interpretation 
and practice under the Hague Child Abduction Convention. 
c. The judges participating in the conference will endeavor to inform their colleagues 
in their respective jurisdictions about the conference and its outcome, and will in 
particular make available information about the International Child Abduction 
Database (http://www.incadat.com) and about the Special Commission on the 
practical operation of the Hague Child Abduction Convention, which is to be held 
at the Hague in March 2001. 
d. It is recognized that, in cases involving the international abduction of children, 
considerable advantages are to be gained from a concentration of jurisdiction in a 
limited number of courts/tribunals. These advantages include accumulation of 
experience among the judges and practitioners concerned and the development of 
greater mutual confidence between legal systems. 
e. The need for more effective methods of international judicial cooperation in the 
field of child abduction is emphasized, as well as the necessity for direct 
communication between judges in different jurisdictions in certain cases. The idea 
of the appointment of liaison judges in the different jurisdictions, to act as channels 
of communication in international cases, is supported. Further exploration of the 
administrative and legal aspects of this concept should be carried out. The 
continued development of an international network of judges in the field of 
international child abduction to promote personal contacts and the exchange of 
information is also supported. 
2. Prompt decision-making under the Hague Child Abduction Convention serves the best 
interests of children. It is the responsibility of the judiciary at both the trial and 
appellate levels firmly to manage the progress of return cases under the Convention. 
Trial and appellate courts should set and adhere to timetables that ensure the 
expeditious determination of Hague applications. 
3. Central Authorities likewise have a responsibility to process Hague applications 
expeditiously. Delays in the administrative process can adversely affect judicial return 
proceedings. 
4. It is recommended that State parties ensure that there are simple and effective 
mechanisms to enforce orders for the return of children. 
5. The Article 13b ‘grave risk’ defense has generally been narrowly construed by courts in 
member states. It is in keeping with the objectives of the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention to construe the Article 13b grave risk defense narrowly. 
6. Courts in many jurisdictions regard the use of orders with varying names, e.g., 
stipulations, conditions, undertakings, as a useful tool to facilitate arrangements for 
return and/or alleviate Article 13b concerns. Such orders, limited in scope and duration, 
addressing short-term issues and remaining in effect only until such time as a court in 
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the country to which the child is returned takes control, are in keeping with the spirit of 
the Hague Child Abduction Convention. 
7. Left-behind parents who seek a child’s return under the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention need speedy and effective access to the courts. Lack of legal representation 
is a significant obstacle to invoking the Convention’s remedies. To overcome this 
obstacle, left-behind parents should be provided promptly with experienced legal 
representation, where possible at the expense of the requested state. 
8. It is widely agreed that the problem of enforcing access rights internationally, 
though intertwined with international child abduction cases, is not adequately 
addressed by the Hague Child Abduction Convention. Other legal and judicial 
solutions should be pursued, including prompt consideration of the 1996 Hague 
Convention on the Protection of Children (which provides, inter alia, a mechanism 
for handling international access cases), and court-referred mediation in 
appropriate cases (to help parents make their own arrangements for international 
access). 
9. Courts take significantly different approaches to relocation cases, which are occurring 
with a frequency not contemplated in 1980 when the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention was drafted. Courts should be aware that highly restrictive approaches to 
relocation can adversely affect the operation of the Hague Child Abduction Convention. 
10. Judges need to be alert to the possibility of international child abduction, and can be 
instrumental in preventing abductions by entering and enforcing orders for appropriate 
safeguards. 
11. Abductions to countries which are not parties to the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention pose serious obstacles for left-behind parents who seek return of, or access 
to, their children. Those government bodies responsible for foreign affairs might 
usefully explore the possibilities of treaty and bilateral approaches to resolve these 
cases, which approaches have already met with some success. 
12. Given the vital role of judges in the operation of the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention, each country participating in this conference should endeavor to have at 
least one judge expert in the Convention in its delegation at the Fourth Special 
Commission meeting at the Hague in March 2001. 
13. The support of the activities of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law is critical to its role in coordinating and disseminating 
information to the international community. This support should extend to special 
projects and services provided by the Permanent Bureau, including the International 
Child Abduction Database (‘Incadat’) developed by the Permanent Bureau, which 
will be of significant assistance to the judiciary, Central Authorities, legal 
profession, and the parties. The judges at this Conference recognize the importance 
of the Permanent Bureau being adequately funded.
7. National Implementation
The U.S. State Department publishes brief summaries of the applicable custody laws in 
various jurisdictions.  While each is accompanied by an explicit disclaimer, these 
remain useful references, especially for States in which the relevant law is not readily 
available in English. 
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U.S. Department of State, International Parental Child Abduction/Egypt7
NOTE: The information contained in this flyer is intended as an introduction to the basic 
elements of children’s issues in Egypt. It is not intended as a legal reference. Currently there 
are no international or bilateral treaties in force between Egypt and the United States 
dealing with international parental child abduction. The Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction cannot be invoked if a child is taken from the 
United States to Egypt, or vice versa, by one parent against the wishes of the other parent or 
in violation of a U.S. custody order. 
Parental Kidnapping  The removal of a child by the non-custodial parent within Egypt, is 
not a crime in Egypt. However, the custodial parent can approach police authorities for the 
enforcement of a custody decree, or request that the court imposes a penalty. 
Dual Nationality  Under Egyptian law, children born to an Egyptian father are considered 
citizens of Egypt, while children born to an Egyptian mother and a non-Egyptian father may 
be Egyptian citizens under limited circumstances. 
Enforcement of Foreign Court Orders  A parent can request that a foreign custody order be 
recognized in Egypt, but enforcement will result only if the order does not contravene 
Sharia law and ‘paternal rights.’ Therefore, as a practical matter, foreign custody orders are 
not generally automatically recognized in Egypt, and the parent must seek legal 
representation in Egypt and file for custody in Egypt. 
Jurisdiction and Right of Custody   Egyptian Civil Courts have ‘legal jurisdiction’ to hear 
child custody petitions. However, Egyptian courts base their decisions on ‘Islamic Sharia 
Law’ when a custody dispute concerns a Muslim child. Thus, an Egyptian Civil Court 
considers a Fatwa, i.e., a ruling from an Islamic Institution, but the court in not bound by it. 
Presumptive Custody Under Egyptian law, the mother is favored, which means that the 
mother is considered to be the appropriate custodian of children; this is based on the age 
and religion of the child. The criteria are as follows: Muslim children: ten years (up to 15) 
for boys and twelve years (or their marriage) for girls. Non-Muslim children: the age of 
seven years for boys and nine years for girls. Normally, if disputes arise between the 
parents, Egyptian courts uphold presumptive custody. 
Conditions for ‘Presumptive Custody’ The Egyptian Courts uphold this custody for the 
mother if she is a person of the ‘Book (Muslim, Christian or Jewish)’ and if she is deemed 
to be a ‘fit’ mother. If the father is Muslim, the mother must commit herself to raise the 
child as Muslims in Egypt. It is important to note that ‘the right of the father to control his 
children’s travel outside of Egypt is inviolable.’ Thus, a U.S. citizen mother can have 
custody, but be prohibited from taking her children to the U.S. Also, under Egyptian law, if 
the mother (Muslim or non-Muslim) remarries she will lose her claim to custody. However, 
this law does not apply to the father who retains custody rights if he re-marries. 
Order of Preference for Non-parental Custody When the mother loses presumptive custody 
due to remarriage, death or inability to counter court findings that she is deemed to be an 
‘unfit mother,’ the courts recognize an established order of preferences of another adult 
custodian. This order is from first to last based upon the child’s religion. For a Muslim 
child: maternal grandmother or great-grandmother, paternal grandmother or 
great-grandmother, maternal aunt, paternal aunt, maternal niece, paternal niece, and finally 
to a male in either the father’s or mother’s family. For a non-Muslim child: maternal 
grandmother, paternal grandmother, sister (adult), maternal aunt, paternal aunt, and finally 
other nieces and aunts. 
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Right of Visitation  In law as well as in practice, visitation depends on the willingness 
of the custodial parent. If a father has custody and does not voluntarily agree to 
visitation, the local authorities will not force the issue. The parent will have to seek a 
court order to enforce visitation. 
Father’s Permission  Children under a certain age (generally, 18 years for boys and 
21 years for girls) cannot depart Egypt without the permission of the father. If the 
child’s name indicates an Egyptian father, even if the child is traveling on an U.S. 
passport, Egyptian Immigration officials require ‘explicit’ permission from the father 
before permitting departure. At times, when the name is Egyptian, a mother and child 
going to the United States for an ordinary visit, Egyptian authorities can require the 
father to go the airport to give his permission to immigration officials. In contrast, if 
the child’s name is not noticeably Egyptian, and the passport does not indicate 
otherwise, an American citizen mother and child could depart without airport officials 
questioning citizenship or requesting the father’s approval. 
Travel Restrictions (child)  Egyptian Immigration Officials allow a father to put a 
travel ‘hold’ on his wife and/or children. This requires no court order or legal 
determination. A simple administrative procedure, which takes ten days to two weeks 
to institute, authorizes a ‘blacklist’ entry that expires after six months if not renewed. 
However, this entry can be extended ‘indefinitely’ by the father or by anyone acting 
on a father’s power of attorney. 
Travel Restrictions (wife) An Egyptian wife requires the permission of her Egyptian 
husband to obtain a passport and depart the county. Although this law also extends to 
a non-Egyptian wife, we are not aware of any cases where a U.S. citizen wife with a 
U.S. passport was prohibited by her Egyptian husband from departing. Immigration 
authorities have not asked an American woman, married to an Egyptian, to produce 
permission from her husband. 
Visa Stamps Departure Immigration officials will prevent departure of any individual 
whose passport lacks a valid entry stamp and residency visa. Egyptian procedures to 
obtain valid entry stamps and residencies must be followed by the bearer when the 
U.S. Embassy issues a parent or a child a new passport. 
Residency Visa Often a parent will declare the first passport stolen or lost; the new 
passport plus a police report of loss or theft is generally sufficient for issuance of a 
tourist visa. However, if the immigration authority’s records indicate the bearer’s 
‘real’ status in Egypt, issuance will halt pending the husband’s permission. As with 
departure, extension of residency requires the father’s explicit agreement. 
Issuance of Egyptian Passports  Under Egyptian Law, no child under 21 years of age 
can obtain an Egyptian passport without the written permission of the father. 
Therefore, if ordered by a foreign court, Egyptian Immigration authorities would 
accept a request from an Egyptian father not to issue a passport to a dual national 
child. 
American citizens who travel to Egypt place themselves under the jurisdiction of 
Egyptian courts. If an Egyptian parent chooses to remain in Egypt or leave a child 
behind in Egypt, the U.S. Embassy cannot force either that parent or the Egyptian 
Government to return the child to the U.S. Additionally, it is not possible to extradite 
an Egyptian parent to the U.S. for parental child abduction. American citizens 
planning a trip to Egypt with dual national children should bear this in mind.
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South Africa
Sonderup v. Tondelli and another8 This appeal concerns a child, Sofia, who was brought to 
South Africa from Canada by her mother and kept here in violation of an order of the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia and against the wishes of her father. 
In the High Court, the Family Advocate brought an urgent application seeking an order 
for the return of Sofia to British Columbia in terms of Article 12 of the Hague Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Convention). 
In the High Court, the mother challenged the constitutionality of the Convention. The 
judge held that there is no conflict between the Convention and section 28(2) of the 
Constitution since both instruments consider the child’s best interests. He determined that 
the best interests of the child would be to allow the court in the best position to dispose of 
the case, here the Supreme Court of British Columbia, to do so. He also decided that it was 
not inconsistent with Sofia’s best interests to return her to the jurisdiction of that court and 
thus ordered her return. 
Writing for a unanimous Constitutional Court, Goldstone J first determined that the 
Hague Convention applies to the facts of the case. He held that the mother’s actions fell 
within the scope of the Convention because she had breached an agreement that had been 
made an order of court that Sofia would be returned to Canada by a certain date. 
Goldstone J then considered the constitutionality of the Convention and held that even 
if the Convention were assumed to be inconsistent with section 28(2) of the Constitution 
which requires that the best interest of the child be paramount in every matter concerning 
the child, the inconsistency would be justified under a limitations analysis in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution. The Court decided that the Convention has the important 
purpose of ensuring appropriate jurisdiction for custody matters, encouraging comity 
between countries, and discouraging unilateral parental self-help and giving some finality to 
custodial disputes. 
The Court also found that the Convention is carefully tailored to achieve its ends with 
consideration given to the interests of the child since the Convention gives a requested state 
discretion to refuse to return a child under the ‘grave risk’ exception in Article 13. The 
Court found that courts applying the Convention within the spirit of the Constitution could 
take steps to protect the interests of the child by expansively interpreting what harms fell 
within ‘grave risk’ and by crafting court orders to protect the child. 
Finally, the Court evaluated the evidence before it and determined, within the 
parameters of the Convention, that the return of Sofia posed no grave risk of harm to her. 
Accordingly, the Court ordered she be returned to British Columbia. The Court made 
efforts to assure that the mother and child would not be returned to Canada before the 
authorities there could guarantee the mother would not be arrested for her actions. In 
addition, the Court satisfied itself that on return, the custody matter would be heard by the 
Canadian court on an expedited basis and the needs of Sofia and her mother would be 
properly catered for in the interim.
Several States have launched public education campaigns urging parents to take 
sensible precautions, such as the entry of a court order prohibiting the issuance of a 
passport for a child upon the application of the other parent or person claiming 
responsibility.  The objective of these brochures and other sources of information is to 
prevent abductions, especially to States which are unlikely to cooperate in the child’s 
return. 
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Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, International Child 
Abductions: A Manual for Parents9
Other Actions  In the event that your child has been abducted to a country that is not a party 
to the Hague Convention, it is possible for you to take other actions both in Canada and 
abroad that could lead to the return of your child. (Some of these actions may also be 
relevant if the abduction has been to a Hague Convention country.) In Canada, the civil 
justice system can be used to reinforce your custody rights and, if appropriate, the criminal 
justice system can be used to initiate criminal action against the abductor. It may be 
possible to take similar actions in the other country. As every situation is unique, it is 
important for you to seek legal and other professional advice and guidance before taking 
specific action.  
Using the Civil Justice System Once you have obtained a custody order from the 
appropriate Canadian court, the next step is to decide whether you wish to use the justice 
system in the country to which your child has been abducted.  
The Consular Affairs Bureau can provide you with general information on the legal 
system of that country, customs and practices of that country related to parental rights, and 
the experience of other people in seeking to use that country’s justice system to have an 
abducted child returned. 
Consular officers in Ottawa and overseas can provide advice and guidance on the laws 
of a foreign country or on what might be the most appropriate action to take. However, for 
authoritative information, you will need to retain a lawyer in that country who is 
knowledgeable and experienced in dealing with custody cases involving foreigners. 
Canadian officials in Ottawa and at Canadian government offices abroad can provide you 
with a list of lawyers who speak English or French, who may be experienced in parental 
child abduction or family law and who may have represented Canadians in circumstances 
similar to yours. However, as this lawyer will be working for you, it is most important that 
you, and only you, make the selection. If you decide to undertake legal action in the other 
country, it may be necessary for you to be there in person at some stage of the proceedings.  
Lawyers’ fees vary widely from country to country and could be in excess of what would be 
paid in Canada. Therefore, you should be very direct when making arrangements for legal 
representation in another country: ensure that the arrangements are in writing and that you 
fully understand what the lawyer will and will not do, when it will be done and at what cost. 
If necessary, Canadian consular officials can assist with translation and provide guidance. 
They can also maintain contact with your lawyer to obtain status reports and to verify that 
your rights, as provided for by the laws of that country, are respected.  
Your lawyer will advise you on the information and documentation that will be required in 
order to represent you within that country’s justice system. In addition to providing a 
certified copy of your custody order, it may be necessary to supply copies of your marriage 
and / or separation or divorce documents, along with copies of the relevant provincial / 
territorial and federal laws relating to custody and child abductions. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa can authenticate these documents before 
they are sent. For information, contact the Authentication and Service of Documents 
Section, tel.: (613) 995-0119; fax: (613) 944-7078; e-mail: jlac@dfait-maeci.gc.ca. Your 
Canadian lawyer can assist you in gathering this material and having it delivered to your 
lawyer in the foreign country.  
A custody order issued by a Canadian court has no automatic binding legal force 
beyond the borders of Canada. Nevertheless, there may be procedures and laws in place in 
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the foreign country to have that order recognized and enforced there. In addition, such an 
order could be persuasive in support of any legal action that you undertake. Courts in other 
countries, like those in Canada, must decide child custody cases on the basis of their own 
domestic laws. This may give an advantage to the person who has abducted your child, if 
the abduction is to the country of his or her nationality or origin. You could also be 
disadvantaged if the country has a legal tradition in deciding custody cases on the basis of 
gender. If custody is given to the abducting parent in another country, you should make 
every effort to have the court specify your access rights. Some countries, even if they award 
custody to you or provide for access for you, will not permit the child to leave without the 
consent of the other parent.  
Your chances of having your Canadian custody order recognized and enforced in 
another country are subject to all these factors and conditions. While it may appear that the 
deck is stacked against you, it is important to accept that recourse to the courts of another 
country may be the only hope for the safe return of your child. Each country is unique, and 
it is up to you to decide whether to proceed with legal action.  
Using the Criminal Justice System Parental abduction is a criminal offence under sections 
281, 282 and 283 of the Canadian Criminal Code. In many situations, the criminal justice 
system can prove to be a very useful instrument in locating and recovering a child, 
especially when the person suspected of perpetrating the abduction has not yet left 
Canadian soil.  
Since the administration of criminal justice is a provincial / territorial responsibility, 
criminal justice may be administered in a slightly different way from one province / territory 
to another. Thus, in the abduction of children, some provinces / territories require 
authorization from the Crown Attorney before proceedings can be set in motion, while in 
others proceedings can be initiated by the police themselves. 
Use of the Criminal Code makes it easier for the police to search for and locate a child. An 
arrest warrant is generally issued, often improving co-operation among police forces both 
nationally and internationally. If necessary, an extradition request may be made if there is 
an extradition treaty with the country in which the alleged abductor is located. 
Extradition  Extradition may be worth considering in some cases of international abduction, 
but may be of no value in others. There is no guarantee that the child will be returned by 
foreign authorities even if they should permit the extradition of the alleged abductor. When 
threatened with extradition, some abducting parents have hidden the child or have gone into 
hiding themselves with the child.  
In addition, not all countries regard child abduction by one of the parents as a criminal  
act. The Consular Affairs Bureau can provide information on the criminal justice system,  in 
the country in question, and on whether it is likely to co-operate in parental child abduction 
cases. 
Other reasons why extradition is not frequently used in connection with parental child  
abductions include: 
Very few extradition treaties between Canada and other countries include parental child  
abduction or custodial interference as extraditable offences. In recent treaties, efforts have 
been made to include the concept of ‘dual criminality’ as the basis for extradition. However, 
this requires that parental child abduction be considered a crime in both the countries that 
have signed the treaty. 
Many civil law countries (in contrast with common law countries such as Canada, Australia, 
the United States and the United Kingdom) will not extradite their own nationals. Nearly all 
the countries of Latin America and Europe are civil law countries. Experience has shown 
that foreign governments are often unwilling to extradite anyone for parental child 
abduction.  
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While it is important to report the abduction of your child to the police as soon as possible, 
your complaint will not necessarily result in child abduction charges. Whether at the level 
of the police, the Crown Attorney’s office or the federal Department of Justice, which is 
responsible for extradition questions, such decisions are made in accordance with the 
particular circumstances of each situation and the possible repercussions on the return of 
the child. Protection of the child is the primary objective.  
The United Kingdom Passport Service, Prevention of Child Abduction10
General  The Child Abduction Act 1984 makes it a criminal offence for anyone connected 
with a child under the age of sixteen to take or send that child out of the United Kingdom 
without appropriate consent. 
Persons connected with a child are parents, guardians and persons with a residence order or 
who have parental responsibility. 
The appropriate consent is the consent of the mother, the father (if he has parental 
responsibility), guardian and anyone with a residence order or parental responsibility, or the 
leave of the court. 
In general, a child’s father only has automatic parental responsibility if he is or has been 
married to the child’s mother. A person with a residence order may take or send the child 
out of the United Kingdom without the appropriate consent for up to a month at a time. 
UKPS Scheme  Normally the Passport Service will issue a passport for a child at the request 
of either parent or person with parental responsibility. 
You can ask the Passport Service not to issue a passport for the child, should the Agency 
receive an application from another person claiming to have responsibility, if you have a 
UK court order as follows: 
(i) a prohibited steps order made under the Children Act 1989 or the Children (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1995; 
(ii) an interdict made under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995; 
(iii) an order confirming that the child’s removal from the jurisdiction is contrary to the 
wishes of the court; 
(iv) a residence order made under (i) to (iii) above, and the objector is the person in whose 
favour the order has been made; 
(v) an order awarding the objector custody of the child or care and control over the child; 
(vi) an order specifying that the objector’s consent to the removal of the child from the 
jurisdiction is necessary; 
(vii) an order upholding the objector’s objections to the child having a passport or leaving 
the country. 
(viii)The mother of a child will not need a court order if she has not been married to the 
child’s father. 
8. IOs and NGOs
IOs
Hague Conference on Private International Law – The International Child Abduction 
Database (INCADAT)11 Several thousand children are the victims of international parental 
child abduction each year.  The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction is a multilateral treaty which seeks to protect children 
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from the harmful effects of parental abduction and retention across international boundaries 
by providing a procedure to bring about their prompt return. 
The International Child Abduction Database (INCADAT) has been established by the 
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law with the object of 
making accessible many of the leading decisions rendered by national courts in respect of 
the [Hague Convention] of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction. 
INCADAT is used by judges, Central Authorities, legal practitioners, researchers and 
others interested in this rapidly developing branch of law. INCADAT has already 
contributed to the promotion of mutual understanding and good practice among the 73 
States Parties, essential elements in the effective operation of the 1980 Convention. 
To achieve maximum accessibility, INCADAT is available free of charge. A password 
however is needed to access the information. Donations, while not obligatory, are indeed 
appreciated. 
NGOs
Reunite12 We are the leading UK charity specialising in international parental child 
abduction.  Reunite was formed in 1986 and registered as a charity in 1990. We provide 
advice, information and support to parents, family members and guardians who have had a  
child abducted or who fear child abduction. We also provide advice to parents who may 
have abducted their child as well as advising on international custody disputes. 
We are part-funded by the Department of Constitutional Affairs, the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office and the Home Office. We also receive funding for specific projects 
from charities and trusts as well as raising independent funds. 
Our philosophy is one that firmly believes any child abduction, whether or not a 
criminal offence, is wrong. However, acting strictly within the law, Reunite will do all it 
can to assist parents who may have abducted their child. Emphasis is placed on helping 
parents to come out of hiding and to regulate the child’s position within the law. This often 
entails assisting the abducting parent, guardian or family member to come to terms with the 
fact that the child must be returned. Then, focusing all the time on the best interests of the 
child, help return take place with minimum disturbance and trauma. 
The Committee for Missing Children, Inc./Missing Children Europe13  The Committee for 
Missing Children, USA is one of the largest distributors of missing and abducted children’s 
photos, and is a leader in the area of family abductions and parent advocacy. The CMC, 
Along with its photo partners has distributed several billion images of missing and abducted 
children worldwide. In 1998 the CMC opened a branch in Germany to assist parents who 
have had their children abducted across international borders. 
The primary mission of the European branch will be to council victim parents. We want 
to help parents of missing and abducted children receive the help they deserve and direct 
their requests, applications and questions to the appropriate agencies. The CMC Europe 
maintains contact with other groups and organizations throughout Europe and the United 
States that have the same or similar objectives. We are collaborating with groups, 
organizations, and agencies associated with missing and abducted children. 
The European branch is working with committed lawyers who have had experience 
dealing with child abduction and have litigated under the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction. The CMC Europe is working to gather 
information, legal papers, court papers, judgments and statistics that will help a parent 
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understand what they will face when forced to apply for the return of their children from a 
foreign country. 
The CMC Europe will work closely with law enforcement in order to assist in the 
recovery and return of missing or abducted children. 
Advice to Parents by the Association for Abducted Children14 An association for abducted 
children (Kaapatut Lapsetry) has been formed in order to support and advise parents of 
abducted children. According to the experiences of the association parents should pay 
particular attention to the following: 
• Find out about the culture and religion as well as about family law and the concept of 
the family in the country of your spouse. 
• For instance the right of the father to decide on matters concerning the children may be 
regarded as natural in some countries. In other countries, a child is thought to belong to 
its mother, and she is thought to be the natural custodian of the child. 
• The memorandum on the management of international child abduction prepared by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice on 31 August 1998 may be of 
use. 
Try to Identify Risk Situations 
The talk and behaviour of your spouse may indicate that everything is not in order. Such 
indications may come up in quarrels, discussions about upbringing and in disputes about 
child custody and rights of access. The other parent may voice a wish to return with the 
child to his or her native country or threaten with abduction. Perhaps this parent no longer 
works. A close relative to your spouse has moved in with you or to the home of the child, 
and supports a move to the native country. Friends of your spouse may assist in organizing 
the abduction. Your spouse sells personal property in your common apartment or in his or 
her own apartment. These signs have to be taken seriously. 
The risk of abduction may increase in connection with custody disputes. A divorce 
between you and your spouse or a new relationship formed by you may also heighten the 
risk. Your former spouse may feel hurt and fear replacement by your new partner. Both the 
mother and the father may abduct the child, and the abductor may be Finnish just as well as 
a foreigner. 
Find out about the Services of the Association for Abducted Children 
The association for abducted children may provide you with contact information about 
parents whose children have been abducted to the same country as your child or to a 
neighbouring country. 
Find out What the Authorities Can Do 
Passports and Visas Inform the diplomatic Mission of your spouse’s native country that 
you have not agreed to apply for a visa or passport for your child. More information about 
dual citizenship and about issuing a passport is available at the diplomatic Mission of your 
spouse’s native country. 
The police may be contacted as regards issuing and revoking the child’s Finnish 
passport. 
Precautionary Measures  Find out about the possibilities of precautionary measures, for 
instance an emergency care order. 
Supervised Meetings  Advice and instructions are available at the child welfare authorities 
of the municipality of residence and at shelters. 
Informing the Day-care Centre and School  Inform the day-care centre and school that the 
child may not be given to the other parent or to some other person without your permission. 
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Informing the Police and Child Welfare Authorities  Inform the police and child welfare 
authorities of the threat of abduction. 
Try to Reach an Amicable Solution  Your child has the right to both its parents. Therefore it 
makes sense to try to settle your differences and reach an amicable solution about child 
custody and rights of access. A settlement is probably the best preventive measure. 
Willingness to co-operate and amicability are also in the best interests of the child. In 
addition, they establish you as a responsible and good custodian of the child in possible 
future trials. 
Retain a Good Lawyer  If an amicable solution is impossible, consult a lawyer. You will 
need a counsellor in your legal proceedings and if you apply for e.g. precautionary 
measures, supervised meetings or a restraining order. 
9.  Possible Approaches to the Problems 
Maria 
As a judicial clerk for the same Court, you will have noted that the facts of Maria’s 
case are very similar to the facts in the Sonderup case, set out in Section 7.  There, like 
here, a child was brought to South Africa from Canada by her mother and kept in 
violation of an order of the Canadian court, against the wishes of the father.  The major 
difference is that in Maria’s case the Canadian order expressly provides for a transfer 
of custody following the child’s wrongful removal.  In Sonderup, in contrast, the return 
of the child was predicated, in part, by assurances that the custody determination 
would be made by the Canadian court, presumably based on the best interests of the 
child.  While the Court is not bound by its holding in Sonderup, which is 
distinguishable on its facts, it may well reach a similar result in view of the Court’s 
recognition of the importance of both the Abduction Convention and the constitutional 
stature of the best interests of the child under South African law.  That is, it should 
probably order Maria’s return, especially if counsel for Arturo will stipulate to a ‘best 
interests’ determination by the Canadian Court. 
Anwar
As set out in Section 1, in most Western States, including the U.S., custody is 
determined under the best interests of the child standard.  Since Anwar has always 
lived in the U.S., and presumably his friends, school, doctors, and home are there, it is 
unlikely that a U.S. Court would make a custody determination which would result in 
the child’s relocation to Egypt.  It is especially unlikely given the warnings of the U.S. 
Department of State regarding the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of securing the 
return of a child from Islamic States.  Thus, since Nora faces little risk of an adverse 
decision, she is not likely to accede to Mahmout’s request for a transfer of custody in 
two years.   
At the same time, she may not want to leave Mahmout without any legal options 
for maintaining a relationship with his son, which might lead to desperation and illegal 
options.  In addition she might consider it important for her son to have an ongoing 
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relationship with his father and his father’s culture.  Mahmout may be able to obtain 
joint legal custody, with liberal visitation within the U.S., if he reassures Nora that he 
will not try to take the child to Egypt, and, as a token of his good faith, allows her to 
keep the child’s passport.  As explained in Section 7, Nora would have extremely 
limited rights if Mahmout takes Anwar to Egypt.   
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Chapter 10
Child Support
1. The Problem 
Astrid, who is Swedish, and Fumio, who is Japanese, lived together in Sweden for 
eight years, during which they had a daughter, Yuri, who is now six.  Astrid and 
Fumio decided to part amicably two years ago.  Yuri lives with Astrid and  Fumio 
visits at least weekly.  Yuri often sleeps at his flat, where she has a small loft.  Fumio 
is a fabric designer and Astrid illustrates children’s books.  Fumio earns a very good 
living; Astrid’s income is more sporadic. 
Fumio has recently decided to return to Japan.  He has been trying to persuade 
Astrid and Yuri to relocate also.  Although he does not want custody of Yuri, he would 
like her to get to know her Japanese grandparents and aunts.  He tells Astrid that he 
is certain that she will find lucrative work in Japan.  Even if she does not, he promises 
that he will provide enough child support to keep her and Yuri as comfortable as they 
are in Sweden. 
Astrid is seriously considering the move, which she thinks will be good for her 
career and for her daughter. She is concerned, however, about losing the 
considerable benefits she and Yuri enjoy in Sweden. She does not think that Fumio 
would deliberately mislead her, but she is reluctant to depend solely on his good 
will.
Astrid comes to see you for legal advice.  How will relocation from Sweden to 
Japan change her situation with regard to child support?  If she does decide to move, 
how can she protect herself and her daughter?   
2. Overview 
In general, parents have a duty to support their minor children whether or not the 
parents are married, and whether or not they have custody of the children.  State 
laws differ, however, with respect to the amount of support to be paid, the process 
through which this amount is determined, the duration of support, the mechanisms 
for its enforcement and collection, and the responsibility of the State, or society at 
large, to make up the difference when the noncustodial parent is either unable to 
provide adequate support or cannot be compelled to do so.   
In some States, such as Japan, child support is agreed to by the parties.  If they 
are unable to do so by themselves, they must go to mediation, where a trained 
third party will help them resolve the matter. Other States leave the amount of 
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child support to the discretion of a tribunal. Factors considered typically include: 
the financial resources of the child, the financial resources of the noncustodial 
and custodial parents, respectively, and the standard of living the child would 
have enjoyed had the parents remained married. The lack of specific guidelines 
often produces unpredictable and widely ranging results, which in turn make it 
difficult to negotiate support. The custodial parent usually incurs a 
disproportionate share of responsibility because she must actually meet the child’s 
expenses on a day-to-day basis.   
In general, the child is not entitled to what she would have had, had the parties 
remained married because that would impose disproportionate costs on the 
noncustodial parent.  This becomes particularly sensitive when the non-custodial 
parents’ support benefits the custodial parent as well as the child, as in the case of a 
housing subsidy. Although it is virtually impossible to insulate the child from the 
consequences of divorce or separation without also insulating the custodial parent at 
the other parent’s expense, support that does not directly benefit the custodial parent, 
such as payment of school fees, may be more palatable.  In addition, the child is 
entitled to a decent standard of living.  The custodial parent is interested in being 
treated fairly regarding child-based expenditures and in being compensated for lost 
labor force opportunity. 
In response to these problems, most western industrialized States have enacted 
guidelines.  Establishing guidelines requires balancing the interests of the State, the 
child, and the parents.  The State is interested in minimizing State expenditures and 
making sure that the next generation of citizens is adequately nurtured and educated.  
Some States, emphasizing the latter, provide relatively generous benefits to sole 
parents as well as State health and childcare programs which benefit all children, 
regardless of their parents’ circumstances.  In others, responsibility for the child’s 
well- being is left almost entirely to the parents. 
In the United States, for example, in 1984 Congress passed the Child Support 
Enforcement Amendment, which required all States to create guidelines in order 
to receive federal welfare funding.  While all decision makers were required to 
have access to these guidelines, they were not mandatory.  In 1987, the Family 
Support Act required the States to implement mandatory guidelines.  These could 
be established legislatively, administratively, or judicially. They were to act as 
rebuttable presumptions in all support proceedings.  
Other industrialized States have enacted laws requiring ‘advanced maintenance’ 
or ‘child support assurance.’ This is a public guarantee of a specific level of 
payment made by a government agency, which then attempts to collect it from the 
parent. 
The amount of child support and its duration varies widely among States.  There is 
no official mechanism for keeping track of these amounts, but a recent survey 
conducted under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
has compiled substantial information in connection with the proposed draft of a global 
convention.  (See Section 2 below.) 
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Mechanisms for determining the amount of child support, similarly, vary 
considerably.  They include:  a percentage of the obligor’s income, which sets a flat or 
varying percentage based solely on the noncustodial income.  This model assumes that 
the noncustodial parent will contribute what she can.  Another model is based on the 
parents’ combined income.  This assumes that support should represent the same 
proportion of parental income a child would receive if the parents lived together. A 
third model begins by assuring the ability of the noncustodial to meet his own 
subsistence needs.  Thus, only when his income exceeds a certain minimal amount is 
any obligation imposed. 
The needs of children change as they get older.  Other factors may also require a 
change in child support.  An unanticipated increase in health care needs, for example, 
may justify a modification.  The substantive rules governing modification, as well as 
the procedural rules governing the jurisdiction in which such applications may be 
brought, also vary.  This has resulted in conflicting judgments of different State courts, 
and the refusal of States to recognize the judgments or the jurisdiction of other States.  
This results in confusion, inconsistency, animosity, and often an inability to collect 
support due. 
Where States are parties to a bilateral agreement regarding child support or 
parties to a multilateral agreement under which they recognize each other’s 
judgments, a judgment of child support is entitled to enforcement like any other 
judgment.  Like other judgments, however, it may be subject to challenge in the 
foreign court on grounds of that court’s public policy.  Examples of such 
challenges are set out in Section 8, below (see excerpt by Michel Pelichet, Deputy 
Secretary General).  Failure to comply with the support judgment subjects the 
obligor to civil or criminal sanctions.  In some States, these may include income 
withholding, income tax interception or licence revocation.  Licences which may 
be revoked may include professional, trade, business, hunting, fishing, and 
driving licences.   
3. Cultural Variations 
In 2003, the Nineteenth Diplomatic Session of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law decided that a global Convention on the Recovery of Maintenance 
should be a priority for the Twentieth Session.  In preparation, a comprehensive 
questionnaire was distributed to the Member States of the Conference as well as 
other interested States as to their current laws and policies regarding such 
obligations.  Excerpts from their responses are included below.1 These suggest the 
range of approaches to child support. The second excerpt, more specifically, 
summarizes the mechanisms adopted by various States for determining the actual 
amount of the award. 
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Japan Preliminary Document No 2 (Responses to the 2002 Questionnaire)
The Answer By The Japanese Government  A spouse who has the custody of an ‘immature’ 
child (see infra, 3) is entitled to receive child support from the other spouse as the share of 
the expenses of marriage life (Article 760 of the Civil Code), and a parent not married is 
entitled to receive it from the other parent as the expenses of the care and custody of 
children (Articles 766, 749, 771 and 788 of the Civil Code). 
A child may obtain support from his / her parents when he / she is in need (Article 877 
of the Civil Code), and we have no clear definition of a ‘dependent child.’ It is considered, 
however, that parents are under heavier duty of support to an ‘immature’ child (i.e. a child 
who cannot maintain his / her economic life without the care and custody of parents) than to 
a ‘mature’ child. 
 * * * 
Child support is ultimately determined through judicial process. 
Child support can be paid either a) by a parent to the child as the performance of 
maintenance obligation, or b) by a parent to the other as the payment of expenses for the 
care and custody of their child. Whatever the legal ground is, the amount can be determined 
by the agreement between the parties concerned. If no agreement is reached or possible, the 
Family Court shall determine the matter by the procedure provided by the Law for 
Determination of Family Affairs (Articles 766, 749, 771, 788 and 879 of the Civil Code and 
Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Law for Determination of Family Affairs). The District Court 
may determine child support in the latter sense (i.e. the payment of expenses for the care 
and custody of the child) in conjunction with the declaration of divorce or annulment of 
marriage (Article 15 of the Law of Procedure in Actions Relating to Personal Status). 
The question of international jurisdiction will be decided on the basis of case law where 
one of the parties lives abroad. Apart from that, the same process will apply regardless of 
the parties’ residence. 
 * * * 
We don’t have any formula, guidelines, or other criteria in making the assessment of 
child support. The child support award may be determined at the discretion of the Family 
Court mainly based on the best interest of the child and the following considerations: 
a. gross and net income of the parents 
b. income taxes, health insurance payments etc. of the parents 
c. business expenses of the parents 
d. age of the child 
e. educational expenses for the child 
f. any other factors the court may deem relevant 
 * * * 
There have been some reported court cases in which a Family Court of Japan rendered a 
decision which in effect altered the preceding foreign judgement by applying the applicable 
law designated by Horei (Law Concerning the Applicable Law in General) in a situation where 
there had been substantial change of circumstances after the foreign judgement and the court 
found that it had international jurisdiction over the case. However, there is no established 
precedent with respect to the modification of foreign maintenance decisions as such.
Sweden
In Sweden, child support guidelines are promulgated by the Department of Social 
Welfare.  The starting point is the standard monthly amount established for dependant 
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adults.  The amount of maintenance for children is pro-rated, depending upon their age 
as follows: 0-6 years, 65%; 7-12 years, 80%; 13 years until majority, 95%.  Parents are 
expected to support the child according to their respective incomes.  If the parents 
stipulate an amount of child support, the courts will generally affirm it.  Sweden has a 
child support assurance program; that is, there is a public guarantee of the basic 
payment which will be made to a lone mother if the father does not contribute.  The 
Swedish government attempts to collect from the father, as set out more specifically in 
Sweden’s response to the question below.
Sweden a) Maintenance payments shall be determined by a judgment or by agreement.  
Payments shall be made in advance for each calendar month. However, the court may 
decide on another mode of payment if there are special reasons for doing so.  An agreement 
under which future maintenance is to be paid by means of a lump sum or for periods 
exceeding three months is valid only if it is in writing and is witnessed by two persons. If 
the child is under eighteen years of age, the agreement must also be approved by the Social 
Welfare Committee.  Maintenance in the form of a lump sum shall be paid to the Social 
Welfare Committee if the child is under eighteen years of age. The sum paid to the 
committee shall be used to purchase from an insurance company an annuity for the child 
appropriate to the obligation to maintain the child, unless the agreement prevents this or the 
Committee finds that the sum can be used in some other appropriate manner for the 
maintenance of the child.  An application for maintenance payments to be determined may 
not be granted for a retroactive period of more than three years prior to the date of which 
proceedings were commenced, unless the person liable to pay maintenance agrees.  b) If the 
spouses cannot agree on the issue of maintenance, a court can determine the dispute.  After 
a divorce, the maintenance allowance shall be periodic. However, payment of a lump sum 
can be ordered if there are special reasons, e.g. that the spouse needs to make a pension 
contribution.  An application for maintenance payments to be determined may not be 
granted for a retroactive period of more than three years prior to the date of which 
proceedings were commenced, unless the person liable to pay maintenance agrees. 
 * * * 
Children, spouses and divorced spouses are eligible to benefit from maintenance decisions.
What is your definition of a dependent child for support purposes?  a) A child under 
eighteen years of age; b) A child over eighteen, but under twenty-one years of age, if the 
child’s basic education is not concluded. 
Which is the law applicable to the question of eligibility of (a) a child and (b) a  spouse 
or other family member to obtain maintenance?  The law of the State where the dependent 
has his or her habitual residence is applicable if the parties do not agree otherwise. 
Procedures for the initial assessment of maintenance
Is child support determined through an administrative or a judicial process? 
Maintenance support for a child with parents who are separated is paid to the custodial 
parent by the local Social Insurance Office at a rate of  SEK 1173/month.  The parent liable 
for maintenance must repay the State, related to income and total number of children.  If the 
allowance instead is paid directly to the custodial parent, the Social Insurance Office pays 
an equally reduced support.  The obligation to repay is initially determined through an 
administrative process.  There is no reason for a child or a parent to ask a court for a 
maintenance order unless the liable parent should pay more than SEK 1173/month and 
neglects this obligation. 
Is the process different where either the applicant or the respondent live abroad?  If so, 
please give details.
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Children living abroad are not entitled to maintenance support from the Social 
Insurance Office.  In those cases the maintenance allowances are decided through an 
agreement or a judicial process. 
If the liable parent lives abroad, the Social Insurance Office can order the custodial 
parent to take steps to get the maintenance obligation determined through a judicial process. 
The Social Insurance Office takes over the child’s right to maintenance allowance up to the 
sum paid out by the office as maintenance support. 
 * * * 
Methods of calculating maintenance 
Is the assessment of child support based on a formula, guidelines, or other criteria?  
Please outline the principal elements involved in making an assessment.
It is based on legal criteria.  A parent is entitled to retain from his or her incomes net of 
tax an amount for his or her own maintenance.  Housing expenses are generally calculated.  
In addition to this, there are other living expenses, which are computed with the guidance of 
an index-linked standard amount.  He or she can also reserve an amount for maintenance of 
a spouse at home if there are special reasons.  Finally the liable parent can make a 
reservation for an amount for the support of children at home.  How much of the excess that 
should be claimed for maintenance allowance depends, among other things, on the needs of 
the child and the other parent’s capacity to bear the maintenance expenses.  To some extent 
deductions can be made for expenses for contact. 
Are there any differences in the assessment criteria employed when (a) the applicant or 
(b) the respondent live abroad?  
No (if the same law still is applicable). 
 * * * 
Responses of the Czech Republic to the Questionnaire
Form of maintenance decision Maintenance decisions concerning obligations toward child, 
spouse or parent are issued by Czech courts as judgments.  In the judgment, the court 
specifies regular alimony payments and/or in what manner the due alimony debt is to be 
paid (by one-time amount paid or in several installments at due dates stipulated by the 
court).  Parents may agree on the alimony for a minor child.  The parents’ written agreement 
is examined by the court in respect to its being in compliance with minor child’s interest 
and needs and shall be approved by the same; the court approval is released as a judgment.  
The court judgment regarding the maintenance obligation satisfaction by means of a one-
time amount settlement or property transfer is not governed by Czech Laws.  Only spouses 
being parties of divorce proceedings may, pursuant to Family Act #94/1963 Coll. Sec. 94 
para 2 in its current version, enter into a written agreement concerning a one-time 
maintenance settlement in an agreed amount once for ever. 
Eligibility Pursuant to Family Act #94/1963 Coll. in its current version are eligible for 
maintenance in the Czech Republic children, spouses and parents.  A maintenance 
allocation is due, under Sec. 95 of said Act, to unmarried mother of the child, for a period 
of 2 years.  Under Sec. 85 para 1 of the Act, children are entitled to maintenance as long as 
they are incapable of earning their own living (e.g. until they complete a study preparing for 
performing certain occupation). 
Procedures for the initial assessment of maintenance As stated hereabove, maintenance 
is established in court proceedings.  The procedure in a Czech court in such proceedings is 
not affected by circumstances that the applicant or the respondent live abroad or that the 
application for maintenance judgment pertains to a spouse or a parent, to the difference to a 
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child.  Proceedings for maintenance of a child or a person specified here may not be 
combined. 
Methods of calculating maintenance The calculation of maintenance for a 
child/spouse/parent is not being made on the basis of a formula, directions or firmly defined 
criteria.  The Family Act #94/1963 Coll. in its current version sets forth that, in determining 
the alimony amount, the court shall take into consideration the justified needs of the 
beneficiary (i.e. the person entitled to maintenance) and the liable persons (i.e. person liable 
to provide for maintenance) abilities, capacity and property as well.  This method shall be 
used for determining the maintenance also in cases when the beneficiary or the liable person 
is living abroad. 
Reassessment (adjustment) modification of maintenance decisions or assessments If the 
material standing of the beneficiary or the liable person, being the basis for determining the 
maintenance for a minor child, change, the court may, even without a motion modify the 
original court judgment or parents’ agreement on the maintenance.  However, if the child is 
of lawful age already, a motion for change or revocation of a judgment on the maintenance 
must be filed.  Maintenance is not automatically valorized in the Czech Republic.
Maintenance may be modified up or down due to reasons quoted hereabove (change 
of material standing on beneficiary’s or liable person’s part) only.  A decision 
concerning maintenance or maintenance amount made by a foreign authority may be 
changed following a motion filed by liable person abroad (in the country where the liable 
person has his/her residence), however, the beneficiary must not be deprived of his/her 
rights as a part to the proceedings in such proceedings (any and all documents must be 
duly delivered to him/her or his/her legal counsel, he/she must have the opportunity to 
take position in the proceedings etc.), a decision of a foreign court must not collide with 
the public order of the Czech Republic. The enforcement of a foreign decision 
concerning maintenance is possible in the Czech Republic based on reciprocity, usually 
warranted by a bilateral or multilateral international treaty. 
William Duncan, First Secretary, Note on the desirability of revising the Hague 
Conventions on Maintenance Obligations2
Generally speaking, child support formulae, whether judicially or legislatively established, 
involve a balance between the child’s needs and the liable parent’s ability to pay, but 
precise formulae differ from country to country and between states within certain federal 
systems. The following are examples. 
In the United Kingdom, the Child Support Act 1991 introduced a complicated formula, 
contained in algebraic form in the schedule to the Act, under which the liable parent could 
be required to pay at the rate of 50% of  disposable income after tax and various 
allowances. 
Under the new German law on child maintenance (Kindesunterhaltsgesetz), which came 
into force on 1 July 1998 (BGBl [Bundesgesetzblatt/Official Gazette] 1998 I 666), 
maintenance may be requested either in the form of a fixed amount (Individualunterhalt), or 
a percentage of the relevant standard amount (Regelbetrag). A fixed amount is usually 
claimed on the basis of one of the various tables established by the courts in the past (the 
best known being the Düsseldorfer Tabelle) and which continue to be used. The standard 
amounts are determined in a statutory instrument (Regelbetrag-Verordnung) which is 
annexed to the new law so as to enable amendment by the executive (presumably on a two-
yearly basis). The statutory instrument distinguishes three different age categories of the 
maintenance creditor; it also establishes specific amounts applicable to the Eastern part of 
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Germany (the former GDR). The standard amounts serve essentially as an assessment basis 
for the issuing of a so-called dynamic maintenance title (Unterhaltstitel in dynamisierter 
Form). Example: Let us assume the maintenance debtor has a net income of 4500 DM and 
the child is 15 years old; according to the Düsseldorfer Tabelle, the fixed amount of 
maintenance would be 713 DM, which equals to 142% of the relevant standard amount 
determined by the statutory instrument (i.e. 502 DM); since this is below the limit of 150% 
fixed by the law, the maintenance debtor is entitled to a dynamic maintenance title. The 
particular benefit of a dynamic maintenance title lies in the fact that the amount to be paid 
by the maintenance debtor is automatically adjusted if the standard amounts are changed or 
if the maintenance creditor moves into the next age category. Furthermore, a dynamic 
maintenance title is immediately enforceable. The standard amounts also serve as a decisive 
marker for the possibility of a simplified maintenance procedure (see footnote 13). 
In the United States, in order to be eligible for Federal funding of child support 
enforcement programmes, individual states must adopt guidelines for child support. (See 
the Child Support Enforcement Program under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.) Some 
states employ percentage tables based on the liable parent’s net or gross income. Another 
formula begins with an assessment of the minimum needs of the liable parent. 
In Sweden, maintenance support is based on a percentage of the annual income of the 
liable parent reduced by a basic allowance. The percentage rate depends on the number of 
children for whom the liable parent is responsible. 
In Canada, judicially established formulae (see Paras v. Paras [1971] 1 OR 130 (Ont. 
C.A.) and Levesque v. Levesque [1994], 4 R.F.L. (4th) 373 (Alta C.A.)) have recently been 
replaced by federal Guidelines, based on Tables which establish monthly child support 
payments by reference to the liable parent’s income, with the percentage increased for the 
number of children and modified slightly by income levels. The tables differ for each 
Province in accordance with different tax rates. The Guidelines are in the form of 
regulations made pursuant to legislation amending the Federal Divorce Act 1985. In 
Austria, where maintenance payments continue to be assessed by the courts, guidelines 
established by the courts operate based on the statistically calculated average needs for 
children of a certain age and a certain percentage of the net income of the maintenance 
debtor. 
4. Private International Law Conventions 
There are four Hague Conventions dealing with maintenance obligation.  English 
translations of two are set out below.  As explained in the excerpt by William Duncan, 
set out in Section 8, these conventions are out of date, ineffective, and many States 
have never become parties to them.  Until a new convention is drafted, however, they 
remain the only alternative in many cases. 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations towards Children 
(24 October 1956) 
The States signatory to the present convention;  
Desiring to establish common provisions concerning the law applicable to obligations 
to support minor children;  
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Have resolved to conclude a Convention for this purpose and have agreed to the 
following provisions: 
Article 1  The law of the habitual residence of the minor child determines whether, to what 
extent, and from whom the minor child may claim support. 
In case of change of the habitual residence of the minor child, the law of the new 
habitual residence is applicable as of the moment when the change occurs. 
Said law equally controls in ascertaining who is qualified to institute the action for 
support and what periods limit its institution. 
* * * 
Article 2  In derogation of the provisions of article one each of the contracting States may 
declare its own law applicable, if 
a. the claim is made before an authority of such State, 
b. the person against whom support is claimed as well as the minor child have the 
nationality of such State, and 
c. the person against whom support is claimed has his habitual residence in such State. 
* * * 
Article 4  The law declared applicable by the present Convention may be disregarded only if 
its application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State to which the 
authority concerned pertains. 
Article 5  The present Convention does not apply to relations concerning support between 
collaterals. 
It governs only conflicts of laws respecting obligations of support. 
 * * * 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to 
Maintenance Obligations (2 October 1973)
The States signatory to the present Convention; 
Desiring to establish common provisions to regulate the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions involving obligations to support minor children; 
Have resolved to conclude a Convention for this purpose and have agreed to the 
following provisions: 
Article 1  The purpose of the present Convention is to ensure reciprocal recognition and 
execution, by the contracting States, of decisions rendered pursuant to petitions, 
international or internal in character, involving claims for support by a legitimate, not 
legitimate, or adopted minor child, not married and less than twenty-one years of age. 
If the decision contains provisions on a matter other than the obligation of support, the 
effect of the Convention is limited to the latter. 
The Convention does not apply to decisions concerning support between collaterals. 
Article 2  Decisions rendered concerning support in one of the contracting States shall be 
recognized and declared executory, without review of the merits (révision au fond) in the 
other contracting States, if  
1.  the deciding authority had jurisdiction under the present Convention; 
2.  the respondent party was duly cited or represented in accordance with the law of the 
State to which the deciding authority pertains; nevertheless, in case of decision by 
default, recognition and enforcement may be refused if, in view of the circumstances 
of the case, the executing authority deems that, without his fault, the defaulting party 
did not have knowledge of, or was not able to defend himself in, the proceeding; 
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3. the decision has become res judicata (chose jugée) in the State where it was 
rendered; nevertheless, decisions which are provisionally enforceable and 
interlocutory measures, although subject to review, shall be declared executory by 
the executing authority if like decisions may be rendered and enforced in the State to 
which such authority pertains; 
4. the decision is not contrary to a decision rendered on the same subject matter and 
between the same parties in the State where it is invoked; recognition and 
enforcement may be refused if, before the decision was pronounced, the matter had 
been pending in the State where it is invoked; 
5.  the decision is not manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State where 
it is invoked. 
Article 3  For the purposes of the present Convention, the following authorities have 
jurisdiction to render decisions involving support: 
1. the authorities of the State in the territory of which the party liable for support had 
his habitual residence at the moment when suit was instituted; 
2.  the authorities of the State in the territory of which the party entitled to support had 
his habitual residence at the moment when suit was instituted; 
3.  the authority to whose jurisdiction the party liable for support has submitted either 
expressly, or by pleading to the merits without reservations as respects the 
jurisdiction. 
Article 4  A party who relies on a decision or who demands enforcement thereof must 
produce: 
1. a transcript of the decision satisfying the conditions necessary for its authenticity; 
2.  documents serving to establish that the decision is executory; 
3.  in case of decision by default, an authentic copy of the process instituting the suit 
and documents serving to establish that such process has been duly served. 
Article 5  Examination by the executing authority shall confine itself to the conditions 
contemplated in article 2 and the documents enumerated in article 4. 
* * * 
Article 7  If the decision of which enforcement is sought, has ordered support to be 
provided by periodical payments, enforcement shall be granted for both payments already 
due and future payments. 
5. Public International Law 
Child support has been recognized as a human right. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child3
Article 27  1. States Parties recognized the right of every child to a standard of living 
adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. 
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have primary responsible to secure, 
within their abilities and financial capacities, the condition of living necessary for the 
child’s development. 
3. States Parties, in accordance with national condition and within their mean, shall 
appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this 
right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, 
particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing. 
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4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance 
for the child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, 
both within the State Party and from abroad.  In particular, where the person having 
financial responsibility for the child lives in a State different from that of the child, States 
shall promote the accession to international agreements or the conclusion of such 
agreement, as well as the making of other appropriate arrangements.  
6.  Regional Conventions 
The following example suggests some of the difficulties, including language, in 
international child support, even where the States Parties have similar cultural norms.  
Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations4
Scope
Article 1  The purpose of this Convention is to establish the law applicable to support 
litigations and to jurisdiction and international procedural cooperation when the support 
creditor is domiciled or habitually resides in one State Party and the debtor is domiciled or 
habitually resides or has property or income in another State Party. 
This Convention shall apply to child support obligations owed because of the child’s 
minority and to spousal support obligations arising from the matrimonial relationship 
between spouses or former spouses. 
When signing, ratifying, or acceding to this Convention, a State may declare that it 
restricts the scope of the Convention to child support obligations. 
Article 2  For the purposes of this Convent ion, a child shall be any person below the age of 
eighteen years. However, the benefits of this Convention shall also apply to those who, 
having attained that age, continue to be entitled to support under the applicable Iaw 
prescribed by Articles 6 and 7. 
 *   *   * 
Article 5  Decisions rendered pursuant to this Convention shall be without prejudice to 
questions of parentage and family relationships between support creditors and debtors. 
Where relevant, however, such decisions may be used as evidence. 
Applicable law    
Article 6  Support obligations, as well as the definition of support creditor and debtor, shall 
be governed by whichever of the following laws the competent authority finds the most 
favorable to the creditor: 
a. That of the State of domicile or habitual residence of the creditor;  
b. That of the State of domicile or habitual residence of the debtor.  
Article 7   The applicable law pursuant to Article 6 shall determine: 
a. The amount of support due and the timing of and conditions for payment ;  
b. Who may bring a support claim on behalf of the creditor; and  
c. Any other condition necessary for enjoyment of the right to support. 
Jurisdiction  
Article 8  At the option of the creditor, support claims may be heard by the following 
judicial or administrative authorities: 
a. Those of the State of domicile or habitual residence of the creditor;  
b. Those of the State of domicile or habitual residence of the debtor; or  
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c. Those of the State to which the debtor is connected by personal links such as 
possessing property, receiving income or obtaining financial benefits.  
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, a judicial or administrative authority of 
another State shall also have jurisdiction if the defendant appears before it without 
challenging its jurisdiction. 
Article 9  Actions to increase the amount of support may be heard by any of the authorities 
mentioned in Article 8. Actions to discontinue or reduce support shall be heard by the 
authorities of the State that set the amount of support. 
Article 10  Support shall be commensurate with both the need of the creditor and the 
financial resources of the debtor. 
Should a judicial or administrative authority responsible for enforcing or securing the 
effectiveness of a judgment order provisional measures or provide for execution of 
judgment in an amount lower than requested, the rights of the creditor shall not thereby be 
impaired. 
International procedural cooperation   
Article 11  Support orders of one State Party shall be enforced in other States Parties if they 
meet the following requirements: 
a. The judicial or administrative authority issuing the order had jurisdiction under 
Articles 8 and 9 of this Convention to hear and decide the matter;  
b. The order and the documents attached thereto required under this Convention have 
been duly translated into the official language of the State in which the order is to be 
enforced;  
c. As necessary, the order and the documents attached thereto have been certified in 
accordance with the law of the State in which the order is to be enforced;  
d. They have been certified in accordance with the law of the State of origin;  
e. The defendant was served with notice or was summoned to appear in due legal form 
substantially equivalent to that established by the law of the State in which the order 
is to be enforced;  
f. The parties had the opportunity to present their defense;  
g. The orders are final in the State in which they were rendered. A pending appeal from 
such order shall not delay its enforcement.  
Article 12  A request for enforcement of an order shall include the following;  
a. A certified copy of the order;  
b. Certified copies of the documents needed to prove compliance with Article 11.e and 
11.f;  
c. A certified copy of a document showing that the support order is final or is being 
appealed. 
 *   *   * 
7. National Implementation 
The following examples compare child support in two Asian societies.  Both China
and Japan expect the parties to reach agreement on this question.  In addition, it sets 
forth the U.S. approach to problems involving international child support, which 
strongly favors bilateral agreements.   
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Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China5
Article 36 The relationship between parents and children does not terminate due to the 
divorce of parents. After the divorce of the parents, the children remain the children of both 
parties no matter they are supported directly by either the father or mother. 
Both father and mother shall, after divorce, have the right and the obligation of 
upbringing their children. 
It is the principle that the children during lactation shall be brought up by their mother 
after the divorce of the parents. If any dispute arises concerning which party shall bring up 
the children beyond lactation, such dispute shall be settled by the people’s court according 
to the specific conditions of both parties and in light of protecting the rights and interests of 
the children. 
Article 37 If, after the divorce of parents, the children are to be brought up by either party, 
the other party shall undertake a part or all of the necessary living and education expenses. The 
amount and term of payment shall be agreed upon by both parties; if no agreement is achieved, 
the amount and term shall be decided by the people’s court. No agreement or judgment 
concerning the expenses for the living and education of the children may in no way prevent the 
children from making reasonable requests, where necessary, to either parent for an amount 
beyond the amount as determined in the said agreement or judgment. 
Japan6
Since the nineties, the number of Japanese children living in families headed by divorced, 
separated, widowed or unmarried mothers has been on a sharp upward trajectory. The 1998 
lone-mother national survey recorded 954,900 such families, representing a 20.9% increase 
from the previous 1993 survey. The ranks of such families continue to grow with the 
divorce rate hitting a record 2.27 per thousand people in 2001. In a comparison with 
European countries, this figure places Japan in the middle band of divorce rates. However, 
unlike most European countries, Japan has no system for the collection of child support 
(maintenance) payments from non-compliant fathers. This unsatisfactory situation is 
causing very serious hardship for many Japanese mother-headed families and puts Japan 
behind in this very important area of social legislation. 
Non-payment of child support (Youikuhi in Japanese) by absent fathers is one of the 
three primary causes of child poverty in Japan. The other two are low wages and inadequate 
social transfers. According to the Citizen’s Basic Living Survey (Kokumin seikatsu kiso 
chosa) released in August 2002, lone-mother families are now some of the poorest in Japan. 
Their average annual income was just 2.52 million yen compared with the average 
household of about 6.17 million yen. 
Japan is deficient in several areas of child support (Youikuhi), most importantly having 
no mechanism in place for enforcing payment or collecting arrears. There is also no system 
for tracking down non-compliant fathers, no requirement to conduct DNA-paternity tests 
and no means for deducting money from the delinquent father’s salary. The courts normally 
do not take action if a spouse does not meet their obligations. To make matters worse, the 
legal framework for solving child support disputes is totally inadequate and requires an 
inordinate amount of time and money. 
Considering the high cost of raising a child in Japan, child support (maintenance) 
payments are relatively low. This is even the case if such payments are awarded by the 
family court. In normal divorce proceedings, the level of child support is usually mutually 
agreed. However, if a husband reneges on the agreement, the wife can do little unless she 
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has the financial resources to pursue the matter legally. Even then, she will not be able to 
obtain full redress. 
For example, a couple sign an official divorce arbitration document in which the 
husband agrees to pays 20,000 yen in child support per month. If he subsequently doesn’t 
pay, the wife only has the option of taking the matter to the courts. However, even if she 
eventually wins, the husband can only be forced to pay up to a quarter of the agreed 
monthly amount. This makes the entire exercise rather fruitless. Furthermore, the legal 
option takes between six months and two years and is an expensive process. Compounding 
the problem is the acute shortage of lawyers in many prefectures, which makes a legal 
solution even more unrealistic. Since the overwhelming majority of lone-mothers do not 
have the financial resources required to go to court, they just have to accept non-payment 
when it occurs. Additionally, it is very difficult to repeatedly go to court with children, 
especially if the mother is working. The few women who take the legal avenue complain 
that nearly all the judges and lawyers are men and the entire process is conducted from a 
male’s perspective. 
Attempts to amend the law have been made, but conservative lawmakers have always 
managed to derail or castrate enforcement measures. For example, a 1985 amendment to the 
child maintenance law had a provision that legally required fathers who could pay to pay. 
However, when this item came before the Diet, the concrete measures required to 
implement the policy were deleted from the final draft. This rendered the legislation next to 
worthless as a father was merely obliged rather than forced to pay child support. Some 
conservative lawmakers argued that making men liable to pay for divorced children would 
go against Japanese traditions. The extremely low number of female politicians may also be 
a factor in the inability of Japanese lawmakers to pass meaningful legislation. 
In comparison to other countries, Japan has been very slow to respond to the changes in 
family structures. Despite the dramatic increase in mother-headed families, the only policy 
the government has consistently pursued is to reduce the welfare budget for such families. 
At present, government policy only stipulates that divorced fathers have an obligation to 
contribute to the cost of raising their children, but there are still no legal measures to make 
them do so. This ineffectual policy was reaffirmed by the Koizumi Cabinet in June 2002. 
Currently, there are no plans on the horizon to introduce a law to force delinquent fathers to 
pay child support. 
Non-payment or the failure to pay the correct amount of child maintenance has been, 
and is, a major problem in most OECD countries. Research indicates that when a father is 
not legally obliged to pay child support, default of these payments is very common. For 
example, most American fathers did not comply with child support orders in the early 
eighties. For this reason, the US passed a series of laws starting in 1984 to increase the 
amount of compliance. A similar pattern occurred in most European countries. In 1993, 
Ontario introduced a scheme for deducting maintenance payments directly from a father’s 
salary. At the same time, a similar arrangement was also functioning in Australia and 
Wisconsin State. In 1993, the British government set up the Child Support Agency to 
collect support payments from absent fathers. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway all took varying approaches to ensure that non-compliant fathers paid 
child support. Only Japanese fathers have been able to escape their obligations with 
impunity. 
Consequently, in the nineties various surveys showed that only between 10% to 20% of 
fathers paid the correct level of child support. There was a great deal of regional variation 
with a 1999 Okinawa survey showing only 10% of fathers there paid child support. 
It can be seen that child support legislation is an area where Japan is completely out of 
sync with other industrially advanced nations. The present payment system is unsatisfactory 
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for a number of reasons. Primarily, many fathers simply do not pay, even if they are high 
income earners. Unlike in most other developed nations, the law has not been amended to 
take into account the rise in the divorce rate and the increase in the number of children 
living in single-parent families. 
One of the primary reasons for lone-mother poverty in Japan is that fathers do not 
financially support their children. Research conducted in other countries clearly shows that 
this is largely due to the lack of an adequate system for the collection of child support 
payments from non-compliant fathers. Since the number of divorces continues to climb, 
there is a pressing need for lawmakers to overhaul the current system. Without adequate 
provision, both Japanese mothers and children will continue to suffer. Despite this critical 
situation, legislators still appear to be reluctant to act. 
United States 
The United States has historically been reluctant to become a party to any multilateral 
treaty regarding maintenance obligations, in part because the states, rather than the 
federal government, assume responsibility for such obligations.  Instead, the United 
States has entered into a series of bilateral agreements. 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of            for the Enforcement of Maintenance (Support) Obligations
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of ________ 
(hereinafter referred to as the Parties), 
Resolved to establish a uniform and effective framework for the enforcement of 
maintenance obligations and the recognition of maintenance decisions, and the 
determination of parentage, 
 * * * 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1  Objective 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties hereby seek to provide for: 
 a.  the recovery of maintenance or the reimbursement of maintenance to which a 
maintenance creditor or a public body having provided benefits for a maintenance 
creditor subject to the jurisdiction of one Party (hereinafter referred to as the 
claimant) is entitled from a maintenance debtor who is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the other Party (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), and 
 b.  the recognition and enforcement of maintenance orders, reimbursement orders and 
settlements (hereinafter referred to as maintenance decisions) made or recognized 
within the jurisdiction of either Party. 
 Article 2  Scope 
1.  This Agreement shall apply to maintenance obligations arising from a family 
relationship or parentage, including a maintenance obligation towards a child born out 
of wedlock. However, a maintenance obligation towards a spouse or former spouse 
where there are no minor children will be enforced in the United States under this 
Agreement only in those States and other jurisdictions of the United States that elect to 
do so. 
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2.  This Agreement applies to the collection of payment arrears on a valid maintenance 
obligation and any applicable interest on arrears and to the modification or other 
official change in amounts due under an existing maintenance decision. 
3.  The remedies provided for in this Agreement are not exclusive and do not affect the 
availability of any other remedies for the enforcement of a valid maintenance 
obligation. 
Article 3  Central Authorities 
1. The Parties shall each designate a body as Central Authority which shall facilitate 
compliance with the provisions of this agreement. 
 * * * 
 Article 5  Functions of the Central Authority of the Requested Party 
The Central Authority or other designated public body of the Requested Party shall take on 
behalf of the claimant all appropriate steps for the recovery or reimbursement of 
maintenance, including the institution and prosecution of proceedings for maintenance, the 
determination of parentage where necessary, the execution of any judicial or administrative 
decision and the collection and distribution of payments collected. 
 Article 6  Cost of services 
All procedures described in this Agreement, including services of the Central Authority, 
and necessary legal and administrative assistance, shall be provided by the Requested Party 
without cost to the claimant. 
* * * 
 Article 7  Recognition and enforcement of maintenance decisions 
1. Maintenance decisions, including maintenance decisions arising from a determination 
of parentage, from one Party shall be recognized and enforced in the other Party to the 
extent that the facts in the case support recognition and enforcement under the 
applicable laws and procedures of the latter Party. 
* * * 
 Article 8  Applicable Law 
1.  All actions and proceedings under this Agreement by either Party shall be carried out 
pursuant to the law including choice of law provisions and procedures of that Party. 
2.  The physical presence of the child or custodial parent shall not be required in 
proceedings under this Agreement within the jurisdiction of the Requested Party. 
8. NGOs and IOs 
NGOs
The Poverty of Families Headed by Solo Mothers7   The number of families headed by solo 
mothers (solo mothers with children under 20 years old) is about 789,000. The number of 
divorces has been increasing recently. The average income of these families is about 2.15 
million yen (1993), only one third of that of general families. About 87% of solo mothers 
have jobs, but only 50% have full time jobs, while 30% are part-timers. Only 15% of the 
fathers pay for the cost of bringing up children. Solo mothers do not get a sufficient share of 
property in the case of divorce and a very low percentage of them own their own homes. 
Because of the recent downturn in the economy, many solo mothers, who are in a weak 
position in the labor market, are forced to face sudden dismissal, bankruptcy, a change in 
the type of contract, bullying, and sexual harassment. One solo mother pays 80,000 yen out 
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of her monthly income of 150,000 yen, to rent a small private room. Her family has to 
survive on the remaining 70,000 yen, paying all other expenses out of this. 
In Japan, families headed by solo mothers caused by the death of fathers can receive a 
survivor’s pension and others can receive a child-rearing allowance. The amount of the 
former is twice as much as that of the latter. 
In 1998, as part of a governmental economic restructuring policy, the upper limit of the 
annual income permitted to get the benefit of the child-rearing allowance was lowered from 
4.07 million yen to 3 million yen and as a result, about 74,000 mothers lost the benefit. At 
the same time, local government bodies carried out the same kind of policies, such as 
lowering the annual income limit for free medical services for solo mothers’ families. If 
children need constant medical care such as for asthma, solo mothers face even more 
difficulties. 
The Japanese government has partly amended its discriminatory treatment of the 
child-rearing allowance for unmarried mothers. This is the government’s only positive 
move. We demand that the government lowers the upper limit of the income permitted for 
solo mothers to receive the allowance, and takes more positive initiatives to help solo 
mothers to find jobs.  
 *   *   * 
IOs 
As noted in Section 3, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has long 
recognized the importance of transnational maintenance and the difficulties in 
enforcing it.  In 1995, a study sponsored by the Conference concluded that the multiple 
conventions in effect functioned adequately.  To the extent that they did not, it was felt 
that deep underlying differences among the States precluded reform.  An excerpt from 
that study, focusing on the different public policy objectives of various States in 
connection with out of wedlock births, is set forth below.  
In 1999, the subject was revisited and the conclusion was very different.  An 
excerpt from the report of First Secretary William Duncan follows. 
From Maintenance Obligations  – Drawn up by Michel Pelichet, Deputy Secretary 
General, 9/95
87 A large number of decisions concern public policy invoked against maintenance 
allowances which have to be paid to a child born out of wedlock and are founded on the 
existence of intimate relations between the defendant and the mother, established solely on 
the basis of a statement by the latter. In this connection, an important judgment of the Court 
of Cassation of 25 January 1977 sanctions a well-established trend in French case law. The 
judgment first of all ascertains that in the light of Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Hague 
Convention of 1958, the French concept of international public policy cannot impede the 
enforcement, unless the foreign decision is manifestly incompatible with this concept; it 
subsequently asserts that this is not the case, as the mother’s statements are corroborated by 
other factors, the evidential force of which is sovereignly appraised by the foreign judge. In 
this case, the Court of Appeal had found that, in the light of the German decision, not only 
was there no indication that the mother had lied under oath, but also the defendant, who had 
raised an objection on the grounds of plurium concubentium, had failed to provide any 
evidence of the plurality of lovers; nor had he invoked any other ground in support of his 
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non-paternity.  In another judgment of the French Court of Cassation delivered on 7 March 
1978, it is equally clearly established that the French concept of international public policy 
does not stand in the way of the enforcement of a foreign judgment, which based the order 
to pay maintenance on the existence of sexual relations between the defendant and the 
mother of the child, established on the basis of a statement by the latter, provided that such 
a statement is corroborated by other factors, the evidential force of which is sovereignly 
appraised by the foreign judge. 
88 A decision of the Italian Court of Cassation goes even further: in fact, the Court of 
Appeal of Brescia had refused to enforce a German judgment, on the grounds that the 
ascertainment of paternity under German law had been based exclusively on evidence taken 
from a statement by the child’s official guardian, in the absence of any objective evidence. 
The Italian Court of Cassation set aside this decision, drawing a distinction between 
recognition of the part of the judgment dealing solely with maintenance, which had to be 
distinguished from the decision concerning the relationships under family law. With regard 
more specifically to the possibility of a partial recognition of the foreign judgment – the 
maintenance obligations alone – it considered that in the case of such a partial recognition, 
the verification of its compatibility with Italian public policy had to be confined to the 
operative clause and ought not to include the merits and evidence, in accordance with 
Italian private international law. 
89 A decision of the Belgian Court of Cassation of 25 October 1979 reaches the same 
conclusion: the defendant maintained that the judgment ordering him to pay a maintenance 
allowance was based solely on a statement made under oath by the mother of the child and 
that  was contrary to Article 340 of the Belgian Civil Code, a provision of public policy. 
The Belgian Court of Cassation considered that Article 340 of the Civil Code was a 
provision of internal public policy and would only be contrary to international public 
policy in the event that by this limitation, the legislator had intended to establish a 
fundamental principle of the political, economic and moral system in Belgium.  However, 
the provision of Article 340 did not constitute such a limitation; the public policy referred 
to in Article 2, paragraph 5, of the 1958 Convention was not the internal public policy of 
the State in which the enforcement was applied for, but the international public policy of 
that State. 
William Duncan, First Secretary, Note on the desirability of revising the Hague 
Conventions on Maintenance Obligations8
9  A quarter of a century has passed since the last two Hague Conventions on maintenance 
obligations were drawn up. It is worth noting certain trends in the development of domestic 
systems of family support which have been in evidence during the intervening years, and 
which may have some relevance in considering appropriate reforms at the international 
level. Some of the legal systems represented during the negotiations twenty-five years ago 
shared certain common features. Maintenance awards were for the most part determined by 
courts on an individualised basis, with the judge having a considerable degree of discretion 
in determining what constituted reasonable maintenance for a dependant having regard to 
the resources of the liable relative and the needs of the dependant. This system of 
individualised justice has come under increasing criticism in several jurisdictions on the 
basis that in its practical operation it tends to be very costly and ineffective. The amounts of 
maintenance awarded are often small, not justifying the expense of a detailed judicial 
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inquiry, and problems of enforcement have tended to be chronic especially in the longer 
term. The burden on lone parents of instituting maintenance proceedings and taking 
measures to enforce judgements has been a heavy one, often undertaken with little prospect 
of obtaining an adequate or regular income in the long term. The problems of poverty 
surrounding single parent families has been met in part by increased public assistance. At 
the same time, many governments have become concerned by the consequent fiscal burden 
in so far as it arises from a failure by liable relatives to honour family commitments. The 
result has been the introduction of various reforms, some still at an experimental stage, 
designed on the one hand, to reduce the burden on individuals of pursuing maintenance 
claims and to secure a regular income for dependant family members, especially children, 
and on the other, to enforce more effectively and at lower cost private support obligations. 
Such measures, which tend to concentrate particularly on child support, may be roughly 
categorised as follows: 
a.  In some countries there has been a change in the way in which maintenance is assessed 
from a broad discretionary basis to one (which has a longer history in certain States) in 
which calculation proceeds on the basis of a more or less refined formula, designed to 
increase predictability and certainty (and indirectly encourage agreement) and to reduce the 
length and costs of hearings. 
b.  In some countries the function of determining the amount of maintenance to be paid, at 
least in the first instance, has become an administrative rather than a judicial function, not 
necessarily involving a hearing, with the objective again of reducing costs and improving 
efficiency. Administrative procedures are sometimes limited to claims for maintenance at or 
below a subsistence level. 
c.  Mechanisms for locating liable relatives, determining their resources, and enforcing 
maintenance orders have become more sophisticated. The use, for example, of orders 
providing for automatic deductions from wages at source have by now become common 
place. Government controlled databases (relating for example to revenue, social welfare or 
public licensing) are being employed more frequently both in gathering relevant 
information and in assisting with enforcement. 
d.  State involvement in securing private maintenance, motivated in part by a wish to reduce 
costs to the State, has in fact intensified in certain jurisdictions. There is a tendency in some 
States towards the integration of public and private support systems, and an acceptance that 
the effective enforcement of private obligations often requires the initiative of the State in 
bringing and enforcing claims against the recalcitrant maintenance debtors.  Systems of 
advance payment by the State of maintenance due to a maintenance creditor are sometimes 
used. 
10 These trends prompt certain questions concerning the existing rules of private 
international law, especially those embodied in the international instruments, and 
concerning the existing systems of administrative and judicial co-operation at the 
international level. For example, does the trend towards simplification in the procedures 
and the basis for assessing maintenance, especially in respect of children, have any 
implications for applicable law rules? Is the increasing involvement of public authorities in 
the process of claiming and enforcing maintenance adequately reflected in current systems 
of administrative and judicial co-operation? Do the existing provisions concerning 
recognition and enforcement of decisions, as well as those concerning co-operation, take 
sufficiently into account the possibilities opened up by the new information technology? 
It is not easy to predict where current trends in the reform of domestic systems will 
eventually lead. However, it may be safe to assume that in any new international 
arrangements, governments will be concerned in particular with questions of cost 
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effectiveness, as well as with the importance of making maximum use of the new 
technology. 
Summary  The potential advantages of working towards a new integrated international 
instrument concerning maintenance obligations may be summarised as follows: 
(1) the development of a set of uniform rules of direct jurisdiction specifying which State’s 
authorities have jurisdiction to decide upon a question of maintenance or to modify an 
existing decision; 
(2) the revision of certain of the provisions concerning the law applicable to maintenance 
obligations contained in the Hague Conventions of 1956 and 1973; 
(3) the reinforcement of the Hague Conventions of 1958 and 1973 on recognition and 
enforcement, by the addition (inter alia) of fast track enforcement procedures, integrated 
provisions concerning administrative co-operation, and provision to encourage the use of 
automated databases and electronic means of communication; 
(4) the improvement of existing machinery for administrative co-operation, by giving more 
precision to the role and functions of responsible national organs; 
(5) the development of a more uniform approach to the provision of assistance in 
proceedings initiated in the State where the debtor has his or her habitual residence. 
81 The Special Commission may therefore wish to consider – 
a whether these are appropriate goals; 
b to what extent any of these goals are likely to be achievable through the development of 
a new international instrument; 
c whether the improvements which appear to be feasible would justify the efforts 
necessary to develop any new instrument. 
82 If a view does emerge that a new instrument is needed, many of the matters which have 
been addressed only in outline above will need to be explored in more detail. The 
Permanent Bureau would then embark on the preparation of a more detailed report. Various 
matters which have not been mentioned in this Note may also need to be addressed. For 
example, is there need for a definition of maintenance to ensure the inclusion of all financial 
orders (i.e. not solely periodical payment orders) whose purpose is to provide for the 
support of dependent family members? Should the scope ratione personae of any new 
instrument take account of changes in the national laws of certain countries extending the 
range of partnerships which give rise to maintenance obligations? The Special Commission 
may wish to identify other areas which may require further study. 
9. A Possible Approach to the Problem 
Fumio is not subsidizing Astrid in Sweden, but in order for Astrid and Yuri to maintain 
their standard of living in Japan, he may have to, because Sweden is subsidizing them 
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now.  Healthcare and education, for example, may well be more expensive in Japan 
because the government assumes less of the cost.  The descriptions of child support in 
Japan and Sweden set out in Section 3, suggests some important differences between 
Japanese and Swedish approaches to this issue.  Japan does not have guidelines, for 
example, while Sweden not only has guidelines but a ‘child support assurance 
program,’ under which Sweden guarantees a payment to Astrid if Fumio does not 
contribute.  If Astrid decides to move, she should not assume that legal process will be 
available in Japan to assure child support.  Indeed, given the very low (15%) 
percentage of Japanese fathers paying support, she should probably expect nothing.  
Even if Fumio is sincere in his assurances in Sweden, he may feel very differently 
when he is back in Japan.   
Thus, it might be advisable for Astrid to request a lump sum to cover her 
anticipated expenses, especially given the sporadic nature of her income.  If Fumio 
does not have the money to give her up front, she should at the very least demand that 
he pay for a Japanese lawyer to advise her regarding the enforceability of an 
Agreement in which Fumio promises to pay her a certain sum every month.  In 
addition, perhaps, she might seek a provision under which he assumes direct 
responsibility for Yuri’s medical expenses and school fees.  In view of the difficulties 
of collecting child support in Japan, described in Section 7, Astrid should be skeptical 
regarding any arrangement that is likely to require her to seek court enforcement.  
Finally, Astrid should consider making any move contingent upon the prior receipt of 
exit costs; i.e., the cost of tickets for Yuri and Astrid back to Sweden, and living 
expenses, including rent, while she re-establishes herself.   
For Further Research 
1. In response to an increasing divorce rate, Japan has sought to limit aid to single 
mothers to discourage divorce by mothers with young children.  For an account of 
Japan’s recent adoption of measures to further restrict eligibility for childcare benefits for 
single mothers, see Curtin, J.S. (2002), ‘Poorest Japanese Families Getting Poorer’; at 
http:www.glocom.org/specialt_topics/social_trends/2002_trends_04/index.html. 
2. For a detailed description of the problems in collecting child support in Argentina, 
and mechanisms adopted to remedy them, see Grossman, C. and Iñigo, D. (2000), 
‘Argentina: The Overriding Interest of the Child in Legislative Policy and in Judicial 
Decision in Argentina,’ in A. Bainham (ed.), The International Survey of Family  Law: 
2000 Edition, Jordan, Bristol, pp. 15-16. For an explanation of Canada’s requiring 
support from psychological as well as biological parents, see Bailey, M. and Bala, N. 
(2000), ‘Canada: Reforming the Definition of Spouse and Child Related Laws,’ in 
ibid. at 71. For a discussion of child support in the Czech Republic, see Gaderjam, J.F. 
(2002),  ‘Czech Republic: A Half-Hearted Family Law Reform of 1998,’ in ibid. at 
128. For a description of the Affiliation Proceedings Bill of 1999 in Botswana, see 
Molokomme, A., ‘Overview of Family Law in Botswana,’ in ibid. 
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3. For a comprehensive and rigorous update, see Hague Conference, William Duncan, 
First Secretary, Note on the desirability of revising the Hague Convention on 
Maintenance Obligations. (Excerpted in Sections 7 and 8, above.) 
Notes 
1  These all may be found at: http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/maint.html.
2  Hague Conference on Private International Law, January 1999.
3  G.A. res. 44/25, annex 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.49) at 167, U.N. Doc.A/44/49 (1989), 
entered into force Sept. 2 1990. 
4  The parties to the Convention are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay.
5  1980 – amended according to the Decision on Amending the Marriage Law of the People’s 
Republic of China made at the 21st meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth 
National People’s Congress on April 28, 2001.
6 http://www.glocom.org/special_topics/social_trends/20020909_trends_s6/. 
7 http://www.jca.apc.org/fem/bpfa/NGOreport/A_en_Poverty.html.
8  Hague Conference on Private International Law, January 1999. 
Chapter 11
Domestic Violence
1. Problem
Naseen is a fifteen year-old girl who grew up in Pakistan.  She has dated a married 
man and her brothers have sworn to kill her.  She has been declared a kari, a ‘black 
woman’ and is serving as a maid in a home of a tribal leader for her own protection.   
You are a lawyer with an aid agency in the region.  Naseen comes to see you and 
explains that she has cousins in the U.K., the U.S., and Canada and that she can live 
with any of them while she finishes high school.  Assuming she can get out of the 
country, where does she have the best chance of being granted asylum as a refugee? 
2. Overview
Domestic violence refers to a broad range of actions, from verbal abuse, including 
threats, to spousal rape and murder, that take place within the privacy of an intimate 
relationship, often within the marital home.  Domestic violence has been a part of 
marriage and other domestic relationships for millions of women throughout the world. 
Even if a husband did not beat his wife, both knew that he could do so if he so chose.  
Even if there are domestic laws prohibiting spouse abuse, as there are in the U.S., 
women are often ashamed or afraid to report it.  Within the past ten years, however, 
domestic violence has been internationally recognized as a crime against women.  It is 
a global problem and international family law deals with it in three specific contexts. 
First, domestic violence is an issue in the enforcement of several ‘private’ 
international treaties, such as the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (see Chapter 9).  These treaties resolve conflicts of law 
issues by coordinating the national laws of States Parties.  Although domestic violence 
is not explicitly referred to in treaties, it is often a relevant issue in the underlying 
domestic law, which must be taken into account under the treaty. 
Second, as part of public international law, domestic violence has recently been 
recognized as a violation of women’s human rights.  At the World Conference of the 
U.N. Decade for Women in 1980, domestic violence was explicitly condemned.  In 
1993 the U.N. General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women.  Recognition of domestic violence as a violation of 
women’s human rights reflects and reinforces the growing numbers of national laws 
that criminalize domestic violence, recognize it as a form of persecution for purposes 
of asylum claims, and provide domestic civil remedies, including damage awards.  
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Since domestic violence is now considered a human rights violation, moreover, the 
State may be held accountable under international treaty monitoring bodies. 
Third, domestic violence has been the subject of several important initiatives, as 
well as sustained efforts at education and intervention, by a number of IOs and NGOs. 
This includes growing networks of private as well as State-sponsored shelters for 
battered women. 
At the same time, there is ongoing resistance to these developments and there are 
new backlashes against them.  Some States, such as Bangladesh and the Sudan, for 
example, have enacted religious laws or Shariah, interpretations of Islam that severely 
limit the rights of women.  This is often presented as a defense of local norms, 
including the traditional prerogative of the patriarch within the home, and resistance to 
Western cultural imperialism. 
Cultures may vary within a State as well.  In the United States, for example, a 
comprehensive study was done to determine the effectiveness of mandatory arrest 
policies in connection with domestic violence.  Under such policies, adopted on the 
municipal level, a city would require its police force to arrest the defendant whenever  
a domestic violence complaint was made.  In the absence of such policies, in contrast, 
when the police appeared in response to a domestic violence complaint, the 
complainant would often recant and withdraw her complaint.   
The study showed mixed results.  In some cities, mandatory arrests were effective 
in reducing domestic violence (or at least, domestic violence complaints) over time.  In 
others, however, mandatory arrest policies produced an apparent increase in domestic 
violence complaints.  The researchers determined that the different results correlated 
to the racial makeup of the cities studied.  In predominately black cities, mandatory 
arrests produced a backlash, while in predominately white cities, mandatory arrest 
policies were an effective deterrent.  Where the arrest had negative consequences for 
the defendant (in addition to those directly attributable to the arrest itself), such as 
shame, loss of status in the community, or loss of a job, such policies were apt to be 
effective.  Where the defendants did not have an image to protect in the community, 
and may even have regarded the complaint against them as a betrayal, there was more 
likely to be retaliatory violence once the defendant was released. Thus, the 
promulgation of laws and policies to address domestic violence, as set forth below, 
may show a good faith effort on the part of State officials to address the problem.  
Unless such measures are carefully tailored to the culture in which they are expected to 
operate, however, they may be futile or even counterproductive.  
3. Cultural Variations
Pakistan – Killings in the Name of Honor1
In August 1998, Zarina and her alleged paramour, Suleiman, were killed in village Gul 
Mohammad Brohi, Larkana district, by Zarina’s three brothers. 
In April 1998, a young man in the Punjab village Chak NO. 65, axed his mother, 
Ghulam Bibi, to death after she was traced by her family and brought back home following 
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her supposed elopement with a man. 
In Kot Addu, near Multan, Naziran, a mother of six was axed to death by her brother on 
suspicion of an illicit relationship in November 1997. 
On 29 April 1999, Shama Bib, 16, wife of Saif Khan, living in Kahuta, Punjab, was shot 
by her husband on suspicion of her having an illicit relationship. She received bullet injuries in 
her abdomen and her condition was stated to be critical; it is not known if she survived. 
On 6 January 1999, Ghazala was set on fire by her brother in Joharabad, Punjab 
province on suspicion of illicit relations with a neighbour. The burned and naked body 
reportedly lay unattended on the street for two hours as nobody wanted to have anything to 
do with it. 
In Pakistan, hundreds of women, of all ages, in all parts of the country and for a variety 
of reasons connected with perceptions of honour are killed every year. The number of such 
killings appears to be steadily increasing as the perception of what constitutes honour – and 
what damages it – steadily widens. Often honour killings are carried out on the flimsiest of 
grounds, for instance when a wife does not serve a meal quickly enough or when a man 
dreams that his wife betrays him (see below). As state institutions – the law enforcement 
apparatus and the judiciary – have dealt with such crimes against women with extraordinary 
leniency, and as the law provides many loopholes for murderers in the name of honour to 
get away, the tradition remains unbroken. In fact, more and more killings committed for 
other motives take on the guise of honour killings on the correct assumption that they are 
rarely – and if so, only lightly – punished. 
Originally a Baloch and Pashtun tribal custom, honour killings are now reported not 
only in Balochistan, the North West Frontier Providence (NWFP) and Upper Sindh which 
has a strong Baloch influx, but in Punjab province as well. Honour killings are no longer 
only reported from remote rural areas but also – though less frequently – from towns and 
cities. The modes of killing vary somewhat. In Sindh, a kari (literally ‘a black woman’) and 
a karo (‘a black man’) are more ritualistically killed and hacked to pieces, often in view of 
and with the implicit or explicit sanction of the community. In Punjab, such killings usually 
take place by shooting and appear more often based on individual decisions, occurring in an 
urban context and not always perpetrated in public. 
The victims include young pre-pubescent girls, unmarried young girls and women, old 
women, including grandmothers, married women and widows. The mere allegation of girls 
and women having entered illicit sexual relationships usually suffices for their male 
relatives to take the law into their own hands and to kill them. The women are usually not 
given an opportunity to respond to such allegation. An allegation is enough to defile a 
man’s honour, and therefore enough to kill a woman – and the man with whom she is 
alleged to have behaved ‘improperly’, if he can be found. 
According to the non-governmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 
888 women were reported deliberately killed in 1998 in Punjab alone. Of these, 595 killings 
were carried out by relatives: of these 286 were reportedly killed for reasons of honour. The 
Sindh Graduates Association said that in the first three months of 1999 alone, 132 honour 
killings had been reported in Sindh. Everyone contacted by Amnesty International about the 
incidence of honour killings in Pakistan held that the real number of such killings is vastly 
greater than the number reported. 
An analysis of data on karo-kari killings collected by the Special Task Force for Sindh 
of the HRCP during 1998 highlights several remarkable features of honour killings in that 
province: In a total of 196 cases reported in Sindh, 255 persons were killed, including 158 
women and 97 men. The data does not in all cases include information about the 
perpetrators, but of 154 persons killed for reasons of honour where the relation of the 
perpetrators to the killed person is given:  
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• in 46 instances when both a kara and a kari were killed, exactly one half of the 
killings were carried out by the husband of the kari and the other half by male 
relatives of the women concerned; 
• of the 81 women killed alone as kari, 40 were killed by their husbands, 36 by male 
relatives, including, brothers, fathers, uncles or sons, five by others including their 
fathers-in-law or brothers-in-law;  
• of the 27 men killed as karo, three were killed by the husbands of the alleged kari,
and 21 by other male relatives of the women, with three killed by others, including 
the husband’s relatives. 
The fact that male relatives of the women concerned are so frequently perpetrators of the 
killings reflects the conviction that marriage and fidelity are not a matter between husband 
and wife but relate to the family and that a woman’s assumed infidelity reflects on the 
honour of the entire family. While in the majority of cases, husbands, fathers or brothers 
commit the killings of girls and women in the name of honour alone or together with male 
relatives, in some cases, tribal councils or jirgas decide that they should be killed and send 
out men to carry out the deed. A jirga of members of the Afridi tribe living in Karachi 
decided that Riffat Afridi and Kunwar Ahsan were to be killed when they got married 
against Riffat Afridi’s family’s wishes. In March 1998, the husband, Kunwar Ahsan, was 
shot at by his wife’s relatives. He remains permanently disabled. While the couple are still 
seeking a way to settle in another country, the jirga has vowed to find and kill them 
wherever they go. 
 * * * 
Honour killings are by no means confined to remote rural areas. They have been reported, 
though less frequently, in urban settings, sometimes among the urban elite. Samia Sarwar 
was killed on the grounds of honour in April 1999 in Lahore; Riffat Afridi and Kunwar 
Ahsan were attacked in Karachi for having defiled Riffat’s family’s honour by marrying 
against their wishes. A Faisalabad-based film producer on 16 February 1999 allegedly 
strangled his 28-year-old wife and mother of a small child at his rented studio office at 
Allama Iqbal Town on suspicion of her illicit relationship with another man. 
The frequency and randomness of karo-kari incidents contribute to an atmosphere of 
fear among young women in Pakistan. Human rights activists in Balochistan told Amnesty 
International that women facing the danger of being branded siahkari [black women] by the 
merest chance contact with a man not belonging to their families, are driven into ever more 
profound seclusion. 
 * * * 
International support for women fleeing abroad when they fear for their lives from their 
families’ death threats has been hesitant. The threat to the lives of women who refuse to 
accept their fathers’ decisions relating to their marriages has only recently been recognized 
as a ground for granting asylum to such women. 
In a landmark decision, the UK House of Lords in March 1999 ruled that two women 
who had come to Britain after rumours about their having illicit relationships were spread in 
Pakistan, had a well-founded fear of persecution as members of a particular social group, 
namely women, who experience discrimination and oppression because they occupy a lower 
status than men in Pakistani society. They were consequently granted refugee status in the 
UK. 
 * * *  
The judgment can be found on the web site www.parliament.uk under House of Lords, 
judgments. 
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‘Ms. A’s Story’ (Jordan)2
The term ‘honor killing’ refers to the practice in Jordan and other Middle Eastern and 
South Asian countries in which male members of the family are duty-bound to kill a female 
family member whom they think has brought dishonor and shame to their family. The male 
members of the family believe they can only regain their honor by murdering the woman 
for her alleged sexual transgressions.  
 * * * 
Ms. A fled to the United States in 1991 because she feared being the victim of an ‘honor 
killing’ in her home country of Jordan. 
If returned to Jordan, A faces death by the hands of the male members of her family 
because of her alleged sexual transgressions. In the summer of 1991, A and her now-
husband, H., secretly started spending time together. In August, they had premarital sex, 
and in September H. proposed marriage. However, A’s father forbade the marriage because 
H. is Palestinian and had a low paying job. A feared that she would be killed if her family 
found out she had lost her virginity, and she decided to flee Jordan with H. and to get 
married abroad. The airport police told A’s father that she had left the country. 
Since A lost her virginity to H. prior to marriage, left Jordan without her family’s 
permission and married against her family’s wishes, her father has ordered the male 
members to kill her on sight. A has learned through letters from her sister that her father is 
enraged and has declared that the shame she has brought on the family can only be removed 
by ‘blood’. He has made her brothers swear to kill her at any place and time they find her, 
and he has also demanded that all her male relatives – including uncles and cousins – kill 
her if they ever come in contact with her. In the most recent letter, A learned that her father 
said that he cannot rest in peace even if he dies, and if he dies before he can kill her, he will
only rest in peace if her male relatives carry out the killings. 
Honor killings are prevalent in Jordan and have been recognized as a gross human 
rights violation that is inadequately dealt with by the Jordanian government. According to 
the 1998 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights Practices, more than 20 ‘honor 
killings’ were reported in Jordan that year. The report points out, however, that most honor 
killings go unreported and the actual number is believed to be four times as high. Fully 25% 
of the murders in the country are estimated to be honor killings. The only form of protection 
offered by the Jordanian government for women who fear becoming victims of honor 
crimes is their own imprisonment. In 1998, there were up to 50 women involuntarily 
detained in this form of ‘protective custody’. 
 * * * 
Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code provides that men accused of honor killings 
are not prosecuted for murder but instead for ‘crimes of honor,’ which carry lenient 
sentences, averaging three months to a year. (The penalty for murder under the Jordanian 
Penal Code, by comparison, is death.) Recently there was a governmental proposal to 
abolish Article 340. Despite being supported by a worldwide campaign, the proposal was 
defeated in Parliament in November 1999. Members of Parliament stated that abolishing 
Article 340 would amount to ‘legislating obscenity’ and that the efforts in support of the 
proposal ‘are attempts by the West to infiltrate Jordanian society and demoralize women.’ 
A applied for asylum in the U.S., but an immigration judge in California denied her 
claim on January 8, 1998. The immigration judge ruled that A did not have a well-founded 
fear of persecution because there was no evidence that her father had been violent towards 
her in the past, and because she had not directly spoken with her father to confirm his 
threats. The judge ignored the three letters from A’s sister, received over a five-year period, 
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that explicitly state her father’s orders to the male members of the family to kill A on sight. 
Although the judge acknowledged that honor killings do occur in Jordan, the judge stated 
that they are violent episodes in specific families and not a pattern or practice against 
Jordanian women in general. The judge rejected the claim that A’s fear of persecution was 
on account of her membership in a social group defined in part by her gender, and instead 
ruled that A’s fear of becoming a victim of an honor killing was a ‘personal problem’ that 
‘without more, cannot be the basis of an asylum claim.’ 
The BIA upheld the judge’s decision on August 20, 1999, ruling that A’s fear of being 
the victim of an honor killing was speculative, and that such harm would not be persecution 
on account of social group membership, but, rather the unfortunate consequences of a 
‘personal family dispute.’ 
On February 14, 2000, [seven U.S. Senators] sent a letter to Attorney General Janet 
Reno asking her to reverse the BIA’s decision in Ms. A’s case, expressing concern that ‘the 
BIA lacks sufficient understanding of current standards in both United States asylum law 
and policy and international human rights law.’ 
On April 10, 2000, [18 Congress people] wrote a letter to Reno, . . . asking her ‘to 
consider withdrawing U.S. government opposition to Ms. A’s application for asylum.’   
In May 2002, after the INS withdrew its opposition to her case, the Board of 
Immigration on Appeals granted Ms. A asylum.
4. Private International Law Conventions
The Hague Convention on Abduction
The Hague Convention on Abduction creates a previously unavailable civil remedy for 
the return of abducted children (see Chapter 9).  Under the Convention, the ‘left-
behind parent can request the designated Central Authority of the State in which the 
abducted child is being held to locate the child, institute proceedings to effect its 
return, assist in administrative formalities, and generally help to restore the status quo. 
The only purpose of the Hague Convention is ‘to restore the actual situation that 
existed prior to a child’s removal or retention.’   
Article 13b of the Hague Convention is triggered in domestic violence cases.  It 
provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative 
authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, 
institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that there is a grave risk that 
his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise 
place the child in an intolerable situation.
In Thomson v. Thomson, the Supreme Court of Canada held that ‘the physical or 
psychological harm contemplated by the first clause of Article 13 is harm to a degree 
that also amounts to an intolerable situation.’  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, in contrast, has rejected such a narrow reading.  Rather, in Walsh v. 
Walsh, the Court held that the district court erroneously required a showing of an 
‘immediate, serious threat’ to the children under Article 13b.  The Court found that 
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respondent mother had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the children 
faced a grave risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm should they be 
returned to Ireland.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on testimony 
establishing the father’s ‘clear and long history of spousal abuse, and of fights with and 
threats against persons other than his wife.’ 
The Court of Appeals held that the district court’s failure to take John’s attacks 
against others into account was reversible error: 
John has demonstrated an uncontrollably violent temper, and his assaults have been bloody 
and severe.  His temper and assaults are not in the least lessened by the presence of his two 
youngest children, who have witnessed his assaults – indeed [his 8-year-old daughter] was 
forced by him to witness the aftermath of his assault on Michael.  Second, John has 
demonstrated that his violence knows not the bonds between parent and child or husband 
and wife, which should restrain such behavior. 
The Court explicitly noted ‘credible social science literature’ showing that serial 
spousal abusers are also likely to be child abusers.  The Court further noted that ‘both 
state and federal law have recognized that children are at increased risk of physical and 
psychological injury themselves when they are in contact with a spousal abuser.’  
Thus, the Court concluded that the requisite ‘threshold showing of grave risk of 
exposure to physical or psychological harm’3 had been made.  In In re F. (a minor) 
Abduction:  Rights of Custody Abroad, an English court reached a similar decision in 
a case involving abuse. 
In Condon v. Cooper,4 even though the mother had secretly taken the children to 
Australia and kept them there without allowing the father any access until the 
Australian courts ordered their return under the Convention, the California court 
allowed the mother to move to Australia with her two children on the condition that 
California courts retained jurisdiction.  The court took into account ‘such factors as 
[the ex-husband’s] physical violence, their mutual verbal violence, her drug-taking and 
the amount of time the children spent with their father.’ 
The Hague Convention on Adoption
The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption (see Chapter 3) seeks to end abuses of intercountry adoption, 
which vary from State to State.  Domestic violence is an issue under the Hague 
Convention on Adoption in at least two distinct contexts.  First, the Convention 
requires that the birth parents voluntarily relinquish the child.  Thus, it must be asked 
whether the mother’s relinquishment is effectively coerced by domestic violence or the 
threat of domestic violence.  Second, the Convention requires a determination as to the 
suitability of the adoptive parents.  Thus, it must be asked whether the adoptive parents 
have been screened for domestic violence.   
In the early 1990s, the prosecution of lawyer Joel Steinberg and his live-in-partner 
Hedda Nusbaum for the death of their adopted daughter, Lisa, made front page 
headlines throughout the United States.  The six-year old child had been viciously 
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abused, apparently for years, and beaten unconscious and left to die one night while 
her parents smoked crack cocaine in the next room.  While Steinberg was prosecuted 
for actually beating the child, Nusbaum was prosecuted for failing to stop him.  At the 
trial, evidence of the years of abuse that Nusbaum herself had suffered at Steinberg’s 
hands was admitted to show that she had little capacity to protect herself, let alone 
anyone else.  As the murder of Lisa Steinberg made so brutally clear, a child being 
adopted into an abusive relationship is at risk not only of witnessing abuse, but of 
being abused herself. 
5. Public International Law
Historically, domestic violence was not viewed as a violation of women’s human rights 
because it is not perpetuated by the State.  Rather, it was considered ‘private,’ 
‘natural,’ or cultural.  International consciousness has been raised in the last decade, 
however.  The three World Conferences on Women that the UN organized in 
connection with the UN Decade for Women between 1975 and 1985 (Mexico City 
1975, Copenhagen 1980 and Nairobi 1985) provided opportunities to bring the issue 
of violence against women to international attention.  After the Nairobi Conference, 
gender violence was placed on the agenda by the Commission on the Status of 
Women, a subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social Council. 
This raised consciousness is grounded in the work of women’s groups on several 
fronts.  Some groups lobbied for recognition of rape as a war crime before the ad hoc
criminal tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  Others urged the 
international community to mobilize against female genital surgeries.  Still others 
explicitly focused on violence within families.  On virtually every issue, women’s 
groups worked on the regional and national as well as the international level, as 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Their work led to the appointment of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy.  The Special Rapporteur, through a series of fact-
finding missions and over two dozen reports prepared by her office on the topic of 
violence against women, brought international consciousness to a new level.  A State’s 
acquiescence, or failure to take effective measures to combat domestic violence, is 
now broadly recognized as a violation of women’s human rights. 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women5
With the unanimous adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women in 1993, 180 States recognized that violence against women ‘both 
violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.’  The issue of state responsibility is explicitly addressed in 
Article 4: ‘States should condemn violence against women and . . . pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women.’ 
Such measures should include:  ratifying the Women’s Convention (or withdrawing 
reservations), preventing, investigating and punishing violence against women, 
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whether on the part of the state or private persons, and modifying social and cultural 
conduct based on stereotyped roles.  Finally, the State should document its efforts in 
self-monitoring reports submitted to existing treaty bodies.  
Although the Declaration was aspirational, prohibition of violence against women 
can be characterized as emerging customary international law.  The requisite State 
practice and opinio juris can be found in its unanimous adoption in conjunction with 
the proliferation of domestic legislation, executive action, and national judicial 
decisions which followed, along with the repeated references to state responsibility for 
domestic violence in reports of the Human Rights Commission, the Special Rapporteur 
on Violence Against Women, and other international instruments as well as regional 
human rights instruments. 
The Declaration explicitly recognizes that violence against women violates their 
‘human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ ‘Violence against women’ has been defined 
by the Committee on Human Rights as ‘any act of gender-based violence that results 
in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, including threats, domestic violence, crimes committed in the name of  honor.’ 
Paragraph 15d reiterates State obligations, including the State’s obligations to pass 
domestic legislation prohibiting violence against women. 
As the Special Rapporteur explains in her Report of 21 January 1999, the 
‘fundamental human rights to be free from torture, gender discrimination and the 
inherent right to life are directly applicable to ... violence against women.’  These 
rights, i.e., to be free from torture, gender discrimination and the right to life, are well 
established in customary international law.  Indeed, their lineage is cited in the 
Declaration itself.  Thus, in a general sense, the rights set out in the Declaration are 
already customary international law.  The Declaration, accordingly, represents the 
codification and clarification of general rights already recognized in customary 
international law in the specific context of domestic violence.  
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women6
The Women’s Convention does not explicitly prohibit violence against women.  The 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has 
attempted to retroactively fill in the gaps through ‘creative interpretation’ of the 
Women’s Convention.  In General Recommendation No. 19, for example, CEDAW 
explained that ‘gender-based violence is a form of discrimination’ and thus included in 
the Women’s Convention’s bar against gender discrimination in general. 
In addition, the Women’s Convention requires all parties to ‘take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or 
enterprise.’  CEDAW  reads this as making States responsible for private acts if they 
fail to ‘act with due diligence to prevent violations of  rights, or to investigate and 
punish acts of violence, and to provide compensation.’ 
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The Convention Against Torture (‘CAT’)7
‘Torture’ is defined in Article 1 as the ‘intentional infliction of severe pain and of 
suffering’ with a view to achieving a wide range of purposes, by, or with the 
acquiescence of, a person acting in an official capacity.  As Rhonda Copelon and 
others have argued, and as the Special Rapporteur has confirmed, domestic violence 
may be torture. 
In addition, Article 3 of the CAT expressly provides ‘No State Party shall expel, 
return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’  Thus, 
the CAT offers what one commentator characterizes as a ‘viable alternative legal 
remedy’ for immigrant women fleeing domestic violence. 
6. Regional Conventions 
Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women8
The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém Do Pará) was open for ratification in 
1995.  This Convention explicitly bars violence against women.  Article 6 affirms 
women’s right to be free from all forms of discrimination, including ‘stereotyped 
patterns of behavior and social practices based on concepts of inferiority or 
subordination.’ 
Article 8 requires the State to support educational and training programs, to 
change attitudes that contribute to violence against women, to provide specialized 
services for women who are the victims of violence, to develop guidelines for the 
media to promote more positive images of women, to support research on the 
causes, consequences, and frequency of violence against women, and to foster 
‘international cooperation for the exchange of ideas and experiences and the 
execution of programs aimed at protecting women.’ Article 10 defines violence 
against women as ‘any act of conduct, based on gender, which causes death or 
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the 
public or private sphere.’ Article 11 authorizes the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights to give advisory opinions on its interpretation at the request of the 
State signatories and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  Article 
12 permits individuals as well as NGOs to file petitions with the Commission 
regarding violations of Article 7, which requires the State to ‘pursue policies to 
prevent, punish, and eradicate ... violence.’ Chapter IV of the Inter-American 
Convention sets out additional enforcement mechanisms, including self-
monitoring. 
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European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Position on Asylum Seeking and Refugee 
Women9
Executive Summary  In this position paper, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE) has compiled the views of its member agencies, consisting of some 60 
organisations throughout 22 European countries, with regard to how the claims of female 
asylum seekers should be determined and how female asylum seekers and refugees should 
be received and settled in European countries of asylum. 
Statement of the Problem  Female asylum seekers and refugees are unable to benefit 
equitably from current legal protection and social assistance measures for a number of 
reasons which this paper examines. 
 ECRE notes that the difficulty of assessing the problems facing refugee and asylum 
seeking women is increased by a lack of gender-differentiated data in European countries. 
This perpetuates the invisibility of refugee women and gender issues, and inhibits the 
development of policy and planning. 
 The legal obstacles faced by women in asylum determination fall into two broad 
categories: substantive and procedural. International refugee instruments – most notably the 
1951 Refugee Convention – are based upon the assumption that all refugees, irrespective of 
their gender, face the same problems and will be treated equally. However, while there is 
nothing which explicitly precludes a woman from being recognised as a refugee, the current 
interpretation of these instruments by European States both reflects and reinforces gender 
biases. 
Women are frequently persecuted for reasons similar to those of their male 
counterparts. However, the persecution of women may differ, both in terms of its form and 
its motivation, from that commonly experienced by men. Many women are targeted because 
they are community organisers or because they persist in demanding that their rights or 
those of their relatives are respected. Others are targeted because they are vulnerable – 
young women who can easily be sexually abused or mothers who will do anything to 
protect their children. In addition the authorities in some countries have exploited family 
relationships to intensify torture and ill-treatment. An attack on a woman may also represent 
an attack on her ethnic group; because they have a reproductive role, women may be 
viewed as the embodiment of the identity and future survival of a given ethnic group. 
In many parts of the world, women who do not live according to the standards imposed on 
them by their societies can suffer cruel or inhuman treatment. Refusing arranged marriages, 
having sexual relations outside marriage, failing to provide a satisfactory dowry or wearing 
certain forms of dress can result in persecution. Due to social and economic constraints, 
relatively few of these women manage to flee to other countries for protection, yet when they 
do, their experiences tend to be interpreted as discriminatory rather than persecutory. 
The substantive problems facing asylum seeking women stem from the failure of 
decision-makers to incorporate the gender-related claims of women into their interpretation 
of the existing grounds enumerated in the 1951 Convention. Decision-makers have largely 
failed to recognise the political nature of seemingly ‘private’ acts of harm to women. This 
paper argues that the interpretation of the 1951 Convention refugee definition should be 
reconsidered so that the claims of women are not precluded. It argues that both political 
opinion and membership of a particular social group can and should provide a legal basis 
for recognition of women fleeing persecution as Convention refugees. It proposes that 
European guidelines on gender issues in asylum cases should be developed and urges 
European States to follow Canada, the United States and Australia in developing and 
implementing such guidelines. 
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The procedures for determining asylum are also critical. Current procedures are based 
on the widespread assumption that asylum seekers are politically active men who have been 
persecuted by the State authorities as a result of those activities, and these procedures 
therefore need to be reviewed and amended through guidelines or legislation. It is 
particularly notable that information on the human rights situation of women in countries of 
origin is often lacking or inadequate, despite the fact that such information is essential for a 
fair evaluation of a claim. 
This paper also examines the social aspects of women’s needs both as asylum seekers 
and refugees in Europe, and the question of why they do not benefit equitably from 
social service provision. Particular problems concerning the physical safety of women 
arise in collective refugee reception centres, and this is as true in Europe as in other 
regions of the world. Such communal accommodation is usually overcrowded and lacks 
privacy for women. These factors increase the risk of sexual or other violence against 
them. 
This paper highlights the most important recommendations concerning protection, 
social assistance, and voluntary return of women. It aims to raise awareness and improve 
standards among European NGOs, lawyers, judiciaries and the governmental sectors. ECRE 
believes that if harmonisation is possible at the level of best practice it would bring many 
improvements to the treatment of female asylum seekers and refugees in Europe. 
Summary of Key Conclusions 1. European States should develop best practice guidelines on 
the determination of asylum claims from women, at the regional and at the national level, 
and should ensure that the content of such guidelines is widely known and implemented at 
all levels. 
2. Any of the five enumerated grounds can and should provide a legal basis for the 
recognition of women fleeing persecution as Convention refugees, in particular many 
claims from women can be determined on the grounds of religion or political opinion. This 
should be reflected in the practice of European asylum States, who should no longer grant 
secondary or ‘de facto’ statuses to women who are refugees within the meaning of the 
Convention. 
3. European decision-makers should not evaluate gender-specific forms of harm according 
to a standard different from that applied to other forms of harm which may amount to 
persecution. Human rights instruments should be used as the basis for assessing the risk of 
persecution. 
4. Where a woman was unwilling to seek protection from State authorities, for example 
where it would have put her at further risk of abuse by a male relative, this fact should not 
prejudice her claim to asylum. European receiving States should not exclude persecution by 
non-State agents from their common understanding of ‘persecution’, and should regard 
State authorities in the country of origin as bearing responsibility for any persecution by 
private individuals where those authorities have failed in their duty to protect the victim. 
5. Country of origin information should be collected that has relevance as evidence in 
gender-related claims, and this information should be routinely utilised by decision-makers. 
A gender perspective should always be incorporated into decision-making regarding the 
‘safety’ of a country of origin; conditions justifying use of the cessation clause; and the 
existence of an ‘internal flight alternative’. 
6. When a female asylum seeker arrives accompanied by family members, she should be 
informed in private of her right to make an independent application and to be interviewed 
without the presence of other family members. Female interpreters and interviewers should
be made available. 
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7. Specific measures to address the physical safety of asylum seeking and refugee women in 
European asylum States should be introduced, particularly where collective accommodation 
is provided. 
8. All asylum seeking and refugee women should be given direct and equal access to 
advice, information and services in the host State, and all refugee women should receive a 
legal status, and set of personal identity documents, independent of their male relatives. 
9. Asylum seeking and refugee women should be consulted at all stages of policy and 
planning, and should participate proportionately in whatever systems exist to consult residents 
in places of collective accommodation. They should also be fully consulted to ensure that any 
‘voluntary return’ of refugees to a country of origin is truly voluntary in nature. 
10. All asylum statistics provided by European States (including recognition rates, figures 
for refugees resettled from overseas, and asylum seekers in detention) should include a 
breakdown by gender.  
7. National Implementation
Canada
Through its Gender Guidelines for Asylum Adjudications, originally issued in March 
1993 and reissued in 1996, ‘Canada became the first government to recognize formally 
that a woman fleeing persecution on gender-specific grounds can claim to ‘fear 
persecution on account of her membership in a particular social group.’10 The 
following Guideline establishes the parameters for immigration officials dealing with 
these issues.   
Guideline 4 Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Framework of 
Analysis11 Assess the harm feared by the claimant.  Does the harm feared constitute 
persecution?  (a) For the treatment to likely amount to persecution, it must be a serious form of 
harm which detracts from the claimant’s fundamental human rights.  (b) To assist decision-
makers in determining what kinds of treatment are considered persecution, an objective 
standard is provided by international human rights instruments.  The following instruments, 
among others, may be considered: 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Right 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
Ascertain whether the claimant’s fear of persecution is based on any of the 
grounds, singly or in combination, enumerated in the Convention refugee 
definition. Considerations: It is necessary to ascertain the characteristic of the 
claimant which places her or members of her group at risk, and to ascertain the 
linkage of that characteristic to a Convention ground.  Gender is an innate 
characteristic and it may form a particular social group. 
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A subgroup of women may also form a particular social group. Women in these 
particular social groups have characteristics (possibly innate or unchangeable) 
additional to gender, which make them fear persecution. 
The gender-defined group cannot be defined solely by the fact that its members 
share common persecution.
Determine whether the claimant’s fear of persecution is well-founded. This 
includes assessment of the evidence related to the ability or willingness of the state 
to protect the claimant and, more generally, the objective basis of the claim. 
  Considerations:   
There may be little or no documentary evidence of similarly situated women 
and the claimant’s own experiences.   
The claimant need not have approached non-state organizations for protection.   
Factors including the social, cultural, religious, and economic context in which 
the claimant finds herself should be considered in determining whether it was 
objectively unreasonable for the claimant not to have sought state protection. 
Where a woman’s fear relates to personal-status laws or where her human rights 
are being violated by private citizens, an otherwise positive change in country 
conditions may have no impact, or even a negative impact, on a woman’s fear 
of gender-related persecution. 
If required, determine whether there is a possibility of an internal flight 
alternative. 
Considerations: 
Whether there would be undue hardship for the claimant, both in reaching the 
location of the IFA and in establishing residence there. 
Religious, economic, social and cultural factors, among others, may be relevant 
in determining the reasonableness of an IFA for a woman fearing gender-
related persecution. 
 * * * 
A.  Determining the Nature and the Grounds of the Persecution 
  I.  General Proposition 
Although gender is not specifically enumerated as one of the grounds for 
establishing Convention refugee status, the definition of Convention refugee 
may properly be interpreted as providing protection for women who 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of gender-related persecution by reason of any 
one, or a combination of, the enumerated grounds. 
 * * * 
Women who fear persecution resulting from certain circumstances of severe 
discrimination on grounds of gender or acts of violence either by public 
authorities or at the hands of private citizens from whose actions the state is 
unwilling or unable to adequately protect the concerned persons.  In the refugee 
law context, such discrimination may amount to persecution if it leads to 
consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the claimant and if it is 
imposed on account of any one, or a combination, of the statutory grounds for 
persecution.  The acts of violence which a woman may fear include violence 
inflicted in situations of domestic violence and situations of civil war. 
Women who fear persecution as the consequence of failing to conform to, or 
for transgressing, certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and 
practices in their country of origin.  Such laws and practices, by singling out 
women and placing them in a more vulnerable position than men, may create 
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conditions for the existence of a gender-defined social group.  The religious 
precepts, social traditions or cultural norms which women may be accused of 
violating can range from choosing their own spouses instead of accepting an 
arranged marriage, to such matters as the wearing of make-up, the visibility or 
length of hair, or the type of clothing a woman chooses to wear. 
 * * * 
The United States
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women12 This 
memorandum is written to provide the INS Asylum Officer Corps (AOC) with guidance 
and background on adjudicating cases of women having asylum claims based wholly or in 
part on their gender. 
Recent international initiatives have increased awareness and suggested approaches to 
gender-related asylum claims.  Enhancing understanding of and sensitivity to gender-related 
issues will improve U.S. asylum adjudications while keeping pace with these international 
concerns.  This guidance will serve as a useful tool for new Asylum Officers, and will help 
to ensure uniformity and consistency in procedures and decisions.  In-Service training at all 
Asylum Offices will be critical to using this guidance effectively.
Despite the increased attention given to this type of claim during the past decade, 
gender-based asylum adjudications are still relatively new developments in refugee 
protection.  This ‘Considerations’ memorandum is a natural and multi-faceted outgrowth of 
a set of gender guidelines issued by the UNHCR in 1991, the 1993 Canadian gender 
guidelines, a proposed set of guidelines submitted by the Women Refugees Project (WRP) 
of the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Program, Cambridge and Somerville Legal 
Service, in 1994, and recent (and still developing) U.S. caselaw.  It is similar in approach to 
the Haiti ‘Considerations’ memorandum of March 9, 1993 and other memoranda issued to 
maintain consistency among Offices and Officers.  Additionally, this memorandum seeks to 
enhance the ability of U.S. Asylum Officers to more sensitively deal with substantive and 
procedural aspects of gender-related claims, irrespective of country or origin. 
 * * * 
The United States’ Gender Guidelines for Overseas Refugee Processing, drafted in 
2000, explicitly recognizes domestic violence as a form of gender-related persecution. 
In the Matter of M.K., a woman from Sierra Leone requested asylum in the United 
States on the grounds of persecution based on domestic violence.  The court found that 
there was in fact persecution, relying on evidence showing that ‘violence against 
women, especially wife beating, is common ... [since] disobedience on the part of the 
wife is considered a justification for punitive measures ... by the husband, police are 
unlikely to intervene except in cases of severe injury or death, and few cases of 
violence go to court.’   
The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, in contrast, such claims have been denied.  In R. v. The 
Immigrant Appeal Tribunal and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Syede Kahatoon Shah, a claim for asylum by a Pakistani woman who had 
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suffered domestic violence and faced the death penalty for alleged adultery under 
Sharia law was denied.  The special adjudicator held that,  
There is no accepted definition of social group and it is no more possible for a woman who 
has suffered domestic violence to be herself within the meaning of social group . . . than it 
is for anyone who has been divorced to say that she or he is a member of a social group 
within the purposes of (the) convention.
In 2000, the United Kingdom established a comprehensive set of guidelines for 
addressing gender-based asylum claims.
Asylum gender guidelines13 These Guidelines aim to assist the Immigration Appellate 
Authority in fully considering all aspects of asylum seekers’ claims to international 
protection under United Kingdom law. 
 * * * 
Harm Within Family Life Physical and mental violence and ill-treatment within the family 
is a wide-spread and often gender-specific form of harm.  The fact that such treatment 
occurs within the family context does not mean that it will not constitute ‘serious harm’ – 
treatment which would constitute ‘serious harm’ if it occurred outside the family will also 
constitute ‘serious harm’ if it occurs within a family context.  As with other forms of harm 
whether it constitutes ‘serious harm’ within the meaning of the Refugee Convention should 
be assessed on the basis of internationally recognized human rights standards. 
Harm within family life and marriage-related harm includes, but is not limited to:
 Forced marriage – marriage of a person without their free consent. 
 domestic violence. 
‘Dowry death’ or bride burning – where a woman is subject to bullying, mental and 
physical harm and may be murdered or driven to suicide by her husband and/or in-laws 
who are dissatisfied with the dowry given by the bride’s family or in order to obtain further 
payments of dowry from the bride’s family 
* * * 
‘Honour killings’ – where a woman is killed in order to retain the ‘honour’ of her family;  
for example, this may occur where a woman has a sexual relationship , including a marriage 
relationship, with someone not approved of by the family, or is in some other manner 
considered to have affected the honour of the family.14
8.  IOs and NGOs
IOs and NGOs have played important roles in advocacy as well as in public education. 
The Special Rapporteur considers them crucial allies.  As she notes, for example,  
Very little effort has been undertaken at the international level to provide for a 
‘clearinghouse’ on domestic violence. . . it is, therefore, proposed that a clearinghouse for 
information, perhaps located within UNIFEM or the Division for the Advancement of 
Women at headquarters, be established to ensure that information on ways and means of 
combating domestic violence at the national level is shared and accessible to all countries.
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IOs
UNIFEM’s Internet Working Group to End Violence Against Women is an example 
of an IO exploiting technology to develop effective working relationships among a 
broad range of women’s groups.  The Internet Working Group has considered 
strategies involving education, training, mobilization, changing male behavior, roles of 
NGOs and governments.  In addition, the Working Group has considered strategies 
relating to the role of the media.  The Working Group has also analyzed the factors 
contributing to the success of anti-violence strategies. 
For women in refugee camps, domestic violence remains a fact of life.  In 1990, 
however, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees recognized that women refugees 
had specific needs, including needs for safety, that were not being addressed.  A new 
policy was adopted, accordingly, to explicitly address those needs.  UNHCR Policy on 
Refugee Women, U.N. Doc.A/AC.96.754 (1990).  The UNHCR and the Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioners Programme has promulgated Guidelines on the 
Protection of Refugee Women and Gender Based Violence as a Form of Persecution 
in a 1985 policy statement of the Executive Committee as well as in new guidelines 
with respect to female asylum seekers. 
NGOs
The NGOs have been similarly proactive. OXFAM is an example of a major 
international NGO with a broad development-focused mandate which has recognized 
the impact of domestic violence in its projects.  OXFAM seeks to address domestic 
violence within the development context.  It recently sponsored a conference focusing 
on the factors contributing to the success of various anti-violence strategies.  These 
included:  sustained work by the women’s movement, increased political participation 
of women, and alliances among local common national and international NGOs.  The 
Conference also noted the obstacles to those strategies, including splits in the women’s 
movement, social and political backlash, and threats against service providers and 
survivors. 
An NGO focused on women in the developed world, the European Women’s 
Lobby, has recently published an extensive report, Unveiling the Hidden Data on 
Domestic Violence in the European Union.  This report notes that violence crosses 
class and cultural boundaries; that violence is the norm rather than the exception; and 
that violence is independent of poverty, education, alcohol or drug use.  In addition, 
Unveiling the Hidden Data notes that women are particularly vulnerable when they are 
pregnant and during the post-natal period, during periods of separation and when their 
children are very young. 
Amnesty International has specifically focused on the problems of women seeking 
asylum from domestic violence, as set forth in the excerpt below. 
Amnesty International Canada, the right to find safety15  The governments of Canada and the 
US are currently negotiating an agreement on refugee claims that could lead to violations of 
the basic rights of refugee claimants who pass through the US on their way to Canada. 
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Under the proposed agreement – known as a ‘safe third country’ agreement – the 
majority of asylum-seekers who come to Canada via the US will not be allowed to claim 
protection in Canada (save for a few exceptions). This is based on the premise that the 
Canadian Government considers the US a safe third country, and thus asylum-seekers who 
land there first should be required to make their claim there. However, Amnesty 
International has documented that the treatment of asylum-seekers in the US falls short of 
international standards, and has called upon the Canadian government to reconsider 
entering into this agreement. Serious shortcomings in the US asylum system mean 
asylum-seekers could be exposed to the following serious violations of their human rights: 
• The very real likelihood that they would face arbitrary and lengthy imprisonment, 
often in isolated detention centres alongside criminal detainees. 
• Women asylum-seekers fleeing honour killings or domestic violence, along with 
other categories of people in need of protection, could be denied based on an overly 
narrow interpretation of the Refugee Convention used in the US. 
• Individuals without proper identity documents, a frequent reality for refugees, could 
be summarily removed, based on the decision of a US immigration officer, without 
access to legal counsel or advice from nongovernmental organizations. 
It is vital that this agreement be reviewed by Parliament. Amnesty International is calling 
for the agreement to be referred to the parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship 
and Immigration. Canada and the US are moving quickly to finalize this agreement, so it is 
important to speak out now. 
The recognition of domestic violence as a human issue reflects and reinforces the 
recognition of other forms of violence against women as human rights issues, as set 
forth in the excerpt below. 
Human rights watch world report 1999, women’s human rights – the role of the 
international community16 The recent commitment of the international community to 
recognize violence against women as a human rights issue, to challenge de jure and de facto 
discrimination against women, and to end impunity for the widespread use of sexual 
violence in war and armed conflict, faced many challenges in 1998. After gaining 
momentum following the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the 1994 
World Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, and the 1995 Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing, the significant progress made by the women’s 
international human rights movement threatened to stall as attacks on women’s human 
rights persisted in 1998. 
Despite these attacks, the presence and impact of women’s human rights activists 
contributed substantially in 1998 to strengthening standards protecting women’s rights and 
to ensuring that policy makers felt obliged to acknowledge and even respond to violations 
of women’s rights. For example, the Treaty of Rome for the creation of a permanent 
international criminal court (ICC) defines rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, and enforced sterilization as war crimes and crimes against humanity. The same 
treaty condemns gender-based persecutions first. 
As a direct result of the breadth and effectiveness of the women’s human rights 
movement, countries throughout the world as well as intergovernmental organizations and 
international financial institutions appeared to understand that women’s human rights could 
no longer be ignored. Nonetheless, significant financial resources were not consistently 
allocated to the advancement of women’s human rights in 1998, nor was redress for 
violations of rights readily available to most women. However, it was clear that some 
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governments and institutions were beginning to integrate the women’s movements’ analysis 
of the interrelatedness of economic development, non-discrimination, and access to justice 
into both their rhetoric and policies, if not always their actions. 
United Nations From negotiations to create an international criminal court, to 
slow-moving work to give victims of sexual discrimination the right to seek redress by 
petitioning the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), to the U.N.’s failure to stand firm on women’s rights in negotiations with the 
Taliban, U.N. member states showed their reluctance to deliver on the promise of human 
rights for women. Even instances of progress were hard-won. 
At the June-July diplomatic conference in Rome to create a permanent international 
criminal court, member states were asked to ensure an end to impunity for crimes of gender 
and sexual violence as a basic principle of the treaty. This straightforward proposition, 
however, was under siege from the beginning as a small group of nations worked with the 
Holy See to undermine the potential for the ICC effectively to provide justice for victims of 
sexual and gender violence. Their attack sought to exclude from the treaty a list specifying 
the crimes of sexual violence that would be covered, particularly any reference to the crime 
of forced pregnancy. These efforts were rebuffed when governments acted to end the 
historical failure to prosecute crimes of sexual violence, by listing such crimes. 
In the final days of the negotiation, due in large measure to the tireless advocacy of the 
Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice and the stalwart support of Canada, Bosnia, and 
Australia, three major goals were achieved: rape and other crimes of sexual violence were 
included in the definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity; gender-based 
persecution was included in the definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity; and 
the term ‘gender,’ which had been under attack by the Vatican and a group of Arab League 
countries, was preserved. Despite widespread usage of the term ‘gender’ by the United 
Nations for at least fifteen years, the Syrian delegate, speaking on behalf of this group of 
states, insisted that the concept of gender threatened the very existence of civilization by 
challenging the concept that disparate treatment was not justified based on biological 
differences. Despite serious flaws in the statute, particularly in limits on jurisdiction and an 
opt-out provision for war crimes, the treaty represented a significant milestone in the 
struggle to end impunity for crimes of sexual and gender violence. 
9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem
Nareen should probably consider seeking asylum in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., in 
that order.  As set out in Section 7, in 1993 Canada became the first government to 
officially recognize gender specific grounds for asylum.  Guideline 4 explicitly directs 
immigration officials to consider the pertinent human rights instruments and 
specifically considers threats posed by non-State actors, such as Naseen’s brothers. 
 Since 2000, the U.K. has similarly adopted Guidelines, under which ‘honour 
killings’ are explicitly recognized as a ‘harm’ within the meaning of the Refugee 
Convention.  The U.S. also adopted Gender Guidelines in 2000 and has in fact granted 
asylum on the ground of domestic violence.  As Amnesty International contends, in 
Section 8, however, the U.S. falls short of international standards in its treatment of 
asylum-seekers.  More specifically, AI accuses the U.S. of denying asylum to women 
fleeing honour killings based on ‘overly narrow’ interpretations of the Refugee 
Convention. 
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early exploration, see Eekebar, J. and Katz, S. (eds. 1978), Family Violence:  An 
International and Interdisciplinary Study. See also, e.g., Yasmeen Hassan, ‘Stove 
Burning, Acid Throwing and Honor Killings,’ in 2 Women and International Human 
Rights Law.
2. For U.N.-compiled data and analyses, see, e.g., United Nations, (2002) The 
World’s Women’s 2000:  Trends and Statistics; United Nations, Strategies for 
Confronting Domestic Violence:  A Resource Manual (describing national and 
international cooperation in developing strategies for responding to victims and 
working with perpetrators); United Nations (1999), Violence Against Women in the 
Family (discussing violence against women in the family as a global issue). 
3. For discussions of domestic violence as human rights violations, see Thomas, D. 
and Beasley, M. (1995), ‘Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue,’ Albany Law 
Review, Vol. 58, p. 1119; Meyer, M. (1999), ‘Negotiating International Norms: “The 
Inter-American Commission of Women and the Convention on Violence Against 
Women” ,’ in M. Myer and E. Perügel (eds), Gender Politics in Global Governance;
Jutta Joachim, ‘Shaping the Human Rights Agenda: The Case of Violence Against 
Women,’ in Gender Politics in Global Governance; Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘The Use of
International Rights Norms to Combat Violence Against Women,’ in R. Cook (ed., 
1994), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, p. 532; 
Sullivan, D. (1994), ‘Women’s Human Rights and the 1993 World Converence on 
Human Rights,’ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, p. 152 (describing 
consideration of gender specific violence at the conference); Roth, ‘Domestic Violence 
as an International Human Rights Issue,’ in Human Rights of Women, supra, p. 326 
(discussing some of the methodological problems that the Human Rights Watch 
Women Rights Project has encountered in addressing domestic violence against 
women). 
4. For a compelling analysis of domestic violence as torture, see Copelon, R. (1994), 
‘Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,’ in ibid., p. 116; 
Copelon, R. (1994), ‘Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence 
as Torture,’ Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 25, p. 291. For a description 
of other forms of gender-specific torture, see Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. 
Nigal S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
1992/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4 1995/34 (1995). 
5. For accounts of the process through which rape was recognized as a war crime 
before the ad hoc criminal tribunals, see Askin, K. (1997), War Crimes Against 
Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals; Askin, K. (1999), 
‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan 
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6. For a practical training model, see Bowman, H. ‘Getting the Message Abroad: An 
International Training Model for Judges and Prosecutors’, in Integrating Responses to 
Domestic Violence.
7. For additional discussions of national implementation of norms against domestic 
violence see Palmer, M., ‘Caring for Young and Old: Developments in the Family Law 
of the People’s Republic of China, 1996-98,’ in A. Bainham (ed.), The International 
Survey of Family Law: 2000 Edition at 95.  See also Minamikatas  and Tamaki, 
‘Developments in Japanese Family Law During 1998 – Domestic Violence Reforms,’ 
in ibid. at p. 231 (describing the recent emergence of law addressing domestic violence 
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Chapter 12
Human Rights of the Family and Human 
Rights of Individuals within the Family
1.  Problem 
Miriam is a single mother of two children, Rebecca, age 4, and Ari, age 10.  They live 
in a small apartment in Tel Aviv, Israel. Miriam describes herself as a strict 
disciplinarian and smacks her children when they disobey her.  She hits them with her 
hand, or sometimes a slipper.  The children have suffered no injury as a result of their 
mother’s sometimes harsh treatment and in other respects she appears to be a 
responsible and loving parent. 
   Ari’s teacher has noticed minor bruises on his shoulders and legs. She has 
reported this to the principal.  You are an attorney with a prominent children’s rights 
NGO.  The principal asks for your advice. 
2.  Overview
Human rights are a recurring theme in international family law  (see Section 5, Public 
International Law, in Chapters 1-11).   A cluster of human rights are implicated in the 
formation of the family, for example.  These range from the requirement that the 
parties freely consent to enter into marriage (see Chapter 1, Section 3), to the exercise 
of their reproductive rights by the married couple, as well as the exercise of these 
rights by the individuals within the couple, and by individuals who are not married.  
The human rights of the biological and adoptive parents in connection with adoption 
(Chapter 3), as well as the open issue of the extension of all of these rights to 
homosexuals (Chapter 2), have been addressed in the preceding chapters. 
This Chapter addresses the rights of the family unit itself.  First, the family is 
entitled to affirmative assistance from the State with respect to support, social security, 
and health care.  Second, the family is entitled to privacy, to be left alone.  That is, the 
State cannot interfere with the private life of the family.  This right may conflict with 
human rights of individuals within the family, however, especially women and 
children. 
Other human rights issues are related to the family less directly.  Child labour, for 
example, often reflects both the composition of the family and the allocation of 
decision-making authority within it.  A greater proportion of adult females in the 
family corresponds to lower rates of child labour, while a greater proportion of adult 
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males corresponds to lower rates of child labour for boys only (Van Bueren and 
Wanduragala, 2000). 
Claims of the Family Upon the State
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, States parties recognized that, 
‘The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State’ (Article 16.3.).  More specifically, the Universal 
Declaration requires States to assure a family wage (Article 23.3) and an adequate 
standard of living, including food, clothing, shelter, and medical care (Article 25). 
The Universal Declaration was originally aspirational; that is, it was not legally 
binding. 
 The rights and obligations set out in the Universal Declaration were defined with 
greater specificity in the legally-binding international treaties which followed, i.e., the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  The Economic Covenant basically addresses 
affirmative obligations of the State, including welfare and social security benefits.    In 
Article 10 of the Economic Covenant, for example, the States parties recognize that 
mothers are entitled to ‘special protection’ before and after childbirth, including paid 
leave.  Thus, a State party would be required to incorporate into domestic law either 
welfare provisions assuring compensation or a requirement that private employers do 
so. 
Claims of the Family Against the State 
There is some overlap between the two conventions.  For example, the Civil Covenant 
expressly reiterates the State’s obligation to protect the family as ‘the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society’ as set out in the Universal Declaration.  This 
arguably requires the State to enact laws protecting vulnerable parties, especially 
women and children, upon dissolution of marriage, for example (see Chapter 5, 
Section 5 and Chapter 10, Section 5).  For the most part, however, the Civil Covenant 
addresses negative obligations of the State; that is, it imposes limits on State 
interference with individuals.  The Economic Covenant, in contrast, requires the State 
to affirmatively assure its people an adequate standard of living, healthcare, education, 
and employment.  
 In addition to the rights assured the family, human rights law protects the rights of 
individuals within the family from interference by other family members.  This 
includes, controversially, the right of the minor child to freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression.  As the Committee charged with the administration of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Children has made clear, while the exercise of such 
rights must always be age-appropriate, these are nonetheless rights of the child and the 
State is under a legal duty to safeguard them. 
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3. Cultural Variations 
International family law is at the center of a major faultline in international human 
rights law; that is, the ongoing debate between universalism and cultural relativism.  
Put simply, the argument of the universalists is that human rights are basically the 
same everywhere.  While there may be some variation in the ways in which  these 
rights are expressed or enjoyed, the prohibition against torture, for example, applies 
everywhere.  Freedom of expression, similarly, cannot be interpreted to mean ‘freedom 
of expression as consistent with Islamic law’ or ‘freedom of expression as understood 
in the U.S. Constitution.’  While freedom of religion may require the State to allow 
religious authorities some leeway (in sanctioning violations of religious law, for 
example) this cannot amount to abdication of the State in favor of those authorities. 
Cultural relativists, on the other hand, insist that any conception of ‘human rights’ 
is necessarily determined by the cultural context in which it is defined. It has been 
argued, for example, that a Muslim cannot truly practice his religion in a secular State. 
The right to practice one’s religion, under this view, may well require a State which 
affirmatively supports that religion.  
A well-known and contentious example may clarify the universalist/relativist 
debate.  Human rights advocates have long demanded an end to female genital 
mutilation (FGM) or circumcision of girls as a rite of passage.  It has been condemned 
as a violation of children’s rights and as a form of torture.  Cultural relativists, in 
contrast, first point out that FGM encompasses a range of practices, from removal of 
the external genitalia to more symbolic and less invasive procedures.  They have 
argued that it is a rite of passage through which a girl becomes a member of her social 
group.  In addition, they have pointed out that within some groups, a girl is considered 
unclean and thus ineligible for marriage unless she has undergone FGM.  Finally, they 
point out that sanctions against the practice, including its criminalization in many 
Western States, merely drives it underground and deters women who have undergone 
the procedure from seeking medical attention.  Rather, they argue for a coordinated 
approach, including grassroots education and respectful consultation with those who 
actually perform the surgeries. 
The cultural relativism/universalism debate is particularly sharp in the context 
of international family law because in many States, including Israel and South 
Africa, primary responsibility for marriage and divorce has been left with 
religious authorities.  This reflects and enforces the paradox of family law as both 
below the political radar of national leaders and essential in shaping the basic 
constituent unit of the polity itself.  Thus, family law may be given as a sop to 
religious authorities when power is divided during the formative years of a new 
State, even as some recognize that family law in fact carries with it an enormous 
amount of normative authority.  While many Islamic States have ratified most of 
the international human rights conventions, for example, they have taken explicit 
reservations to the effect that their obligations under these instruments are to be 
interpreted in light of Sharia, or Islamic personal law. 
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4. Private International Law Conventions  
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(Concluded October 25, 1980) 
Article 20 
The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would  not 
be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
5.  Public International Law
Universal Declaration of Human Rights1
Article 16  3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the State. 
 * * * 
Article 23  3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and 
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 
 * * * 
Article 25  1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care 
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control. 
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
 * * * 
Article 26  3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given 
to their children. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2
Article 10  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that: 
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is 
the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and 
while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be 
entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses. 
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and 
after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or 
leave with adequate social security benefits. 
3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children 
and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. 
Children and young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. 
Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to 
hamper their normal development should be punishable by law. States should also set age 
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limits below which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and 
punishable by law. 
* * * 
Article 11   1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-
operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full 
use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of 
nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the 
most efficient development and utilization of natural resources; 
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, 
to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need. 
 * * * 
Article 12  1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness. 
 * * * 
Article 13  1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to 
participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the 
full realization of this right: 
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary 
education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate 
means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; 
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by 
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; 
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those 
persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education; 
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an 
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching 
staff shall be continuously improved. 
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3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other 
than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum 
educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 
4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals 
and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance 
of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this article and to the requirement that the 
education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be 
laid down by the State. 
 * * * 
Article 17 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
 * * * 
Article 23  1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the State. 
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be 
recognized. 
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of 
rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any 
children.
Convention on the Rights of the Child 3
Preamble  The States Parties to the present Convention,  
 * * * 
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has 
proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance, 
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment 
for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be 
afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its 
responsibilities within the community, 
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her 
personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love 
and understanding, 
Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, 
and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United 
Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and 
solidarity,  
 * * * 
Recognizing that, in all countries in the world, there are children living in exceptionally 
difficult conditions, and that such children need special consideration, 
Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people 
for the protection and harmonious development of the child, 
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Recognizing the importance of international co-operation for improving the living 
conditions of children in every country, in particular in the developing countries, 
Have agreed as follows:  
Article 11 1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return 
of children abroad. 
2. To this end, States Parties shall promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements or accession to existing agreements 
Article 12  1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views 
of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.  
* * * 
Article 19  1.  States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, 
injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including 
sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has 
the care of a child. 
2.  Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the 
establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those 
who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for 
identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of 
child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement. 
* * * 
Article 23  1. States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should 
enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and 
facilitate the child’s active participation in the community. 
* * * 
Article 27  1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living 
adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. 
6.  Regional Conventions
Arab Charter on Human Rights4
Article 38 (a) The family is the basic unit of society, whose protection it shall enjoy. 
(b) The State undertakes to provide outstanding care and special protection for the family, 
mothers, children and the aged. 
Article 39
Young persons have the right to be afforded the most ample opportunities for physical and 
mental development. 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 5
5. States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that a 
child who is subjected to schools or parental discipline shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the child and in conformity with the present Charter. 
* * * 
Article 16: Protection Against Child Abuse and Torture 
1. States Parties to the present Charter shall take specific legislative, administrative, social 
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and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and especially physical or mental injury or abuse, neglect or 
maltreatment including sexual abuse, while in the care of the child. 
2. Protective measures under this Article shall include effective procedures for the 
establishment of special monitoring units to provide necessary support for the child and for 
those who have the care of the child, as well as other forms of prevention and for 
identification, reporting referral investigation, treatment, and follow-up of instances of child 
abuse and neglect. 
* * * 
1. Parents or other persons responsible for the child shall have the primary responsibility of 
the upbringing and development of the child and shall have the duty: 
(a) to ensure that the best interests of the child are their basic concern at all times – 
(b) to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, conditions of living necessary to 
the child’s development; and 
(c) to ensure that domestic discipline is administered with humanity and in a manner 
consistent with the inherent dignity of the child. 
7. National Implementation
Argentina
Laws against domestic violence, including violence against children, have been 
enacted in Buenos Aires and provinces throughout Argentina.  In addition, a national 
campaign to increase public awareness and thereby deter such violence has been 
launched.  This includes daily radio broadcasts advising victims or witness how to 
register complaints (Grossman and Iñigo 2000).
Israel
In State of Israel v. Plonit,6 the District Court convicted a mother of assault and 
abuse, sentencing her to 12 months’ imprisonment suspended and 18 months 
probation.  The mother was a strict disciplinarian who smacked her children 
regularly.  The court overruled an earlier decision upholding parents’ right to use 
‘reasonable and moderate’ physical punishment on the ground that norms had 
changed (Schulz 2001). 
Japan
The Prevention of Child Abuse Act was enacted in Japan in 2000, resulting in 
dramatically increased visibility of the problem of violence against children.  
During its first year, for example, advice was sought from Child Welfare Offices 
regarding suspected abuse in 17,725 cases, 1.5 times the number of queries the 
year before and sixteen times the number of queries  ten years earlier (Tamaki, 
2002).
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Scotland 
In some states, corporal punishment remains legal.  As of 2003, for example, it was 
still legal for Scottish parents to subject their children to ‘reasonable chastisement’ 
(Sutherland, 2002). 
Second Periodic Reports of States Parties due in 1999: Canada7
I. Abuse and Neglect – Article 19 Measures in Force  192. In its Concluding Observations 
on Canada’s First Report, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child stated that further 
measures need to be considered to effectively prevent and combat all forms of corporal 
punishment and ill-treatment of children in schools or institutions where children may be 
placed. The Committee also referenced the existence of child abuse and violence within the 
family and insufficient protection afforded by existing legislation in that regard. 
193. The Criminal Code of Canada contains several provisions to protect children and 
youth from all forms of sexual abuse, including: sections 151 (sexual interference), 152 
(invitation to sexual touching), and 153 (sexual exploitation). Specific offenses in the 
Criminal Code concerning parents, guardians and householders include: sections 170 
(parent or guardian procuring sexual activity), 171 (householder permitting sexual activity) 
and 172 (corrupting children). 
194. The Family Violence Initiative (1991-1996) supported a wide range of activities 
including research, program development, demonstration projects, evaluation studies on 
existing programs, professional training, and public awareness and education. The current 
Family Violence Initiative (1997-2002) continues these activities through the funding of 
numerous information, training and evaluation projects. 
195. Two components of the initiative are The National Clearinghouse on Family Violence 
and the Family Violence Prevention Unit. The National Clearinghouse on Family Violence 
provides support to front-line workers, health professionals, educators, law enforcement 
officials and others in the prevention and treatment of all forms of child abuse and neglect. 
Health Canada is the lead department on this initiative, and provides leadership in the 
prevention of family violence through the coordination of federal action and collaboration 
with voluntary and corporate sectors, national professional associations and provincial and 
territorial governments. 
196. Since the 1970s, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) has 
financed the building or renovation of shelters for women and children fleeing domestic 
violence. In 1992, in partnership with the Family Violence Initiative, CMHC launched the 
Next Step Program to provide capital funding for non-profit organizations to build second 
stage housing, provide transitional housing with more security, support services, and to 
permit longer stays than first stage emergency shelters for women who have left abusive 
domestic situations.  During the five-year program, 174 second-stage units were developed. 
197. A national consultation hosted by CMHC in 1994 indicated a need to ensure that 
existing shelters are safe and secure and that they address the special needs of children, 
persons with disabilities and older Canadians. In addition, a lack of shelters was identified 
in northern and remote regions. In response, the Shelter Enhancement Initiative (SEI) was 
established to renovate and upgrade existing shelters and to develop a limited number of 
new emergency and second stage units. Between 1995 and 1997, CMHC directed the 
enhancement of 4,448 bed/units and the development of 61 emergency beds and 22 second
stage units. Additional federal funding extended the SEI project to March 31, 1998. 
198. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) and Health 
258 International Family Law
Canada provide funding for First Nations family violence prevention projects on reserves. 
 In 1996-97, DIAND funded 321 projects in this area.  
Factors, difficulties and progress  199. In its Concluding Observations, the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child asserted that existing Canadian legislation does not adequately 
protect children from abuse and neglect. The Government of Canada’s view is that in 
addition to the protection provided in criminal legislation, all provinces and territories have 
child welfare legislation that permits authorities to remove a child from a home when in 
danger of physical or emotional abuse, including neglect. The Government of Canada has 
been seeking to reinforce and clarify protection under the Criminal Code. 
200.  The Criminal Code applies to actions taken against children as well as adults.  
However, s. 43 of the Criminal Code permits a parent, teacher or person acting in the place
of parent to invoke a defence to a criminal charge where the parent, teacher or adult acting 
in place of the parent uses reasonable force against a child by way of correction. A 
non-government organization, Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, has 
received funding from the government-funded Court Challenges program to apply to a 
Canadian court for a determination as to whether s. 43 of the Criminal Code infringes 
children’s constitutional rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Priorities and Goals  201. Health Canada continues to promote research on alternative 
methods of punishment and also works, through various media, to increase public 
awareness of family violence. A current example of the latter function is the Family 
Violence Prevention Unit’s funding of a music video for children and adults on the subject 
of alternatives to corporal punishment. 
202. Health Canada is also supporting the development of the Canadian Incidence Study of 
Reported Child Abuse and Neglect (CIS), which studies the incidence of several types of 
abuse. Also, through the Reporting and Classification of Child Abuse in Health Care 
Settings Project, the department has supported research on the ways in which selected 
Canadian pediatric hospitals classify and report child abuse. 
203. In June 1997, DIAND and CMHC announced they would jointly fund the capital costs 
of building 10 new family violence emergency shelters across the country. They expect the 
centres to be in operation by the end of 1999. 
Government and NGO Cooperation 204. The Child Welfare League of Canada, with 
financial support from Canadian Heritage and Health Canada, has developed resources to 
promote healthy parenting and disseminate information on child abuse in 11 languages. The 
brochures were distributed to organizations that provide family services to ethnocultural 
communities as a way of helping parents better understand the Canadian system to protect 
children from abuse. 
205. Status of Women Canada, a federal agency, provides funding assistance to 
organizations in support of advancing gender equality, including those which support 
actions and strategies that address the impact of family violence on girls. These initiatives 
include public education activities and the development of action plans aimed at preventing 
sexual abuse, workshops in schools to address issues such as dating violence and sexual 
harassment and protocols to improve community responses to the needs of girls. For 
example, the agency has provided financial support under the Family Violence Initiative to 
an alliance of 5 research centres on family violence and violence against women. The 
funding supports the alliance in its development of recommendations for a national strategy 
for the prevention of violence to female children. 
206. The Government of Canada is allocating $2.75 million per year to a 
non-governmental group to cover legal costs associated with cases of national 
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significance in further defining the nature and extent of constitutionally-based rights 
contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Cases encompass issues 
such as the aforementioned issue of corporal punishment of children, the right to 
education in a minority official language, and protection of children with disabilities, 
among others. The government’s objective is to contribute to an up-to-date body of 
legally-protected individual rights, with special attention being paid to traditionally 
disadvantaged segments of our society. 
207. Health Canada supports a range of activities to improve understanding of child 
abuse and its health consequences, to identify best practices through research, data 
gathering and evaluation activities. Moreover, Health Canada promotes increased 
public and professional awareness, particularly in the health field, about the causes 
and consequences of child abuse. Participation in these activities is ongoing with a 
number of advisory groups. 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 8
Written Replies by the Government of Singapore 9
(ii) Declaration in respect of Articles 19 and 37 of the Convention 
Upon accession, Singapore made the following Declaration: 
The Republic of Singapore considers that articles 19 and 37 of the Convention do not 
prohibit – 
(a) the application of any prevailing measures prescribed by law for maintaining law and 
order in the Republic of Singapore; 
(b) measures and restrictions which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in the 
interests of national security, public safety, public order, the protection of public health or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; or 
(c) the judicious application of corporal punishment in the best interest of the child. 
Singapore subscribes to the concept of the family being responsible for raising 
children and having responsibilities in matters of discipline. Schools, having the 
welfare of the children in mind, are also permitted to take disciplinary action against 
errant students. Caning as a judicial sentence by the High Court and the Subordinate 
Courts (for males only) is only statutorily permitted for a short list of very serious 
criminal offences which generally includes physical violence to the victims. Under the 
Children and Young Persons Act, it is expressly provided that notwithstanding the 
provisions of any other written law, no child (defined as a person who is below 14 
years old) or young person (a person who is 14 years of age or above and below the 
age of 16 years) shall be sentenced by any court other than the High Court to corporal 
punishment. In the case of a youthful offender (defined as between 7 to 16 years old), 
caning shall be inflicted with a light rattan. In all circumstances, caning is imposed 
under medical supervision. A prisoner undergoing reformative training or a young 
offender who is found guilty of an aggravated prison offence as stated in the Prisons 
Act may also be ordered to undergo corporal punishment as prescribed in the 
aforementioned Act. Accordingly, Singapore entered this declaration to clarify that 
these Articles do not prohibit the application of any measures prescribed by Singapore 
law for maintaining law and order.
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8. IOs and NGOs 
IOs 
The UN has recently undertaken a study on Violence Against Children, described in 
the first excerpt, below.  In addition, like the CEDAW, the Economic Covenant, and  
the Civil Covenant, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’) seeks to 
promote State compliance by establishing a Committee to examine the progress made 
by States Parties in achieving the realization of the obligations undertaken in the 
convention.  Like the other human rights treaties, the CRC requires States Parties to 
submit reports documenting their progress to the Committee.  Upon review of these 
reports, the Committee ‘may make suggestions and general recommendations’ to the 
State. The following excerpts are examples of such suggestions and general 
recommendations from the Committee to the indicated States Parties in connection 
with two of the rights protected under the CRC: 1). Children’s freedom of expression 
and 2) the prohibition on violence against children, including corporal punishment.
The United Nations Study on Violence against Children 
On 12 February 2003, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Paulo 
Sergio Pinheiro of Brazil as the independent expert to lead a global study on violence 
against children.  The purpose of the study is to provide an in-depth picture of the 
prevalence, nature and causes of violence against children. It will put forward 
recommendations for consideration by Member States, the UN System and civil society for 
appropriate action, including effective remedies at the national and international levels. 
 The study will be guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child which 
emphasizes children’s rights to physical and personal integrity, and outlines States parties 
obligations to protect then from ‘all forms of physical or mental violence, including sexual 
and other forms of exploitation, abduction, armed conflict, and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.’  It also obliges the State to enact preventive measures and ensure 
that all child victims of violence receive the support and assistance they require. 
 The UN General Assembly called for the study in 2001 acting on the recommendation 
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.  In overseeing the implementation of the 
Convention on the Right of the Child, the Committee held two days of general discussion 
on the issue of state violence against children within the family and in school (2001) and 
state violence against children (2000).  The request for an international study on the 
question of violence against children was an outcome of these days of discussion. 
Letter date 12 October 2001 from the Chairperson of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child addressed to the Secretary-General 10
(7) In accordance with the provisions of article 45 (c) of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, the Committee recommends that the Secretary-General be requested, through the 
General Assembly, to conduct an in-depth international study on violence against children.  
The study should be as thorough and influential as the report of the expert of the Secretary-
General, Mrs. Graca Machel, on the impact of armed conflict on children (see a/51/306/).  
Such a study should: 
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(a)  Be guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other relevant international 
standards and take full account of the recommendations adopted by the Committee on its 
days of general discussion, held in 2000 and 2001; 
(b) Document the different types of violence of which children are victims, the 
prevalence of such violence and its impact on children, adults and societies.  Areas of 
study should include violence within the family and home, in schools and care or 
residential institutions both State and private, in work situations and in the streets, in 
detention facilities and prisons, violence by the police and the use of capital and 
physical punishment.  Violence should include all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, including sexual abuse, 
bullying in schools and corporal punishment.  Attention should be paid to the impact 
of discrimination based on gender, race, economic status etc. and on the patterns of 
violence and vulnerability experienced by children. 
(c) Seek to identify the causes of and contributing factors to violence against children, 
including factors – such as the role of legislation, public education and training of 
professionals – that contribute to or obstruct prevention, protection and recovery, and 
explore the links between different provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and other international human rights treaties in relation to violence against 
children; 
(d) Draw primarily on existing research and documentation, including reports to and of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, special rapporteurs and other United Nations and 
United Nations-related bodies, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, The United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations 
Development Fund for Women, the United Nations Population Fund and the World Health 
Organization, and studies conducted by academic, research institutions and non-
governmental organizations.  The study should collect information on different human 
rights mechanism and United Nations bodies and agencies and the extent to which the 
problem of violence against children is addressed in those activities from a human rights 
perspective; 
(e) Be conducted in collaboration with all United Nations agencies and bodies, and  
particularly the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations human rights 
mechanisms, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the World Health Organization, and 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, as well as with 
relevant non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and international 
professional organizations, and involved children themselves. 
On this basis, and taking into account information on the effectiveness of existing 
approaches, the study should lead to the development of strategies aimed at effectively 
preventing and combating all forms of violence against children, outlining steps to be taken 
at the international level and by States to provide effective prevention, protection, 
intervention, treatment, recovery and reintegration. 
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Committee on the Rights of the Child 11
Concluding Observations:  Republic of Korea12
Respect for the views of the child 34.  The Committee is concerned that traditional attitudes 
towards children in society still limit respect for their views within the family, schools, 
other institutions and society at large. 
35. The Committee recommends that the State party, in accordance with article 12 of the 
Convention: 
(a)     Ensure that the Child Welfare Act, amended in 2000, be revised to include the right 
of children to express their views freely in all matters affecting them, and take effective 
measures, including legislation, to promote respect for the views of children and facilitate 
their participation in all matters affecting them, by courts,  administrative bodies, schools 
and disciplinary proceedings in the education system; 
(b)  Provide educational information to, inter alia, parents, educators, government 
administrative officials, the judiciary and society at large on children’s right to have their 
views taken into account and to participate in all matters affecting them; 
(c)    Undertake a regular review of the extent to which children’s views are taken into 
consideration and of the impact this has on policies, programmes and children 
themselves. 
* * * 
Corporal punishment 38.  The Committee notes with great concern that corporal 
punishment is officially permitted in schools.  The Committee is of the opinion that 
corporal punishment does not conform with the principles and provisions of the 
Convention, particularly since it constitutes a serious violation of the dignity of the child 
(see similar observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
E/C.12/1/Add.79, para. 36).  The fact that the Ministry of Education guidelines leave the 
decision on whether to use corporal punishment in schools to the individual school 
administrators suggests that some forms of corporal punishment are acceptable and 
therefore undermines educational measures to promote positive, non-violent forms of 
discipline. 
39. The Committee recommends that the State party: 
(a)     Implement the recommendation of the National Human Rights Commission that the 
relevant legislation and regulations be amended to expressly prohibit corporal punishment 
in the home, schools and all other institutions; 
(b)   Carry out public education campaigns about the negative consequences of ill
treatment of children in order to change attitudes to corporal punishment, and promote 
positive, non-violent forms of discipline in schools and at home as an alternative to such 
punishment.
Concluding Observations:  Italy 13
Respect for the views of the child 25. The Committee is concerned that the general 
principle, as laid down in article 12 of the Convention, is not fully applied in practice.  In 
this regard, the Committee is concerned that the right of children to be heard is 
insufficiently guaranteed in proceedings affecting them, in particular in cases of the 
separation of parents, divorce, adoption or foster care, or within education. 
26. The Committee recommends that: 
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(a) Legislation governing procedure in courts and administrative proceedings ensure that a 
child capable of forming his or her own views has the right to express those views and that 
they be given due weight; 
(b) Particular emphasis be placed on the right of every child to participate in the family, at 
school, within other institutions and bodies and in society at large, with special attention to 
vulnerable groups; 
(c) Awareness-raising among the public at large, as well as education and training of 
professionals on the implementation of this principle, be reinforced
Concluding Observations:  Viet Nam14
Respect for the views of the child  29.  The Committee is concerned that traditional attitudes 
towards children in society still limit the respect for their views, within the family, schools 
and society at large.  In addition, administrative and judicial proceedings are not always 
required to take the views of the child into account, for instance in the case of divorce 
hearings. 
30.  The Committee recommends that the State party:
(a)  Carry out awareness-raising campaigns aimed at, inter alia, parents, teachers, 
government administrative officials, the judiciary and society at large on children’s right to 
have their views taken into account and to participate in all matters affecting them; 
(b) Take legislative measures to guarantee that in all court and administrative proceedings 
affecting them, children have the right to express their views and have those views taken 
into account regarding children; 
(c) Promote and facilitate, within the courts and all administrative bodies, respect for the 
views of children and their participation in all matters affecting them, in accordance with 
article 12 of the Convention.
* * * 
Ill-treatment and violence  33.  The Committee is concerned that children in the State  party 
are subject to various forms of violence and ill-treatment, including child abuse and neglect, 
and corporal punishment.   
34.  The Committee recommends that the State party: 
     * * * 
(e)   Explicitly prohibit corporal punishment in the home, schools and all other institutions;
(f)  Carry out public education campaigns about the negative consequences of ill treatment 
of children, and promote positive, non-violent forms of discipline as an alternative to 
corporal punishment.
Concluding Observations:  Czech Republic15
Violence/abuse/maltreatment However, the Committee is concerned by the ill treatment and 
abuse committed against children in the family, the school and other institutions as well as by 
public officials in the streets and in places of detention, particularly in the context of a form of 
popular justice for an alleged crime such as theft.  The Committee is further concerned that 
certain groups of children, such as Roma, are specifically targeted, and that a very small portion 
of reported cases of suspicion of abuse and neglect are investigated.  It is also concerned at the 
lack of an integrated system of services and that problems of child abuse and neglect are often 
solely addressed in an ad hoc manner by NGOs . . .
 * * * 
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40. The Committee is concerned that there is no legislation explicitly prohibiting corporal 
punishment, and that it is practised in the family, in schools and in other public institutions, 
including alternative care contexts. 
41. The Committee recommends that the State party take action to address ill treatment and 
abuse committed against children in the family, in schools, in the streets, in institutions and 
in places of detention through, inter alia: 
* * * 
(f) Taking all the necessary steps to enact legislation prohibiting the use of corporal 
punishment in schools, institutions, in the family and in any other context; 
* * * 
(i) Taking into account the Committee’s recommendations adopted at its day of general 
discussion on violence against children within the family and in schools (CRC/C/111). 
     * * * 
43. (b) Undertake a comprehensive review of all legislation, policies and administrative 
decisions related to children within the family in order to assess their impact on the family 
as a whole with a view to the adoption of a family policy.  The Committee further 
encourages the State party to adopt a family policy including a minimum of social security 
for the child and the family, housing and social services, consistency between parents’ work 
and child care, women’s and single parent’s status, child maintenance, maternity and 
paternity leave and other family-related issues; 
(c) Adopt and implement international and domestic legislation to address these concerns, 
including the 1973 Hague Convention No. 24 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance 
Obligations.
Concluding Observations: Iceland. Committee on the Rights of the Child16
Violence/abuse/neglect/maltreatment  28. The Committee welcomes the adoption of the 2002 
Child Protection Act, which contains a comprehensive set of provisions to protect children from 
neglect and ill-treatment in the home. It also notes the establishment of Children’s House to 
treat sexually abused children.
 29. The Committee recommends that the State party: 
(a) Raise awareness among parents, other caretakers and the public at large of the 
prohibition of corporal punishment – including in the family – under existing legal 
provisions; 
(b) Continue to strengthen and expand the coverage of the Children’s House concept 
throughout the State party; 
(c) Conduct public education campaigns about the negative consequences of ill-treatment of 
children, and promote positive, non-violent forms of discipline as an alternative to corporal 
punishment; 
(d) Allocate sufficient resources for the provision of care, recovery and reintegration of 
victims; 
(e) Train teachers, law enforcement officials, care workers, judges and health professionals 
in the identification, reporting and management of cases of ill-treatment, including with 
respect to interviewing techniques which are the least harmful to child victims of abuse. 
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Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya17
 Violence/abuse/neglect/maltreatment 
33. The Committee welcomes the prohibition of corporal punishment in schools and takes 
note of the information that measures have been adopted to report and investigate 
maltreatment of children. Nevertheless, it is concerned at the lack of information on the 
actual situation in the State party with respect to ill-treatment of children within the family. 
Further, it regrets the lack of information on prevention and awareness-raising activities. 
34. The Committee recommends that the State party: 
(a) Conduct a comprehensive study to assess the nature and extent of ill-treatment and 
abuse of children, as well as other domestic violence, and use the results to design policies 
and programmes to address this issue; 
(b) Carry out preventive public education campaigns about the negative consequences of 
ill-treatment of children and promote positive, non-violent forms of discipline as an 
alternative to corporal punishment; 
(c) Take the necessary measures to prevent violence against, and abuse of, children; 
(d) Establish effective child-sensitive procedures and preventive mechanisms to receive, 
monitor and investigate complaints, including through the intervention of social and 
judicial authorities where necessary, to find appropriate solutions, paying due regard to the 
best interests of the child; 
(e) Give attention to addressing and overcoming sociocultural barriers that inhibit victims 
from seeking assistance; 
(f) Train teachers, law enforcement officials, care workers, judges and health professionals 
in the identification, reporting and management of ill-treatment cases; and 
(g) Seek assistance from, among others, UNICEF and WHO.
Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations: San Marino18
Protection from abuse and neglect 
21. The Committee welcomes the information that article 234 of the Penal Code also 
includes the prohibition of corporal punishment, but is concerned at the lack of any 
concrete statistical data and other information on the prevention and prevalence of and 
intervention in cases of child abuse and neglect. 
22. The Committee recommends that the State party undertake awareness-raising  
campaigns on the negative impact of corporal punishment. Furthermore, the State party 
should undertake studies to assess the prevalence and nature of violence against children 
and develop a comprehensive plan of action based on this study for the prevention of and 
intervention in cases of child abuse and neglect, including the provision of services for 
recovery and social reintegration of victims, taking into account the recommendations of 
the Committee adopted at its days of general discussion on children and violence (see 
CRC/C/100, para. 688 and CRC/C/111, paras. 701-745).
NGOs
NGOs have also recognized violence against children as a human rights issue, as set 
out in the excerpt below. 
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Save the Children19
What we do/Exploitation & Protection/Violence  Violence is a fact of life for many children 
around the world. It can take many forms, such as physical punishment at home or in 
school; sexual abuse; trafficking for sexual exploitation; or dangerous and exploitative 
labour. There is a higher risk of violence in emergencies. Some groups of children are at 
particular risk within their communities, such as those living without their families, children 
living and working on the streets, and disabled children. Sometimes violence is a result of 
traditional customs or discriminatory beliefs that are harmful to girls or boys. 
 Save the Children works to raise awareness of children’s rights and the effects of 
violence. We promote ways of protecting children in their communities. We also work 
directly with children, helping them to understand their rights and the risks they face, and to 
find ways of reducing their vulnerability to violence.
9.  A Possible Approach to the Problem
This problem highlights the tension between children’s right to be free from ‘all forms 
of physical or mental violence’ under Article 19 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, on one hand, and parents’ rights to family ‘privacy’ under Article 17 of the 
Civil Covenant, on the other.  The issue is an extremely sensitive one, especially 
where, as in the Problem, the children have suffered no physical injury (except for 
Ari’s minor bruises) which would implicate their right to health under Article 12 of the 
Economic Covenant. 
 Under the recent decision of the Israeli court in Plonit, discussed in Section 7, 
Miriam may well face criminal sanctions, especially if, like the mother there, she 
smacks the children regularly.  Thus, the situation should be reported to the police.  At 
the same time, it is not clear that prosecuting their mother will improve family life for 
the children, whom Miriam may blame for her legal problems.  As an attorney with a 
prominent children’s rights NGO, you might inquire within your organization about 
possible support services, government-sponsored or private, which might help the 
family.  Miriam needs to learn other ways of managing her children.  The children 
need to understand their rights and to find ways of reducing their vulnerability 
described in Section 8. 
For Further Research 
1. Nuack, B. (1994), ‘Note: Implications of the United States Ratification of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  Civil Rights, The Constitution 
and the Family,’ Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 42, pp. 675-706;  Young, K. 
(1999), ‘An Examination of Parental Discipline as a Defense of Justification:  It’s 
Time for a Kindlier, Gentler Approach,’ Naval Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 1-66. 
2. In their cogent introduction to a survey of International Family Law, Geraldine Van 
Bueren and Randini Wanduralaga aptly observed that, ‘particularly in relation to 
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international human rights law, there are emerging trends which will have an impact on 
the family. Broadly, the areas concern the competing interests of individual family 
members within the family and cover such issues as access to medical treatment, the 
elderly and the role of the family in the eradication of child labour.’ For their 
discussion of these issues, see Van Bueren, G. and Wanduragala, R. (2000), ‘Annual 
Review of Family Law,’ in Bainham, A. (ed.), The International Survey of Family 
Law: 2000 Edition, Jordan, Bristol, pp. 1-9.  For country-specific surveys, see Shulz, 
R. (2001), ‘Child Protection in the Israel, Supreme Court: Tortious Parenting, Physical 
Punishment and Criminal Child Abuse,’ Bainham, A. (ed.), The International Survey 
of Family Law: 2001 Edition, Jordan, Bristol;  Grosman, C. and Iñigo, D. (2000), ‘The 
Overriding Interest of the Child in Legislative Policy and Judicial Decisions in 
Argentina,’ in Bainham, A. (ed.), The International Survey of Family Law: 2000 
Edition, Jordan, Bristol, pp. 9-19. 
3.  There are a growing number of useful web sites addressing international human 
rights issues from a range of perspectives.  Some noteworthy examples follow.   
ASIL Guide to Electronic Resources for International Law: Human Rights
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/bibliog/bibllios.htm 
Fordham O Wara: Bibliographical Pathfinder: African System for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights (2002) 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/bibliog/africanpathfinder.html 
Bibliography on Crimes of Honour 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/bibliog/honour.html 
Bibliography for Research on Human Rights in Asia 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/bibliog/contents.html 
Bibliography: Human Rights in the African Context  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/african.html 
Council of Europe bibliography  http://civnet.org/civitas/coe/document/hrbible.htm 
The Human Rights of Women: A Reference Guide to official United Nations Documents 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/women/engl-wmn.html 
UN Human Rights Documentation, A Guide to Country-Specific Research  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/bibliog/guide.htm 
Violence Against Women Bibliography  
http://www.sigi.org/Resource/vaw_bib.htm 
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Womens Human Rights Resources Database (Toronto)  
http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/diana/
Notes 
1 G.A. Res. 217A  (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
2 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
3 G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 
entered into force Sept.2 1990. 
4 September 15, 1994, reprinted in 18 Hum. Rts. L.J. 151 (1997). 
5 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999. 
6  Ct. App. 456/98. 
7 CRC/C/83/Add.6. (State Party Report). 
8 Thirty-second session Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 
44 of the Convention, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
9 (CRC/C/51/Add.8). 
10  A/56/488, Annex. 
11 Thirty-second session Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 
44 of the Convention, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
12 CRC/C/15/Add. 197. 
13 CRC/C/15/Add. 198. 
14 CRC/C/15/Add. 203. 
15 CRC/C/15/Add. 200.
16 CRC/C/15/Add. 201. 
17  CRC/C/15/Add.209, 4 July 2003. 
18 CRC/C/15/Add.214, 27 October 2003. 
19  http://www.savethechildren.org. 
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